The June 4, 2003
trilateral summit meeting in Jordan that brought together President
Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Prime
Minister Mahmoud Abbas was a small step in right direction. But
there is a long, grueling, uphill journey ahead if peace is to be
established.
Abbas Must
Back Words With Deeds
The summit generated soothing rhetoric. Abbas called for the
end of terrorism against Israelis and said "The armed intifadah
must end and we must use peaceful means in our quest to end the
occupation and the suffering of Palestinians and Israelis."
Sharon stated "It is in Israel's interest not to govern the
Palestinians, but for the Palestinians to govern themselves in
their own state." Sharon also freed 100 Palestinian
prisoners, eased controls on Palestinian areas, and pledged to
remove settlement outposts in disputed territory that had not been
approved by the Israeli government.
The two leaders
appear to have established a degree of trust that has been lacking
in bilateral relations since Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat
rejected a possible deal at the July 2000 Camp David summit and
returned to terrorism against Israelis. But Prime Minister
Abbas must back up his words with deeds if that trust is to grow to
the point that negotiating a genuine peace would be possible.
Unfortunately, it
is unclear whether Abbas can deliver on his promises. He
lacks a secure political power base and could be dismissed as Prime
Minister by Arafat, who remains President of the Palestinian
Authority, if Arafat chooses to act as a spoiler. According
to U.S. officials, Abbas commands the support of only about 400
members of the Palestinian security services, which number more
than 30,000. And radical Palestinian factions such as Hamas
and Palestine Islamic Jihad reject peace with Israel and have vowed
to continue their terrorist attacks.
Abbas has pressed
those groups to accept a ceasefire on attacks against Israelis, but
a much more robust policy is needed to disarm and dismantle
Palestinian terrorist groups to give peace a chance. Abbas
does not have the will or capability to crack down on such groups
and needs the support of Arab states and the West to isolate and
weaken them.
Marginalize Arafat, End Terrorism
The June 3 Sharm al Sheikh summit that brought Bush and Abbas
together with the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and
Jordan gave some hope on this score. The Arab leaders
condemned the "culture of extremism" and pledged to block support
for terrorist groups and ensure that all financial aid is
transferred directly to the Palestinian Authority, not to shadowy
nongovernmental and charitable organizations that could be
terrorist front groups.
This is a good
start, but much more needs to be done. For example, all
Western and Arab aid should be funneled to the Palestinian
Authority's Ministry of Finance, not to Yasser Arafat's
office. Washington also should press Arab leaders to
downgrade their relations with Arafat, who was pointedly excluded
from both summits, and upgrade relations with Prime Minister Abbas,
whose standing already has been bolstered by the two summits.
If Arafat is not
marginalized and terrorism ended, then the road map will soon lead
to gridlock. No Israeli government will take further risks
for peace unless the Palestinians comply with their commitments and
Arafat, who has made a career out of terrorism, has demonstrated
again and again that he cannot be trusted.
The roadmap is
more of a wish list of negotiating goals than a blueprint for
achieving peace. Although the Israelis and Palestinians have
conditionally accepted it, much arduous diplomatic spadework is
necessary to flesh out the details of its vague outlines.
President Bush has promised to "ride herd" on the process to keep
it going. But he should refrain from intervening unless
absolutely necessary and put the burden on Israel and the
Palestinians to work things out for themselves. Excessive
American intervention leads both sides to negotiate with Washington
rather than each other, as the Clinton Administration soon
discovered. Most of the biggest breakthroughs in the
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations have come through bilateral
diplomatic efforts such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1977
visit to Jerusalem or the secret Israeli-Palestinian talks at Oslo
in 1993.
Meanwhile, Bush
must "ride herd" on the State Department and the three other
members of "the quartet" who proposed the roadmap - Russia, the
European Union, and the United Nations. The Bush
administration must stick to principles laid out in the President's
June 24, 2002 speech, which stressed the importance of developing a
Palestinian leadership untainted by terrorism. (See: ,
by James Phillips)
Ending
Terror Will Lead To Statehood
President Bush has ably guided American policy in dismantling two
terrorist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. He should not
allow pressures for a diplomatic settlement at any cost to result
in the establishment of a Palestinian state that would become a
staging area for continued terrorism. Palestinians must
actively take systematic steps to crush terrorism before they
attain statehood, not merely pledge to do so.