The Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has once again raised the stakes
in its showdown with the rest of the world by announcing it
successfully conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on October 8. It
is not a surprise that the DPRK has a nuclear weapon-United States
intelligence estimates have shown for some time now that the DPRK
possesses at least one or two nuclear weapons and enough nuclear
material for many more weapons. Nonetheless, if a nuclear test did
occur, that test is both provocative and intolerable. In
response to the test, the U.S. and its allies must extend a
comprehensive offensive and defensive deterrent policy to the
Korean peninsula.
Kim Jong-Il's
interests in pursuing a nuclear test include intimidating American
allies in Japan and South Korea, further impairing the U.S.
alliance with South Korea, and putting pressure on the United
States. His behavior flies in the face of clear messages from the
United Nations as well as key stakeholders in international
stability. For the last year, North Korea has refused to rejoin the
Six Party Talks, negotiations between North Korea, the United
States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia aimed at solving the
North Korean nuclear issue. Coupled with its refusal to participate
in the Six Party Talks, the nuclear test amplifies the oft-stated
point that North Korea has never had any interest in good faith
negotiations. Rather, North Korea's consistent approach has been to
keep the responsible world tied up at the bargaining table while
the regime builds its nuclear weapons program.
President Bush, in
his first State of the Union address after the September 11
terrorist attacks, made clear the threat a nuclear-armed North
Korea would pose to the United States. "By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.
They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the
means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or
attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these
cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic," he said.
"The United States of America will not permit the world's most
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons."
President Bush's
analysis underscores the reasons it is intolerable for North Korea
to have the weapons Kim Jong-Il has now shown the world he
possesses. The gravest threat, however, is that Kim Jong-Il will
overestimate the leverage he has gained and behave recklessly as a
result. In fact, he has gained very little new leverage on the rest
of the world. Rather, he has further isolated himself by
aggressively ignoring an international consensus that a North
Korean nuclear test is intolerable.
Kim Jong-Il may
believe that a successful nuclear test provides him with a safety
blanket from under which he may lash out at the region and cause
greater instability. American policymakers need to be conscious of
this potential miscalculation on Kim Jong-Il's part. In reality,
the strategic calculus in East Asia has long contained the
possibility of a devastating North Korean attack on American allies
South Korea and Japan-whether that attack comes from conventional
rockets and missiles or from the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
The first, and
most important, step is to make it clear to Pyongyang that a
successful nuclear test does not give it any significant new
leverage in international affairs. The calculus of a nuclear North
Korea has already been factored into international strategic
thinking. A toughly-worded, Chapter VII resolution from the U.N.
Security Council demanding the DPRK suspend its missile and WMD
programs is an important first step.
Furthermore,
America must be prepared to defend itself, its allies, and its key
interests from North Korean attack or blackmail. Accordingly,
America must extend a comprehensive offensive and defensive
deterrent policy to the Korean peninsula. On the offensive side,
America must make absolutely clear that the use or sale of nuclear
weapons by North Korea will have devastating consequences to the
regime. America cannot and will not tolerate nuclear weapons being
used against our nation, allies, or interests, nor their sale to
entities which may use them in such a manner.
Defensively, the
United States must commit to funding and implementing a fully
functioning, comprehensive ballistic missile defense system. The
United States currently has a very limited capability to shoot down
ICBMs. Congress and the Administration should immediately revisit
the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) proposal made
in 1991 by the then-director of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, and current National
Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley. The GPALS system could engage
up to 200 individual missile reentry vehicles and destroy ICBMs
such as the Taepodong 2. In the next few years, North Korea will
likely have the capability to strike the United States; the United
States must develop a defensive capability able to protect itself
from Pyongyang's unpredictable behavior.
Finally, North
Korea's belligerence poses a direct threat to the American national
security strategy of preventing the world's most dangerous regimes
from possessing the world's most dangerous weapons. Accordingly,
the United States and its allies must make it absolutely clear that
it cannot and does not tolerate North Korean nuclear weapons or
nuclear testing and will actively work to reverse these programs.
The U.S. should engage in a policy of active regime intolerance.
America has already engaged in several tactics to put pressure on
the North Korean regime, specifically financial measures to counter
DPRK currency counterfeiting and the proliferation security
initiative to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery
systems. In light of the North Korean provocation, America and
other responsible stakeholders in a peaceful and stable global
order must go further.
Specifically, the
U.S. should work with the U.N. Security Council to get
comprehensive sanctions backed by international community; work
with its allies and China to enforce a blockade on all North Korean
exports; impose further multilateral economic sanctions, including
cutting off all fuel going into North Korea from China and
elsewhere; and pressure the over 70 nations with diplomatic ties to
the DPRK to sever those relations immediately. Finally, no country
should accept the legitimacy of the North Korean regime or its
policies. The world and North Koreans would be far better off
without Kim Jong-Il as a leader. The United States, its
partners in the Six Party talks, and the international
community as a whole should aim to give the North Korean people an
alternative.
All eyes now turn
towards China. Until now, China's enthusiasm for applying real
pressure on their North Korean ally has been tepid, at best.
Moreover, China has long served as a transit point for North Korean
proliferation and other illicit behavior. China claims to be a
responsible stakeholder in the existing international system. Now
is China's opportunity to choose whether to continue as an enabler
of the world's rogue states or to become a "responsible
stakeholder" in a stable international system.
North Korea's
nuclear test significantly raises the stakes in Asia, but does not
fundamentally alter the strategic calculus that has been in place
for years. America and other responsible stakeholders in the world
need to articulate to the North Korean regime that they are not
intimidated by its behavior, they will actively institute a
combination of offensive and defensive military options to protect
their interests from this gathering threat, and they will engage in
a policy of active regime intolerance towards the North Korean
regime.
Michael A.
Needham is Director of the Asian Studies
Center at The Heritage Foundation.