President-elect George W. Bush has
inherited his predecessor's troubled relations with Russia.
President Bill Clinton often overlooked Russia's transgressions,
such as a recently reported political treaty with Beijing, massive
arms sales to Iran and China, and pervasive money laundering. He also
sought to accommodate Russian opposition to a U.S. national missile
defense system, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to the Cold
War view of arms control and ignoring the need to counter the
growing threat of ballistic missiles from rogue states.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his
administration espouse a nationalist agenda that seeks to
re-establish Russia as a great world power and to offset America's
global leadership position. Putin and his security team have issued
a series of documents that call the United States, and the
"unipolar world order" it allegedly promotes, a major threat to the
Russian state. Clearly, relations with Russia will pose serious
policy challenges for the new American President.
Soon
after entering office, President-elect Bush must issue a clear
statement about relations with Russia. Indeed, such a statement
would appeal to Russian policymakers and experts, who have
expressed their preference for clear-cut statements that define
America's priorities with regard to Russia. The Russians respected
President Ronald Reagan for his forthrightness, for example, even
when he called the Soviet Union the "evil empire" and demanded that
Mikhail Gorbachev "tear down this [Berlin] Wall." Clear statements
of national security objectives and firm implementation of foreign
policy decisions provide a measure of predictability that would
help Russian leaders navigate the shoals of the global strategic
environment.
However, in establishing the tenets of his
foreign policy, it is vital that President-elect Bush impress upon
his Russian counterpart the extent and limits of cooperation. For
example, while such transgressions as arms sales to Iran and Iraq
and support for rogue leaders like Saddam Hussein will not be
tolerated, Putin can expect cooperation in such areas as strategic
arms reduction, economic development, space exploration, and the
fight against international crime and terrorism. To demonstrate his
desire for better relations, the President-elect should invite
Putin to a summit in Washington in late spring or early summer, or
offer to meet with him at the summit of the G-8 countries to be
held in Genoa, Italy, later this summer. Such a summit would give
the leaders an opportunity to initiate a new chapter in
U.S.-Russian relations, one that seeks to ensure national and
global security--a strategic objective for both countries.
PUTIN AND RUSSIA'S NEW AGENDA
Russia occupies a unique geopolitical
position. It abuts most of the important regions of the Eastern
Hemisphere, including Western Europe and the oil-rich Middle East.
It is a prime exporter of the arms and energy many of these regions
desire. Such a position enables President Putin to focus his
foreign policies on ways to increase Russia's prestige and power.
While abroad, Putin speaks about advancing economic reform and
attracting foreign investment; at home, he talks about the
"dictatorship of law" and strengthening the Russian state. As Michael
McFaul of the Carnegie Endowment points out, Putin wears two hats:
one when he speaks to the Russian people and another when he
addresses foreign audiences. It is an ability that must not be
underestimated by the new Bush Administration.
Vladimir Putin began a whirlwind foreign
policy offensive to improve Russia's status in the region and the
world even before he became president of Russia on May 7, 2000.
After becoming prime minister in August 1999, for example, he met
with President Clinton five times. As acting president, he met with
British Prime Minister Tony Blair in St. Petersburg on March 11,
2000. Since becoming president, he has visited the major Western
European countries, including Great Britain, Germany, France,
Italy, and Spain. He has visited China, Japan, Mongolia, and the
two remaining Marxist-Leninist countries, North Korea and Cuba. And
he has made appearances in the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, hoping to enhance Russia's status in
this energy-rich region. This is an impressive itinerary for
Putin's first year in office. This initiative extends to officials
within his administration as well, as the recent meetings in Moscow
of high-ranking national security officials from Russia with
similar officials from Iran and Iraq show.
