According to some mayors and local police chiefs, the United
States is at the beginning of an epidemic of violence that will
worsen if Congress does not restore one particular type of funding
for local police officer salaries and related expenses that the
Bush Administration and Congress have reduced over the past several
years. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Bush
Administration decided that the Department of Justice needed to
reprioritize federal resources away from subsidizing local police
salaries toward bolstering homeland security and other law
enforcement needs. This meant shifting funding away from wasteful
and ineffective law enforcement grants, which did not address any
clear national responsibility, toward strengthening the capacity of
state and local governments to respond to terrorist threats.
Those who want to restore funding bolster their argument with
reports that crime rates are rising. For example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation reported small increases in crime rates in
2005 compared to 2004.[1] Further, a preliminary FBI report suggests
that crime rates increased during the first six months of 2006
compared to the first half of 2005.[2] Critics of President Bush's
reprioritization also point to a recent Police Executive Research
Forum study, which concluded that violent crime is on the rise.[3] This
trend led a delegation of police chiefs to Washington, D.C., in
late 2006 to meet with White House and U.S. Department of Justice
officials[4] to lobby for increased funding for general
police salaries in programs such as the Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS).
Contrary to the claims of the police chiefs, funding these
programs would have little effect on the nation's rising crime
rates and would instead contribute to the overfederalization
of the criminal justice system.
In response to rising crime, the Bush Administration's
fiscal year (FY) 2008 budget plan requests $200 million for a new
grant program called the Violent Crime Reduction Partnership
Initiative.[5] The grants would pay for officers' overtime
and equipment for police departments participating in federal
anti-crime task forces focused on gang-related violence,
gun-related crimes, and methamphetamine sales.[6]
Unlike COPS grants, the new grants would require applicants to
develop specific strategies to reduce violent crime and to show
improvements in order to receive further funding. Further, the
allocation process for these grants would give preference to
applicants seeking to reduce interstate crime problems for which
the national government shares at least some responsibility and
would not directly subsidize the salaries of local officers as COPS
hiring grants do. Although the new grants present some federalism
concerns, they are a step in the right direction. Other programs,
such as those involving the arrest and detention of criminal,
illegal immigrants pursuant to the immigration laws (discussed
later in this paper), are even better examples of the proper
national-state cooperation in law enforcement priorities.
Overfederalizing Local Law
Enforcement
Local law enforcement agencies' panic over losing some of their
unrestricted federal funding reveals just how dependent on the
federal government they have become. The disagreement between the
police chiefs and the Bush Administration raises the question of
just how and to what extent the national government should be
funding local police departments. Too much national
involvement in state and local law enforcement is part of the
overfederalization of crime. The number of federal crimes has
grown to monolithic proportions, and adding large amounts of
federal funding increases the federal government's presence
and influence in an area that has traditionally belonged to the
states.[7]
Increased federal influence in the operations of local police
departments could also effectively create a nationalized police
force. Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-DE) has introduced a bill (S.
368) to reauthorize the COPS program that would move the nation
significantly closer to a federal force. It would transform COPS
into a permanent subsidy by granting the Justice Department the
power to continue to fund officer salaries long after the original
grants have expired. In essence, this change in the law would
create a new federal obligation to fund local officers'
salaries, which is tantamount to establishing a new federal
entitlement for localities.
Transforming local police departments into a national police
force through national government grants has been done before. In
the United Kingdom during the 1870s, the national government
began to give grants to localities in exchange for increased
supervision and regulation. By the 1940s, local control of police
departments had been greatly diminished as grants accounted for
about half of all police expenditures.[8] Since then, a series of
national laws has centralized policing and weakened the links
between the police and local communities.[9] Today, crime rates in the
U.K. are high, and the debate over police control has focused
increasingly on restoring local management of policing.[10]
Whether or not the United States is facing a future crime
epidemic, reducing the unrestricted federal law enforcement grants
for police salaries is justified because:
- Grants that subsidize the routine activities of local law
enforcement assign to the federal government functions that
fall within the expertise, jurisdiction, and constitutional
responsibilities of state and local governments.
