Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
moved to establish embassies and to engage the strategically placed
states of Central Asia. Their weaknesses were evident from the
beginning, but we believed it important to shore up their
independence and provided modest assistance to help them to develop
into stable modernizing countries. Key elements in this strategy
included multiple pipelines to help the countries of the region
benefit from their energy wealth, humanitarian efforts to stave off
the collapse of some of the countries' social structure, civil
society programs to develop modern political structures,
cooperative efforts to obstruct the export of weapons of mass
destruction, and some development aid to help economic
modernization. As security tensions nurtured by terrorist groups
formed in Afghanistan late in the decade, the United States also
provided a modicum of security assistance.
The attacks of September 11 made it clear that our policies in
the region had not gone far enough. We needed the assistance of the
states of the region (through bases, overflight rights, supplies,
etc.) to prosecute Operation Enduring Freedom; even more
critically, the attacks brought home the danger that fragile
countries like Afghanistan and potentially some of the states of
Central Asia could become the breeding ground for International
terrorist groups aimed at the United States. It was critical to the
national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our
relations with the five Central Asian countries and help them find
ways to take the political and economic reform measures necessary
for long-term prosperity and stability.
The Presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were invited to the
United States, numerous Congressional delegations and cabinet
secretaries have visited the region, and government ministers from
these countries now regularly visit Washington. Our assistance
budgets for most of the countries have increased significantly. The
states of Central Asia have been excellent partners in the war
against terrorism and they have welcomed our contribution to their
security.
Experience proves that individual liberty, free markets, good
governance, and international peace are interconnected and mutually
reinforcing. The challenge before us is how should we engage with
these regimes to move them in the right direction toward greater
personal freedom, rule of law, and economic openness.
We have a vision for this region -- that it become stable,
peaceful, and prosperous -- and that this is achieved through
political and economic reform. These reforms are the only way to
bring these states into competitive global economy. Without it,
they cannot survive as modern states. When the Soviet Union
collapsed, many hoped that the new countries that emerged would
quickly embrace pluralistic democracy and a market economy. We now
know that those expectations of the pace and scale of democratic
and economic change in the early 1990s were unrealistic. Not
because democracy isn't right for Central Asia. Not because the
citizens of these countries wouldn't prefer to exercise the
everyday political freedoms democracy affords. Indeed, it would be
folly to assume that the universal human desire for freedom and
dignity that has swept the whole world somehow comes to an abrupt
stop at the borders of the Central Asian region, skirts them
briefly, and rushes on elsewhere. It is not their "Central
Asianness" that has held back the growth of democracy in that
region, but the leadership and socio-economic structures of these
countries which have so far kept them frozen in a Soviet past. We
understand that major transitions in the basic nature of these
regimes may require generational change and we are invested in
political and economic reform in this region for the long term.
Authoritarian governments and largely unreformed economies, we
believe, create the conditions of repression and poverty that could
well become the breeding grounds for further terrorism. And this is
what we tell the Central Asian leaders. Al-Qa'ida and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan have only been disrupted, not destroyed. And
the radical Hezb ut-Tahrir is increasingly active in Central Asia,
especially in the Fergana Valley shared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
and Kyrgyzstan.
Thus, not only do we believe it is strongly in our national
interest to engage fully with these governments to urge the
political and economic reforms that we judge are essential to
alleviate the conditions that breed terrorism, but we also firmly
believe it is in these countries' own national interests. When
citizens, and especially youth, feel that they have a voice in how
they are governed, when they believe that they have an economic
stake in the future, then they are less likely to be attracted to a
radicalized path cloaked in Islam that offers a utopian solution to
their discontent.
It is extremely difficult to convince Central Asian leaders that
long-term economic and democratic reforms are necessary to
eliminate the roots of terrorism if we are not willing to help them
counter terrorism in the short term and prove that we will be
engaged for the long term. Our assistance in the areas of military
infrastructure, training, military exchanges, and development of
interoperability with U.S. and international forces help to
establish their short-term capability to cooperate in the global
war on terrorism, instill confidence in our partnership, and give
them reason to believe that political and economic reforms will
lead to greater cooperation, sustained assistance, and concrete
enhancements to their security and sovereignty.
Our enhanced engagement has been in place for only a short time.
It is too early to tell if our calculated risk will lead to success
- politically and economically reformed governments that will be
responsible and prosperous members of the world community. We are,
however, confident that this path has led to success in many
regions of the world and our ambassadors and their staffs strive
daily to nudge these governments in the direction we know can work.
So far, this early in the game, the results are promising but
mixed.
Press freedoms are suffering in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the
two most politically advanced states in Central Asia. Across the
region, leaders prosecute political opponents for corruption as a
way to sideline them from competing for power. While we strongly
oppose corruption, we object to the selectivity of some of these
prosecutions, and we tell the leaders so. Free and fair elections
have not yet occurred, let alone peaceful transfers of power, and
some of the leaders have extended their tenures through decrees and
referenda.
While we recognize that serious problems continue in Central
Asia, we believe that our policy of enhanced and long-term
engagement has already begun to show some results.
Uzbekistan is the most intriguing test case of our policy of
enhanced engagement. As a result of our intense economic dialogue
and a renewed calculation of Uzbekistan's interests, the country
has reestablished its relations with the International Financial
Institutions and is moving slowly toward economic reform that it
had previously rejected.
Uzbekistan has also taken steps to improve its human rights
record. In March, for the first time ever, Uzbekistan registered an
indigenous human rights organization; the government also has
stated its willingness to register more of them. Also, for the
first time the government successfully prosecuted and convicted
four police officers charged with beating to death a man suspected
of Islamic extremist activities, and another such trial of three
National Security Service officers yielded convictions and
sentences of five to 15 years. The government has released about
860 political prisoners, and local human rights activists report
that new arrests have dropped to the single digits in most cities.
Furthermore, after Assistant Secretary Craner's last visit, the
Uzbek government has extended an invitation for the UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture to come to Uzbekistan. Independent
international organizations are working with the Interior Ministry
on prison reforms and have visited prisons, including pretrial
detention centers. The parliament is moving on a number of fronts
to develop a more humane criminal code, to address abuse of power
at the local level, to make prosecutors more accountable, and to
create a more independent judiciary. The long-banned political
opposition part, Birlik, is openly holding congresses around the
country and moving toward re-registration.
Taken together, these individual achievements are adding up to
an impressive beginning on reform, but they have not been broadly
reported in the United States. As our engagement with the Uzbek
authorities on human rights and religious freedom issues
intensifies, the government of Uzbekistan has taken several notable
steps. There is a long way to go, but we are encouraged.
Kyrgyzstan, which has retreated from its early promise, reached a
crisis point this year. Some argued that the government may have
believed it had carte blanche to restrict human rights because it
was permitting the coalition [use of its] military base at Manas
Airport. We have not, of course, backed off. In fact, we increased
our engagement on human rights. Kyrgyzstan's well-developed civil
society mounted largely peaceful public protests against the
government's selective prosecution of popular opposition
politicians and limitations on freedom of the press. During these
protest, police killed five demonstrators. In an attempt to defuse
the ensuing crisis, the government resigned, and President Akayev
has appointed several reformist ministers to key positions. He also
rescinded a government decree, which had earlier resulted in
printing presses refusing access to independent newspapers. The
give and take between the government, the opposition, and other
elements of Kyrgyz society is a dynamic one, confirming again the
strong roots of civil society.
Kazakhstan is currently undergoing worrisome developments. There
has been a spate of unsolved attacks and government restrictions
against the independent media, and the government continues
selective corruption prosecutions against opposition politicians
when they appear to be gaining political influence. Furthermore,
the Kazakh lower house of Parliament recently passed a law on
political party registration requiring that each party have no less
than 50,000 members, greatly hindering the formation of opposition
parties. However, there have also been success stories. The
Constitutional Court struck down restrictive amendments to the
Religion Law, and President Nazarbayev upheld this decision. Also,
the government has registered an opposition political party,
although it is prosecuting two of the leaders of one of the
parties. The trend in Kazakhstan in recent months has been
generally disappointing. We will continue to press for
improvement.
In Tajikistan, an Islamic opposition party plays a responsible
role in government, and the International Committee of the Red
Cross has for the first time attained access to prisons. Even in
isolationist Turkmenistan, non-governmental organizations - the
foundation of civil society - are beginning to take hold, and the
government appears to recognize that the stranglehold of the
Committee for National Security (the KGB's successor) needs to be
relaxed, and the abolishment of exit visas has eased the flow of
citizens in and out of the country.
I have gone to some length about each of these countries to
demonstrate the complexity of the human rights issues in the
countries of Central Asia. While there continue to be real
problems, there have also been successes since September 11. Our
enhanced engagement is helping to break the habit of repression and
stagnation.
The challenges facing the Central Asian countries are indeed
daunting. But if the countries of the region are now willing to
undertake political and economic reforms that will lead to greater
freedom and opportunity for their citizens, then we are prepared to
support those efforts. We have increased our assistance to the
region, and are working closely with the governments, private
sector, and NGO's. If the actions of the governments fail to match
their words on reform, then we will reassess the assistance we
provide. Central Asia's stability also is threatened by fundamental
problems of poverty, unemployment, political oppression, and
isolation from the rest of the world. These problems can make the
region potential breeding grounds for religious extremism and
ethnic conflict.
While addressing these problems requires a long-term vision and
commitment of resources, we already have increased our effort in
several key areas, such as improvements in local infrastructure and
social services, job creation through provision of microcredits and
small business training and assistance to support accession to WTO
and to promote trade, investment, and economic development through
fiscal and accounting reform. We have also expanded exchanges to
show Central Asians, particularly young people, how our society has
worked to promote religious and ethnic tolerance, educational
reform, and strengthening of NGO's, the independent media, and
human rights monitors to urge greater government transparency. We
continue to support the independent media, and are helping improve
primary health care, with a particular focus on fighting
tuberculosis. We also are working with the five Central Asian
countries to improve regional water resource management, and have
supported NGO's in each country to help build and strengthen civil
society.
The steps we have taken to greatly enhance our ties with the
countries of Central Asia have been taken because they are in the
U.S. national interest. We need to work closely with these
countries to prosecute the war against terrorism, but we also need
to do what we can to ensure that this becomes a stable, prosperous
region, not a threat to international society. To this end, we are
seeking to use our influence to promote the political and economic
reform necessary for them to prosper. What we want is for these
governments to exercise power wisely, responsibly, and humanely so
that these nations can attain stability, security, and prosperity.
This is our vision for Central Asia. We believe we are on the right
track.
Lynn Pascoe is U.S. Ambassador to
Malaysia