February 25, 2002 | Backgrounder on Latin America
America's policy toward the Andean region, which has focused predominantly on curbing drug cultivation and trafficking, has been unsuccessful. Illegal armies in Colombia are growing more powerful and more cooperative with drug traffickers besides engaging in production and trafficking themselves. Together, these groups have become a destabilizing element in the Andean region.
For Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru to achieve political and economic stability, they must curtail illegal drug cultivation and promote market liberalization. For Colombia to do so, it must additionally defeat its guerrilla threat and associated paramilitary backlash.
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are part of the mountainous Andean region in northwest South America. Agriculture, mining, and oil are the region's primary economic sectors, followed by fishing.2 Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru enjoy access to the Pacific Ocean, facilitating the shipment of products and contributing to the development of the fishing industry. Bolivia, which is landlocked, has rich deposits of zinc, silver, and tin, as well as petroleum and significant natural gas reserves. Its semitropical valleys lend themselves to farming a variety of products.3 Despite these many resources, however, these Andean countries continue to struggle due to historically poor economic policies and political instability.
Economic growth in Latin America will likely slow in 2002 along with a decrease in global economic growth and the U.S. recession. This will follow declines in productivity last year. According to the World Bank, "GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean [declined] to 0.9 percent in 2001, down from 3.8 percent in 2000."4 But as the Bank notes, "some adverse domestic conditions" are also responsible for this lack of growth. For example:
Political instability, weak rule of law, and over-regulation have undermined the benefits of market liberalization for the Andean countries, but these countries--like most of Latin America--have addressed these problems only reluctantly. In addition, liberalization has made little impact on the excessive growth of the public sector. As Wall Street Journal "Americas" column editor Mary O'Grady explains, "Latin America's experiment with reform...has demonstrated that efforts to adjust the economy without limiting the [size of] government are like working on the engine of a car with no wheels."11
Stability in the Andean region and elimination of the illegal drug trade are in America's interests. While the Andean nations share similar economic shortcomings, chronic political instability and erosion of the rule of law in Colombia surpasses that of its neighbors, principally due to the growing power of drug traffickers and guerrilla groups, requiring a different U.S. policy approach.
The serious threat posed by the guerrillas and drug trafficking extends far beyond the Andean region. (See text box, "Colombia's Problems: Dual Threats to International Stability.") As the Bush Administration has stated,
The drug cartels are among the most powerful criminal groups ever to operate on American soil. No effort to stop these powerful organizations can succeed without the ability to strike at the cartel's leadership and reach criminal activity that recognizes no national boundaries. These powerful criminal organizations also pose a threat to our democratic allies throughout the Western Hemisphere.12
The cooperation between the illegal drug industry and the guerrilla groups has created a lawless environment that brings enormous instability to the Andean region as both groups strive to increase their operations, wealth, and power.13 In addition, these groups are financing international terrorism. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) has remarked that "terrorist organizations routinely launder the proceeds from drug trafficking and use the funds to support and expand their operations internationally, including the purchasing and trafficking of illegal weapons."14
COLOMBIA'S PROBLEMS: DUAL THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY
|Colombian drug traffickers and guerrillas
pose a national security threat to the United States and
increasingly to Europe.
Both of these problems, which began in the 1960s and expanded through the 1980s in Colombia's depopulated and largely ungoverned countryside, were mostly ignored by the government. By the mid-1990s, U.S. counternarcotics assistance had helped the Colombian government defeat drug trafficking by organized cartels. But the Clinton Administration justifiably suspended U.S. assistance from 1994 to 1998 when it suspected that President Ernesto Samper received campaign contributions from drug kingpins. This suspension, however, had the unintentional effect of aiding a marriage between independent drug lords and Marxist guerrillas.
