Sea-power trends
in the Pacific Ocean are ominous. By 2025, China's navy could rule
the waves of the Pacific. By some estimates, Chinese attack
submarines will outnumber U.S. submarines in the Pacific by five to
one and Chinese nuclear ballistic missile submarines will prowl
America's Western littoral, each closely tailed by two U.S. attack
submarines that have better things to do. The United States,
meanwhile, will likely struggle to build enough submarines to meet
this challenge.
A misplaced
diplomacy leaves some U.S. Navy commanders reluctant to admit
publicly that China's rapidly expanding submarine force in the
Pacific is a threat, but if the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
and the latest Pentagon "Report on the Military Power of the
People's Republic of China" (MPPRC Report) are any indication, they
are undoubtedly thinking it. In a speech sponsored by the Asia
Society in Washington earlier this month, for example, Admiral Gary
Roughead, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, commented,
I'm always asked
about the Chinese threat and I say, 'It's not a threat,' because
you have to have two things to have a threat, and that's capability
and intent. There is no question that the PLA navy is modernizing
and building its capability and is moving very quickly, but what is
the intent?
The Pentagon has
already begun to answer this question, but it has yet to do so in a
way that shows it takes this threat seriously.
China's Intent
The QDR addresses
the question of China's intent:
Chinese military
modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in
response to central leadership demands to develop military options
against Taiwan scenarios. The pace and scope of China's military
build-up already puts regional military balances at risk. China is
likely to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric
military capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare;
counter-space operations; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced
integrated air Defense systems; next generation torpedoes; advanced
submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated
land and sea-based systems; and theater unmanned aerial
vehicles…
According to the
MPPRC Report's executive summary, China's specific intent is to
"build counters to third-party, including potential U.S.,
intervention in [Taiwan] Strait crises." The report continues,
"Deterring, defeating, or delaying foreign intervention ahead of
Taiwan's capitulation is integral to Beijing's strategy." To this
end, China is expanding its "force of ballistic missiles
(long-range and short-range), cruise missiles, submarines, advanced
aircraft, and other modern systems."
China's Sea-Power
Goals
If they are
curious about China's intent, Pentagon planners might look to
comments by General Wen Zongren, Political Commissar of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army's elite Academy of Military Science. The
MPPRC Report quotes General Wen as asserting that China must
"break" the "blockade [by] international forces against China's
maritime security… Only when we break this blockade shall we
be able to talk about China's rise… [T]o rise suddenly,
China must pass through oceans> and go out of the oceans> in its
future development." In fact, it is the explicit goal of the
Chinese Communist Party to "increase the comprehensive strength of
the nation."
The Chinese
navy-and its submarine fleet, in particular-is a key tool in
achieving that goal. The September 2004 promotion of Admiral Zhang
Dingfa, a career submariner, to Chief of Staff of the People's
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and a full seat on the Central Military
Commission was a clear signal of the primacy of submarine warfare
in China's strategy for the Asia-Pacific region.
Growing Submarine
Force
Admiral Zhang led
PLAN's submarine modernization program and oversaw the acquisition
of four modern Russian-built KILO subs, including the stealthy
Type-636. Orders for eight more are on the books, with the first
new boats to be delivered this month. That three Russian shipyards
are at work to fill China's orders for new submarines betrays this
build-up's urgency.
Admiral Zhang
isn't relying solely on the Russians. He has also increased
production-to 2.5 boats per year-of China's new, formidable
Song-class diesel-electric submarine. China is also testing a new
diesel-electric that the Defense intelligence community has
designated the "Yuan." The Yuan is heavily inspired by Russian
designs, including anechoic tile coatings and a super-quiet
seven-blade screw. The addition of "air-independent propulsion,"
which permits a submarine to operate underwater for up to 30 days
on battery power, will make the Song and Yuan submarines virtually
inaudible to existing U.S. surveillance networks-and even to U.S.
subs.
These new
submarines will be more lethal when armed with Russian SKVAL
("Squall") torpedoes, which can reach 200 knots. There are reports
that the SKVAL is already operational on some Chinese subs. As
well, Russia has also transferred the Novator 3M-54E three-stage
anti-ship cruise missile to China's submarine fleet for use against
aircraft carriers. Each Chinese KILO is armed with four of these
missiles.
America's Endangered
Submarine Supremacy
In February 2005,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented that the size of the
Chinese fleet could surpass the United States Navy's within a
decade. "It is an issue that the department thinks about and is
concerned about and is attentive to." Indeed, the U.S. Navy will
hold a series of major naval exercises in the Pacific this summer
that will involve four aircraft carrier battle groups, including a
carrier normally based on the U.S. East Coast. This will be the
first time the Navy has deployed an Atlantic Fleet carrier to a
Pacific exercise since the Vietnam War.
However, there is
little indication that the Pentagon is taking the Chinese submarine
challenge seriously. If it were, the QDR issued earlier this month
would have recommended that the erosion of the U.S. submarine fleet
come to an end.
But the QDR
envisions a "return to a steady-state production rate of two attack
submarines per year not later than 2012 while achieving an average
per-hull procurement cost objective of $2.0 billion." This means
that the U.S. sub fleet will continue to decline for another six
years, during which time America's industrial base for constructing
subs will further diminish and the per-unit cost of submarines will
jump past $2 billion, impelling further cuts in the fleet.
Of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet's 35 submarines (including three nuclear attack
submarines based in Guam during 2006), about a dozen are underway
at sea on operational duties at any one time. Under the QDR's most
optimistic estimates, Pacific Command's sub fleet will diminish to
about 30 by 2025.
Electric Boat
(EB), the nation's preeminent submarine contractor, has announced
plans to lay off 900 of its 1,700 designers and marine draftsmen
engineers over the next three years. This is a crisis. It will mark
the first time in 50 years that the U.S. has not had a new
submarine design on the drawing board. EB laid off nearly 200
submarine engineers and machinists in early February-and EB is the
only shipbuilder in the nation that maintains submarine designers.
As the build-rate for subs collapsed, EB used maintenance and
repair work to pay designers' salaries and maintain its staff of
highly-skilled steelworkers. But without new orders, EB will lay
off almost half of its workforce of over 5,000 over the next three
years
U.S. Navy
combatant commanders already require 150 percent of the attack
submarine days currently available, and these requirements will
only increase as the submarine force dwindles. If the United States
allows production to dwindle further, expertise will be lost and
costs will skyrocket for any new classes of submarines contemplated
for the post-2012 period.
Meanwhile, China's
fleet of modern attack submarines is growing: China already has ten
Song/Yuan/Kilo submarines in the Pacific today, over 50 older
Ming-class and Romeo boats, five Han class nuclear attack
submarines, and one Xia-class ballistic missile submarine. In
addition, China has 25 new boats under contract now; 16 are under
construction today, including a new class of nuclear attack
submarine designated the Type-093 and a new nuclear ballistic
missile sub, the Type-094.
The U.S. has three
submarines under construction today. Although the Navy's new
30-year shipbuilding plan calls for 48 nuclear attack submarines in
the fleet by 2035, the Navy's top submarine commander, Vice Admiral
Charles L. Munns, has testified before Congress that the Navy needs
at least 54 boats to fulfill current critical missions. This number
will rise as China's navy expands.
If the Navy does
not start launching new subs at the rate of two per year until
several years after 2012, the force would dip to a low of 40 in
2028, or 17 percent below the Navy's stated needs. And that rate
will not even permit the Navy to reach its sub-minimal target of 48
attack submarines until 2034. All of this assumes that the Navy
does not decommission ships faster than expected due to expanded
operations in coming years.
Recommendations for
the Administration and Congress
The United States
must return to building at least two, and preferably
two-and-a-half, new attack submarines per year beginning in FY
2009. The U.S. must begin procurement for long lead-time
components, such as nuclear reactors, in FY 2007 and 2008. These
steps are necessary just to hold U.S. subsurface strength
steady.
The Administration
should also work with key strategic partners in Asia to bolster
their fleets. Japan and India are potential submarine warfare
partners. Japan must also be encouraged to upgrade its
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surveillance systems.
Congress should
hold hearings into reports on the editorial pages of
DefenseNews (February 13, 2006) and Jane's Defence
Weekly (February 15, 2006) that the U.S. Navy has sabotaged
Taiwan's efforts to procure modern diesel-electric boats from U.S.
shipyards by hyper-inflating prices in order to keep U.S. yards
from building anything but nuclear boats. A robust Taiwanese fleet
would be a welcome relief as the U.S. Navy attempts to counter
increasing Chinese sub-surface fleet pressures in Asian littoral
waters. The United States and Japan also need an enhanced
partnership with Taiwan in airborne and subsurface ASW
reconnaissance and surveillance in waters under Taiwanese
administration.
John J.
Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in China Policy in the
Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.