Indonesia, the fourth most populous
country in the world and a cornerstone of security and economic
development in Southeast Asia, is a continuing source of
international concern amid worries that President Abdurrahman Wahid
is not in control. The September 14 car bombing under Jakarta's
stock exchange, which killed at least 15 people, is only the latest
example of the instability in this nation of 6,000 inhabited
islands. Just weeks ago, an Indonesian military-supported,
militia-led mob killed three United Nations relief workers in West
Timor, including one American. Yet the Clinton Administration,
which has condemned Jakarta for not keeping order and controlling
its military, is working to renew U.S. military engagement with
Indonesia's military, the National Armed Forces (TNI).
The
TNI is widely considered responsible for the September 1999 chaos
in East Timor and the armed attacks that continue in that newly
independent state. About 120,000 refugees who fled last year's
violence remain scattered in camps in West Timor. Militias continue
to terrorize them as well as U.N. workers. All international aid
workers were withdrawn from West Timor in September 2000 as a
result of the continued presence and activities of army-sponsored
militias. The TNI is also being held responsible for provoking
bloody sectarian violence in the Moluccas islands and for the
savage suppression of independence movements in the provinces of
Aceh and Irian Jaya (Western Papua). It also retains important
political appointments in the legislature, even after the
government's transition from an authoritarian dictatorship to a
nascent democracy, and owns legal and illegal business ventures in
all the provinces.
To
remedy Indonesia's numerous security problems, the National Defense
University's Institute for National Security Studies, in Washington
D.C., recommended that the United States increase "the number of
TNI officers enrolled in professional military education
institutions in the United States." This traditional
solution to civil-military problems of increasing the number of
Indonesian soldiers trained in U.S. military schools is unlikely to
resolve Indonesia's numerous problems. It is time for a new
approach.
A
better way to address Indonesia's enduring problems would be to
continue forgoing military-to-military training for Indonesia until
the TNI is under Jakarta's control and placed under civilian
authority. The TNI must demonstrate that it respects the rule of
law. Indonesian officers who have received training in the United
States should be encouraged to use that training to build a
professional armed force in Indonesia by sharing the values they
learned about democratic ideals and the importance of a civil
society.
DESPITE ENGAGEMENT, TNI STILL CORRUPT
Engagement with foreign militaries, especially in the form
of military schooling, has become an increasingly important
national security tool. It offers an opportunity for the United
States to build important relationships with foreign armed forces,
particularly those of its allies and potential coalition partners.
It also helps small or poorly funded forces to develop
institutional strength. Finally, military-to-military engagement
helps to spread democratic values and respect for the rule of
law.
During the Cold War, it was easy to argue
that engagement with the Indonesian armed forces was beneficial. At
that time, Southeast Asia was a hotbed of Cold War confrontation.
In 1965, Indonesia had the largest communist party outside of the
communist bloc; it received extensive Soviet military support; and
its army was locked in a power struggle with the communists. In
1966, after a bloody purge of the communists, Suharto assumed the
presidency, backed by the Indonesian army. Suharto's reign ended in
1998 when he was forced from power in a democratic revolution.
Although the Indonesian government was
authoritarian and undemocratic, the Cold War and the fact that the
Indonesian armed forces shared America's security objective of a
non-communist Indonesia justified U.S. engagement with the regime.
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S.
Department of Defense did not reevaluate its strategy.
Military-to-military engagement was still touted as the best way to
influence the government of Indonesia.
The
results of this policy decision have been dismal. Indonesia's
military remains systemically corrupt, and the professional
education of many of its officers in the United States did little
to change the nature of the armed forces. Engagement, instead of
fostering such American interests as political stability, economic
development, and democracy, allowed the Indonesian armed forces to
create or aggravate every security crisis in the country.
TNI's POWERS OVER CIVILIAN
SOCIETY
Today, the Indonesian military and its activities are the greatest
threat to the security and territorial integrity of Indonesia. The
TNI is heavily vested in both public and private power structures.
It owns businesses throughout the islands. Members of the military
have been appointed to the national legislature. And its officers
show little respect for the law, despite decades of military
engagement with the United States. Though various officials in
Washington praise military-to-military engagement with Indonesia,
they fail to show how engagement with Indonesia's armed forces is
complementing U.S. foreign policy objectives. From Aceh,
Indonesia's westernmost province, to Irian Jaya, the easternmost,
the TNI has been intimately involved in civilian society; worse, it
has instigated or aggravated nearly every security crisis.
"Sweeping
Operations" in Aceh
The chronic insurgency in Aceh seeks independence or
substantive autonomy from Jakarta. Although the Indonesian
government negotiated a "humanitarian pause" for peaceful
negotiations with the rebel group GAM ( Gerakan Aceh Merdeka ), both the military
forces and the national police largely ignore the truce. Sixty-four
people were killed in Aceh this year between the start of a truce
on June 2 and August 21. Of those, 51 were
civilians.
The
TNI's maneuvers in Aceh, called "sweeping operations," typically
move troops into an area; these troops proceed to rob
indiscriminately, burn villages to the ground, and shoot anyone
engaged in suspicious behavior--which could include anything from
raising an Aceh flag to sitting peacefully in a café. When a
military unit moves into an area to conduct a sweeping operation,
the inhabitants flee; consequently, there are now tens of thousands
of displaced refugees within Aceh and neighboring northern Sumatra.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of people in Aceh
would rather remain citizens of Indonesia than push for
independence, but the arbitrary and cruel actions of the TNI have
eroded that slim margin of support.