In November 1998, incoming President Andrés Pastrana
found that both drug traffickers and guerrilla groups had expanded
in numbers and resources. 7 Unsure of whether the United States
would resume counternarcotics aid, and aware of America's
reluctance to intervene in a guerrilla conflict, he granted the
largest rebel group, the FARC, a Switzerland-sized sanctuary to
achieve a cessation of hostilities. Two months later, he initiated
what he called a "peace" dialogue-a series of open-ended talks. The
FARC has used the sanctuary to expand its operations to over 70
percent of Colombia's countryside, increase its troop strength from
10,000 to an estimated 17,000, cultivate drug crops, hold kidnap
victims, make bombs, and organize attacks on rural villages. The
lack of government protection in this area led to a dramatic growth
of paramilitary groups, exacerbated the violence and chaos, and
contributed to the displacement of more than 1.5 million citizens
and incalculable damage to infrastructure and the environment. 8
The European community has become a champion of the country's on
again-off again dialogue with the FARC since six European nations
joined a group of 10 "friendly" countries to witness the peace
talks 9 on March 8, 2001,
between the government's peace negotiator and FARC leader Manuel
"Sureshot" Marulanda, culminating in a declaration calling for a
cease-fire. As the year progressed, the FARC refused to cooperate
and finally walked out of the talks. When Pastrana threatened to
close down the FARC sanctuary in January 2002, European diplomats
and a U.N. emissary persuaded the guerrillas to return to the
dialogue-delaying what should have been a day of reckoning for
Colombia's most dangerous group. Since then, the deterioration of
the situation and the intransigence of the FARC and its kidnapping
of Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay on February 20, 2002, have
led the Colombian government to end the peace negotiations.
Since September 11, both the United States and its European allies have begun to take terrorism and groups that engage in it far more seriously. Both should label Colombia's guerrillas as drug traffickers and terrorists, and cooperate on a strategy to bring them to justice or defeat. Now that the day of reckoning is at hand, the United States and its European allies should act together to support the growing resolve of the Colombian government to defeat the guerrillas and curtail drug trafficking.
1. Based on street prices of $20 to $200 per gram and an estimated 500 metric tons of cocaine arriving in the United States in 2000. See National Drug Intelligence Center, "National Drug Threat Assessment 2002," December 2001, at www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/716/cocaine.htm (January 14, 2002).
2. National Institute on Drug Abuse, as quoted in "2000 National Drug Control Policy Annual Report," at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/ndcs00/endnotes.html#116 (October 27, 2000).
6. See David Lister, "Colombia Says IRA Sent 25 to Train Rebels," The Times, January 8, 2002, and David Williams and Michael Seamark, "IRA Man Held in Colombia 'Linked to Gerry Adams'," Daily Mail, August 16, 2001.
7. According to Colombian government sources, the country's illegal armies made more than $1 billion in 1998, with half coming from the drug trade. See Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth-The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Arlington, Va.: RAND Corp., 2001), p. 32.
8. Between January 1999 and December 2000, rebels brought down 630 electrical pylons, while repeated attacks on the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline spilled 496,000 barrels of oil, contaminating rivers and streams, causing production to fall and the government to lose $35 million in royalty revenues, according to Colombia's Office of the Vice President, "Progress Report on the Presidential Program for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law," April 2001.
The Clinton Administration supported Pastrana's initiative to negotiate peace with the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) and his unprecedented ceding of control of a large part of the country to the guerrillas. The European community also championed Colombia's on again-off again dialogue with the rebel groups and participated in negotiations between the FARC, a United Nations representative, and the Colombian government's peace negotiator beginning last March.
The peace process failed to end the conflict. On the contrary, the guerrillas used their territory to launch strikes against the Colombian military, kidnap and kill civilians, and establish their own cultivation of illicit drug crops. In August 2001, three members of the Irish Republican Army were discovered advising FARC troops on how to make bombs and antipersonnel mines inside the sanctuary.15 An embarrassed President Pastrana ordered the military to patrol the perimeter, conduct surveillance flights, and keep foreigners from entering the zone. On January 14, 2002, diplomats from the observer group and U.N. envoy James LeMoyne salvaged the process with another cease-fire timetable.16 Before the ink on this agreement was dry, however, the FARC dynamited a police station outside the safe haven, killed a guard and released 39 inmates from a prison near Bogotá, and blew up two power transmission pylons.17
Since then, the deterioration of the situation and the intransigence of the guerrilla groups have led the Colombian government to end the peace negotiations.18 According to Colombia security expert Alfredo Rangel, "for the FARC, the negotiation continues to be a political tactic within the war" --a war it believes it can win.19 The FARC's intransigence has convinced the Colombian government that the peace process is doomed.
The Bush Administration reviewed the U.S. policies for the region that it inherited from the Clinton Administration but did not significantly change those policies. According to a February 2001 U.S. Department of State fact sheet, U.S. policy in Colombia is to support President Pastrana's efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the country's longstanding civil conflict.... Until the country's civil conflict is resolved, sustained progress will be more difficult on all other fronts--reducing drug supply, protecting human rights, and promoting democracy and economic development.20
The chronic political instability and erosion of the rule of law in Colombia undermines the effectiveness of economic liberalization efforts. Until the government's authority is restored throughout Colombia by defeating the guerrilla groups and curbing drug trafficking, its economic policies will remain a secondary concern. The Bush Administration should recognize the futility of pushing peace negotiations with groups uninterested in becoming peaceful, law-abiding parts of Colombian society and support the Colombian government's efforts to regain control of the territory and re-establish law and order.
ATPA has failed as an incentive to reduce net coca cultivation--coca cultivation minus eradication--in the Andean region. Since it was enacted, total drug cultivation in the region has remained almost unchanged,22 merely accomplishing a shift in production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia.23 (See Chart 1.) Net coca cultivation decreased in Peru by 60 percent, and in Bolivia by 45 percent.24 Coca cultivation in Colombia, however, grew by 226 percent over that period.25
Though U.S. trade with Andean countries has increased, ATPA cannot be considered a successful trade agreement, for two reasons. First, the average annual growth in trade between the United States and the Andean nations since it was enacted is less than the average between the United States and the world over that period, and far below the growth in trade between America and its free trade partners. (See Chart 2.) Second, while growth in U.S. trade with the Andean countries has been steadier under ATPA, the trend lines depicted in Chart 3 show that Andean trade was increasing more rapidly before ATPA than after it was signed. The conclusion is that while ATPA has been marginally beneficial, it has not been nearly as successful as its supporters claim.
The reason: ATPA is a limited agreement that does not remove all trade barriers between the Andean countries and the U.S. market. In fact, only 10 percent of imports from Andean countries enter the United States exclusively under ATPA provisions,26 and the law fails to reduce barriers for many of the products that are particularly relevant to the Andean nations, including textiles and apparel, rum and sugars, syrups, and sugar-containing products.27 A free trade agreement would be superior to ATPA because it would remove all barriers that artificially impede economic opportunities, make those benefits permanent, and thereby reduce the risks for investors making long-term decisions.28
Fighting the illegal drug industry through interdiction and discouraging consumption is very difficult because the illegal drug business is so profitable that producers and traffickers can afford to increase the amount paid for coca and poppy to offset any increased profitability of legal crops. (See text box, "Subsistence Farming in the Andean Region.") Fighting this trend will require a strategy that also discourages cultivation.
Coca cultivation declined in Peru and Bolivia during the 1990s because the leaders of those countries implemented plans to combat cultivation and guerrilla activities. Bolivian President Banzer aggressively undertook coca eradication, and former Peruvian President Fujimori effectively defeated the guerrillas in Peru and then eradicated most of the coca cultivation.
Meanwhile, coca cultivation grew in Colombia because the government failed to adopt and implement a comprehensive plan to establish order in the countryside. Furthermore, U.S. assistance was largely withdrawn during the presidency of Ernesto Samper in response to allegations that he took campaign contributions from drug lords. In the interim, drug traffickers and guerrillas formed a symbiotic relationship that strengthened both groups. Now guerrillas and paramilitary groups alike provide valuable protection that makes the drug trade more profitable; the guerrillas and paramilitary groups use their profits from this activity to buy weapons and equipment to expand their power and influence.
SUBSISTENCE FARMING IN THE ANDEAN REGION
|Large price differences exist between what
farmers and low-skill workers receive for their coca and poppy and
the retail price of cocaine on the streets of America and Europe.
(See Chart 4.) 1 These
differences highlight two important difficulties in substituting
legal crops for coca and poppy cultivation in this region:
As long as cocaine and heroin profits remain high, coca and poppy will be grown, the illegal drug industry will find a place to establish itself, and it will have a strong incentive to remain in business. For as long as it remains in business, it will be able to substitute illegal crop cultivation for legal crop cultivation and legal goods production.
