After much
anticipation, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK or
South Korea) announced on February 4 the commencement of
preliminary negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA).
This announcement was heralded on both sides of the Pacific as
a milestone in elevating the relationship between the two allies to
a new level. An FTA with South Korea would undoubtedly advance U.S.
economic interests by expanding trade and investment
opportunities in South Korea, the world's 11th largest
economy, and contribute to America's global trade agenda. It
would also greatly enhance U.S. strategic objectives in Northeast
Asia by counterbalancing China's growing economic influence in
the region and by providing comprehensive support to the
U.S.-ROK alliance.
Yet, for all the
potential gains from an FTA, a number of substantial political
hurdles lie ahead. Unless leaders in both Washington and Seoul
properly manage these challenges, the two allies will be risking
not only a trade agreement, but also the future of the alliance due
to the short-term bilateral tensions that can be expected to arise
during negotiations.
The two governments
intend to conclude the agreement by the end of the year, which is
an important goal given that the U.S. President's trade promotion
authority expires in June 2007. Thus, Washington and Seoul should
focus not just on the intricate details of trade practices, but
also on preparing for the expected rise in tensions and the
domestic political battles that will challenge the viability of the
agreement.
Political
Challenges. As in any negotiation,
the differences, not the areas of agreement, will garner the most
attention. To its credit, Seoul has demonstrated its
willingness to open broad areas of trade to the United States,
but President Roh Moo-hyun's administration will likely face
fierce opposition at home from increasingly well-organized
special interests that will oppose aspects of an FTA. In such
a vibrant democracy with a citizenry reveling in its recently
earned public voice, the government needs to manage domestic
political pressures rather than fall victim to their whims.
South Korea's FTA with Chile, which was ratified only after more
than a year of intense political wrangling, is a warning of
the immense pressures awaiting the Roh government.
The Bush
Administration will face similar domestic pressures. The Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) barely passed Congress in
2005, and the upcoming mid-term elections increase the potential of
political grandstanding. Because the U.S.-ROK FTA surpasses CAFTA
in economic and political terms, the political fight is likely to
be that much greater.
Issues outside the
technical scope of an FTA will also cause friction, such as whether
or not products manufactured in the Gaesong Industrial Park-a
special economic zone in North Korea being run by South Korean
investments-should be included. Although minute in terms of total
trade volume, this is a topic of high sensitivity in both Korea and
the United States and highlights their starkly different
stances toward North Korea.
Given the almost
certain difficulties, both governments should commit early on
to make every effort to manage the process as smoothly as
possible. Presidents Bush and Roh are to be credited for their
initiative in advancing a U.S.-ROK FTA, which, if successful, will
be critical in setting the bilateral relationship on the right
track.
What the U.S. Should
Do. To ensure a positive
outcome, the Bush Administration should:
Immediately reach out
to the business community and key congressional
leaders to energize
support for an FTA. Given the short timeframe available for
completion of the agreement, the Bush Administration must
generate a broad base of support sooner rather than
later.
Quickly launch strong
public diplomacy campaigns in both South Korea
and the United States to explain the benefits of an FTA and
alleviate concerns. The controversy over the ROK- Chile FTA
indicates that South Korean political opposition to an FTA with the
U.S. will be loud, vociferous, and expressed in "anti-American"
terms. American leaders should be prepared to address these
misplaced nationalist sentiments, and South Korean leaders should
be equally prepared for any ensuing "anti-Korean" backlash in
America. Emotional outbursts, if not managed well, could overshadow
the legitimate debate over substantive issues and permanently sour
the relationship.
Continue to improve
the alliance through ongoing
strategic dialogue initiatives. The alliance, sealed by
American and Korean blood shed together more than a half-century
ago in defense of South Korea, has long served as a
fundamental pillar of the bilateral relationship. An FTA will
undoubtedly improve the relationship by enhancing economic
stability and prosperity for both partners. Yet an FTA alone cannot
sustain the alliance unless the two countries' current
differences, such as their policies toward North Korea, are
addressed jointly and constructively.
Consider admitting the
ROK to the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. It is U.S. policy to
separate immigration issues from trade negotiations.
Nevertheless, Korea's current status of non-inclusion is
clearly one of the most troublesome issues plaguing the bilateral
relationship. Moreover, the economic advantages of including the
ROK in the Visa Waiver Program would be tremendous and would
complement the benefits derived from an FTA. Freer movement of
goods, capital, and services should be synchronized with freer
movement of citizens between the two countries.
Conclusion.
A U.S.-ROK FTA
should not be seen as an antidote to alliance tensions that have
recently arisen, particularly over managing threats from North
Korea and the alliance's role in regional security. Nor will
it address the root causes of growing South Korean dissatisfaction
with the United States and its security policies. Indeed, FTA
negotiations will likely magnify "anti-American" sentiments in the
short run and unleash a backlash in America.
The FTA, however,
presents a unique opportunity for both countries to commit to
a new and more meaningful level of cooperation that will be of
profound mutual benefit and enhance the bilateral relationship
in the long term. Without question, an FTA is a political risk
worthy of significant American and South Korean effort.
Balbina Y. Hwang,
Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia
in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation