By all accounts, U.S. and North Korean diplomats reached
consensus, if not an actual deal, during mid-December bilateral
talks in Berlin. While movement in the Six-Party Talks would be a
welcome development, the U.S. must not abandon its demand for
complete dismantlement of all of North Korea's nuclear weapons
programs in a rigorously verifiable manner. Moreover, as
counterintuitive as it may appear on the verge of a diplomatic
breakthrough, Washington must begin contingency planning for the
eventual failure of the Six-Party Talks, because it is unlikely
that North Korea is willing to negotiate away its nuclear weapons
capability.
An uncharacteristic sense of optimism now permeates diplomatic
and media circles prior to the February 8 resumption of the
Six-Party Talks in Beijing. Though details of the Berlin talks have
not been disclosed, the U.S. may have agreed to a partial release
of seized North Korean financial assets, formalized diplomatic
recognition, security assurances, and the resumption of economic
aid in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear activities at
the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the readmission of IAEA
inspectors to monitor compliance. The parameters are similar to a
North Korean proposal made during the second round of Six-Party
Talks in February 2004.
The Bush Administration may have been driven to greater
negotiating flexibility by a need to achieve a foreign policy
victory to compensate for declining public support for the Iraq war
effort and the loss of Republican leadership of Congress. For its
part, North Korea may see an opportunity to wrest greater
concessions from a weakened opponent, or it might feel impelled to
return to the talks to mitigate deteriorating economic conditions
brought on by U.S.-led economic restrictions.
Potential for Progress, Not
Resolution
North Korean negotiator Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan
claimed to have achieved a "certain agreement" and established
"direct dialogue" with U.S. counterpart Assistant Secretary of
State Christopher Hill during their Berlin discussions. Hill denied
an agreement but noted "very useful discussions" that provided the
basis for progress in multilateral negotiations. His constrained
optimism may have been driven by wariness of potential criticism
for appearing to have reversed Bush Administration policy against
direct bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice underscored that the Berlin discussions were
conducted within the overall framework of the Six-Party Talks and
that the U.S. had not made bilateral negotiations with
Pyongyang.
Despite widespread optimism generated by the results of
Assistant Secretary Hill's renewed negotiating leverage, derailment
of any pre-arranged agreement remains possible. The principle
impediment to preliminary progress remains the $24 million in
seized North Korean assets in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia
(BDA). In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
BDA a "primary money laundering concern" under Section 311 of the
Patriot Act for its facilitation of North Korean counterfeiting and
money laundering.
Rumors are rife that the U.S. has agreed to advocate the release
of between $8 million and $12 million from BDA accounts following a
determination that they are not linked to any illicit activities.[1]
However, on January 31, the State Department denied the existence
of any such plan. Bilateral talks between Treasury officials and
North Korean counterparts in Beijing on January 30 and 31 ended
without the expected announcement. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Treasury Daniel Glaser announced that while progress had been made
during the discussions, U.S. suspicions of North Korea's "financial
crimes" had been vindicated.
Pyongyang boycotted the Six-Party Talks for 13 months and,
according to a former U.S. official who met with North Korean
officials in November 2006, based its return to negotiations in
December 2006 on the incorrect assumption that China would unfreeze
the accounts with U.S. acquiescence. North Korea indirectly
signaled last week that a failure to resolve the BDA issue would
lead Pyongyang to conduct a second nuclear test.
Don't Lower the Bar
During this week's Six-Party Talks, the U.S. should affirm that
its primary goal remains the "verifiable denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula" and call for North Korea to comply with the
September 2005 Joint Statement requirement for "abandoning all
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an
early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and to IAEA safeguards."[2] As such, a North Korean
agreement to freeze nuclear activities at the Yongbyon facility
under IAEA supervision should be insufficient to receive benefits.
Only taking steps to disable the Yongbyon reactor, on a path toward
eventual dismantlement, should be the trigger point for
compensatory benefits.
The U.S. should aggressively engage in a good faith effort to
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but Washington should
emphasize that any agreement will require the concurrence of all
six parties and that its commitment to negotiate is not
open-ended.
The U.S. should stress to other Six-Party participants that Kim
Jong-Il's actions are inconsistent with peace and stability in
Northeast Asia. Washington should recommend imposing a deadline for
a resolution to prevent Pyongyang from dragging out discussions
while increasing the threat to the region from its growing nuclear
weapons inventory. Talking is not success, and North Korea should
not be rewarded for its intransigence or its non-compliance with
U.N. resolutions.
A Satisfactory Resolution
Any resolution with Pyongyang must include the following
provisions:
- Ensuring that both plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons
programs are subject to the agreement;
- Addressing North Korean missile programs in line with U.N.
Resolution 1718, which "decides also that the DPRK shall abandon
all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile program in a complete, verifiable and irreversible
manner";
- Requiring complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement
of all nuclear weapons program components; the accounting of all
nuclear material; and intrusive on-site inspections, including
challenge inspections;
- Making any security reassurances (a non-aggression pact)
contingent on North Korea's abandonment of belligerency, including
threatening military behavior;
- Ensuring that any peace treaty between the U.N. and North Korea
is followed by discussions on confidence-building measures,
including the redeployment of North Korean military forces away
from the demilitarized zone;
- Ensuring that North Korea's removal from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism is contingent on satisfactory resolution of
the Japanese and South Korean abductee issue;
- Conditioning future humanitarian and development assistance, as
well as membership in international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, on monitoring
requirements to prevent the diversion of aid.
Parallel Efforts to Maintain Pressure
In addition, the United States should take
these steps to keep up pressure on Pyongyang:
- Continue to investigate and take action against any North
Korean financial entity suspected of complicity in illicit
activities, irrespective of the release of any funds from BDA
accounts deemed to be from legitimate business activity;
- Continue targeting North Korea's illicit activities through
international financial, intelligence, and law enforcement
means;
- Press U.N. member countries to comply with U.N. Resolution 1718
by implementing all required measures against North Korea's WMD and
missile programs;
- Maintain defenses against North Korea's proliferation of WMD or
missiles and encourage China and South Korea to join the
Proliferation Security Initiative; and
- Continue international efforts to highlight North Korean human
rights violations.
Conclusion
The U.S. should continue diplomatic initiatives to resolve the
North Korean nuclear impasse, but it must not purchase Pyongyang's
return to the previous status quo. North Korea should not be
rewarded for violating its previous commitments, nor should the
international community condone Pyongyang's nuclear weapons status.
A diplomatic agreement must be structured to redress previous
loopholes and prevent yet another nuclear crisis on the Korean
Peninsula.
Bruce Klingner is Senior
Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation.