In 1995, The
Heritage Foundation's Missile Defense Study Team proposed to
Congress a comprehensive plan for developing and deploying an
effective global defense against ballistic missiles.
The panel was chaired by the former director of the Strategic
Defense Initiative, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, and among its
recommendations was a proposal to evolve the existing AEGIS weapons
systems onboard Navy surface ships for air defense into a missile
defense system. Last month, the Navy demonstrated the wisdom of
this approach by successfully testing modified versions of the
AEGIS system and its accompanying Standard Missile-2 Block IV
surface-to-air missile against a target ballistic missile off
Hawaii.
It downed the target missile in its last stage of flight, called
the terminal phase. The Heritage panel predicted this success in
its 1995 report:
The earliest,
least expensive, and politically least intrusive way to achieve a
global defense [against ballistic missiles] is to build on the
nearly $50 billion the U.S. has already invested in the Navy's
AEGIS system. The AEGIS system has been deployed on Navy cruisers
and destroyers to provide defenses against aircraft. The system can
be upgraded and the ships armed with a modified Standard
surface-to-air missile. The Navy system will initially provide
protection against missile attacks for only a limited area, with
the Navy Lower Tier program.
Policy Choices Put
the Navy Lower Tier System on Hold
The Clinton
Administration opposed this obvious, effective, and inexpensive
near-term approach to missile defense for reasons related to arms
control, not technical shortcomings with this approach. The Clinton
Administration's overarching policy was to preserve and strengthen
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the former Soviet
Union. This policy precluded progress on progressive modifications
of the Aegis Weapons System and the Standard Missile because the
Clinton Administration interpreted ambiguous language in the Treaty
that barred giving other systems - in this case an air defense
system - an anti-missile capability as applicable to sea-based
missile defenses under certain circumstances. The Clinton
Administration's determination allowed continued testing of the
system only if it was "dumbed down." Specifically, it precluded the
sharing of anti-missile targeting data with the interceptor from
off-board radar and sensors. This effectively halted progress until
the end of President Clinton's second term in January 2001.
Prior to President
Bush's first term, Ambassador Cooper and his fellow panel member
Admiral J.D. Williams urged Congress and the Department of Defense
to revisit the issue of evolving the AEGIS weapons system and the
Standard Missile-2 Block IV into an effective missile defense
system.
This appeal was rebuffed because of the Missile Defense Agency's
preference for advancing ground-based defenses at the expense of
sea-based and space-based options.
Consistent with this bias against the sea-based option, Under
Secretary of Defense Pete Aldridge announced the cancellation of
the sea-based terminal defense program, then called the Navy Area
program, on December 17, 2001.
This action was justified on the basis that the program was too
costly and not performing well.
Successful Test of
Sea-Based Terminal Defense Proves Program Critics Wrong
If Under Secretary
Aldridge's criticism was based more on performance concerns than
cost, then last month's test proved those concerns to be unfounded.
According to the Missile Defense Agency, the combined effects of
the modified Standard Missile-2 Block IV's hit-to-kill and blast
fragmentation kill capabilities produced an outcome in which "the
threat missile was completely destroyed."
The charge that
the sea-based terminal defense option would be excessively
expensive has also been shown to be overblown. According to the Navy, the test assets were
drawn from existing Navy programs, and therefore no new program was
established for this capability. In fact, procurement of the
system's components is complete, and existing funding supports
operations and the requirements for sustaining the system. The
recent test was conducted in response to direction from the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in 2003 after the cancellation of the Navy
Area program and was financed by the Navy at a
total cost of just $25 million in research and development funds.
The Need for
Congressional Guidance
The terminal
defense system successfully tested by the Navy last month provides
an immediate option for protecting U.S. coastal areas against
short-range missiles launched from ships. This is the conclusion of
a recent report by an independent panel of experts on missile
defense.
This is because the Standard Missile-2 Block IV is readily
available. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant
General Henry Obering, is committed to talking with the Navy and
Combatant Commanders about putting this kind of missile defense
capability to sea.
Congress, however, should not leave it to the Missile Defense
Agency to determine how to proceed.
Rather, Congress
should directly fund the Navy to continue testing the terminal
defense system it demonstrated last week and to provide modified
versions of the Standard Missile-2 Block IV to the fleet as soon as
possible. Further, it should direct the Department of Defense to
field the system in a manner that will provide a limited defense of
U.S. coastal areas against ship-launched, short-range ballistic
missiles and applicable areas of allied territories against
short-range missiles launched from land or sea.
Conclusion
When it takes more
than ten years to allow a weapon to demonstrate its utility, it can
undermine the confidence of the American people in the political
leadership's commitment to national security. This is particularly
the case when the delays are the result an irrational commitment to
an irrelevant arms control agenda or the petty bureaucratic
preferences of those managing alternative programs. The nation
could have had a sea-based terminal defense against ballistic
missiles years ago. The question now is, will it be too late? Only
Congress can reduce that risk. It can do so by directing that this
capability be put to sea as soon as possible and providing the
necessary funds directly to the Navy to achieve that outcome.
Otherwise, the American people will have every right to question
their faith in the political leadership's commitment to national
security.
Baker
Spring is F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
at The Heritage Foundation.