The election of
Angela Merkel as Germany's new chancellor and the departure of
Gerhard Schroeder provide an opportunity for Washington and Berlin
to lay the groundwork for greater cooperation in the war on
terrorism and in international efforts to address the growing
threat from rogue regimes such as Iran and Syria. Merkel's
ascendancy will pave the way both for an easing of tensions between
Germany and the United States in the wake of the Iraq war and for a
modest warming of relations.
Merkel chancellorship will not herald a fundamental
transformation of the U.S.-German relationship. Washington
must not raise its expectations too high with regard to relations
with Germany in the post-Schroeder era.
ability to act on the international stage will be heavily
constrained by the coalition nature of her government and the fact
that members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) hold many key
positions in the new German government. There also exists a huge
degree of uncertainty regarding the longevity of the Merkel
government, which could even collapse in the next two years amid
political infighting. New elections returning the SPD to power in
the near future remain a distinct possibility.
It should also be
acknowledged that Angela Merkel is no Margaret Thatcher. Merkel has
so far demonstrated no appetite to push for the kind of
intensive economic reform that Germany needs to reverse years of
economic stagnation. Astonishingly, she has proposed further
tax increases as her solution to the country's economic woes.
As a committed
Euro-federalist, Merkel is also a firm believer in closer political
integration in Europe, despite the rejection of the European
Constitution in France and Holland. She has reiterated the
traditional German view that the Franco-German axis must remain the
driving force of the European Union. In Merkel's words, "Germany
and France, with their notions about the social market economy and
globalization, should be driving forces."
Germany should be
viewed as an important ally in some areas critical to U.S.
interests, including the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the battle
against al-Qaeda. However, it should also be seen as a
vociferous potential opponent of U.S. interests in other key
areas, including the scrapping of trade subsidies in the European
Union, the EU Constitution, and the role of international
institutions and treaties. It should be acknowledged that the
worldview in Germany, particularly in terms of public opinion,
is increasingly shifting away from that of the United States.
Germany has become a largely pacifist nation, with a growing belief
in submerging its national sovereignty and identity within
transnational institutions such as the European Union and the
adopt a hardnosed approach in its relationship with Germany, which
is fundamentally different from the close Anglo-American
special relationship. The U.S. should work with Germany on an
issue-by-issue basis, cooperating with Berlin on matters of closely
aligned common interests but strongly opposing German policy in
areas of disagreement. Specifically, the Bush Administration
healthy balance of power in Europe. It is in U.S. interests
that no single power bloc dominate continental Europe. The
straitjacketed Franco-German axis driven by Gerhard Schroeder and
Jacques Chirac posed major problems for the U.S. in its efforts to
build support in Europe ahead of the Iraq war. The Bush
Administration should strongly back the new German government's
efforts to implement a more flexible policy in Europe by
strengthening its bilateral ties with pro-U.S. allies such as
Poland and Britain.
Europe of nation-states. Washington should strongly
welcome the death of the European Constitution in the French and
Dutch referenda. A Europe in which national sovereignty remains
paramount in foreign and security policy, in which states act
flexibly rather than collectively whenever possible, will enable
America to engage the continent most successfully.
greater U.S.-German cooperation in the war on terrorism.
Washington should both push Berlin to adopt a more aggressive role
in waging the global war on terrorism and call for a greater degree
of military, judicial, and intelligence cooperation between Germany
and the United States. President George W. Bush should express
strong disapproval of the recent German decision to free convicted
terrorist and murderer Mohammad Ali Hammadi and should seek a clear
explanation of his release.
Call for real
reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Franco-German-driven CAP is the world's largest barrier to
free trade, accounting for 85 percent of the world's agricultural
subsidies. The CAP consumes over half of the EU budget and
costs EU taxpayers roughly $46 billion a year.
Administration should call on Chancellor Merkel to push for
trade liberalization by the EU and advance the reform process for a
trade policy that is hugely damaging to the United States, the
developing world, and Europe itself.
Angela Merkel, age
51, became German chancellor on November 22, 2005. She is both
Germany's first female chancellor and its first leader from the
former East Germany.
After two months
of uncertainty following the inconclusive election of September 18,
2005, which favored neither the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
nor its leftist rival, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the
two parties managed to form a government by agreeing to a Grand
Coalition for the first time since 1969.
Much like Dr.
Doolittle's fabled pushmi-pullu, a creature with two heads and two
pairs of legs pulling in opposite directions, the governing
philosophies of the CDU and SPD are hopelessly at odds. It is
likely to be a government of lowest common denominators in terms of
policy. Nor did Merkel, in her desperate desire to be chancellor,
cut a good coalition deal-eight of the 14 ministries were given to
the SPD, including the foreign affairs, finance, and justice
portfolios. This is a curious result, given that the SPD "lost" the
such a combustible arrangement together will consume much of the
new chancellor's energy. While the Grand Coalition in theory
commands 448 of the 614 seats in the Bundestag, 51 members of the
coalition voted against Merkel's becoming chancellor even after the
CDU-SPD agreement was signed-not a good omen for political
stability. As new SPD Chairman Matthias Platzech put it after the
coalition agreement was signed, "This is a sober marriage of
It is impossible
to escape the conclusion that the new CDU-led Grand Coalition is
unlikely to accomplish very much. This definitely puts a
spanner in the works for the Bush Administration. As Samuel
Johnson put it, a second marriage is the triumph of hope over
experience. There is little doubt that the Bush Administration is
hoping for a second U.S.-German union, following the separation
over the Iraq war. However, given the election results, for
improved German-American relations to work, expectations must be
realistic; currently, they are not. The worst fate that could
bedevil the U.S.- German union is a false sense of expectation.
The Ghost of
Schroeder in Foreign Policy
to distance herself clearly from the foreign policy of her
socialist predecessor will be limited, with one or two notable
exceptions (such as the policy toward Russia) on which opinion
in the SPD is divided. It is striking that some of the most
important portfolios in terms of U.S. interests, including foreign
affairs and economic policy, are held by remnants of the Schroeder
government, which could barely disguise its contempt for the
influence will undoubtedly continue through the presence in the new
cabinet of Frank-Walter Steinmeier, his closest adviser and
long-time protégé. Steinmeier, who was Schroeder's
chief of staff, took over from Joschka Fischer as Germany's foreign
minister, widely regarded as the second most powerful position in
the German government. Steinmeier was extremely influential in
shaping Schroeder's international outlook and has pledged
"continuity" in German foreign policy, telling Fischer at his
inauguration ceremony: "Joschka, I will ensure that we continue
where we left off."
German Policy on the
The new Merkel
government has pledged to strengthen Germany's ties to the United
States and reduce tensions between Berlin and Washington after the
disastrous period in U.S.-German relations since 2002. However, the
CDU-SPD government has signaled that it does not foresee a
significant shift in policy on most of the key issues that divide
the two countries, including Iraq, strategies for waging the war on
terrorism, EU expansion to include Turkey, reform of the U.N.
Security Council, legitimacy of the International Criminal Court,
and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on Global
Those expecting a
renaissance in U.S.-German relations after the fall of Schroeder
will likely be disappointed. While the relationship between the
White House and the Chancellery will be more cordial, the
underlying policy tensions will remain. The United States will also
continue to face a German public that is overwhelmingly
hostile toward U.S. foreign policy and likely to remain so. Many
Germans now see America as a threat to world peace rather as than
the defender of international security and democracy. In a major
2005 poll conducted for the German Marshall Fund and the
Compagnia di San Paolo, 60 percent of Germans stated that it was
"somewhat undesirable" or "very undesirable" for the United States
to "exert strong leadership in world affairs." Just 5 percent
believed that U.S. leadership was "very desirable."
Despite her strong
support for the Iraq war, a hugely unpopular position in Germany,
Angela Merkel has pledged not to send German troops to Iraq. The
deployment of German troops to the Middle East would be a political
earthquake that would instantly split the coalition, causing the
fledgling government to collapse. It would also be strongly opposed
by many in her own party.
will continue the Schroeder government's policy of supporting
Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction efforts without a direct
military footprint inside Iraq. Germany has trained Iraqi civilian
police and units of Iraqi engineers in the United Arab Emirates
since May 2004. In addition, Germany has provided $200 million in
reconstruction funds and forgiven 4.7 billion euros in Iraqi
debt. Merkel has also pledged continuing German
support for the NATO-led International Security and Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which includes 1,600 German
Merkel will be a strong supporter of supranational
institutions such as the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court, as well as lofty global conventions such as the
Kyoto Protocol. Foreign Minister Steinmeier has given the U.N.
notice that the new German government will aggressively pursue a
permanent seat on the Security Council as part of the Group of Four
(G-4) nations, which includes India, Japan, and Brazil. So
far, the United States has signaled support for Japan's application
but has strongly opposed the broader G-4 application, which will
likely be a significant source of tension between Washington and
Berlin in 2006.
Germany and the War
In the war on
terrorism, President Bush should find in Merkel a significant,
though at times critical, ally on the international stage. The
White House should not anticipate another Tony Blair, who has
emerged since September 11 as an eloquent and powerful world leader
in the fight against al-Qaeda.
cooperation in the battle against global terrorism-especially with
respect to intelligence coordination-should be enhanced in the
post-Schroeder era. There will, however, be tensions, especially
over the U.S. rendition of terrorist suspects and allegations of
CIA secret prison facilities, as well as the American detention
camp at Guantanamo Bay.
Merkel has already
expressed strong opposition to Guantanamo, urging Washington to
shut it down. According to the German chancellor, "an institution
like Guantanamo can and should not exist in the long term. Other
ways and means must be found to deal with these prisoners."
source of tension between Washington and Berlin will be
Germany's refusal, because of German opposition to the death
penalty, to extradite terrorist suspects to face trial in the
United States. This was highlighted by the recent decision by
German authorities to release convicted Hezbollah terrorist
Mohammad Ali Hammadi, whose extradition to the United States
had been a long-standing request.
Hammadi, a Shiite
militant from Lebanon, was convicted by a German court in 1989 of
the brutal killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem in the
June 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome. Stethem,
who was singled out because he was an American serviceman, was
savagely beaten before being executed and dumped by the
terrorists on the tarmac of Beirut International Airport. Hammadi
was sentenced to life in prison in Germany but was released in
December 2005, despite strong opposition from the U.S.
government, and flown back to Lebanon after serving less than
19 years behind bars.
Thinking in Europe
Because Germany is
a mid-level power on the international stage with little global
projection of military might and limited strategic influence
outside of Europe, its primary foreign policy focus will be
relations with its European neighbors, principally France,
Russia, the U.K., and Poland, not the United States or the war on
terrorism. Unlike Great Britain or France, Germany has few global
aspirations, with the exception of a U.N. Security Council
seat and expanding trade markets. The Germans consistently punch
below their weight on the world stage despite possessing the
world's third largest economy. As Chancellor Merkel noted in a
recent news conference, "by European and global standards Germany
is in a state of decline."
Germany remains a
political and geographical leviathan at the heart of Europe, albeit
a shrinking one, with roughly a fifth of the EU population.
Together with France, it has for decades been the engine of the
policy of ever-closer integration in Europe and a key driver of the
"European project." German policy in the postwar era has been
overwhelmingly Euro-centric, built around the axis of the
Franco-German alliance. There is little evidence that this
will change under Merkel.
While Merkel has
extended the hand of friendship to British Prime Minister Tony
Blair and has promised an end to the freeze between the
Chancellery and Downing Street that prevailed under Schroeder,
it is clear that she sees France as Germany's closest ally in
Europe, and a majority of the German public shares this view.
According to a July Allensbach poll, 70 percent of Germans see
France as the country with which they want to cooperate most, ahead
of the United States at 63 percent.
Washington will be wooed by Berlin, but there will be no
divorce with Paris. Significantly, Merkel's first visit abroad
was to France and a meeting with President Jacques Chirac. Although
largely neutral in the tumultuous budget talks that marred the
final weeks of Britain's EU presidency, Merkel made no attempt to
challenge France's assertion that there should be no further reform
of the CAP until 2013. By all accounts, it looks like business as
usual in Europe.
between Merkel and the French president might not be as intimate as
the Schroeder- Chirac romance, and there will be significant spats
between the two over some issues. However, it will be a force to be
reckoned with in EU politics, and if Chirac's main challenger,
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, moves into the Elysee Palace in
2007, the Franco-German partnership will be further strengthened.
In addition to a
robust, though not entirely exclusive, partnership with
France, Merkel has signaled her intention, in the spirit of Mary
Shelley, to bring back to life the Frankenstein project of the
European Constitution. The constitution, gravely wounded if not
killed altogether by the "no" votes in the French and Dutch
referenda, is very much on the new German government's agenda.
In a statement soon after she came to power, Chancellor Merkel
Europe needs the
constitution…. [We] should not give up the constitutional
treaty…. We may allow a pause for further consideration and
second thoughts but we have made it very clear that we are willing
to make our contribution to whatever is necessary to see the
constitution come into force.
continuing the policy of the Schroeder government in her dealings
with France and the European Commission, Merkel is unlikely to
share her predecessor's passion for Russia and its President
Vladimir Putin. She is also likely to be more aggressive on human
rights issues, which will have implications for German and EU
policy toward China. This is good news for the Bush Administration,
which has strongly opposed European military cooperation with
significant change in German policy in Europe under Merkel is
likely to be the weakening of the Franco-German-Russian axis, which
Schroeder, along with Jacques Chirac, had worked hard to develop as
a counterweight to the U.S.-British alliance. According to
Wolfgang Schauble, "[T]he Paris- Berlin-Moscow axis is nonsense.
Many in the SPD didn't support it-it was a personal policy of
Schroder's and he won't be in charge any more."
sets off into the sunset as an adviser to Russia's state-owned
natural gas monopoly Gazprom, Merkel has already begun to
cultivate closer ties with Poland and other former client states of
the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe that remain deeply suspicious
of Moscow's ambitions. In a visit to Warsaw, Merkel stated that
"good, strategic relations are important to us but cannot be
developed over Poland's head." Having grown up under the
shadow of Russian tyranny in East Germany, Merkel has few illusions
when it comes to dealing with the former KGB agent at the helm of
Merkel is also far
less enamored than Schroeder with China, the other giant of the
East. Although bilateral trade with China now amounts to $62
billion per year, she has indicated that she will place a
higher priority on human rights issues in her dealings with
Beijing. Schroeder, together with his French counterpart, had led
efforts to lift the European Union's arms embargo on China.
Merkel has refused to back China's call for a lifting of the
embargo, and her new coalition has pledged that "dialogue on
democracy and human rights will be intensified" within the broader
"long-term strategy of partnership."
The Illusion of
German Economic Reform
Without doubt, the
single most important issue facing the new Merkel government-the
one upon which its political future will rise or fall-will be
dealing with the stagnant German economy. Angela Merkel comes to
power pledging to fix an economy characterized by moribund growth
rates and a spiraling deficit. In addition, despite spending
billions of euros, eastern Germany is falling ever further behind
the more affluent western part of the country.
In 2005, Germany's
gross domestic product grew by an anemic 0.9 percent. The German
government is set to break the EU's Stability and Growth Pact for
the fourth year running, posting a 2005 deficit of 3.3 percent.
Even the Hartz labor market reforms, the crowning achievement of
the outgoing Schroeder government, are performing as many expected
they would-that is, they are not working and in some cases are
actually making things worse. As this has been the
centerpiece of the battle to reduce joblessness, it is little
wonder that unemployment still stands at a formidable 11.2
monumental task of righting the long-suffering German economy, it
would seem that a quick start to dealing with the overriding
problem-weak domestic consumption-would be in order. Instead,
the centerpiece of the new coalition program-reducing the $41
billion budget deficit-may well make things worse.
To plug the gaping
hole in government expenditures, the new government is
resorting to the self-defeating policy of raising taxes, which is
hardly likely to encourage the cautious German consumer to spend
more. Ignoring her own party's election promise to cut taxes,
Merkel is instead raising the German value added tax (VAT) from 16
percent to 19 percent in 2007. In addition, earlier plans to cut
corporate taxes have been shelved indefinitely. Income tax for the
better off (those making above $300,000 per year) will also be
raised from 42 percent to 45 percent rather than cut as the
CDU advocated during the German election campaign.
The only bright
spot in this seemingly counterproductive program is that the
age for retirement will be raised gradually from 65 to 67 for those
workers born after 1970. However, this economic policy will not
cure what ails Germany. As Guido Westerwelle, head of the
pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP) wryly notes:
This orgy of tax
increases agreed by the Grand Coalition could just as easily have
been the work of the last government. We do not need new elections
for that. The bottom line is that the Grand Coalition's program is
not favorable to employment or the creation of jobs.
As the CDU
declared in its election manifesto, the last thing a high-tax
economy such as Germany's needs is higher taxes.
Given its economic wrongheadedness, the days of the new government
may already be numbered.
result itself was a ringing defeat for those espousing economic
reform of any kind. Chancellor Schroeder's Agenda 2010, a
program of tepid economic reforms, had left him deeply unpopular
with the country. Following a series of local defeats in the
laender (German states), in frustration, Schroeder called a snap
election despite the fact that he was running around 20 points
down in the polls at the time.
forthrightly proclaimed that she would go even farther than the
chancellor in reforming the economy. However, after her
pronouncement, her approval rating also fell out of the sky. Most
Germans intellectually accept that only significant reforms
can save their cherished global economic position, but this
election demonstrates that they are not yet emotionally ready to
vote for such a change. As on so many fronts, Germany has been slow
to adapt to the modern world. Rather, it wishes, like the
Titanic, to drift slowly toward the iceberg of economic
irrelevance without so much as a look ahead.
significant constraints imposed by the new coalition, Merkel was
forced to junk much of her needed but unpopular economic program in
an effort to come to terms with the SPD, come what may. This
short-term political thinking will do Germany no economic good
in the long term. American euphoria at the rise of Merkel and
the demise of Schroeder should be tempered by the basic fact that
the German economy is unlikely to turn around, given the
government's economic program. Unless there is a radical
change in policy, Merkel may not survive for long; nor can Germany
be expected to play a wider global role even if the government is
rhetorically more pro-American.
What the Bush
Administration Should Do
In dealing with
the Merkel government, the Bush Administration should:
healthy balance of power. The Paris-Berlin alliance will
continue to be a dominant force in German thinking under
Angela Merkel, but the Merkel-Chirac dynamic will be weaker than
the Schroeder-Chirac partnership, with potential disagreements over
issues such as the China arms embargo. It will be in the U.S.
interest to maintain a healthy balance of power in Europe. A
strengthening of collective and bilateral ties between Berlin and
close U.S. allies such as London and Warsaw, as well as a firm
German commitment to the NATO alliance, will enhance America's
strategic influence in Europe.
Call for a
Europe of nation-states. The position of the Bush
Administration should be clear: support for a Europe of democratic
nation-states where the principle of national sovereignty is
paramount and sacrosanct. Washington should offer no encouragement
for resurrecting the European Constitution, which two of the EU's
leading members have firmly rejected. The development of an
undemocratic, centralized Europe is in the interests of neither the
continent nor the United States.
greater U.S.-German cooperation in the war on terrorism.
President Bush should push Germany to adopt a more robust role in
the global fight against terrorism, including a greater commitment
to enhanced defense spending, and should call for European
governments to cooperate with the United States by extraditing
terrorist suspects to face prosecution in the U.S. and by
classifying Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The President
should seek a clear explanation from the German government
regarding the release of convicted terrorist Mohammad Ali
pressure on Iran.
Washington and Berlin should push the
International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran's violations of
its nuclear safeguard agreements to the U.N. Security Council.
The United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other allies in
Europe should forge an international coalition to impose targeted
economic sanctions on Iran and strengthen military,
intelligence, and security cooperation with threatened states, such
as Iraq, Turkey, Israel, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates). Such a coalition would help to contain the
expansion of Iranian power.
German economic reform.
Washington must push aggressively
for Germany to adopt market-friendly policies aimed at making
Germany a more competitive, open, and dynam-ic economy. As
Germany's largest trading partner outside of Europe with bilateral
trade valued at nearly $155 billion, the United States has a huge
vested interest in the German economy. Germany is also a major
foreign investor in the United States, with investments worth just
under $150 billion providing 800,000 U.S. jobs.
adopt a pragmatic, realistic approach toward working with Germany.
Realpolitik should be the order of the day. As the EU
member with the largest economy and largest population,
Germany is simply too important to be ignored. It is in the U.S.
interest to engage Berlin on an issue-by-issue basis, working
together where agreement can be reached.
should be under no illusion that the Germany of today is the same
as the Germany of Helmut Kohl or Konrad Adenauer in its approach to
transatlantic relations. Chancellor Schroeder did not create
anti-Americanism in Germany; he merely took advantage of it.
At the philosophical level, which is most enduring, there is
little doubt that a large majority of Germans do not agree with the
standard American view of the world. Attitudes regarding
international law, the efficacy of military force, and the
significance of multilateralism could hardly be further apart,
regardless of who the German chancellor or the U.S. President is,
and this philosophical gulf is unlikely to be bridged.
From an American
point of view, Angela Merkel's rise is a step in the right
direction, but it is only a very relative evaluation. On the vital
issue of Iran, as well as Germany's steering a more traditional
Adenauer-like course between Paris and Washington, with
Eastern Europe mattering more to Berlin than Putin's Russia, things
are likely to improve.
clearly intends to be more pro-American than Schroeder, she
strongly disagrees with the United States about Turkish accession
to the EU and shows no sign of bravely pushing to reform the Common
Agricultural Policy, a necessity if the developing world is truly
to be helped. Critically, she is trying to resurrect the EU
Constitution, something that is as dead as a dodo and certainly not
in American interests. Nor is any German government prepared
to reverse its position on Iraq.
relationship to work with Angela Merkel, it is important to see it
as it is, warts and all. The German-American alliance is less
than it used to be, unlikely ever to be fully mended, but it is
still very important to the transatlantic relationship. The United
States must learn to accept these ambiguities and paradoxes if the
partnership is to endure.
John C. Hulsman,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs
and Nile Gardiner,
Ph.D., is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
Toby Helm and Colin
Randall, "Merkel Alarms Blair over EU Constitution," The Daily
Telegraph, November 24, 2005.
For background, see
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., "Germany's Strategic Error in the War Against
Terrorism," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 953, January 4,
See Sara J.
Fitzgerald and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., "Achieving Trade
Liberalization: Why the U.S. Should Challenge the EU at
Cancun," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1686,
September 8, 2003, at
"Germany's Grudging 'Grand Coalition,'" The Washington Post,
November 15, 2005, at www.washingtonpost.com/
Steps Out of the Shadows," Financial Times, December 6,
Fund of the United States and Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy),
"Transatlantic Trends 2005: Topline Data," p. 4, at
(January 6, 2006).
Washington, D.C., "Fact Sheet: Germany and America-A Strong
Alliance for the 21st Century," November 12, 2004, at
(January 6, 2006), and "Fact Sheet: German Aid for the
Stabilization and Reconstruction of Iraq," March 11, 2005, at
(January 6, 2006).
International, "Merkel Revives UN Seat Demand," November 30, 2005.
See also Associated Press, "German Foreign Minister Steinmeier
Meets UN Secretary General Annan," November 28, 2005.
background on the debate over Security Council expansion, see Nile
Gardiner, Ph.D., and Brett D. Schaefer, "U.N. Security Council
Expansion Is Not in the U.S. Interest," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 1876, August 18, 2005, at
It should be noted that over a six-year period (1999 to 2004),
Germany had the best record among leading candidates for the
Security Council in terms of voting coincidence with the
United States in the U.N. General Assembly, at 55 percent, compared
with Japan which voted with the U.S. just 50 percent of the time.
However, German support for U.S. positions at the General Assembly
has been in overall decline, falling from 70 percent of votes in
1999 to 45 percent in 2004.
Richard Milne and
Guy Dinmore, "Merkel Urges U.S. to Close Detention Camp,"
Financial Times, January 9, 2005.
"Merkel Launches 'Loveless Marriage' to Revive Germany," The
Sunday Times, November 13, 2005, at
(January 6, 2006).
Realigning: German Foreign Policy," The Economist, July 16,
See "Merkel Forges
Strong Bond with Sarkozy on European Issues," Financial
Times, July 20, 2005.
Helm and Randall,
"Merkel Alarms Blair over EU Constitution."
"Britain Is No Model, Says Merkel's Man," The Sunday Times,
October 9, 2005, at www.timesonline.co.uk/
article/0,,2089-1817180,00.html (January 6, 2006).
"Germany Moves to
Mend Polish Ties," BBC News, December 2, 2005, at
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4491248.stm (January 6,
Stance on China Arms Export," Financial Times, November 12,
Controversial German Job Market Reforms," Deutsche Welle, December
28, 2005, at www.dw-world.de/dw/
article/0,2144,1837819,00.html (January 6, 2006).
Program Comes Under Attack," Deutsche Welle, November 13, 2005, at
www.dw-world.de/dw/article/ 0,2144,1774359,00.html (January
The Economist, November 19, 2005.
See John C.
Hulsman, "As the Dust Settles, It's Time to Grow Up,"
Handelsblatt, September 20, 2005.
analysis of the Iranian nuclear threat and how it should be
addressed, see James Phillips, John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and James
Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Countering Iran's Nuclear Challenge,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1903, December 14,
"Fact Sheet: Germany and America."