Putin's effort to enhance Russia's
position includes a promise to increase substantially the sales of
Russian oil, natural gas, and electricity to Europe. Moreover, to
gain a louder voice in European security policy, the Putin administration has
broached the idea of joining the controversial European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) initiative, a joint military structure
for the European Union (EU) that some countries hope will
counterbalance America's role in European security in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Putin is using arms sales to boost
Russia's influence as well, signing large deals in 2000 with China,
India, and Iran that total almost $10 billion. Weapons sales
generate revenue for Moscow to use in the strategic modernization
of Russia's aging military forces; they also strengthen Russia's
influence in important (and volatile) areas such as the Taiwan
Strait, the Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, and the
Persian Gulf. While Putin has announced plans to reduce Russia's
nuclear forces significantly to between 1,000 and 1,500 warheads,
either in a negotiated treaty or in tandem with the United
States,
he strongly opposes the deployment of a national missile defense
(NMD) system for America.
To
strengthen his position as a global leader, Putin made appearances
at the G-8 summit in Okinawa and the Millennium Summit at the
United Nations in September 2000, the summits of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) in Moscow and Yalta, a bilateral summit
with the EU in Paris, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum in Brunei in November. During these trips, his public
relations team carefully orchestrated moves that would garner media
attention. In Japan, for example, he allowed a 10-year-old Japanese
girl to throw him on a mat, which charmed the Japanese public. At
the G-8 summit in Okinawa, he gave the other leaders an
"intelligence briefing" on North Korea based on his personal
meeting with Kim Jong-Il and recommended that they stay in touch by
e-mail.
Behind this public relations effort is a
steely commitment to Russia's re-emergence in the "major league" of
nations. The focus on Russia's strategic and economic interests
covers up the inherent weakness in this approach: the Russian
economy, which is based on obsolete industries and a rapidly aging
population and which has contracted by more than 50 percent since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin and his administration seek
an external opponent--similar to what Great Britain was for
imperial Russia in the 19th century during their "Great Game" for
control of Central Asia and the Caucasus--that enables them to make
a show of Russia's strengths. It appears, from Russia's actions and
national security and foreign policy documents, that the opponent
it has chosen is the United States. Putin is campaigning for allies
in this effort by making deals with states like China and India.
The implications of this offensive for U.S.-Russian policy in the
future can be found in the fronts on which Putin's campaign is
being waged.
GEOPOLITICS AND THE TWO-HEADED EAGLE
Russia fittingly adopted the Byzantine
Empire's two-headed eagle as the state symbol in the 15th
century,
but it is also appropriate today. It symbolizes Russia's past
efforts to expand its territory both to the East and the West.
Rather than territorial aggrandizement, Russia is looking in the
21st century to strengthen its ties to its neighbors to the East
and West and to create alternative foci of power to offset the
global leadership position of the United States.
Russia's elites are preoccupied with
advancing "Eurasianism," which sees Russia as the "ultimate
World-Island state" apart from, and hostile to, the maritime and
commercial Euro-Atlantic world. Russian analysts such as
Yu. V. Tikhonravov argue that the nation holds a special place in
the Eastern Hemisphere as a counterbalance to the "globalist"
U.S.-led hegemony; their works are now part of the college
curriculum approved by the Ministry of Higher Education. Because
the West is so often portrayed as materialistic and corrupt, many
Eurasianists advocate closer cooperation with China, the Arab
world, and Iran while espousing anti-Turkic rhetoric.
Indeed, since the fall of the Soviet
Union, Russia has become the major arms supplier for China and
India. On a recent trip to New Delhi, Russian representatives
signed arms and nuclear deals worth an estimated $3 billion,
including cooperation in nuclear and missile areas.
Russia and China are in the process of
negotiating a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which they are
expected to sign when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits Moscow
in mid-2001. Analysts have suggested that the treaty may have
secret appendices outlining the conditions for a common defense,
military cooperation in space, cooperation on military
technologies, and new weapons sales. Russia is already selling
nuclear weapons blueprints, multiple warhead (MIRV) technology,
Sukhoi-27 fighter jets, and, most recently, $1 billion worth of
A-50 Beriev AWACS early warning planes to China that will make it
possible for the People's Liberation Army to coordinate its air,
surface, and naval operations in areas like the Taiwan Strait.
Russia supports China's claims regarding Taiwan, and China supports
Moscow's activities in Chechnya. Finally, both Russia and
China have vociferously opposed Washington's plans to deploy an NMD
system.
