Barely four months after exploding a nuclear weapon, North Korea
has again foiled attempts to penalize it for violating
international commitments. Kim Jong-il used his characteristic
mixture of military provocations, brinksmanship, and crisis
diplomacy to gain benefits for a return to the status quo ante and
promises of future steps. The Beijing Agreement, announced on
February 13 by the Six-Party Talks participants, rewards Pyongyang
for its bad behavior and reflects America's abandonment of several
previously intractable negotiating positions.
Although some might view the agreement as another step toward
North Korea's eventual nuclear disarmament, its vague provisions
and deferred requirements give Pyongyang loopholes that it will
seek to exploit. Moreover, the accord sends a dangerously
accommodating signal not only to North Korea, but also to Iran and
any other aspiring nuclear weapons state.
Closing the Barn Door
The agreement initially constrains, rather than resolves, the
North Korean nuclear issue. If the agreement is fully implemented,
North Korea will negotiate away its nuclear weapons-building
capability for immediate aid and promises of future benefits. But
the accord does not specifically address North Korea's
uranium-based nuclear weapons program, which triggered the current
imbroglio, or the steps by which North Korea will divest itself of
existing nuclear weapons. Also left for future negotiations are the
details of verification requirements for facilities other than
those at Yongbyon and the sequencing of benefits with North Korea's
steps toward denuclearization.
North Korea has agreed to "shut down and seal for the purpose of
eventual abandonment" plutonium processing operations at the
Yongbyon nuclear facility and allow International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors to monitor the cessation of activity. The
document carefully avoided the term "freeze," which would have
elicited direct comparisons with President Clinton's Agreed
Framework, much maligned by the incoming Bush Administration.
Elsewhere in the document, North Korea is required to disable its
existing facilities.
Left unclear is whether the language "all necessary monitoring
and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK" includes
pre-existing authority for challenge inspections of suspect sites
and any additional measures needed to verify the parameters of the
uranium program and monitor stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
radioactive material outside of the Yongbyon facility. North Korea
should also commit to returning to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
Other Provisions
- North Korea agreed to "discuss with other parties a list of all
its nuclear programs." Still unresolved is whether this will
resemble the data declarations required under other arms control
agreements, which can be verified through on-site inspections.
- The U.S. agreed to talks aimed at moving toward full diplomatic
relations and at removing North Korea from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism and Trading with the Enemy Act coverage.
Separate discussions will be held between North Korea and Japan to
move toward normalization of diplomatic relations, including
addressing "outstanding issues of concern" (i.e., the kidnapping of
Japanese citizens by Pyongyang).
- All parties agreed to "cooperate in economic, energy and
humanitarian assistance" to North Korea, with an immediate shipment
of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and further shipments of up to one
million tons.
- "Directly related parties"-presumably the U.S., South Korea,
North Korea, and China-will negotiate a permanent peace treaty to
formally end the Korean War.
- The six nations agreed to establish five working groups to set
out implementation steps. The groups will address denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations,
normalization of DPRK-Japan relations, economy and energy
cooperation, and a Northeast Asia peace and security
mechanism.
Agreed Framework Redux?
Lost in the details of the agreement was that North Korea
achieved a significant strategic objective by having gained
international acquiescence to its agenda. Although many of the
broader benefits (e.g., the non-aggression pledge, normalization of
relations, and economic aid) had been previously promised to North
Korea, few had been forthcoming due to Pyongyang's actions over the
past decade.
Despite that its covert nuclear weapons program violated the
North-South Denuclearization Accord, the Agreed Framework, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards Agreement, North Korea was able to win benefits,
rather than suffer penalties, to halt its nuclear programs.
Conspicuously absent from the agreement is any direct reference
to North Korea's uranium-based weapons program, which was what
caused both sides to abrogate the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang used
the intervening years to build its stockpile from an estimated one
to two nuclear weapons at the end of the 1990s to enough fissile
material for approximately ten weapons today. The U.S. decision to
defer confrontation of North Korea over its uranium program weakens
the rationale for the Bush Administration's diplomatic approach
over the past five years. Moreover, it calls into question the
necessity of instigating the crisis in 2002 when it was unwilling
to stay the course.