- Local law enforcement grants have been fraught with waste,
fraud, and abuse. They originally were supposed to be temporary,
and the grantees agreed to hire additional police with the grants
and retain them for at least one year with their own money after
federal funding ran out. The grantees have broken their
promises and now just want the federal funding for local
needs.
- Local law enforcement grants have failed as a crime-reduction
policy.
- The federal government should carefully limit its involvement
in local law enforcement and crime prevention to discrete roles
that only the federal government can perform.
Outside the Federal Government's
Scope, Expertise, and Responsibility
Originally, the federal government had no role in subsidizing
the routine responsibilities of state and local law enforcement.
Most if not all federal law enforcement grant programs run counter
to the Founders' vision for the federal government. In The
Federalist No. 45, James Madison wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.[11]
Law enforcement clearly falls within the category of "objects
that concern the internal order, improvement and prosperity of
the State"; thus, it is a principal responsibility of the state and
local governments. Principles of federalism require us to
consider whether any proposed issue is national in character or
simply common to all states before federal action is taken.
Although all states have a crime problem, it is an inherently local
problem.
There is good reason for dividing the responsibilities of
federal and state government. Large federal grants distributed for
use at the discretion of the police departments discourage
accountability and efficiency. As the late Nobel Laureate Milton
Friedman pointed out, we never spend other people's money as
carefully as we spend our own money.[12]
The COPS program grants illustrate this difficulty. They
disconnect use and accountability in a way that creates an
efficiency problem.
It is a matter of incentives. When police agencies receive
federal funding-especially without accountability for
results-they do not have to worry about defending their use of the
funds or about losing funding for next year if the funds are not
used effectively. However, when state and local agencies spend
money that they have raised themselves, they are acutely aware of
its use. Police departments face serious competition for limited
resources on the state and local levels, and this provides adequate
motivation to monitor the effectiveness of the spending and to
ensure that the money would not be better used elsewhere in the
locality.
In addition, federal funding for state and local
responsibilities creates the false public perception that ordinary
street crime is a federal responsibility. This allows state and
local officials to shift accountability for local crime away
from themselves and toward the federal government when they fail to
devote adequate resources to fighting crime.
Boston is an example of how federal law enforcement grants
encourage local officials to become dependent on federal funding,
discourage them from using resources efficiently, and enable them
to shift responsibility for controlling local crime to the federal
government. Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino has blamed the Bush
Administration for his inability to staff the Boston Police
Department properly. During the 1990s, Boston accepted
millions of dollars in COPS grants to hire additional police
officers. When accepting these grants, Boston promised to retain
these officers and keep current staffing levels after the federal
contributions expired. Instead of developing a plan to retain the
officers, and in violation of the federal grant rules, Mayor Menino
decided to downsize officer staffing after the grants expired.[13]
The number of Boston police officers declined from 2,252 in 1999 to
2,036 in 2004-a 9.6 percent decrease. When population growth is
taken into account, the number of police officers per 10,000
residents declined by 13.1 percent from 1999 to 2004, down
from 40.4 officers per 10,000 to 35.1 officers per 10,000.[14]
Commenting on Boston, former COPS official Craig Uchida said,
"They knew they had to pick up the salaries after the three year
period" of federal funding. Responding to criticism that Boston
failed to plan adequately for the phaseout of federal
assistance, Mayor Menino's spokeswoman Jacque Goddard
said, "The mayor knew all along the money would run out. We would
have expected the federal government to offer additional grants
that we would have applied for and received."[15] Mayor Menino
appears to have viewed COPS grants as an entitlement to
perpetual federal funding for the officers hired under the original
grants.
State and local governments have become so used to receiving
these federal funds that some no longer make law enforcement the
budgetary priority that it should be and instead spend the
money elsewhere. With these funds, the federal government
discourages the states and local governments from fulfilling one of
their primary duties.
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
As the situation in Boston demonstrates, local law enforcement
grants like COPS grants do not solve police department problems,
but rather enable problems to continue and to worsen. A recent
Heritage Foundation evaluation of COPS grants found that large
cities used federal funds to supplant local funds, contrary to
Congress's intent in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, which directed that the funds should only be
supplementary.[16] Supplanting occurs when federal funds are
used to replace local funds-for example, when federal funds
intended to hire additional police officers are used instead to pay
the salaries of currently employed officers. To receive the grants,
grant applicants must sign the following stipulation:
The applicant hereby certifies that Federal funds will not be
used to replace or supplant state or local funds, or funds supplied
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, that would, in the absence of
Federal aid, be made available to or for law enforcement
purposes.[17]
The Heritage Foundation findings are consistent with audits of
COPS-funded police departments by the U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Inspector General (OIG).[18] These audits indicate that
the grantees frequently failed to hire or redeploy officers as
required and in many cases used federal funds to supplant local
funds.
The problems range from supplanting to spending the hiring
grants on activities not allowed under the grant conditions.
Dallas, Louisville, and Newark actually reduced their force sizes
after receiving grants to hire additional officers.[19]
For example, instead of hiring 249 new officers, Newark reduced its
police force by 142 officers from FY 1996 to FY 1997. Other audits
indicate that some police departments supplanted by failing to hire
the required number of additional officers. For example, OIG
audits indicated that Atlanta, El Paso, and Sacramento used COPS
grants to supplant local funding.[20] Atlanta used over $5.1
million in hiring grants to pay the salaries of officers who
otherwise would have received funding from local sources. After
receiving grants to hire 231 additional police officers, El Paso
failed to hire the number of officers required by the grant.
Sacramento used over $3.9 million in hiring grants to retain
officers funded through earlier grants.
In Washington, D.C., the police department was awarded almost
$11 million in Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) grants
to hire 56 civilians and redeploy 521.4 officers through
technology purchases.[21] However, when the OIG asked for a list of
officers redeployed from administrative duties to community
policing as required by the grants, the list included only 53
officers. Of the 53, one officer was deceased, 10 were retired, and
13 no longer worked for the police department.
In addition, these programs do not adequately monitor the use of
the funds, thereby encouraging waste and inefficiency. An OIG audit
of COPS grant management, for example, found that the use of funds
by grantees was not monitored properly. Specifically, the OIG
audited the COPS program's grant closeout process. Closeouts
involve reviewing the grantee's use of federal funding to determine
whether or not the grant conditions were followed properly.
According to the OIG, "Timely grant closeout is an essential
program and financial management practice to identify grantees
that have failed to comply with all grant requirements, as well as
any excess and unallowable costs charged to the grant, and unused
funds that should be deobligated." Without a timely closeout
process, "non-compliant grantees may not be identified until years
after the grant end date."[22] Thus, timely closeouts are crucial to
effective monitoring of how federal taxpayer dollars are used.
The OIG determined that, of the 12,840 closed COPS grants
totaling almost $3 billion, only 135 grants (1 percent) were closed
within six months after the grant end date. Eighty-three percent of
the grants were not closed until more than two years after the
grant end dates. On average, COPS took more than three years to
close these grants properly.[23]
Of the 10,643 grants that expired but were not closed by COPS,
72 percent had been expired for more than two years. Twenty-four
percent were expired for more than five years after the grant end
date. On average, these grants had been expired without proper
closure for more than 3.5 years.[24]
Review of a small sample of 30 expired but unclosed COPS grants
found that 20 (67 percent) of the grantees did not comply with
grant requirements. However, these noncompliant grantees were
subsequently awarded 39 additional grants totaling $18.7 million.[25] If
COPS had implemented a proper closeout process, these
noncompliant grantees would not have been awarded additional
grants without first meeting the conditions of their original
grants.
COPS appears to have done little to resolve the misuse of the
grants. According to Inspector General Glen A. Fine, "[I]n
many cases, the response to our findings was a paper exercise
and…the COPS program did not take sufficient action to
either bring the grantee into compliance, to offset the funds, to
recoup the funds or to waive the funds."[26] Inspector General Fine
testified before Congress that COPS did not pay enough attention to
ensuring adherence to the grant requirements, including the hiring
of officers, retaining officers, and tracking the redeployment of
officers.[27] The lack of oversight by COPS created
inadequate incentives for local-level compliance with grant
conditions.
A Failed Crime-Reduction Policy
The Bush Administration and Congress were correct to reduce
funding for grant programs that pay local law enforcement to carry
out their traditional responsibilities. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has recommended funding reductions for
the COPS program because the program has not demonstrated its
effectiveness in reducing crime.[28]
Heritage Foundation research has uniformly found that COPS
grants had little to no impact on crime rates. In 2001, the Center
for Data Analysis (CDA) conducted an independent analysis of the
COPS program's effectiveness.[29] After accounting for
yearly state and local law enforcement expenditures and other
socioeconomic factors in counties from 1995 to 1998, the CDA
evaluation found that COPS grants both for the hiring of additional
police officers and for technology had no statistically
significant effect on reducing the rates of crime.
In 2006, a second CDA evaluation of COPS grants using data from
1990 to 1999 for 58 large cities confirmed the earlier conclusion
that the program has done little to reduce crime. For
instance, the hiring grants did not have a statistically
significant relationship with murder, rape, assault,
burglary, larceny, or auto theft rates, although they were
associated with negligible reductions in robberies, with a 1
percent increase in hiring grants associated with a 0.01 percent
decrease in robbery rates. The findings of the CDA analysis
strongly suggest that merely paying for the operational expenses of
police departments is ineffective in reducing violent crime.[30]
Professors John Worrall of the University of Texas at Dallas and
Tomislav Kovandzic of the University of Alabama at Birmingham
recently evaluated the impact of COPS grants in 189 large cities
from 1990 to 2000.[31] The authors found that COPS hiring, MORE,
and other innovative grants had little to no effect on crime.
Commenting on the significance of their finding for public policy,
the authors concluded that "[A] strategy of throwing money at
the crime problem, of simply hiring more police officers,
does not seem to help reduce crime to a significant extent."[32]
In addition, the COPS program failed to keep its less
significant promise to place 100,000 additional officers on
America's streets. Contrary to the program's assertion that
the goal of "funding the 100,000th officer ahead of schedule and
under budget" was reached on May 12, 1999,[33] research both by
The Heritage Foundation and by the Department of Justice found that
the COPS program actually failed to place 100,000 additional police
officers on America's streets.[34] One Department of Justice
study concluded, "Whether the program will ever increase the number
of officers on the street at a single point in time to 100,000 is
not clear."[35]
The program failed to reach another of its important goals
by failing to effect any substantial advancement in the
adoption of community policing across the nation. The Justice
Department tested the ability of COPS to promote community policing
by conducting a survey of community policing tactics as used
by police agencies, both funded and not funded by COPS, from
pre-1995 to 1998.[36] The survey examined 40 community policing
activities that related to partnership building, problem
solving, prevention, and organizational change.[37]
Although COPS certainly did not hinder the spread of community
policing, the evidence does not support claims that it
substantially advanced it.[38] Of the 40 community policing activities
measured, COPS increased the participation rate in only seven.[39]
Moreover, some of the activities encouraged by COPS, such as
late-night recreation programs, are of dubious worth as
crime-fighting initiatives.
Jeremy M. Wilson, associate director of the Center for
Quality Policing at the RAND Corporation, studied the impact of
COPS grants on the adoption of community policing by police
departments across the nation, and his findings support the
Department of Justice research.[40] Commenting on COPS grants,
Wilson concluded that "[F]unding incentives do not seem to be
a prominent predictor of COP [community oriented policing]
implementation, nor a panacea for its implementation."[41]
The research from The Heritage Foundation, the Department of
Justice, and others underscores the ineffectiveness of this type of
federal funding in fighting crime. As the COPS program
demonstrates, federal funding for routine law enforcement needs is
difficult to administer and removes the incentives for careful
budgeting and resource planning.
