The Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee recently
approved a major maritime security bill that would start the
Department of Homeland Security down the road to 100 percent
scanning of cargo containers. There have also been attempts in the
House to add requirements for radiation scanning and the use of
seals on all containers before they enter the United States. These
approaches are misguided.
These approaches are efforts to thwart a
nuke-in-a-box scenario, but the nuke-in-a-box is an unlikely
terrorist tactic. If an enemy wanted to smuggle a bomb into the
United States, an oil or chemical tanker, roll-on/roll-off car
carrier, grain or other bulk vessel, or even private watercraft
would be a more logical and secure way to transport it, either
directly to the target (e.g., a port) or indirectly by landing it
in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean and then moving it across a
remote section of the U.S. border. Indeed, logic suggests, and most
experts believe, that a port is more likely to be attacked from
land than from sea, especially given the lack of visibility into
the domestic trade network, the lack of protection on the landward
side, and the ease of constructing explosive devices with domestic
resources. Terrorists would likely construct smaller items (e.g.,
biological agents) domestically and then deliver them through FedEx
or a similar carrier.
While nuclear smuggling is possible, so are
dozens of other attack scenarios. Overinvesting in countering one
tactic when terrorists could easily employ another is dangerously
myopic. Spending billions of dollars and deploying thousands of
personnel to screen every container is an extremely inefficient and
expensive way to stop terrorists from using cargo containers,
especially since they would probably use other means. Choosing to
screen every cargo container creates an easily bypassed bottleneck
that gives people a false sense of security. Furthermore, even if
these were good ideas, much of the technology, especially with
regard to seals, is fairly immature. Admittedly, the Senate
legislation asks for only three test sites, but why waste money on
testing a bad idea?
There is no apparent viable business case for
many of the proposed solutions for "hardening" shipping containers,
conducting 100 percent container scanning, or requiring expensive
tracking or monitoring devices. These measures would provide only
minimal utility at the cost of billions of dollars in new duties,
taxes, and operating costs. Such efforts would distract resources
from solutions that could measurably strengthen maritime security,
such as watching the back door of American ports through which
trucks, trains, and barges travel daily.
To safeguard the flow of global maritime
commerce, the United States needs to expand Coast Guard
capabilities, improve the sharing and use of commercial
information, and enhance international cooperation.
Inspecting every container that is shipped to
the U.S. makes no sense. Doing so would cost billions of dollars
and drown authorities in useless information. Moreover, it is not
clear why every container would require inspection. The
"nuke-in-a-box" scenarios deployed to justify such drastic measures
are highly implausible. Scanning and sealing every container will
not make Americans much safer but will increase the cost of just
about everything that American consumers buy. Already, the United
States evaluates every container coming into the country and
inspects the suspicious ones. It is not a perfect system-it can be
improved-but it is a reasonable precaution and reasonable
deterrent.
Alane
Kochems is a Policy Analyst for National Security
and James
Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for
National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.