Japan
has recently begun a process to transform its security strategy and
envision a new role for itself that accepts larger regional and
global responsibilities, a bold change from its insular
self-defense security posture of the past half-century.
Security cooperation and strategic coordination on a variety of
issues-including North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, Iraq, and the
war on terrorism-are potent examples of Japan's new security
outlook.
Major
disputes over trade and economic issues no longer dominate the
bilateral discourse as they have in the past, and President George
W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi seem to have forged a
closer personal relationship than have previous leaders of the
two countries. The conventional wisdom among observers of
U.S.-Japan relations on both sides of the Pacific is that the
bilateral relationship today is the best that it has been since the
alliance was created in 1954.1
Yet,
while the United States and Japan have embarked on a new alliance
interaction, unhindered by many of the difficulties and tensions of
previous eras, it would be a mistake for either country to become
complacent about the present positive dynamic. The two countries
have yet to fully address and resolve important issues-such as the
strategic and practical ramifications of Japan's new security
outlook in the region-that pose significant challenges to the
present harmonious relationship.
Both the
United States and Japan need to continue to strengthen the alliance
and to utilize the current atmosphere of good will to tackle
upcoming challenges. Doing so will ensure the development of a
genuine global partnership that will endure well into this
century.[1]
Japan's
Evolving Security Role
Since
the end of World War II, Japan has maintained a limited and
insular defense strategy within the confines of the U.S.-Japan
alliance. During the Cold War, Japan's security priorities became
focused on deterring and defending against a "limited or
small-scale invasion" by the Soviet Union while relying on the
United States for nuclear deterrence and maintenance of broader
regional stability, such as in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean
peninsula.
With the
end of the Cold War, Japan's relationship with the United
States began to change as skepticism grew on both sides of the
Pacific about the viability of, and even the need for, the U.S.-
Japan alliance. In Japan, public support for the alliance began to
wane as the perceived costs of hosting U.S. forces increased and as
security threats to Japan declined with the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
In the
United States, after a decade of wariness created by bilateral
trade and economic disputes in the 1980s that contributed to
mistrust and suspicion in both countries, questions were
raised about the utility of the alliance in the face of growing and
increasingly vocal opposition to the U.S. military presence in
Japan. American skepticism about Japan's value as an ally was
reinforced by its lackluster response to the 1991 Gulf War, to
which Japan contributed $13 billion but no troops.
Further
doubts were raised by Japan's unwillingness in 1994 to support
United Nations sanctions in the face of North Korean threats to
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Tokyo
expressed even greater reluctance to discuss potential military
cooperation with the United States in the event of conflict with
North Korea. This cautious Japanese response to contingency
military planning in the face of a potentially serious crisis
called into question the very viability of the alliance in the
post-Cold War era.
Largely
as a response to the difficulties and disappointments
encountered during this period, and at the urging of the United
States, Japan took initial steps in the mid-1990s to transform its
security relationship with the United States. In 1995, Japan
revised its National Defense Program Outline to include "situations
in areas surrounding Japan" and contributions to international
peacekeeping as integral parts of its defense strategy. In
1997, a revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
was a well-intentioned attempt to rejuvenate the alliance, but
it lacked details on how Japan might support U.S. forces in
the context of military operations. This omission was due largely
to Japanese reluctance to approach the sensitive issues of
constraints under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, as well
as public trepidation about a more active security role for
Japan beyond its own shores.
Japanese
optimism for a period of post-Cold War peace and stability gave way
after September 11, 2001, to new fears about unconventional threats
such as terrorism. This new threat, combined with North Korea's
test launch of a Taepo Dong missile over Japan in 1998 and the
re-emergence of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in 2002,
acutely increased Japan's sense of vulnerability.
In
addition, anxieties about China's rapidly expanding economic,
military, and political power and its aggressive incursions into
Japan's territory increased Japan's sense of urgency in
re-evaluating its defense strategy and addressing these new
security realities. Finally, due to the bitter experience of
receiving little recognition but much criticism for its "checkbook
diplomacy" in the 1991 Gulf War, Japan desired a stronger and more
proactive response to the American-led global war on terrorism
and in the Iraq War.
Thus, in
the months after September 11, Japan took bold and concrete
measures to show strong support for its ally and to contribute more
actively to international security. Significant milestones in the
transformation of Japan's security strategy were the decision in
2001 to send naval support to the Arabian Sea to assist coalition
forces in the war in Afghanistan[2] and the historic decision in
2003 to deploy 1,000 Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq to aid in
reconstruction-Japan's most ambitious military operation since
World War II. In December 2003, Japan also decided to cooperate
with the United States on missile defense.[3]
Two
significant reports released in 2004 were additional important
developments in Japan's evolving security identity. The ruling
Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Defense Policy Studies
Subcommittee and the Council on Security and Defense
Capabilities (the Araki Commission)[4] both released reports that
recommended a fundamental overhaul of Japanese defense
policies.
These
recommendations provided the basis for the 2005 National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG),[5] which addressed issues such as the new
security environment, counterterrorism, and more active roles for
Japan in international peacekeeping operations. It also identified
North Korea and, for the first time, China as specific security
concerns, emphasizing Japan's need to deal effectively with
ballistic missile and terrorist attacks, along with maintaining the
ability to respond to invasions of Japanese islands and intrusions
into its airspace and territorial waters.
In order
to carry out these newly defined roles effectively, the NDPG
recommends the creation of a multifunctional military capability by
streamlining the SDF under a centralized command
structure, upgrading intelligence and communications
functions, and creating a rapid reaction force capable of
responding to new threats such as terrorism. Finally, a key
component of the NDPG is the emphasis on strengthening the
U.S.-Japan alliance, including the joint development of a
missile defense system and greater intelligence gathering
and sharing.
While
groundbreaking in its scope, the NDPG is deficient in some areas.
For example, it does not provide a specific road map for conducting
joint operations, either among the three Japanese military
services or with the United States. Nor does it detail specific
strategies, such as how to address terrorist threats. Furthermore,
the report's continued emphasis on an "exclusively defense
oriented defense" (senshu boei) continues the ambiguity that makes
it difficult to address evolving security threats in the region
squarely.
Ultimately,
the NPDG stops short of fully addressing the politically sensitive
issue of collective self-defense. As long as Japan continues
to interpret Article 9 as prohibiting collective self-defense
actions, especially with the United States, it impedes Japan's
ability to participate fully in regional and global operations and
missions.
Regional
Concerns
The NDPG
clearly signals that Japan is ready to move away from a purely
self-defense security strategy, but regional concerns pose
challenges to achieving a smooth transformation. Both China and
North Korea have rejected being characterized as security
concerns, despite pursuing aggressive and threatening actions.[6] Given
such developments, it is not surprising that Japan's restraint has
given way to a pragmatic evolution of its defense
policy.
Yet it
would be wrong to portray Japan's new stance as confrontational or
as a return to the country's militaristic past. Japanese reactions
to incidents involving China and North Korea actually reveal
that Japan's responses have not been particularly tough by
international standards. In fact, Japan's efforts to address these
regional threats are part of its overall goal to regain its
status as a "normal" nation and to protect its national
security and interests.
Regrettably,
more than a half-century after the end of World War II, Japan's
historical legacy remains an unresolved and nettlesome issue. The
issue erupted recently in violent anti-Japanese demonstrations
throughout China, ostensibly over the publication of a new Japanese
history textbook that critics claim glorifies Japan's colonial and
wartime activities. However, the Chinese demonstrations
were clearly politically motivated and directed by the leadership
in Beijing to exploit Japan's wartime guilt to block Japan's bid
for a seat on the U.N. Security Council.
Nor is
the scope of this issue limited just to China. Similar anti-Japan
protests erupted in South Korea over the textbook issue and a
recent vote by a Japanese prefecture to claim Tokdo/Takeshima,[7] a
historically symbolic island located halfway between the two
countries in the Sea of Japan/East Sea.[8] While demonstrations in a
free and open society such as South Korea differ from those in
communist China, the implications for the United States may
actually be more serious.
