W. Bush will meet with Germany's new Chancellor Angela Merkel at
the White House on January 13. The summit will be an important
opportunity for Washington and Berlin to lay the groundwork for
greater cooperation in the war on terror and in confronting the
growing threat posed by rogue regimes such as Iran and Syria. The
meeting will also pave the way for an easing of tensions between
Germany and the United States in the wake of the Iraq war and a
modest warming of relations.
Merkel chancellorship does not herald a fundamental transformation
of the U.S.-German relationship. Washington must not raise its
expectations too high with regard to relations with Germany in the
post-Schroeder era. Merkel's ability to act on the international
stage will be heavily constrained by her coalition government and
the fact that many key positions in the new administration are held
by members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Some of the most
important portfolios in terms of U.S. interests are held by
remnants of the Schroeder government, which could barely disguise
its contempt for the Bush Administration.
And Angela Merkel
is no Margaret Thatcher. Merkel has so far demonstrated no appetite
for pushing for the kind of intensive economic reform that Germany
needs to reverse years of economic stagnation, and has actually
proposed higher taxes as her solution to the country's economic
woes. As a committed Euro-federalist, Merkel is also a firm
believer in closer political integration in Europe, despite the
rejection of the European Constitution by France and Holland. She
has reiterated the traditional German view of the central role of
the Franco-German axis in the European Union. In Merkel's words,
"Germany and France, with their notions about the social market
economy and globalization, should be driving forces."
Germany should be
viewed as an important ally in some areas critical to U.S.
interests, including the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the battle
against al Qaeda. However it should also be seen as a vocal
potential opponent of U.S. interests in other key areas, including
the scrapping of trade subsidies in the European Union, the
European Constitution, and the role of international institutions
and treaties. Germany's worldview, particularly in terms of public
opinion, is increasingly shifting away from that of the United
States. Germany has largely become a pacifist nation, with a
growing belief in submerging its national sovereignty and identity
within supranational organizations such as the EU and the United
Germany is a
mid-level power on the international stage with little global
projection of military might and limited geo-strategic influence
outside of Europe, and so it is natural that Germany's primary
foreign policy focus will not be the United States but her
relations with Europeans neighbors, principally France, Russia, the
UK, and Poland. Unlike Great Britain or France, Germany has few
global aspirations, with the exceptions of a UN Security Council
seat and expanding trade markets. The Germans consistently punch
below their weight on the world stage, despite possessing the
world's third largest economy. As Chancellor Merkel noted in a
recent news conference, "by European and global standards Germany
is in a state of decline."
adopt a hard-nosed approach in its relationship with Germany, an
approach fundamentally different from the close Anglo-American
special relationship. The U.S. should work with Germany on an
issue-by-issue basis, cooperating with Berlin on matters where
there are closely aligned common interests but strongly opposing
German policy in areas of disagreement.
German Policy on the
administration has pledged to strengthen Germany's ties to the
United States and reduce tensions between Berlin and Washington
after a disastrous period in U.S.-German relations since 2002.
However, the new government has signaled that it does not foresee a
significant shift in policy on most of the key issues that divide
the two countries, including Iraq, strategies for waging the war on
terror, expansion of the EU to include Turkey, reform of the UN
Security Council, the legitimacy of the International Criminal
Court, and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on global
Those expecting a
renaissance in U.S.-German relations are likely to be disappointed.
While the relationship between the White House and the Chancellery
will be more cordial, underlying policy tensions will remain. The
United States will continue to face a German public that is
overwhelmingly hostile towards U.S. foreign policy and which is
likely to remain so. Many Germans now see America as a threat to
world peace, rather than the defender of international security and
democracy. In a 2005 poll conducted for the German Marshall Fund
and the Compagnia di San Paolo, 60 percent of Germans stated that
it was "somewhat undesirable" or "very undesirable" for the United
States to "exert strong leadership in world affairs." Just 5
percent believed that U.S. leadership was "very desirable."
Despite her strong
support for the Iraq war, a hugely unpopular position in Germany,
Angela Merkel has pledged not to send German troops to Iraq. The
deployment of German soldiers to the Middle East would instantly
split the CDU/SPD coalition and force the fledgling government to
collapse. It would also be strongly opposed by many in Merkel's own
will continue the Schroeder government's policy of supporting Iraqi
stabilization and reconstruction efforts without a direct military
footprint inside Iraq. Germany has trained Iraqi police and units
of Iraqi engineers in the United Arab Emirates since May 2004. In
addition, Germany has provided $200 million in reconstruction funds
and forgiven 4.7 billion euros in Iraqi debt.
Merkel has also pledged continuing German support for the NATO-led
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,
which includes 1,600 German troops.
Merkel will be a strong supporter of institutions such as the
United Nations and the International Criminal Court, as well as
lofty global conventions such as the Kyoto Protocol. Her foreign
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has given the UN notice that the
new German administration will aggressively pursue a permanent seat
on the Security Council as part of the Group of Four (G-4) nations,
which also includes India, Japan, and Brazil.
So far, the United States has signaled its support for Japan's
application but has strongly opposed the broader G-4 application,
which is likely to be a significant source of tension between
Washington and Berlin in 2006.
and the War on Terror
In the war on
terror, President Bush should find in Merkel an important ally on
the international stage, though the White House should not
anticipate another Tony Blair, who has emerged since 9/11 as an
eloquent and powerful world leader in the fight against al Qaeda.
U.S.-German cooperation in the battle against global terror should
be stronger in the post-Schroeder era, especially in terms of
intelligence cooperation. There will still be tensions, however,
especially over the U.S. rendition of terror suspects and the CIA's
secret prison facilities.
source of tension is Germany's continuing refusal to extradite
terror suspects to face trial in the United States because of
German opposition to the use of the death penalty. This was
highlighted by German authorities' recent decision to release
convicted Hezbollah terrorist Mohammad Ali Hammadi, whose
extradition to the United States has been long requested.
In 1989, a German
court convicted Hammadi, a Shiite militant from Lebanon, of the
brutal killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem in the June
1985 Hezbollah hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome.
Stethem, singled out because he was an American serviceman, was
savagely beaten before being executed and dumped on the tarmac of
Beirut International Airport. Hammadi had been sentenced to life in
prison but was released in the face of strong opposition from the
U.S. Government in December 2005 and flown to Lebanon after serving
less than 19 years behind bars.
for the Bush Administration
- Maintain a
Balance of Power in Europe. The Paris-Berlin alliance will
continue to be a dominant force in German thinking under Angela
Merkel. However, the Merkel/Chirac dynamic will be weaker than the
Schroeder/Chirac partnership, with potential disagreements over
issues such as the China arms embargo. It will be in the U.S.
interest to maintain a healthy balance of power in Europe, and
where possible the United States should seek to strengthen
collective and bilateral ties between Berlin and close U.S. allies
such as London and Warsaw. As well, the U.S. should support a firm
German commitment to the NATO alliance, which will enhance
America's strategic influence in Europe.
- Call for a
Europe of Nation-States. The position of the Bush
Administration should be clear: it supports a Europe of democratic
nation-states where the principle of national sovereignty is
paramount and sacrosanct. Washington should give no encouragement
to the idea of resurrecting the European Constitution, which has
been firmly rejected in two of the European Union's leading
members. The development of an undemocratic, centralized Europe is
neither in the interests of the continent nor the United
- Foster Greater
U.S.-German Cooperation in the War on Terror. President Bush
should push for Germany to adopt a more robust role in the global
fight against terror, including a greater commitment to enhanced
defense spending. The President should also call for European
governments to cooperate with the United States by extraditing
terror suspects to face prosecution in the U.S. and by classifying
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. As well, he should seek a
clear explanation from the German government regarding the release
of convicted terrorist Mohammad Ali Hammadi.
- Increase the
Pressure on Iran. Washington and Berlin should push the
International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran's violations of
its nuclear safeguard agreements to the UN Security Council. The
United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other allies in Europe
should forge an international coalition to impose targeted economic
sanctions on Iran and strengthen military, intelligence, and
security cooperation with threatened states, such as Iraq, Turkey,
Israel, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates).
Such a coalition could help both to contain the expansion of
Iranian power and to facilitate military action, if necessary,
German Economic Reform. Washington must push aggressively for
Germany to adopt market friendly policies aimed at making its
economy more competitive, open, and dynamic. As Germany's largest
trading partner outside of Europe, with bilateral trade valued at
nearly $155 billion, the United States has a huge vested interest
in the health of Germany's economy. Germany is also a major foreign
investor in the United States, with investments worth just under
$150 billion, providing 800,000 U.S. jobs.
- Press for Real
Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The Franco-German
driven CAP is the world's largest barrier to free trade, accounting
for 85 percent of the world's agricultural subsidies. The CAP
consumes over half the EU's budget and costs EU taxpayers roughly
$46 billion per year.
The Bush Administration should call on the new German chancellor to
push for trade liberalization by the EU and to advance the reform
process for a trade policy that is hugely damaging to the United
States, the developing world, and Europe itself.
adopt a pragmatic, realistic approach toward working with Germany.
Realpolitik must be the order of the day. As the EU's largest
economy and member by population, Germany is simply too large a
player to be ignored. It is in the U.S. interest to actively engage
Berlin on an issue by issue basis, working together where agreement
can be reached. But Washington should be under no illusions that
the Germany of today is the same as that of Helmut Kohl or Konrad
Adenauer in its approach to transatlantic relations.
Gardiner, Ph.D., is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow, and
Hulsman, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs,
at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom in the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The