1. Profit differences in Chart 4 had to be drawn in logarithmic scale, where all the segments of the vertical axis are multiples of 10. For example, in a scale from 1 to 1000, a log scale would have 10, 100, 1000 as segments, whereas a linear scale would have 1, 2, 3, 4…1000 as segments. The reason for using the logarithmic scale in Chart 4 is that the large profit gap for coca and heroin would not have allowed for the inclusion of coffee and cacao.
4. International Trade Commission, "The Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on US Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution," Seventh Report 1999, Investigation No. 332-352, September 2000, p. 65.
The lessons of the past decade are clear: Eradicating illegal drug cultivation in the Andean region requires (1) political will on the part of Andean governments; (2) changing policies that make it easier for guerrillas and drug trafficking to thrive (i.e., weak rule of law and partially closed economies); and (3) reducing U.S. trade barriers to Andean products in which they have a competitive advantage through a free trade agreement.
The guerrilla groups and drug traffickers have not experienced any setback that would lead them to reconsider their successful strategy of killing and kidnapping opponents, oppressing peasants, and building ties with other terrorist groups. For this reason, they are not only a serious threat to eradicating drugs from the region, but also--and most important--a threat to stability in the Andean region and to U.S. national security, financed by international terrorism, that must be countered.31
Given the seriousness of the security situation in Colombia, the Bush Administration should support the decision of the Colombian government to begin establishing public order throughout its national territory to protect citizens from violence and terrorism. Although the Colombian army and police have become better trained and more professional in the past three years, their numbers and capabilities are still insufficient to meet the threat of a highly mobile guerrilla force. The United States should provide Colombia with the additional training, equipment, and security assistance to carry out such a plan. Since lawlessness is the root problem, Congress should ease restrictions on the use of U.S.-donated equipment and assistance so that it may by employed against all lawbreakers, not just carefully defined drug traffickers. In addition, the Administration should provide security assistance to Colombia's neighbors to help them defend their territory against any spillover from Colombia's deteriorating situation.
Strengthening the rule of law, however, must go beyond tribunals. As Andrzej Rapaczynski, professor of Law at Columbia University, points out, statutes need to be adapted to the social and economic needs of the majority of the population for the rule of law to be effective.34 For example, if a person must work illegally in the black market because employers find it costly to abide by a complex set of labor regulations, local lawmakers should simplify those regulations so that employers can offer legal jobs. In this respect, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia need to revise their statutes in a way that can integrate the informal sector. In a study on the determinants of economic development, Richard Roll and John Talbot of the Anderson Business School at the University of California-Los Angeles note that, "With adequate property rights, developing countries might not require much external assistance. Their economies could percolate up from inside."35
Although the impetus for strengthening the rule of law must be homegrown, America can facilitate it by offering technical expertise, such as experts from the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on how these countries should reform their judicial and law enforcement systems. With a stronger rule of law, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador would be able to build on and sustain key elements in a long-term strategy to counter drug traffickers and guerrilla groups by reducing corruption, enhancing political stability, and protecting the prosperity gained through increased economic liberalization.
The United States should transform ATPA by negotiating a free trade agreement with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, countries that have made a commitment to eliminate drug-related trade and cultivation and/or guerrilla activity from their countries. This agreement should be finalized even before the negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are concluded in 2005.37 Colombia should be integrated into this free trade agreement after it has demonstrated its commitment to eliminating guerrillas and drug traffickers as well.
Prosperity created by a permanent free trade agreement with the United States--one that would give these countries free access to the U.S. market for legal products--would increase as investment and trade grow, thereby undermining incentives to cultivate illegal crops. In addition, a free trade agreement would motivate the leaders of these countries to continue working to sustain their prior illegal-drug and/or guerrilla eradication efforts. In short, while Congress and the Administration could remove the restraints on trade that undermine the effectiveness of ATPA, a free trade agreement would have a more durable effect.