Restoring ties with Europe has become a
personal objective for Putin, who has cultivated a friendship with
Prime Minister Tony Blair and also has carefully strengthened
Moscow's ties to Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder of Germany. As
France and Germany have sought to strengthen the European Union and
offset European military reliance on the United States, Moscow has
begun to express an interest in joining the ESDP, which would drive
a wedge between Europe and the United States. Russia's offer to
construct a common missile defense with the EU may have been made
with the same strategic goal in mind. However, Putin, who had
suggested in March 2000 that Russia may one day be interested in
joining the NATO alliance, later disavowed this possibility.
Russia's increasing activities in the
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East are causing
concern in Washington. Since 1991, Russia has sold Middle Eastern
countries $6.9 billion worth of modern weapons, including almost $3
billion in sales to Iran alone. Aided by its
multibillion-dollar missile, military technology, and civilian
nuclear reactor deals with Russia, this unstable Islamic state is
emerging as the predominant military power in the Gulf.
Moscow recently announced that it had
annulled a secret memorandum signed by Vice President Al Gore and
Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in June 1995, which acknowledged
that Russia had sold Iran such conventional arms as submarines,
anti-ship missiles, and tanks. The agreement between the
two officials made it clear that the United States would do nothing
about the arms sales if Moscow promised to cease these activities
by 1999. The weapons sales continue. Moreover, the secret agreement
may have been in violation of the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act cosponsored by then-Senator Gore (D-TN), which
stipulates that the United States would impose sanctions on Russia
if it persisted in selling weapons of this type to Iran or
Iraq.
Moscow disclosed that, in summer and fall
2000, it shipped 325 shoulder-launched anti-aircraft SA-16 missiles
to Tehran, part of a deal totaling 700 missiles worth $1.75
billion. Because Tehran is known for re-exporting weapons to
Islamic radicals in the Middle East, such as the Lebanon-based
Hezbollah movement, it is only a matter of time before these latest
missiles find their way to Hezbollah terrorists or the Islamic
Jihad.
U.S. objections over this sale were met with terse advice from
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov:
The
issue is that Russia, when it comes to military cooperation with
Iran as well as with other countries, does not consider itself
constrained by any special obligations in spheres which are not
restricted by international obligations.
Since 1992, Congress has attempted to
impose sanctions on countries and companies that contribute to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially to
rogue states. The provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, the
Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act, and the Iran Non-Proliferation Act
of 1999 call for imposing sanctions against Russia. However, these
sanctions have not worked in Iran or Iraq. Saddam continues to
acquire WMD and the technology to deliver them. Moreover, Russia
ignored its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group
Agreement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
continued proliferating weapons and weapons technology to Iraq. The
Clinton Administration failed to uphold the law and impose the
sanctions.
Moscow is also boosting its ties with Iraq
to break U.S. domination in the Persian Gulf and to recover some of
the Soviet-era Iraqi debt of approximately $7 billion. In violation
of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, Russia began supplying it with
high-tech military spare parts, such as gyroscopes for its Scud
missiles, and equipment for the production of bacteriological
weapons.
Its efforts to rebuild the once-strong relationship between Iraq
and Moscow include exchanges between the pro-Putin Unity party of
Russia and Saddam's Ba'ath party.
Public Support for Putin's
Approach
Russia's frustration with America's global preeminence began
escalating under former Prime Minister Primakov and has continued
escalating since Putin's ascent. An increase in nationalist
sentiment and a substantial decrease in support for the United
States have been reported by pollsters since 1993. Representative
polling by a reliable Russian public opinion institute demonstrates
how quickly attitudes about the United States have deteriorated
under Putin. In December 1998, 67 percent of those polled
characterized their attitude toward America as "very positive" or
"basically positive." By May 1999, at the height
of the NATO bombardment of Serbia, which Russia opposed, less than
a third of respondents subscribed to this view, and the number of
those who said their attitude was "very negative" or "generally
negative" shot up from 23 percent to 52 percent. The shift is even more
dramatic considering that in 1993, according to the United States
Information Agency (USIA), 70 percent of Russians felt favorable
toward America.
During Kosovo, it should be recalled,
Russian officials encouraged the Russian people to demonstrate in
front of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Serbian diplomats provided
Moscow State University students (who were bussed to the
demonstrations by city authorities) with eggs and tomatoes to throw
at the U.S. embassy. In the heat of these demonstrations, a Russian
vigilante fired a shoulder-launched missile at the embassy.
Clearly, the intention of the government is to increase
anti-American sentiments.
An
examination of current Russian TV programming and media content
demonstrates how anti-American and anti-Western that content has
become. Television moderators and reporters covering last
November's vote count problems in Florida, for example, expressed
glee over the "deep crisis" of the "overrated" American
democracy. Such anti-Americanism,
rarely heard since the early 1980s, is very troubling to Russia
experts and policymakers in the United States. Yet the Clinton
Administration did little of substance to counter this trend.
Institutional Support for Putin's
Approach
The most disturbing development under Putin is the extent to which
Russia's national security and diplomatic institutions attempt to
sway public opinion against the United States and its policies.
These institutions include not only the Putin administration, but
also the Security Council, the foreign and defense ministries, the
general staff of the armed forces, and the intelligence services,
such as the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the successor to
the KGB secret police, the Federal Security Service (FSB).
For
example, during the Kosovo operation, the Russian military accused
NATO of preparing a full-scale attack on Russia. It advocated
rearmament and war in Chechnya as Russia's response to the NATO
operation against Slobodan Milosevic. Marshal Igor Sergeev went so
far as to accuse the United States of provoking the war in
Chechnya. The commander of the
Russian air force, General Anatoly Kornukov, who was responsible
for downing a Korean passenger jumbo jet in 1983, recently boasted
about a surprise flight made by Russian Su-24 reconnaissance planes
over the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. The Russian military has
also blamed U.S. and British submarines for the Kursk submarine
disaster, despite offers from the United States and other countries
to lend assistance in rescuing the crew.
During the 1990s, the FSB arrested
environmental activist Alexander Nikitin, military journalist
Grigory Pasko, and scientist Vladimir Soifer for treason or other
alleged transgressions, such as disclosing serious environmental
pollution by the Russian military. This included burying over two
dozen burned-out nuclear submarine reactors on the ocean floor
without taking any precautions to prevent radiation seepage. The FSB
accused Igor Sutyagin, an arms control researcher at the Institute
for USA-Canada, of spying for Canada. It prosecuted Radio Liberty
journalist Andrey Babitsky, ostensibly for passport violations, and
confiscated the passport of Al Decie, a Western assistance worker.
Although American businessmen Edmond Pope was convicted of
espionage in December, Putin later pardoned him. These cases demonstrate the
increasing power of the internal security services, while the
Yeltsin and Putin administrations did nothing to re-establish the
rule of law.
Energy Exports as a Foreign Policy
Tool
One of Putin's primary tools in implementing his foreign
policy has been energy and commodity exports. For example, Putin
has resurrected the Soviet-era plans to build a gas pipeline from
the Arctic Yamal peninsula into the heart of Europe through Belarus
and Poland, bypassing Ukraine. Such a route will weaken Ukraine by
denying Kiev tariff revenue from the pipeline and will prevent
unauthorized siphoning off of Russian gas. Russia's natural gas
monopoly, Gazprom, is supporting this proposal. Some Russian
officials are also demanding that the government seize control of
the Ukrainian natural gas distribution network and other industrial
enterprises to repay the existing $1.2 billion Ukrainian debt to
Russia for past supplies. In addition, the government and Gazprom's
subsidiary Itera are behind the interruption in the natural gas
supply to Georgia, plunging its capital, Tblisi, into darkness on
New Year's Day. Critics believe such
interruptions in supply are designed to force Georgia to side with
Moscow over such issues as Chechnya and the direction of the
pipelines through the Caspian Sea region.
Meanwhile, the energy-hungry EU countries
are concerned about the current instability in the Middle East and
would like to increase their imports of Russian natural gas. Russia
is already planning to sell electricity to Europe and Japan, and
possibly to China. But history shows that energy trade is often
linked to security cooperation. Political instability or policy
differences can threaten energy exports and thereby force the
dependent country to mute its concerns. For example, Europe,
especially France, is already toning down criticism of Russia's
actions in Chechnya. Poland is decreasing its support for Ukraine.
Thus, with higher dependency on energy from Russia, the EU may
become even less critical of Russia's assertive foreign policies.
Russia is already exporting a large amount
of its natural resources and industrial goods to emerging markets
in Asia. As economic growth continues in China and the Asia-Pacific
region, these markets will likely become more important to Russia's
economy than the markets in Europe. China alone offers Russia a
large market where it can sell goods ranging from grain to nuclear
reactors and AWACS planes, though Beijing cannot reciprocate with
investment dollars or new technology. Therefore, while Russia
improves its relations with Asian states like China, Korea, and
Japan, it will continue to seek U.S. investment.
Even
before Vladimir Putin ascended to his country's highest office, as
the head of the National Security Council, director of the FSB, and
then acting prime minister, he presided over the formulation of
four important government documents that articulate Russia's
foreign and defense policy. These documents, taken together,
explain the new "Putin Doctrine" for Russian national security in
the 21st century and demonstrate Moscow's step back to more
traditional Russian and Soviet threat assessments. The documents
include:
-
A Defense Doctrine, published in draft
form in October 1999 and reissued by presidential decree on April
21, 2000;
-
A National Security Concept unveiled in
January 2000;
-
The Foreign Policy Concept adopted on July
30, 2000; and
-
The Information Security Concept adopted
in August 2000.
Following the themes first espoused by
former Prime Minister Primakov, these documents decry the emergence
of a unipolar world dominated by the United States. They lay claim
to a sphere of influence that encompasses most of the Eastern
Hemisphere. The National Security Concept, for example, names
Europe, the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific region,
and the Middle East as spheres of influence for Russia. It also
names the expanding NATO alliance as a danger to the Russian
homeland and condemns the use of force by NATO under U.S.
leadership as both a violation of international law and a dangerous
security trend.
More
important, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the
Kremlin calls the United States a major threat to the Russian
state. This represents a radical departure from Yeltsin's foreign
policy documents, which proclaimed that Russia has no external
enemies and that the main danger to the Russian state stems from
such domestic concerns as crime, corruption, and political
extremism.
The
National Security Doctrine broadly defines threats to the Russian
state, including the establishment of foreign military bases in
proximity to Russian borders. Not only does it warn against
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems, but it envisages the first use of nuclear weapons by
Russia if it is attacked by non-nuclear weapons of mass
destruction, such as chemical warheads or biological weapons, or by
an overwhelming conventional force. It brands as threatening
the weakening of the integrative processes in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). It cautions about claims to Russian
territory and warns that conflicts close to Russia-CIS borders
could escalate.
In
the Foreign Policy Concept, Russia for the first time has made an
open claim to the need to dominate its neighbors. The Foreign
Policy Concept adopted by presidential decree on June 28, 2000,
calls for the establishment of a belt of good neighbors around
Russia's perimeter. As "the strongest Eurasian power," Russia
asserts in the Concept that "the [U.S.] strategy of unilateral
action may destabilize the world, because the use of force
represents the basis for international conflict."
The
Information Security Concept signed by Putin in August 2000
articulates the view that television, mass media, and the Internet
are avenues that threaten Russian security and must therefore be
controlled by the state. The document calls upon the Federal
Security Service to monitor all
e-mail traffic; it also stipulates registration and control of Web
sites and all national TV channels. This same strategy was
taught in the Soviet-era KGB academies.
These documents reflect the military, KGB,
and Communist Party mindset, training, and education of Russia's
current national security and foreign policy elites. Each one is
also larded with rhetoric about peace and appeals for cooperation
from other foreign governments that support international fora such
as the United Nations. These appeals are an attempt to offset
Russia's conventional military weakness, especially in regions
where it currently lacks power projection capabilities. Despite
these appeals, each document is an obvious rallying cry to
countries that resent America's power and military dominance.
Clearly, Russia is seeking international support for its efforts to
become an alternative power center to challenge the United
States.
A NEW CHAPTER IN U.S.-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS
While a more confident and anti-American
Russia is emerging under Putin's leadership, this does not mean
that the new Bush Administration should fear that a conflict with
Moscow is either imminent or necessary. However, it does mean that
the United States will need to reformulate its policy approach
toward Russia.
Some
experts in Russia have suggested a "grand bargain" that balances
U.S. acceptance of deeper strategic arms cuts and Russian foreign
debt rescheduling with Moscow's acceptance of U.S. deployment of a
national missile defense system and a significant reduction in
military cooperation with China and Iran. But as Russia's
cancellation of the secret Gore-Chernomyrdin deal and the $3
billion arms deal with Tehran signed by the Russian Defense
Minister show, it is becoming more
difficult to rely on Moscow's promises to curtail proliferation.
Moreover, the Kremlin has shown little flexibility on U.S. national
missile defense plans, and the economic outlook for Russia's
economy hardly justifies debt rescheduling.
In
addition to rescheduling parts of its $58 billion sovereign debt to
the Paris Club, Russia wants Western help
in its effort to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
cooperation on fighting radical Islamic terrorism. Economic growth
in Russia would help to make Moscow's policies more trade-friendly
and less security-oriented.
The
new Bush Administration must design its Russia policy around a core
set of priorities: deploying a national missile defense; limiting,
to the extent possible, strategic cooperation between China and
Russia; preventing Iran from increasing its nuclear weapon and
ballistic missile capabilities; containing Saddam Hussein and Iraq;
and keeping Eurasian countries from falling exclusively under a
Russian sphere of influence.
To
this end, President-elect George W. Bush should offer to meet with
Vladimir Putin at a summit to address the issues of concern. This
summit could take place in Washington in late spring or early
summer, or as a side conference at the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy,
to take place sometime this summer. During this summit, the Bush
Administration should:
-
Pursue Russia's acceptance of the
deployment of a national missile defense system for America.
The Administration should emphasize that such a system is not aimed
at eliminating Russia's potential for deterrence. The system would
be designed, first and foremost, to shield the American people
against missile attack by rogue states that possess small numbers
of weapons or by terrorist groups. Moscow has already expressed an
interest in joint development of boost-stage interceptors for
theater missile defense. Such cooperation could open the door to
Russia's agreement on a U.S. national missile defense system.
Further incentives could include an offer to purchase more of
Russia's uranium from its dismantled weapons, to be blended into
nuclear reactor fuel at energy-generating facilities to help with
the current energy shortages in states like California.
-
Establish more stringent
nonproliferation and arms trade criteria. The Administration
should insist that Russia limit its sales of arms, military, and
dual-use (military-civilian) technology to China, cease such sales
to rogue states, and severely limit them to countries in conflict,
such as India and Pakistan. According to President Putin, Russia
must speed up its integration into the Western community; if he is
serious, Russia should not be involved in activities that undermine
the security of the West. While striving to strengthen existing
nonproliferation regimes, such as the MTCR, the United States
should work with other countries to develop new export controls for
the conventional and strategic arms trade.
-
Convince Russia to halt nuclear and
ballistic missile cooperation with Iran. The Administration
should discuss with Moscow the potential effects of Russia's
cooperation with Iran in weapons of mass destruction and convince
it to stop, in exchange for a deal in a lucrative high-tech area
such as satellite launches or for purchasing more highly enriched
Russian uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons. In 1993, the
United States signed a 20-year, $11 billion deal to purchase 500
tons of Russian weapons-grade uranium to use as fuel in civilian
reactors. As compensation for
Russia's verifiable cessation of nuclear and missile cooperation
with Iran, Washington could also relax or suspend anti-dumping
measures applied to such Russian imports as certain types of steel.
