The threats of the new century are international in character
and indeterminable in length, and they require an international
response. Alone, the United States cannot win the long war against
transnational terrorism, nor can it respond effectively to the
other emerging national security concerns of the 21st century.
America needs allies. America's greatest strength is strength in
numbers: the number of free nations that share its commitment to
peace, justice, security, and--above all--freedom.
Building strong alliances requires a proactive strategy that
reinforces rather than undermines the sovereignty of the state and
at the same time strengthens the bonds of trust and confidence
between free peoples, enabling them to act in their common
interest. The focus of this strategy should be on building enduring
alliances, not just "coalitions of the willing." As part of a
comprehensive alliance-building strategy, the Administration and
Congress should undertake initiatives to establish international
partnerships that more closely resemble those with America's
traditional long-standing allies during the Cold War.
American Alliances in History
George Washington was America's first great strategist. He
understood well how to deal with the complex challenge of balancing
ends (the goals of a strategy), ways (how the goals will be
accomplished), and means (the resources that will be used to
support the strategy). For that reason, Americans rightly took
seriously his cautious approach to global alliances. "It is our
true policy," Washington declared in his farewell presidential
address, "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
the foreign world."
Washington recognized that while America attempted to build a
fledgling democracy, it would be unwise to become deeply embroiled
in the conflicts between European states that had little interest
in seeing the American experiment succeed. However, he did not intend to
declare an immutable principle of statecraft. As a strategist, he
knew that, as global conditions changed, America's strategy for
engagement with the rest of the world would need to change with
The Framers also recognized that the United States required the
capacity to undertake formal joint actions with other nations when
they included the Treaty Clause in the Constitution: "The President
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties...." They understood that the ability to form
alliances was an essential element of statecraft, but they wanted
to ensure that America did so only when it was clearly in American
The Framers believed that treaties should be strictly
honored...because the United States could not afford to give the
great powers any cause for war....
The fear of disadvantageous treaties also underlay the Framers'
insistence on approval [of treaties] by two-thirds of the Senate.
In particular, the Framers worried that one region or interest
within the nation, constituting a bare majority, would make a
treaty advantageous to it but prejudicial to other parts of the
country and to the national interest.
Thus, the Constitution envisioned a strong executive responsible
for guiding foreign relations with appropriate checks and balances
between the executive and legislative branches.
Even at the dawn of the 20th century, American policymakers
remained skeptical of the value of alliances. One of the lessons
that many took from the outbreak of the First World War was that
Europe's rigid alliance structure had contributed significantly to
the rapid escalation of the conflict. These concerns contributed to
America's rejection of the League of Nations and return to pre-war
America's alliance strategy evolved considerably after the
United States emerged as a true global power after the Second World
War. During the Cold War, formal alliances became an important
element of blocking the expansion of Soviet power. In particular,
NATO served as the cornerstone of efforts to ensure peace,
prosperity, and security in Western Europe and uphold wider U.S.
strategic global interests. At the same time, U.S. bilateral
relations with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea
proved vital in protecting the interests of America and its allies
The need for enduring alliances came under intense security
after the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. As Paul
Kennedy has argued, the post-Cold War world had become a
"multipolar" place where nations would be less dependant on U.S.
power and less interested in aligning with the United States.
Nor were many analysts confident that alliances like NATO would
endure only on the basis of providing collective security to their
members. "Collective security," Henry Kissinger wrote, "defines no
particular threat, guarantees no individual nation, and
discriminates against none." They endure only if the participating
nations share nearly identical views and are committed to using
force based only on the merits of the case, regardless of the
impact on national interests--conditions that were unlikely to
prevail after the collapse of the Soviet menace.
Many thought that "coalitions of the willing" (groupings of
states to deal with particular problems) would become far more
commonplace. The first Gulf War, in which the United
States successfully fought with an ad hoc alliance, appeared to
validate the utility of employing temporary coalitions.
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States
made specific reference to the growing importance of coalitions of
the willing. Such coalitions were to be the coin of
the realm for international relations in the 21st century whereby
the problem would determine the coalition.
Alliances in the Long War
The experience of the past decade, however, argues the opposite.
The most concerted efforts to promote stability in the post-Cold
War world and combat transnational terrorism have been by the
United States and its traditional Cold War allies. America's
strongest military partners in Iraq have been its longest-standing
military allies, Great Britain and Australia. Meanwhile, in
Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan have remained steadfast U.S.
partners. Even Canada and European nations, which have differed
significantly from the United States in their policies toward Iraq
and how the war on terrorism should be fought, in practice have
offered significant cooperation in combating transnational
terrorism and supporting operations in Afghanistan.
Some analysts have tried to depict U.S. and Canadian-European
policies as contrasting poles, describing U.S. efforts as
unilateral, preemptive, and utopian and European measures as
multilateral, consensual, and realistic. In practice, however, the
ends, ways, and means employed by the United States and its
traditional allies are marked by many more similarities than
Not only have America's traditional allies been more important
than ever, but so have other countries that have worked more
closely with the United States in recent years. India and Poland
have demonstrated greater interest in developing deep political,
economic, social, and cultural ties rather than just participating
in casual military and security cooperation. In short, they have
shown an inclination to be more partners in an enduring alliance
than participants in an ad hoc coalition.
That traditional alliances have re-emerged as an important
element of statecraft should come as no surprise. "Alliances always
presume a specific adversary," wrote Kissinger, unlike collective
security, which "defends international law in the abstract." Unlike
coalitions of the willing, an alliance produces an "obligation more
predictable and precise than an analysis of national interest."
In other words, when facing real dangers, nations turn to other
nations with which they share trust, confidence, and a common view
of what needs to done. The dangers of transnational terrorism,
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, and the emergence of
potential regional hegemons that demonstrate a propensity to take
power by force have served as catalysts for renewed interest in
establishing enduring alliances as a hedge against the emerging
threats of the 21st century.
Shortfalls in Alliance-Building
Since most national security threats today are international in
character, U.S. alliance-building skills are more important than
ever. Yet the talents and instruments used to build enduring
alliances during the Cold War have become rusty at best. In part,
this has happened because of efforts to thwart U.S. policies by
attempting to undermine America's legitimate efforts to exercise
sovereignty and act in its own interests as it sees fit.
Some analysts call this "lawfare," misusing or reinterpreting
laws to make American actions appear illegitimate in the eyes of
the world. In some cases, America's difficulty in
sustaining traditional allies and nurturing new alliances reflects
failures of public diplomacy that poorly articulate and defend U.S.
goals and actions. In large part, however, America has been
without a serious, deliberate strategy that employs all the
elements of national power to build enduring alliances.
Building alliances is not about gaining consensus in
international action or allowing U.S. sovereignty to be overseen by
multinational institutions. Indeed, abrogating the state's
responsibility for national security is the surest way to undermine
a nation's capacity to secure the safety, prosperity, and freedom
of its citizens over the long term. Rather, building enduring
alliances requires proactive initiatives that build common
interests between states by developing deep cultural, economic,
social, and military ties between established free-market
Learning from the Special
America has found its strongest, most enduring alliance in its
Special Relationship with Great Britain. This relationship has been
defined by consistent and recurring cooperation, systematic
engagement, and enduring bilateral relations that emerged from
common values and obvious interests. Mutual recognition of the
value of democratic government, the rule of law, individual rights,
and the market economy combines with a single historical and
cultural experience until 1776, continued cultural intermingling
since then, and a common language before and after. As Douglas
Johnson explains, "The two nations are very closely related by
blood and philosophy."
Shared Values. Ultimately, the Special Relationship is
special because the shared values and common interests that bind
the two countries reach far beyond the philosophical utopia
prefacing speeches by European Union (EU) elites dreaming of a
European superstate. The common political, diplomatic, historical,
and cultural values shared between Americans and Britons actually
Further still, Britain and America are prepared to defend these
values--with military force if necessary. Common values really mean
something only if both parties are ready to defend them. Winston
Churchill coined the term "Special Relationship" in his 1946
"Sinews of Peace Address" in Fulton, Missouri, after Britain and
America had both just spilt horrendous amounts of blood and
treasure in an unwavering defense of their shared values.
The tenets of classical liberalism formed the bedrock of a
deeply held common political tradition between the two countries
from the outset. In modern terms, this has come to mean essentially
the rights of the individual over the state--or, as President
Ronald Reagan so ably argued, viewing government as the problem
rather than the solution.