It is puzzling that North Korea did not insist upon inclusion of
its demand for receiving a light-water reactor or the annual
provision of two million megawatt-hours from South Korea to
compensate for the supposed loss of Yongbyon's electrical
generating capacity (though the facility was never connected to the
country's electrical power grid). Pyongyang had previously
conditioned its agreement on a follow-on agreement to the September
19, 2005, Joint Statement that provided for construction of the
reactors-a 10-year process-prior to any dismantlement of its
nuclear facilities.
Also unmentioned in the agreement is the dispute over seized
North Korean financial assets in the Banco Delta Asia. U.S. defense
measures taken against the regime's illicit activities prevented
resumption of nuclear talks for 13 months and were the likely
reason for the collapse of the December 2006 negotiating round.[1] North Korea's
acceptance of the Beijing Agreement either means it has relaxed its
earlier demands or believes the U.S. has provided sufficient
assurances that a satisfactory resolution will be
forthcoming-perhaps release of funds assessed to be from legitimate
business activity. The Chosun Shinbo, a pro-North Korean
newspaper in Japan, claimed the U.S. had promised during the
bilateral Berlin talks to lift the financial restrictions against
Banco Delta Asia within one month.
The Beijing accord marks a resurrection of the Agreed Framework
process, in which North Korea committed to previously agreed-upon
obligations in exchange for resumption of cancelled benefits or
discussions over future concessions. North Korea will accelerate or
impede progress in the five working groups in correlation to how
they fulfill Pyongyang's objectives. North Korea will presumably
focus on obtaining energy and economic assistance while obfuscating
on denuclearization, verification, and resolution of the Japanese
abductee issues.
Without success in those working groups, the Beijing Agreement
would appear to provide little not already included in the Agreed
Framework. As such, the Bush Administration will be vulnerable to
criticism that it has not only abandoned its principles, but that
it did so while allowing North Korea to augment its nuclear weapons
inventory.
Ramifications
- Japan's Reaction: Tokyo may feel abandoned since
it predicated the resumption of talks on Pyongyang's prior
commitment to denuclearize and argued that no energy assistance
should be provided without resolution of the abductee issue. Little
progress is expected on the latter because it has been relegated to
a bilateral North Korean-Japanese working group.
- The Bill for Energy Assistance: Even before the
announcement of an agreement, South Korea was already worried about
the bill, foreseeing that it would foot the lion's share. Seoul has
been the most eager to engage North Korea to resolve the nuclear
impasse, and then-Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young offered
North Korea two million won in June 2005, which Kim Jong-il deftly
pocketed. The political opposition and populace may, however, balk
at the expected cost of the new agreement if it later includes
large-scale energy assistance.
- South Korean Engagement: Seoul may see the release of
fuel oil as a green light to resume deliveries of humanitarian aid
that it reluctantly halted after North Korea's nuclear test.
President Roh Moo-hyun may be encouraged to resume outreach to the
North, including rumored preparations for a meeting with Kim
Jong-il. Roh would be motivated by perceptions that an inter-Korean
summit could reverse his plummeting approval ratings, improve the
potential for a progressive candidate to win the December 2007
presidential election, and secure his legacy.
- Waning Support for Sanctions: Beijing, Moscow, and Seoul
will see the agreement as a vindication of their calls for greater
U.S. flexibility to resolve the nuclear impasse. They will be even
more reluctant to impose the sanctions against North Korea called
for by U.N. Resolution 1718. They will likely call upon Washington
to minimize efforts against North Korea's illicit activities, such
as economic restrictions on financial institutions, lest these
derail the Six-Party Talks.
Conclusion
Crafting a diplomatic agreement that serves a country's national
interests is similar to building a house, with both requiring
painstakingly careful construction of components. In both
endeavors, it is critically important to start with a sound
foundation, or instability will result. The Beijing Agreement makes
this mistake. It may be possible, however, to salvage the end
results. The U.S. must insist upon stricter measures in follow-on
negotiations to ensure that North Korea divests itself of nuclear
weapons in an expeditious and rigorously verifiable manner.
Bruce
Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the
Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.