The Right Kind of Federal
Involvement
Any federal involvement should recognize state responsibilities
and should encourage and enable the states to meet their own law
enforcement objectives. Just as Congress and the Bush
Administration concluded in 2002 that the federal government
should desist from paying for the Violent Offender
Incarceration/Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) Incentive
Formula Grants that funded the construction of state prisons,
it is time for the federal government to stop subsidizing the
routine activities of local police departments. Instead, as former
Clinton Administration Assistant Attorney General for Justice
Programs Laurie Robinson has recommended, the federal
government should focus its services on "value-added" functions.[42]
In the area of crime policy, the federal government should
perform tasks that no state or local jurisdiction can carry out
alone. In particular, as recommended by Laurie Robinson, the
federal government is in a unique position to fund the evaluation
of innovative criminal justice programs and disseminate the
findings to state and local officials. Through testing
innovative ideas and disseminating findings, such a federal
research program would be likely to have a greater long-term impact
on crime control than perpetually funding the traditional
responsibilities of state and local governments could ever
have.
In addition, federal law enforcement agencies should develop
partnerships with local law enforcement and coordinate law
enforcement activities to combat crime that crosses state lines.
For example, Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) provides the means for state and local authorities to
cooperate in immigration law enforcement-a national
responsibility with state and local ramifications. The program
created by the INA gives state and local agencies the authority to
investigate, detain, and arrest aliens on civil and criminal
grounds. Another example is Operation Community Shield, launched in
2005 by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).[43]
Partnering with local law enforcement, ICE agents targeted criminal
gangs, including Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), resulting in the
arrest of almost 2,400 suspected gang members and associates
including more than 1,000 with violent criminal histories. The
Immigration and Nationality Act and Operation Community Shield are
excellent examples of appropriate partnerships between federal and
local law enforcement.
Conclusion
Any significant increase in crime should be cause for concern,
but eliminating wasteful and ineffective grant programs will not
cause crime to increase. Federal funding programs such as COPS have
failed to achieve their intended purpose of aiding local law
enforcement and reducing crime. Instead, research has shown that
these programs have been misused and poorly administered, and state
and local law enforcement have became dependent on these funds for
their routine police activities.
If state and local governments are serious about fighting crime,
they need to make law enforcement funding a priority. When
accompanied by oversight and accountability at the state and local
levels, law enforcement funding stands a much greater chance of
affecting crime levels.
If Congress wants to aid in the fight against crime, it should
limit itself to unique roles that only the federal government can
play. Whether through sponsoring innovative interstate criminal
justice programs or by enlisting the support of local law
enforcement to help enforce immigration laws, the federal
government should enhance the ability to fight crime, but it should
not become a crutch on which local law enforcement becomes
dependent.
David B. Muhlhausen,
Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis
and Erica Little is Legal Policy Analyst in the Center for Legal
and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[3]Police Executive Research Forum, Chief
Concerns: A Gathering Storm-Violent Crime in America, October
2006.
[4]Mark
Schoofs and Robert Block, "Police Chiefs to Ask Bush for More
Anticrime Funds," The Wall Street Journal, October
10, 2006, p. A4.
[8]James A. Maxwell, The Impact of Fiscal
Federalism in the United States, Harvard Economic Studies, Vol.
79, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946).
[9]Barry Loveday and Anna Reid, Going Local:
Who Should Run Britain's Police? (London: Policy Exchange,
2003).
[11]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay, The Federalist (London: Everyman's Library, 1788
[1990]), p. 239 (emphasis added). Americans have strongly opposed a
national police force from the earliest days of the republic.
[12]Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose:
A Personal Statement (San Diego, Cal.: Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1980).
[13]Kevin Rothstein, "Menino Defense Cracks;
Ex-Grant Officials Fault Mayor over Cop Funding," Boston
Herald, November 5, 2005, p. A11.
[14]Calculations based on Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1999, pp.
300-367, Table 78, at www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_99/99crime/99cius6.pdf (March
7, 2007), and Crime in the United States, 2000, pp. 300-367,
Table 78, at www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/contents.pdf (March
7, 2007).
[15]Rothstein, "Menino Defense Cracks."
[16]David B. Muhlhausen, "Impact Evaluation of
COPS Grants in Large Cities," Heritage Foundation Center for
Data Analysis Report No. CDA06-03, May 26, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/upload/97702_1.pdf.
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 requires
COPS grants to supplement, not supplant, state and local funds.
"Funds made available under this part to States or units of local
government shall not be used to supplant State or local funds, or,
in the case of Indian tribal governments, funds supplied by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, but shall be used to increase the amount
of funds that would, in the absence of Federal funds received under
this part, be made available from State or local sources, or in the
case of Indian tribal governments, from funds supplied by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs." Public Law 103-322, Title I, §
1704(a).
[17]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, Universal Hiring Program
Grant Owner's Manual, April 1998, p. 46.
[18]For audits of COPS-funded police departments,
see U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
"Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Grant Reports," Web
page, at www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/_cops.htm (March
8, 2007).
[19]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General, "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Grants to the City of Dallas, Texas, Police Department," executive
summary, Audit Report No. GR-80-00-003, November 1999, at
www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g8000003.htm (May
16, 2006); "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Grants
to the Louisville, Kentucky, Police Department," executive summary,
Audit Report No. GR-40-01-002, February 2001, at www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g4001002.htm (May
16, 2006); and "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Grants to the Newark, New Jersey Police Department," executive
summary, Audit Report No. GR-70-98-007, June 1998, at www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g7098007.htm (May
16, 2006).
[20]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General, "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Grants to the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department," executive
summary, Audit Report No. GR-40-98-006, April 1998, at www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g4098006.htm (May
16, 2006); "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Grants
to the El Paso Police Department, El Paso, Texas," executive
summary, Audit Report No. GR-80-01-013, May 30, 2001, at
www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g8001013.htm (May
16, 2006); and "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Grants to the City of Sacramento Police Department,
California," executive summary, Audit Report No.
GR-90-98-022, May 1998, at www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g9098022.htm (May
16, 2006).
[21]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General, "Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Grants to the Metropolitan Police Department, District of
Columbia," executive summary, Audit Report No. GR-30-01-003,
December 29, 2000, at www.usdoj.gov/oig/grants/g3001003.htm (May
16, 2006).
[22]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General, Audit Division, "The Department of Justice's
Grant Closeout Process," Audit Report No. 07-05, December
2006, pp. 2 and 8.
[26]Glen A. Fine, in hearing, Office of
Justice Programs, Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
March 5, 7, and 14, 2002, p. 109.
[30]Muhlhausen, "Impact Evaluation of COPS Grants
in Large Cities."
[31]John L. Worrall and Tomislav V. Kovandzic,
"COPS Grants and Crime Revisited," Criminology, Vol. 45, No.
1 (February 2007), pp. 159-190.
[34]Gareth Davis, David B. Muhlhausen, Dexter
Ingram, and Ralph Rector, "The Facts About COPS: A Performance
Overview of the Community Oriented Policing Services Program,"
Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report
No. CDA00- 10, September 25, 2000, at www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/CDA00-10.cfm;
Christopher S. Koper, Jeffrey A Roth, and Edward Maguire, "Putting
100,000 Officers on the Street: Progress as of 1998 and Preliminary
Projections Through 2003," in Jeffrey A. Roth, Joseph F. Ryan,
Stephen J. Gaffigan, Christopher S. Koper, Mark H. Moore, Janice A.
Roehl, Calvin C. Johnson, Gretchen E. Moore, Ruth M. White, Michael
E. Buerger, Elizabeth A. Langston, and David Thatcher, National
Evaluation of the COPS Program: Title I of the 1994 Crime
Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2000), p.
163; and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General,
"Police Hiring and Redeployment Grants, Summary of Audit Findings
and Recommendations," Audit Report No. 99-14, April 1999, at
www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/COPS/a9914/index.htm (March
8, 2007).
[35]Koper et al., "Putting 100,000
Officers on the Street," p. 152.
[36]Janice A. Roehl, Calvin C. Johnson, Michael
E. Buerger, Stephen J. Gaffigan, Elizabeth A. Langston, and Jeffrey
A. Roth, "COPS and the Nature of Policing," in Roth et al.,
National Evaluation of the COPS Program, pp. 179-245.
[39]Roehl et al., "COPS and the Nature of
Policing."
[40]Jeremy M. Wilson, Community Policing In
America (New York: Routledge, 2006).
[42]Laurie Robinson, "Gazing into the Legislative
Crystal Ball," Corrections Today, Vol. 64, No. 7 (December
2002).