Tension
between two of America's most important Asian allies comes at
a time of increasing uncertainty in U.S.-South Korean relations. In
the near term, this has grave implications for finding a diplomatic
solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, occurring at precisely
the time when regional cooperation is needed more than ever with
the ongoing six-party talks. In the long term, a growing sense of
alienation from Japan and misplaced suspicions about Japanese
motives for a stronger defense posture among South Koreans could
drive a wedge in the U.S.-Korea alliance. Such a development
would only benefit the strategic interests of North Korea and
China, further threatening U.S., South Korean, and Japanese
interests.
Ultimately,
without a thorough domestic debate in Japan that once and for all
confronts its past, the evolution of Japan's security outlook
toward a normal status will continue to be challenged by
regional neighbors. If Japan can address its historical legacy
in a responsible and transparent fashion, then it will effectively
eliminate the ability of governments in Beijing, Pyongyang,
Seoul, and elsewhere to manipulate the history issue for their
own domestic and international political purposes.
Furthermore, it will allay suspicion that a more robust
Japanese security strategy poses a threat to countries that
share the same interests in promoting peace and stability in the
region.
Challenges
for the United States and the Alliance
Despite
these obstacles, Japan's new security outlook is a positive
contribution to the bilateral relationship. This was reiterated in
the February 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
(SCC) or "2 + 2 Meeting,"[9] which produced a joint declaration that
went further than any previous statements by articulating a
direction for the alliance and a set of common strategic goals.
These goals range from supporting peaceful reunification of
the Korean peninsula and ensuring stability in the Taiwan
Strait to maintaining and enhancing the stability of global energy
supplies.
Much
attention was focused on the declaration's call for both
countries to take steps to "encourage the peaceful resolution of
issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue." While
incorrectly interpreted by many in Asia and the United States as a
Japanese commitment to contribute actively to the defense of
Taiwan, the statement did go further than any previous joint
statement on this issue. The statement does not necessarily ensure
U.S.-Japan regional security cooperation, but it does signal a new
willingness by Tokyo to align itself more closely and openly with
Washington on regional issues.
Nevertheless,
certain obstacles pose challenges to the continuation of the
alliance in its present positive condition. Many will be
encountered during the next and crucial stage of development
of Japan's new security outlook: the implementation and operational
phase. For example, a true test of Japan's willingness to support
regional military operations will come in future commitments to
specific shared roles and missions, such as operations to
enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative, to deal with North
Korean aggression, or to handle a Taiwan contingency. Without
concrete commitments on how to carry out the common strategic
objectives articulated in the 2005 SCC joint declaration, the
impetus for adopting a new defense strategy under Japan's new NDPG
could lose momentum and meaning.
Other
obstacles are political. Japan's dramatic shift in security
strategy was driven largely by the leadership of Prime Minister
Koizumi, his partnership with President Bush, and their
coordinated response to September 11. As the momentum for a
concerted and sustained response to terrorism fades, other
political pressures in both countries may dilute popular support
for bold new security initiatives. In addition, both Koizumi and
Bush will be battling lame-duck status. Koizumi's term will end in
September 2006, when he will step down as chairman of the LDP,
effectively resigning as prime minister. While Bush's term will
last three more years, Iraq, the Middle East, and China will likely
draw attention away from strengthening the U.S.- Japan
relationship, which was a priority during the first Bush
Administration.
In
addition, both leaders face domestic political battles, with
Koizumi's promise to overhaul the postal system and Bush's goals of
reforming Social Security and the tax system. Their focus on these
domestic issues will likely divert public attention and focus away
from security issues. For Prime Minister Koizumi, expending his
wealth of political capital on domestic issues makes
significant movement on controversial security issues even more
challenging.
With
Japan's leadership unknown after Koizumi steps down, Japan's
ability to continue evolving its security outlook at the current
pace is uncertain. What is certain is that the U.S.-Japan alliance
will be a central political issue in the Japanese elections next
September. The U.S. military presence in Okinawa has been and will
continue to be a political lightning rod. Governor Shigefumi
Matsuzawa has already expressed strong opposition to the U.S.
Army's plans to relocate 1st Corps headquarters from Fort Lewis in
Washington State to Camp Zama in the Kanegawa Prefecture. Replacing
the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will
also be a flash point for public opposition.
Given
the uncertainty over Japan's future political leadership, it
is also unclear whether or not the momentum to address the highly
sensitive issue of reinterpreting the constitution's Article 9 will
continue. To date, significant changes in Japan's security policy,
such as the SDF deployment to Iraq, have been on an ad hoc
basis. As Japan begins to ponder action that confronts
collective self-defense issues, the debates will become far
more political, and implementation of new actions will become more
entangled in legislative and technical procedures.
Finally,
a significant challenge for both the United States and Japan is not
to allow expectations to outpace realities. The current atmosphere
of unprecedented positive support for the alliance should not
eclipse the realization that long-term goals cannot be achieved in
the short term.
For
example, some in Washington may be under the unrealistic assumption
that, because of the relatively rapid pace of changes adopted
by the Japanese defense establishment, activist policies such as
shoulder-to-shoulder combat operations will be embraced as quickly
after remaining political obstacles such as the ban on
collective security defense are removed. Yet without established
rules of engagement for hostile actions, the relative
immaturity and lack of combat experience of the Japanese Defense
Agency and the SDF will make active engagement almost impossible in
the short term. If such unrealistic expectations are not
managed properly, the resulting disappointment could damage the
alliance, particularly during a time of crisis.
What
the United States Should Do
Asia is
undergoing rapid change, and recent developments command careful
attention by the United States. Japan has begun the challenging
task of reassessing its position and status in the region and
transforming its security posture to meet emerging threats more
effectively.
The
United States should do all that it can to support the process
of "normalizing" Japanese security policy within the framework of
the U.S.-Japan alliance while ensuring that Japan's evolving
role in Asia continues to contribute to peace and stability in the
region. Specifically, the United States should:
-
Prioritize
the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation scheduled for later this year. One of the most
important tasks in the guidelines should be the building of joint,
bilateral interoperability with a focus on improving command
and control systems and information sharing to allow the U.S.
military and the SDF to work together more closely.
Tokyo
has already targeted intelligence sharing, technology and
equipment exchanges, and operational coordination as goals for
enhanced cooperation over the next 10 years, but the details on how
Japan and the United States will carry out operational cooperation,
particularly in "areas surrounding Japan," need to be specified.
The future of U.S. bases, particularly in Okinawa, in the context
of the Pentagon's Global Posture Review should also be
addressed.
-
Encourage
Japan to continue strengthening the operational capabilities of the
Japanese Self Defense Forces as part of the new Guidelines
for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including developing and
deploying an integrated missile defense architecture with the U.S.
These should include expansion of regional air and sea power
capabilities. Transparency in this process should be encouraged to
instill confidence and minimize suspicions in neighbors such
as China and South Korea.
-
Pursue
an expanded strategic dialogue with Japan that goes beyond the
Pentagon's relationship with the Japanese Defense
Agency. The bilateral security alliance will remain
incomplete until both sides actively engage the non-defense
scientific community and industry in Japan to further the
application of science and technologies to national defense
programs. Efforts to link the civilian and military sectors in
Japan can be encouraged through concerted efforts by U.S. defense
officials and industry counterparts, and their cooperation can
also serve as a productive model for Japan.
One way
to do so is to recommend that U.S. Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff travel to Japan to discuss with his Japanese
counterparts methods of improving international cooperation to
strengthen homeland security for both the United States and Japan.
Secretary Chertoff has already spearheaded a multifaceted approach
to security, integrating intelligence, technology, and law
enforcement activities overseas, as evidenced in his
successful trip to Europe in May. Active engagement on
these issues can take the security alliance with Japan to new
levels of cooperation and coordination.
-
Express
support for Japan's initiative to re-examine Article 9 of its
constitution to allow for collective self-defense.
