Immediately after
Hurricane Katrina struck, criticism began about how slow the
federal response was. However, response timelines from other,
similar natural disasters show that the military arrived at
least at its typical speed. There are three lessons that one can
learn from this response.
First, the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) did not slow or complicate the response.
Second,
while the
Department of Defense (DOD) has an adequate response mechanism for
normal disasters, it is not adequately organized and prepared to
respond to catastrophic disasters.
Third, the Defense Department
should restructure the National Guard so that it can respond more
effectively to catastrophic disasters.
Catastrophic disasters
are of a different magnitude. State and local resources are usually
destroyed or exhausted immediately, and the authorities may have
difficulty determining or communicating their needs. In this
situation, federal resources are needed immediately in
unprecedented amounts, despite possible difficulties. Currently,
the United States is incapable of this type of response.
How the "Normal"
Disaster System Works
The United States has a
tiered disaster response. Local leaders request state resources
when they have exhausted their own. In turn, states ask the federal
government for aid when their means are exceeded. Under the current
system, state and local authorities already have the ability to
communicate their requirements to the federal government
clearly and manage an effective short-term response.
In the majority of
disasters, state and local governments have sufficient
resources to respond to the crisis for the first few hours and days
while national resources are requested, gathered, and deployed.
Deploying federal resources to an area usually takes days,
especially in situations such as hurricanes. This is because
prepositioned assets must be kept far enough away from the
hurricane's likely path so that they will not be destroyed or need
to be rescued themselves.
The Pentagon's
Role
Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5 gives the Secretary of Defense
responsibility for providing military support to civil authorities
when the President directs him to do so and when such actions would
be: 1) consistent with military readiness, 2) legal, and 3)
appropriate.[1] Typically, this means that the Defense
Department provides civil support when local, state, and other
federal resources have been overwhelmed and the federal agency
responding to the disaster requests assistance. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has supervisory
responsibility for the civil support mission and for coordinating
with DHS. NORTHCOM has operational responsibility, which it
usually fulfills by creating a joint task force.
DOD's civil support
roles take three forms:
-
"Military Support to
Civil Authorities [MSCA] generally consists of support during
natural disasters, special security events…and man-made
incidents…which have evoked a presidential or state
emergency declaration."
-
"Military Support to
Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies consists of support provided to a
Lead Federal Agency…for activities such as
counterterrorism and counterdrug operations and may include
provision of equipment, training, or expert advice."
-
"Military Assistance
for Civil Disturbances occurs when the President employs the armed
forces to suppress insurrections, riots, or to assist the states in
maintaining law and order. In these situations, the Lead Federal
Agency supported by DOD is the Department of Justice."
[2]
In catastrophic
response, the Defense Department provides MSCA with National
Guard and military personnel and assets.
The National Guard's
Roles
The National Guard is
unique in that it is neither a purely federal nor purely state
organization. It can operate as either type of organization or at
times with aspects of both. It is this flexibility that makes the
National Guard so useful in responding to catastrophic
events.[3] Typically, the National Guard operates
under the direction of state and territorial governors. If there is
a disaster or civil disorder, a governor can order the Guard to
"state active duty." In this capacity,
National Guard
personnel operate under the control of their governor, are paid
according to state law, can perform typical disaster relief tasks
and are not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act
(that is, they can perform law enforcement functions).[4]
States usually have
agreements with other nearby states that permit National Guard
units from states outside the affected area to assist when
necessary. During Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard was
initially called up for state active duty.
State governors can
also activate and control National Guard units under 32 U.S. Code
§ 502(f), which gives governors the authority to activate
National Guard personnel without their consent to train or complete
missions in addition to annual or inactive duty training. Under
Title 32 status, National Guard personnel receive federal pay and
benefits as well as certain legal protections while under their
governor's control. Again, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply
when the National Guard is used under Title 32. In an attempt to
equalize pay and benefits for National Guard members
participating in Hurricane Katrina relief operations, it is
likely that the Secretary of Defense will retroactively convert the
units from state active duty status to Title 32 status.
The third way that
National Guard units can operate is under the control of the
President in a purely federal status (Title 10 status):
In this federal status,
National Guard personnel operate under the control of the
President, receive federal pay and benefits, and can perform
typical disaster relief tasks. However, in this status they
generally are subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus
Act: that is, they cannot perform law enforcement functions unless
expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.[5]
Congress has provided a
few such authorizations. They include the Insurrection Act[6] and 10
U.S. Code. § 12406. The Insurrection Act permits the President
to call up the National Guard to suppress an insurrection
against a state government, at the state government's request or to
enforce federal laws and suppress rebellion against U.S. authority.
Under 10 U.S. Code § 12406, the President can use the National
Guard in their federal status to suppress rebellion and
execute U.S. laws. Troops were not used under this status during
the Hurricane Katrina response.
Defense Department and
National Guard Responses in Previous Disasters
Although the response
will never be as rapid as people would like, the Defense Department
sent aid to Katrina victims at speeds similar to what it has done
in the past. States are able to preposition-or at least immediately
call-National Guard troops to state active duty, while it typically
takes the Defense Department a few days to move personnel and
assets into an area. Depending on the severity and how the
President describes the event, National Guard units' status may be
changed or more members called up under Title 32 as time
progresses.
For instance, in 2004,
when Hurricane Ivan became the third hurricane to hit Florida and
the Gulf Coast in five weeks, it took two days for the Army to
activate its 24-hour crisis action team (September 18, 2004).
National Guard troops had been prepositioned on September 9, 2004
(two weeks before landfall), and the Alabama governor deployed them
the same day as the hurricane made landfall.
In 1992, the Pentagon
also faced criticism for its slow response to Hurricane Andrew.
Early in the morning on August 24, 1992, the Category 4
hurricane struck south Florida. That same day 2,000 National
Guard troops were deployed, and the Florida governor requested
engineers from the Army Reserve. (This request was denied because
he had not called out the National Guard engineers first.) Also on
August 24, the Coast Guard Reserve was called up and given 48 hours
to report for duty. Three days later, the first Army troops
arrived. On August 29, 6,000 Army troops and 1,000 Marines arrived
to aid in rescue operations. In response to criticism of its
dilatory response, the Pentagon responded that it could have
delivered aid on August 24, but did not because civilian leaders
had not yet ordered a large-scale federal response, which they did
on August 27.
These examples
demonstrate the flexibility of the National Guard and its ability
to respond quickly to disasters. They also show how clear
communication and requests for aid must be received or else
the Defense Department will not and, to some extent, cannot
act.
Hurricane Katrina
Response Timeline
Prior to Katrina's
landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2005, NORTHCOM began
implementing alert and coordination procedures. In addition, the
Defense Department assessed what resources would be needed and
started deployment preparations. Most deployments began after
President Bush declared a state of emergency on August 30 and an
Incident of National Significance on August 31. (The National
Response Plan and the Defense Department's Homeland Security
Doctrine both expect the DOD to wait for such formal
presidential pronouncements before acting.) NORTHCOM activated
Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-Katrina) on August 30. By August 31,
the Defense Department has started medical airlift operations
and the USS Bataan had arrived off New Orleans. As the
situation deteriorated, the DOD sent in additional active duty
ground forces, including elements of the 82nd Airborne and 1st
Cavalry, which arrived on September 5. A second amphibious assault
ship and an aircraft carrier arrived on September 6. The Defense
Department had 42,990 National Guard members, 17,417 active duty
personnel, 20 ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed-wing aircraft in
the affected area by September 7.[7]
Creating a Defense
Department Catastrophic Response Capability
Only during
catastrophic events would state and local emergency responders
become so overwhelmed that a large-scale military response
would be needed. Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that the Defense
Department has a way to go before it is ready to be the primary
responder in a catastrophe. For instance, Deputy Defense Secretary
for Homeland Defense Paul McHale cited a lack of
integration between National Guard plans and NORTHCOM plans.
"The planning of NORTHCOM was first-rate but was not well
known to the National Guard. The Joint Staff didn't have a grasp of
the National Guard's plans."[8] The Defense Department must first resolve
the poor coordination between the National Guard and
NORTHCOM and then reconfigure the National Guard for
catastrophic response.[9]
Making catastrophic
response a DOD mission is the right action to take. Federal
agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector are
unable to maintain the capacity and resources necessary for
immediate catastrophic response. Asking them to do so would be
counterproductive and ruinous. For example, asking hospitals to
keep empty beds available is counterintuitive. However, the Defense
Department has a need for such a capacity. For instance:
The Pentagon could use
response forces for tasks directly related to its primary
warfighting jobs-such as theater support to civilian governments
during a conflict, counterinsurgency missions, and postwar
occupation-as well as homeland security.[10]
These units, as with
all military forces, should be used only for matters of vital
national interest. They could support major foreign operations and
respond during catastrophic events in the United States.
Furthermore, using the military in this way would neither violate
the Posse Comitatus Act or other constitutional principles nor
require altering any existing laws.
Because of its
flexibility in working under state or federal control, the National
Guard is the best choice to task with this mission. The Defense
Department would need at least six divisional units in order to
have one always on active duty and ready for rapid response
missions in the United States or abroad. Furthermore, the Air
National Guard should be self-deployable and organized into
self-contained units. The units should be sized so that there are
always forces training, ready for deployment, and recovering from
deployment. In addition, the active unit should belong to
NORTHCOM, which can then use it for experimentation, training,
and planning purposes. This would give NORTHCOM immediate access to
troops in the case of a large-scale disaster and provide troops for
training exercises. A National Guard that is prepared for a
catastrophe would have robust medical, security, and critical
infrastructure response units.
Out of all catastrophic
response areas, the United States is weakest in its ability to
respond to a medical catastrophe (e.g., one with at least
200,000 casualties). The military's current field hospitals take
days to weeks to deploy and set up. Not only is this medical
support too small and slow for the task, it is also ill suited. The
Defense Department needs a medical response capability that can
handle thousands of casualties with little notice; deploy in hours;
assess and convert existing structures, such as schools, into
medical facilities; and deliver mass care to people where they are,
rather than having to transport them to clinical
facilities.
Ad hoc military
responses to events such as large-scale terrorist attacks in
civilian communities can be disastrous. The Pentagon should have an
established response capability that involves specially
trained and equipped personnel who can and have worked with
civilian agencies. These troops would also be able to conduct
counterinsurgency operations in urban terrain abroad.[11]
As currently
structured, the military is not designed to restore critical
national infrastructure after a catastrophic event in the United
States or overseas. However, it is a need that the DOD has
already encountered. Attempts to fix Iraq's infrastructure after
the war were poorly planned, cobbled-together attempts at
reconstitution. Domestically, the means to reconstitute critical
infrastructure are present. A combination of the Defense
Department's security assets, the Army Corps of Engineers'
expertise in large-scale contracting under difficult conditions,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's experience in
conducting needs assessment and coordinating community recovery
could provide an effective infrastructure protection and recovery
force for catastrophic events, regardless of where they
occur.
Role of the Private
Sector
NORTHCOM and, more
generally, the Defense Department also need to consider how to use
the private sector in responding to catastrophic events. The DOD
currently uses contractors to fulfill many of its responsibilities
in post-conflict situations. The Pentagon should also consider
where private sector entities can contribute to catastrophic
response. For instance, during Hurricane Katrina, patient tracking
during evacuations from medical facilities was a large problem. The
Transportation Command is designed to use military evacuation
protocols, but the civilian hospital patient records systems did
not mesh well with the Transportation Command systems. In addition,
civilian medical facilities also voiced privacy and liability
concerns in sharing information (e.g., privacy violations under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). This is one
area in which cooperation with the private sector could be very
beneficial during the next catastrophe.
Determining the Right
Force Mix
The Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) is a congressionally mandated review, conducted
every four years, of the Defense Department's forces, resources,
and programs. It outlines a strategy for addressing critical issues
such as budget and acquisition priorities, emerging threats,
and Pentagon capabilities for the next 20 years. The 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review is a unique opportunity for the Pentagon
in four ways. It is the first wartime QDR. It is the first time the
Secretary of Defense has had the opportunity to conduct a
second QDR. It is also the first QDR undertaken when budgets are
consistently growing, and the first QDR in the post-9/11
environment. During this review, Secretary Rumsfeld and his
planners should determine how to structure the National Guard so
that it can respond to catastrophic events. The recommended force
size that comes out of this QDR should be sufficient to have one
unit always on active duty and ready for immediate deployment. It
should also allow for the constant and necessary rotation of troops
preparing and training to respond to a contingency.
What Should Be
Done
In preparation for the
next catastrophic event, several changes should be made to the
current system.
-
The Pentagon should use the QDR to
determine the appropriate force size for responding to a
catastrophe. This will probably consist of approximately six
division-sized National Guard units, which would allow for constant
rotation of units through training, full readiness, and
recovery from deployment.
-
These dedicated
National Guard forces should be placed under NORTHCOM control for
rapid disaster response and training.
-
The QDR should address
ways in which the private sector can assist and what structures
need to be in place so that response plans can work together
effectively.
Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina was a
test of the nation's preparedness for a catastrophic event,
whether natural or manmade. The results of this test are troubling.
Although the formation of DHS and NORTHCOM did not hinder the
response, better coordination among all the moving parts was
clearly needed. Furthermore, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the
absence of a comprehensive, all-hazards national system to respond
to catastrophic events and the fact that the military is not
properly configured to provide aid during such
catastrophes.
Alane
Kochems is a Policy Analyst for National Security in
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.