This concept should not be dismissed. The British and American
peoples are naturally suspicious of government and do not believe
that they derive their rights from the government, but rather that
government derives its legitimacy from the people. The European
Constitution, wherein government grants the individuals their
rights in exchange for ensuring vast swathes of social rights,
illustrates how the mindset of most Western Europeans differs from
the Anglo-American mindset.
The economic relationship that binds the U.K.- U.S. alliance is
special in two separate but equally important ways.
First, whereas Brussels regularly squares off against
Washington, British-American disputes are largely played out in
private to augment the relationship between the world's two largest
outward investors, who are also the largest investors in each
Second, the sheer contrast of the free-market
Anglo-American economic model with the highly statist Rhineland
model demonstrates the shared economic traditions of the Special
Relationship in especially marked comparison to Europe. The fact
that many European nations are still trying to regulate themselves
out of disaster--matched by the complete failure of the EU's Lisbon
agenda--illustrates that these already deep divisions are deepening
even further. While German Chancellor Angela Merkel talks about
making a more social Europe with "good jobs," Britain and
America are actually getting on with the job of driving the
economic engine of world growth.
Past Challenges to the Special Relationship. The Special
Relationship has faced repeated challenges. In addition to
occasional disagreements, events have produced passivity and
indifference at times. On occasion, each country has put its
national interest above the other's interests, but these events
should not be interpreted as threatening the relationship. For
instance, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan notably disagreed
over the U.S. invasion of Grenada but still went on to cooperate
fully in fighting--and eventually winning--the Cold War.
In fact, the Thatcher-Reagan era demonstrates some of the most
enduring features of the Special Relationship. Thatcher's ability
to be both a steadfast partner and cautionary critic during times
of cooperation and conflict is not just an example of her undoubted
mastery of statecraft, but a testament to the strength of the
alliance. Shared beliefs do not prevent quarrels, even among
allies; but more often than not, they yield the right result for
both sides. Critics saw Reagan's eventual support for the British
liberation of the Falkland Islands as dissenting from America's
long-held Monroe Doctrine, but Reagan came to see that supporting
Britain's sovereign assertion in defense of an existing possession
had greater merit and value than did supporting the existential,
geographical pull of Argentina.
The passivity of the 1990s came to an end as the United States
and United Kingdom came to cooperate extremely closely in the war
on terrorism, markedly in Afghanistan and Iraq. The recurring
pattern is of each finding the other a necessary, indispensable
ally in times of need, regardless of left-right orientation or
prevailing political conditions.
The underlying traditions and historic cooperation shared
between Britain and America essentially negate any short-term
threat to this enduring alliance. Indeed, while it was the French
who proclaimed "Nous sommes tous Américains" in the
wake of 9/11, it is Anglo-American political, cultural, military,
and diplomatic solidarity that has outlasted this initial show of
strength from America's European allies.
Modern Threats. Significant threats to the Special
Relationship do exist in the modern era. Britain's geographic
position as a European power but history as a great global power
makes for a unique situation. The EU's relentless supranational
drive has demanded a surrender of British national sovereignty in
areas such as trade, the economy, and public health.
However, the institutional and political constraints demanded by
further European integration will severely limit Britain's ability
to make foreign policy, especially in international
alliance-making. In political, diplomatic, and financial terms, no
good has come from limiting Britain's geopolitical outlook to the
European continent, and certainly no benefit can de derived from
deeper EU absorption that limits Britain's historical and proven
links with the United States.
In fact, large parts of the EU policy agenda-- such as the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and
Defense Policy--are designed precisely to serve as counterweights
to the American "hyperpower." Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the perceived need for another power to
counterbalance the United States has consistently motivated
advocates of European integration.
The recent investigation by the European Parliament into
America's renditions policy visibly demonstrates the anti-American
direction of current EU policymaking. The EU believes that
supranational institutions like itself and the United Nations
should be the sole arbiters of the use of force and should
determine the rules of engagement for both symmetrical and
asymmetrical conflicts. This thinking was nakedly displayed by the
EU during the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom, with powerful
European nations, including France and Germany, not just
critiquing, but also actively obstructing American foreign policy.
EU accession countries were even threatened with delays to their
accession for supporting the war. Underlying this diplomatic
crisis was the message that Europe's time had come to directly
challenge a sovereign foreign policy decision of the United States
in an attempt to contain American power.
A major threat to the Special Relationship is also posed by
rising levels of anti-American sentiment in Britain. Favorable
opinion toward the United States has dropped from 83 percent in
1999-2000 to just 56 percent in 2006. The British press
regularly ridicules Tony Blair as President George W. Bush's
poodle. The Conservative Party under David
Cameron's leadership has called on Britain to adopt a less
"slavish" relationship with America, and Kendall Myers, a
leading U.S. State Department adviser, recently described the
Special Relationship as a "myth," arguing that Tony Blair got
"nothing, no payback" for supporting President Bush in Iraq.
Neither Blair nor Bush has properly made the case for the fruits
of the Special Relationship, which has in fact operated to mutual
advantage especially in the new era of transnational terrorism.
High-level intelligence exchange is possible only in an atmosphere
in which both sides exercise a high degree of trust. Undoubtedly,
the plots to detonate liquid explosives on up to 10 transatlantic
flights in summer 2006 were foiled only because of key
transatlantic intelligence exchange and cooperation. As Tony Blair
said at the time, "There has been an enormous amount of
co-operation with the U.S. authorities which has been of great
value and underlines the threat we face and our determination to
Both sides need to make the case for the Special Relationship
much more aggressively, demonstrating the effectiveness and
substantial value of the close British-American cooperation. Both
sides could learn from the golden days of Thatcher- Reagan, as well
as those of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, each of whom
regarded the other as an indispensable, critical partner.
The Special Relationship demonstrates that common interests can
overcome past enmities and occasional conflict. Britain and America
have stood shoulder to shoulder in the hardest of times and
continue to enjoy the fruits of a solid relationship. As Nile
Gardiner has stated, "The U.S.-British alliance continues to
operate as a strikingly successful partnership of two great nations
built on the solid foundations of a common heritage, culture, and
This history suggests grounds for optimism about the Special
Relationship in the future, in spite of today's considerable
anti-American feeling in Britain. The anti-Americanism of the 1980s
as the Reagan Administration installed Trident missiles in Europe
gave way to the British-American-led victory in the Cold War. The
passivity of the 1990s gave way to a post-9/11 period of enormous
diplomatic and military unity. While hostility and indifference
prove passing and ephemeral, the common interests and values that
produce the Special Relationship prove enduring time and again, but
their very historicity and commonality are therefore equally
difficult to replicate.
The U.S. needs a clear and proactive strategy for nurturing and
building new enduring alliances. The Administration and Congress
can undertake initiatives now to support that strategy,
establishing better economic, social, cultural, and security
relationships with other free-market democracies of geostrategic
importance to the United States.
Building Bridges Between Peoples. Anenduring alliance
transcends governments, building bonds of trust and confidence
between people based on shared values and personal experiences.
Frequent people-to-people interaction is essential and that
requires improving opportunities for safe and open international
Since 9/11, Congress has done far too little to encourage
foreign visitors to come to the United States. Foreign travel to
America has still not recovered to pre-9/11 levels, and
congressional inaction threatens to undermine the competitiveness
of U.S. society. Both to reestablish America's reputation as an
opening and welcoming country and to make the nation more secure
against foreign threats, Congress and the Administration
End the requirement that 100 percent of visa applicants be
interviewed. Congress recently required that every visa
applicant be interviewed by a consular officer. In many parts of
the world, the interview requirement represents a significant
burden in terms of the expense and inconvenience of reporting and
waiting for the interview and lost time from work. Likewise, the
issuing officers are under pressure to speed through the interviews
and make snap judgments that might deny visas to legitimate
travelers or miss a serious security threat.
Congress should amend the law to require the Department of State
to conduct interviews based on a risk-based assessment conducted
jointly with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
departments should have the option to waive interviews for
countries, classes of travelers, and frequent visitors from trusted
companies, governments, and academic institutions.
Establish electronic travel authorization. It is long
past time for the United States to join the 21st century by
updating its means of issuing and monitoring visas. Other nations,
such as Australia, already use electronic travel authorization.