The Bush Administration should be concerned about the potential chaos in the Andean region and take immediate action to adjust its policies to address the many problems facing the region before they deteriorate further. Guerrilla groups in Colombia are growing more powerful and cooperative with the drug traffickers, and together they have become a destabilizing element throughout the region. Too few realize that Latin America, not the Middle East, was the world's leading region for terrorist activities in 200038 and that drug traffickers and guerrillas are increasing their ties with and financing international terrorism. To eliminate the guerrilla and paramilitary threat as well as illegal drug cultivation, and to bring political stability to the Andean region, the United States must recognize the new realities there and revise its Andean strategy.
Positive reforms in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru should be encouraged and reinforced by transforming ATPA into a full free trade agreement with those nations, encouraging them to continue to liberalize their economies and strengthen the rule of law. The seriousness of the situation in Colombia, however, requires the Administration to support the Colombian government's fight against the guerrilla groups. As the Colombian government demonstrates its commitment to eliminating the guerrillas and the drug traffickers, the United States should integrate Colombia into a broader economic agenda and free trade agreement with Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.
Ana I. Eiras is Economic Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Center for International Trade and Economics; John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., is Research Fellow for European Affairs, and Stephen Johnson is Policy Analyst for Latin America, in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; and Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation. Research Assistants Anthony Kim, Carrie Satterlee, and Kimberly Thompson also contributed to this paper.
4. The World Bank, "Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean Is Down in 2001 but Prospects for Rebound Are Strong," News Release No. 2002/###/S, October 31, 2001, at /static/reportimages/CF3E81949F1A8701EC601EC1083DD50C.pdf.
7. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2001 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2001). For evidence of insufficient protection of property rights in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, see, for example, U.S. Department of State, Bolivia Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, at www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-BOLIVIA2002-CH--006BB658: "Property and contractual rights may be enforced in Bolivian courts, but the legal process at best is time-consuming and at worst can be subject to political influence and corruption." According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Colombia's "judiciary, in common with all other government institutions, has been susceptible to intimidation and corruption." See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2001 for Colombia. According to the U.S. Commercial Service, "For the most part, Ecuadorian law provides adequate protection for property rights. However, it is sometimes difficult to gain effective protection via the legal system due to problems in transparency and endemic corruption." See U.S. Department of State, Ecuador Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, at www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-ECUADOR2002-CH--006E0715. Regarding Peru, the U.S. Commercial Service reports that, "In principle, secured interests in property...are recognized.... [However] the capabilities of individual judges vary substantially, and allegations of corruption and Peruvian government interference in the judicial system have been common." See U.S. Department of State, Peru Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, at www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-PERU2002-CH--004DD742.
9. This situation holds for Peru and Bolivia, and to a lesser extent for Ecuador, where more than half of the labor force works informally. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profiles 2000 for Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru; Country Profile 2001 for Colombia. In Colombia, informal employment is due mainly to the drug trade. See O'Driscoll et al., 2001 Index of Economic Freedom.
10. Although the Andean countries have improved marginally, much remains to be done. In Bolivia, the U.S. Department of State has reported that "plenty of red tape and archaic policies remain at all levels of Bolivian Government." Bureaucratic red tape and lack of transparency continue to hinder efficiency in Colombia as well. Ecuador's civil service, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, "is renowned for slowing investment decisions with needless bureaucracy. Though efforts have been made to reduce size, cost and corruption at higher levels, the bureaucracy is still complex, much larger than necessary and often inefficient." Finally, Peru's regulatory environment is rife with red tape and the U.S. Trade Representative reports that "Executive branch ministries, regulatory agencies, and the judiciary lack the resources, expertise and independence necessary to carry out their respective duties." See O'Driscoll et al., 2002 Index of Economic Freedom, pp. 119-120, 157-158, 179-180, and 329-330.
11. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, "Too Many Promises," in O'Driscoll et al., 2002 Index of Economic Freedom, p. 30. The resistance of many Latin American countries to reform is encouraged by the economic crisis in Argentina, which many countries inaccurately blame on liberalization. Argentina never fully liberalized its economy. See Ana I. Eiras and Brett D. Schaefer, "Argentina's Economic Crisis: An `Absence of Capitalism'," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1432, April 19, 2001. Argentina's government clung to spendthrift policies that dramatically increased debt without resulting in growth, refused to liberalize onerous labor regulations, and transformed government monopolies into private monopolies. The potential use of Argentina's crisis to justify anti-market policies is a greater threat than the economic impact of the crisis itself. Countries should not take the wrong lesson from Argentina's crisis--increased liberalization, not less, is a vital component of future prosperity.
12. The White House, "Combat Crime and Drug Abuse," A Blueprint for New Beginnings: A Responsible Budget for America's Priorities, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/bud09.html (January 2002).
13. To be sure, illegal businesses also exist in prosperous countries, but not as easily as in countries plagued with poverty and political instability. In fact, without political instability, semi-closed economies, and poverty, drug producers and guerrillas would find it difficult to operate, much less turn their activities into large-scale operations.
14. Office of National Drug Control Policy, "John Walters Confirmed as Nation's Drug Czar: New Office of National Drug Control Policy Director to Lead Balanced Approach to Nation's Drug Problem," December 7, 2001, at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press01/120701.html.
15. Scott Wilson, "Colombia's Peace Bid at Risk; Arrests of IRA Trainers Spark Calls to Close Safe Haven for Rebels," The Washington Post, August 25, 2001, p. A13. For an update, see Fabio Castillo, "Manejando con el Ira, El Espectador, January 13, 2002, at www.elespectador.com/periodismo_inv/2002/enero/nota1.htm (January 16, 2002).
16. Juan Forero, "Peace Talks in Colombia Are Revived by an Accord," The New York Times, January 15, 2002, at www.nytimes.com/2002/01/15/international/15COLO.html (January 16, 2002).
17. Carlos Hamann, "Pastrana, Rebels Face New Deadline for Peace Talks Progress," Agence France-Presse, January 16, 2002. Either those operations could not be called off in time, or FARC commander Marulanda cannot control his troops, which would make the peace process meaningless.
19. Hernán González Rodríguez, "¿Se acrecienta el escepticismo?" El Espectador, at www.elespectador.com/opinion/nota1.htm (January 23, 2002).
20. "Plan Colombia and the Peace Process," fact sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 20, 2001, at www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/index.cfm?docid=1037.
21. "Third Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean Trade Preference Act," Office of the United States Trade Representative, January 31, 2001, p. 3, at www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/atpa3.pdf.
22. This phenomenon is called the "balloon effect" (see Chart 2), based on the principle that when a balloon is squeezed on one end, the other end gets bigger, but the total air in the balloon is the same. See International Trade Commission, "The Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on US Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution," p. 67.
27. See the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (H.R. 3009), "Articles Eligible for Preferential Treatment" (Section 3), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:4:./temp/~c107QcMDCP:e3467:.
28. These products include, but are not limited to, canned tuna, certain footwear, watches, sugars, syrups, molasses, and rum products. See K. Larry Storrs, "Andean Regional Initiative: Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors," Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress RL31016, September 18, 2001.
32. Robert J. Barro, "Rule of Law, Democracy, and Economic Performance," in Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2000 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2000), pp. 31-51; see also Alejandro A. Chafuen and Eugenio Guzmán, "Economic Freedom and Corruption," 2000 Index of Economic Freedom, pp. 51-65; and William W. Beach and Gareth G. Davis, "The Institutional Setting of Economic Growth," in Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 1999 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 1999), pp. 1-21.
33. The U.S. Department of Justice helps train civilian police forces, members of independent judiciaries, and prosecutors through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and through the Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance Program (OPDAT).
35. Richard Roll and John Talbott. "Developing Countries that Aren't," November 13, 2001, p. 16. Available upon request at email@example.com.
37. Bilateral trade agreements should be pursued, despite the Administration's commitment to the FTAA, for several reasons. First, FTAA negotiations have dragged and many countries are behind in adopting trade liberalization, making the goal of an FTAA by 2005 less certain. Second, the situation in the Andes requires immediate action, not action in three years. Third, following the crisis in Argentina, some Latin policymakers are considering greater trade protection over liberalization, which runs counter to the FTAA. Finally, bilateral trade agreements are not inconsistent with an FTAA and can be structured to yield to an FTAA once it is implemented.
38. "Patterns of Global Terrorism--2000," Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2451.htm