A time frame should be established for the cessation of all
proliferation and arms cooperation with Tehran.
-
Seek cooperation in terminating Iraq's
missile and weapons programs and Russian support for Saddam Hussein
at the United Nations. The Russian Foreign Ministry and U.N.
representatives have defended Saddam and his rogue regime and
sought to protect Iraq from further U.N. sanctions. Since kicking
U.N. weapons inspectors out of Iraq in 1998, Saddam has succeeded
in rebuilding Iraq's conventional military capabilities and, it is
feared, has restarted its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons
programs. Moscow should work with the other Security Council
members to see that U.N. weapons inspectors return to Iraq. The
Kremlin should cease calling for the lifting of the sanctions.
Moscow should use its influence with Iraq to insist that its
resistance to inspections and violations of the U.N. sanctions
stop. In exchange for intelligence-sharing about Saddam's WMD
programs, the Bush Administration should offer Moscow incentives,
such as preferential economic treatment in Iraq after Saddam is
deposed. The United States should also increase pressure on Moscow
to ensure that arms sold by Russia to other countries do not wind
up in Iraq.
If Russia refuses, the Administration
should ensure that the sanctions embodied in U.S. law are imposed.
This includes Russian oil companies violating the U.N. sanctions by
selling Iraqi oil or investing in Iraq. Congress should examine the
application of sanctions against such companies as they seek U.S.
financing through initial public offerings and American Depository
Rights (ADRs) in U.S. capital markets. These are efficient steps
that would punish companies that are boosting Saddam's arsenals and
replenishing his treasury to their own gain. Such sanctions would
not, however, affect America's ability to export food to Iran or
Iraq or limit non-military trade relations.
-
Seek limits on Russia's cooperation
with China. China is not only aggressively remodernizing its
military, but also has been proliferating weapons and technology to
rogue regimes that threaten security in Eurasia and worldwide. The
Russian military-industrial complex allowed China almost unlimited
access to Soviet-era and post-Soviet arsenals. Recent reports of a
forthcoming Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Moscow and
Beijing deeply concern many American policymakers. However, Russian
politicians and experts increasingly are recognizing the potential
threat to Russia from a rising militaristic China. The United
States and Russia should open discussions to highlight potential
threats from China to both countries.
-
Express support for Russia's accession
to the WTO. Russia is taking a slow approach to WTO
accession. However, President Putin
has proclaimed Russia's integration into international economic
flows and liberalization of the Russian economy as paramount goals.
Minister of Economic Development German Gref announced that Russia
wants first to join the WTO and then to hold talks on economic
liberalization. Such an approach is a negotiating tactic that will
slow the process of trade liberalization and delay accession to the
WTO. The Bush Administration should offer Moscow technical support
both in developing policy measures, laws, and regulations that meet
WTO standards and in developing a specific strategy to achieve WTO
accession.
The
Bush Administration must firmly defend America's national security
interests, but it should also send a signal to Russia's elites that
is seeks better relations and a growing dialogue with the people of
Russia about freedom, economic opportunity, and prosperity. To
facilitate this dialogue, the Administration should encourage
Congress and non-government organizations to expand exchange
programs with the Russians and the countries in Eurasia, similar to
a program for Russian political elites hosted by the Library of
Congress (though the selection of participants in that program
could be improved). Academic exchanges, especially in the fields of
economics, public administration, law, and business, should be
expanded. Students from Russia who study in the United States
become its best ambassadors when they return to their homeland. The
United States should also consider military-to-military and
civilian expert exchanges where issues of doctrine, strategy, and
peacekeeping can be discussed.
Conclusion
The new U.S. Administration faces a more determined,
disciplined, and organized Russian government led by an energetic
president: a former Soviet intelligence officer and a tough Kremlin
insider who is intent on maximizing Russia's international
prestige. The Bush Administration must do its homework on Russia
and then offer to host a summit with President Vladimir Putin to
develop important policies, especially on missile defense,
proliferation, regional security, Russia's foreign debt, and other
economic issues. Most important, Washington should stand firm on
matters of national security and national interest.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is
Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.