When
President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet
for summits in Russia and Rome later this month, they will have an
opportunity to define a new framework for U.S.-Russia strategic
relations that extends beyond the war on terrorism. Such a
framework could lay the foundation for a new 21st century security
architecture while facilitating Russia's integration into the
European-North Atlantic security and economic environment.
Given Russia's proximity to Western
Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Far East, and in
light of Putin's decision to line up with the United States in the
war on terrorism, establishing closer
cooperation with Russia will have significant benefits for U.S.
national security and regional and economic interests. Closer
cooperation with Moscow is vital, for example, for isolating such
terrorism-supporting states as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North
Korea and for slowing the transfer of Russian military technology
to China.
On the Summit Agenda
At
the summit meetings in St. Petersburg and Moscow on May 23-26 and
at the NATO-Russia summit in Rome on May 28, President Bush and
President Putin will focus on matters of security and economic
policies. In Moscow, they will sign a formal treaty that calls for
deep cuts in nuclear arsenals on both sides over the next 10 years.
Both leaders are committed to ending the legacy of the Cold War by
reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of their countries to
around 1,700 to 2,200 deliverable warheads each. Such a commitment
will also be required in cooperative efforts to reduce the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to
increase security in regions of common interest, and to increase
trade to strengthen economies.
The
treaty to reduce U.S. and Russian offensive nuclear arsenals is
compatible with currently projected U.S. security requirements.
These requirements, however, could change with little warning. As a
result, reductions should proceed cautiously and the process should
permit flexibility. The treaty allows flexibility by limiting its
duration to 10 years, by pacing the reductions within the 10-year
period, and by allowing either party to withdraw from the treaty
with three months' notice. Another welcome sign of this flexibility
is the agreement not to require the destruction of the warheads or
to impose limitations on missile defenses.
Specifically, during his summit meetings
with President Putin, President Bush should:
- Ask for Russia's
support for removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from
power. For Russia, the issues in Iraq are primarily the
Soviet-era debt of $11 billion to $13 billion for arms sales during
the Iran-Iraq war and how the oil deals secured by Russian
companies in Iraq (worth $30 billion in cash flow for the life of
the projects) would be grandfathered in under a new regime. In
addition, Russia is concerned about the territorial integrity of
Iraq. President Bush could secure Russia's active diplomatic and
military participation in an operation against Baghdad by
guaranteeing that such concerns would be addressed in the
post-Saddam Iraq in a manner that is satisfactory to Russia.
- Encourage Moscow
to terminate Russian sales of conventional weapons to Iran and
technological cooperation to produce WMD. In 2001, Russia
and Iran signed a $300 million a year, multi-year arms export
agreement, making Iran the third largest customer for Russian
weapons after India and China. Moscow is also building two nuclear
reactors at Bushehr, from which the precursors to nuclear bomb
fissile material could be obtained, and is selling sophisticated
anti-ship missiles and other destabilizing weapons to Iran.
On May 6, Under Secretary of State John
Bolton called for the United States and Russia to sign a political
declaration on the New Strategic Framework that would cover not
just strategic offense and defense systems, but also
nonproliferation and counterproliferation. Such a
framework should promote cooperation to prevent Iran from becoming
a nuclear state armed with ballistic missiles. The Administration
should be ready to offer an economic quid pro quo for Russia's
actions, such as participation in building the components of
ballistic missile defense systems and expansion of civilian space
launch quotas.
- Reject any
limitations on strategic defenses. Although the treaty to
reduce strategic nuclear arms does not include a provision limiting
missile defense programs, the Russians may seek such limitations
through other declarations to be issued during the summit.
President Bush, as he has in the past, should continue to resist
Russian pressure to limit missile defenses. According to the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), strategic defenses--which include
missile defenses--are a necessary leg of the new strategic triad
that includes offensive strategic forces and responsive forces. Now
that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the former
Soviet Union is scheduled to lapse in mid-June, nothing should
reimpose its limitations on missile defense.
- Move forward
with NATO-Russia cooperation. On May 28, NATO and Russia
will sign an agreement to establish the NATO-Russia Council. This
agreement should allow for joint development of policy and the
planning of mutual activities in such areas as the war on
terrorism; operations against terrorist organizations and their
financial supporters; nonproliferation and WMD security; special
forces interoperability; educational exchanges between officers on
all levels; peacekeeping operations; and comprehensive military
reform, which President Putin and
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov would welcome.
In the past, the forum provided by the
1997 Permanent Joint Council often turned into a venue for Moscow
to air its frustrations with NATO actions, such as the Balkans
operations. Today, the joint NATO-Russia
peacekeeping activities in that region demonstrate how these two
sides can cooperate. Top U.S. generals, such as Supreme Allied
Commander Europe General Joseph Ralston and
Commander in Chief of Central Command (CENTCOM) General Tommy
Franks, routinely praise Russia's cooperation with the United
States and NATO. The NATO-Russia Council should
be seen as a first step on the road to greater security integration
between Russia and the North Atlantic alliance. The President also
should invite President Putin to address the NATO summit in Prague
in November.
- Encourage Russia
to expand its energy sales in the global market. Russia
could increase energy sales significantly by enhancing corporate
governance transparency and shareholder rights for Western
investors. In addition, production could be increased by including
100 new oil and gas fields in the Production Sharing Agreement
(PSA) legislation, which allows Western oil companies to be
compensated by drawing oil for sale from the jointly developed
fields. U.S. companies need assurances that their investments in
Russian fields and infrastructure are secure. President Bush should
ask Putin to support guarantees for Western companies through
expanded PSA legislation and to ensure its passage in the Duma.
Russia exports over 1.8 billion barrels of
oil and 6.7 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year. It is the
world's largest exporter of natural gas and second largest exporter
of oil. Together with the countries
of Eurasia, it could catch up with Saudi Arabia as a leading oil
exporter by 2010. U.S. export development
agencies, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), the Export-Import Bank, and the international financial
institutions, could assist foreign investors by insisting that the
rule of law be honored and contracts upheld. A boost in Russia's
energy exports also would provide its European and Far Eastern
customers with additional energy security in the event that OPEC
continues its policy of high prices and production cuts.
- Express support
for the lifting of U.S. barriers to trade with Russia. The
Administration supports Russia's economic integration with the
West, including its membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO). President Putin has declared that Russia will not require
any special deals from the WTO, so standard WTO criteria for
membership should apply. President Bush should declare U.S. support
for Russia's accession in 2004, provided the negotiations in all
sectors are completed successfully.
The U.S. statute known as the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which denies Russia most favored nation
status, is a relic of the Cold War. It was passed in 1974 when the
Soviet Union severely limited emigration. Congress suspended
application of the amendment after the Soviet Union collapsed. At
the Russia summit, President Bush should express his support for a
permanent lifting of the Jackson-Vanik restrictions, which Congress
could accomplish by attaching an amendment to trade
legislation.
Conclusion
The
forthcoming U.S.-Russia summits offer both countries a unique
opportunity to launch a strategic partnership that would assure
greater security in the 21st century. At the summit meetings, both
President Bush and President Putin should focus on casting off the
baggage that has hampered U.S.-Russia relations in the past, such
as Moscow's ties with Iran and Iraq and other states that sponsor
terrorism.
The
two leaders will put to rest the legacy of the Cold War by signing
a strategic treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Most
important, they should expand joint actions in the war on
terrorism, as well as establish goals for NATO-Russian cooperation
and support policies that further integrate Russia into the global
market.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. is Research Fellow
in Russian and Eurasian Studies, and Baker Spring is F. M.
Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, in the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.