For low-risk countries and classes of travelers, the United
States should implement online visa applications. This would
greatly facilitate travel to the United States, significantly
reducing the cost and inconvenience of personally applying for a
Expand the Visa Waiver Program. The Visa Waiver Program
allows most visitors from participating countries to enter the
United States for up to 90 days without a visa as long as they have
valid passports from their countries. In turn, U.S. citizens with
valid passports do not need visas to visit these countries.
Currently, 27 countries participate in the program. Adding
countries to the program increases security because these nations
must pledge to maintain the same security standards as the United
In addition, adding counties would greatly facilitate visiting
America. In many places, the price of a U.S. visa is considered
exorbitant. In Poland, for example, the visa application fee is a
month's salary for an average worker and is nonrefundable because
it pays for processing the application. If the visa is denied for
any reason, the applicant has simply lost the money. Expanding the
Visa Waiver Program to countries in Eastern Europe and Asia, where
the United States has growing economic, cultural, and security
ties, could both strengthen America's bonds to these nations and
enhance travel security.
Building a Shared Common Vision. Enduring alliances can
never be complacent in explaining how government policies reflect
the common interests of their peoples. Sound public diplomacy
programs are essential for explaining the linkage between common
interests and current policies.
Public diplomacy is a long-term program to promote dialogue with
foreign audiences, nurture institutional relationships, help to
educate young democrats and prospective friends, and share ideas.
Without this foundation, advocacy for current policies will have
little resonance. A model public diplomacy (PD) strategy should
Define the public diplomacy mission as promoting U.S.
interests and security by understanding, informing, and influencing
foreign publics as well as broadening dialogue between American
citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad on a daily,
long-term basis. The global war on terrorism should be a priority
within this broad mandate.
Establish doctrinal principles to explain how to
accomplish the PD mission. These include responding to audience
needs, never misleading, disseminating bad news quickly and
completely, and ensuring that information always comes from a
Specify lines of authority. The PD strategy should
clearly specify who decides and who acts, or nothing will get done.
With collateral agencies engaged in international communications,
guidance and arbitration of tactics must come from someone who
speaks for the White House and can de-conflict competing,
multiagency PD strategies.
Target desired audiences. Priority audiences vary by
country and region. A national strategy should identify classes of
opinion leaders and populations that are vulnerable to
anti-American messages around the globe, not just in the Middle
East. The strategy should task U.S. embassy country teams with
further segmenting their audiences and specifying the best
approaches to dialogue, as U.S. Information Agency (USIA) diplomats
Identify multiple channels. Illiterate populations are
likely to listen to radio. Elites may rely on phone text messaging
and the Internet. Students get information from textbooks, which
are usually in short supply outside industrial democracies. Compact
disks and satellite television appeal to the middle classes, while
meetings and exchanges help to form opinions one person at a time.
The Bush Administration needs to go beyond reliance on the press
and utilize different means of outreach more fully.
Create planning, clearing, and assessing processes to
establish a workflow across agency boundaries. Polling and country
team assessments should tell planners what channels and messages
apply to certain audiences. Common clearance procedures known to
all agency communications leaders can facilitate rapid reaction to
breaking news. Finally, research should be used to assess the
effectiveness of all PD efforts. At present, each agency conducts
its own limited polling, planning, and evaluation efforts. Research
and broad planning should be more centralized and accessible to all
Building Mutual Security. After 9/11, the United States
incorrectly framed its international security initiatives as
"pushing the border out," implying that the United States was
forcing other countries to take measures to enhance American
security. In fact, improving the security of international trade
and travel is about enhancing security for all countries that
participate in regimes to thwart terrorist travel and
transportation of materials, technologies, and weapons of mass
Programs that promote mutual security are essential to enduring
alliances. The United States needs to reinvigorate the instruments
of security assistance and cooperation that it employed during the
Cold War and expand these mechanisms to address homeland security
as well as military capabilities. Specifically, Congress and the
Establish an international homeland security and
counterterrorism assistance program. The United States has long
maintained the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program, which provides low-cost U.S. security assistance to other
countries through training on a grant basis to students from allied
and friendly nations. IMET has also been critical to developing
personal and professional relationships among key military
personnel and to providing English language training and
interoperability. Congress should authorize and fund similar
programs for the DHS.