Reinterpreting the constitution to permit Japan to come directly to
the aid of its ally will contribute to American and international
security. However, Washington should also make clear that any
constitutional reinterpretation is a Japanese domestic issue
and should be initiated, conducted, and achieved through Japanese
leadership. The leadership should also be urged to proceed with
this process transparently through public debate so as to allay
regional misperceptions about Japanese motives.
-
Urge
the Japanese leadership to address Japan's historical
legacy. While the United States should not become involved
in historical disagreements between Japan and its neighbors,
it is in Washington's interests to promote a resolution of this
issue that is led by Japan. Doing so in a responsible fashion will
remove obstacles to improving relations and promoting cooperation
between Japan and South Korea, two of America's most critical
allies in Asia.
-
Revive
and expand the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
(TCOG) to address issues of alliance building and
maintenance. The TCOG was established in the
mid-1990s initially to bring the United States, Japan, and South
Korea together in regular meetings to coordinate policy toward
North Korea. This process can be used to begin exploring the
long-term goal of possibly expanding America's bilateral alliances
into a formal trilateral alliance. In the short term, the TCOG
process should focus on developing common strategies on how to
address China's rise and to promote stability on the Korean
peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.
Conclusion
Japan's
defense posture, like America's, is undergoing a fundamental
transformation. This is a positive development in the
maturation and evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance and is long
overdue given the profound changes in the international security
environment. Yet many challenges lie ahead.
As the
two countries move forward, it is important that they not be
carried away by lofty ambitions and unrealistic expectations
that could lead them to ignore the daily challenges and
difficulties of implementing these policies. Patience on both sides
of the Pacific will be required in achieving the goal of
transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance into a strategic partnership
that can contribute to peace and stability beyond the Asia-Pacific
region.
Balbina
Y. Hwang is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in
the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]The
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the
United States was signed on April 28, 1952, and revised on January
19, 1960. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between
Japan and the United States of America, January 19, 1960, at
www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/anpo_.htm (June 27,
2005).
[2]Japan
deployed ships to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea to provide fuel
and logistical support to U.S. and international forces on
antiterrorism missions in Afghanistan and surrounding areas. Japan
was able to dispatch these vessels under a special
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed by the Diet in October
2001.
[3]The
Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) has announced that Japan will move to
the development stage of the joint sea-based defense project during
the fiscal year 2006-2007. (Japan's fiscal year runs from April 1
to March 31.) "Japan to Push Missile Defense Plan to Development
Stage Next Year," Kyodo News, June 5, 2005.
[4]Liberal
Democratic Party, National Defense Division and Policy Research
Council, Defense Policy Studies Subcommittee, "Recommendations on
Japan's New Defense Policy: Toward a Safer and More Secure Japan
and the World," March 30, 2004, at
www.jimin.jp/jimin/saishin04/pdf/seisaku-006E.pdf (June 30,
2005), and Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, "Japan's
Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities," October
2004, at www.jiaponline.org/resources/japan/security/
Japan%20CSDC%20Report.pdf (June 30, 2005). The Council on
Security and Defense Capabilities is a private advisory panel that
reports to the prime minister.
[5]The
National Defense Program Outline was changed to the National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004. For the full text, see
Japan Defense Agency, "National Defense Program Guideline, FY
2005-," provisional translation,December10,2004,at
www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/fy20050101.pdf (June
27, 2005).
[6]North
Korea's recent provocative actions include pursuit of nuclear
weapons programs in clear violation of several international
treaties and agreements, missile development and proliferation, and
illegal activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting. In
November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine violated Japanese
territorial waters, and Chinese companies have begun drilling
for gas in the Chunxiao Field in the East China Sea, an area
claimed by Japan. In addition, China has adopted an increasingly
aggressive stance toward Taiwan, including passage of the
Anti-Secession Law in March 2005.
[7]The
island's South Korean name is "Tokdo." Its Japanese name is
"Takeshima.
[8]The
sea's official South Korean name is "East Sea." Its Japanese name
is "Sea of Japan."
[9]The
U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is often referred to as
the "2 + 2 Meeting" because it includes the U.S. Secretaries
of Defense and State and the Japanese Ministers of Defense and
Foreign Affairs.