Foster the sharing of homeland security technology.
Establishing a database of homeland security technologies and an
office in the DHS to facilitate technology sharing is especially
urgent. The DHS clearinghouse would describe existing technologies,
their capabilities, and their possible missions. A technology
clearinghouse would enable partners to know what technologies are
available for transfer, provide a method of setting standards so
that technologies are understandable, create a forum for
interoperable and transferable means for industry-to-industry
dialogue, establish predictable export control requirements, and
construct acquisition mechanisms such as joint development
programs, licensing agreements, and something comparable to the
foreign military sales program.
Remove unnecessary technology transfer barriers. Congress
should mandate consultations between the State Department and the
DHS on proposed technology exports that have a significant homeland
security purpose. U.S. export controls should distinguish among
technologies with predominantly military, law enforcement, or
homeland security applications.
The laws and regulations will also need to balance the benefits
of sharing American homeland security technologies against the
risks of foreign actors employing them either against the U.S. or
for inappropriate commercial purposes. If a proposed technology
transfer would promote the security of the United States and the
recipient and is unlikely to be wrongfully acquired or used, the
transfer should be governed by the Department of Commerce's Export
Administration Regulations rather than by the more demanding
provisions of the U.S. Munitions List, which are administered by
the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the State
The Way Ahead
Building enduring alliances should be the centerpiece of
long-war strategy, but these alliances will not appear by
happenstance. It will require a concerted U.S. effort to build:
Bridges between peoples, facilitating safe and secure travel and
interchange between America and its friends and allies;
A shared common vision, enhancing public diplomacy so that
America can better make its case on the world stage; and
Mutual security by creating new opportunities for security
America can do better, but it will require concerted leadership
from the Administration and Congress to do the job.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.,
is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for
National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis
Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Sally McNamara is Senior
Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom, a division of the Davis Institute.
Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: The
Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988),
Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.
Edwin Meese III, Matthew Spalding, and David
Forte, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (Washington,
D.C.: Regnery, 2005), p. 205.
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy,
1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p.
is best described in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). A less
persuasive, alternative view of Cold War alliance history was
pioneered by William Appleman Williams, whose Tragedy of
American Diplomacy, published in 1959, argued that America was
engaged in "Open Door Imperialism," a ceaseless quest for economic
dominance and the establishment of an informal empire designed to
sustain U.S. economic prosperity and prevent revolutionary
agitation against the American global system overseas.SeeJustus D.
Doenecke, "William Appleman Williams and the Anti-Interventionist
Tradition," Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring
2001), p. 284. Williams's thesis fails on number of points, the
most salient of which is that if the United States was merely
"empire building," why did U.S. allies so readily participate and
so frequently demur from U.S. leadership when they perceived that
their interests differed from U.S. interests? Williams ignores the
fact that Cold War alliances were built primarily on common
interests and shared democratic practices. For example, see John
Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Kennedy, "American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning
from the European Experience," in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand
Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1991), pp. 175-177.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 247.
example, see Elke Krahmann, "Conceptualizing Security Governance,"
Cooperation and Conflict,Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 2003), pp.
For example, see Felix Sebastian
Berenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and
European Security Strategies," Security Dialogue, Vol. 36,
No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 71-92.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "The Death of
Neutrality: U.S. and European Convergence in Fighting the War on
Terrorism," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 956, August 3,
2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl956.cfm.
See also hearing, U.S.-European Cooperation on Counterterrorism:
Achievements and Challenges, Subcommittee on Europe and
Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Human Rights, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., September 14, 2004, at
95829.pdf (April 19, 2007).
Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 247.
Former Socialist French Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine (1997-2002) coined the word "hyperpuissance,"
meaning hyperpower, to define America's political, military, and
economic strength after the Cold War.
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Primum Non Nocere,"
interview by Witold Zygulski, The Polish Voice, April 4,
2003, at www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1892 (December 7,
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Jonah J.
Czerwinski, and Richard Weitz, Ph.D., "Homeland Security
Technology, Global Partnerships, and Winning the Long War,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1977, October 5, 2006,