Inciting
Militias in Irian Jaya
As in Aceh, the people of Irian Jaya fear and hate the
military and the police. They are fighting for independence, but
they are much less willing than the people of Aceh to seek
autonomy. Indigenous leaders are willing to negotiate peacefully
with Jakarta to gain a peaceful and just transition to
independence; nevertheless, the TNI refuses to permit peaceful
discussions of the future status of Irian Jaya.
Along with its brutal suppression of and
disregard for human rights in Irian Jaya, the TNI has created a
pro-Jakarta militia to provoke riots and other security-related
incidents, which in turn are used to justify its repressive
tactics. The TNI had used a similarly indirect method to attack the
local population in East Timor during its 24-year occupation of
that state. There, militia units terrorized the local population
and were principally responsible for the destruction of East Timor
after the people passed a referendum on independence in August
1999. Elements of the TNI are believed to continue to fund, train,
and equip former East Timor militias to infiltrate that country and
shoot at U.N. peacekeepers.
Violence in the
Moluccas Islands
The problems in Aceh and Irian Jaya pale in comparison to
those of the Moluccas islands, where more than 4,000 people have
been killed in the past 18 months. This formerly peaceful province
has been wracked with sectarian violence between evenly divided
Christian and Muslim populations.
Many
observers suspect that the TNI is inciting the fighting in the
Moluccas islands, since no substantive underlying issues seem to be
driving the combatants to battle. Compared with Aceh and Irian
Jaya, there has been no insurgent uprising in the Moluccas. Leaders
of both sides proclaim their desire to remain in Indonesia and to
live together peacefully. Evidence of TNI involvement came after
the initial rioting between Muslim and Christian communities began
to ebb and new fighters from Java called the Laskar Jihad (Soldiers of Jihad) appeared.
Their funding is widely believed to come from members of the TNI
and the Suharto family.
President Wahid ordered the TNI to prevent
the Java-based terrorist organization from deploying to the
Moluccas islands, but the military
claims it is powerless to stop them. More than 2,000 heavily armed
Laskar Jihad fighters have been seen
provoking instability in the Moluccas. For months, the TNI denied
any involvement in the fighting, but the British Broadcasting
Company (BBC) succeeded in filming an Indonesian army unit as it
provided covering fire for Laskar
Jihad fighters. Now representatives of the Indonesian army and
the Ministry of Defense are blaming this problem on "rogue"
elements.
Repressing citizens is not the TNI's only
involvement in violent affairs. The TNI has been linked to a spate
of bombings in Jakarta: The bombs and equipment used appear to be
military in origin. Indeed, Akbar Tanjung, Speaker of the
Indonesian Parliament, specifically linked these bombings to the
military. The TNI's
motivation for its activities, especially in Aceh, Irian Jaya, the
Moluccas islands, and Jakarta, seems to be a desire to retain
political and economic power by holding hostage the security and
territorial integrity of Indonesia.
Seeking More Power
U.S. foreign policy makers should understand that in Indonesia, the
goals of the government and the TNI are not necessarily the same.
The Indonesian military is an independent political, social,
economic, and security entity outside government control; yet it
has the strength to manipulate the instruments of political power.
It is not responsible to the Indonesian government, and the
president is the only figure with constitutional authority over the
armed forces; yet presidential control appears to be more formal
than real.
Since 1966, the military has co-ruled
Indonesia through a doctrine of its own creation, called dwi fungsi
("dual function"). This doctrine postulates that the Indonesian
military has a double role: defender of the country and
sociopolitical leader. The doctrine legitimized the military's
self-promotion into politics, the government bureaucracy, and large
portions of the economy. At its peak during Suharto's presidency,
the military controlled 100 seats in the national legislature,
important cabinet positions, and the governorships of several
provinces, while it also appointed representatives to every village
in Indonesia.
During the Suharto era, the president and
the army worked in unison, each supporting the other's position.
With the introduction of a democratic government in 1999,
justification for military control disappeared, but the TNI's
pervasive influence did not. The security apparatus that had
supported Suharto and effectively suppressed political dissension
still exists and is unapologetically unreformed. President Wahid,
to his credit, attempted to gain control over the military by
reducing its presence in the legislature (abolishing all military
presence by 2004), appointing a civilian defense minister,
dismantling the territorial command structure, and prosecuting
members of the military who were suspected of human rights
violations. Sadly, most of these measures have come to naught.
Today, the TNI maintains its territorial
command organization embedded throughout the country. The
organization runs parallel to the government down to the village
level, and in many cases the authority of the army supersedes local
government authorities. Although there has been substantial
discussion in Jakarta about the territorial apparatus, it is still
very much in place. As Harold Crouch, an Australian observer of
Indonesia, has said, "This territorial structure has given the army
considerable capacity to intervene in local politics under the
guise of maintaining
stability."
Through open intimidation and blunt
threats, Indonesia's army generals convinced the last parliamentary
session to extend the TNI's numbers in the national legislature
until at least the year 2009. The parliament also granted them a
blanket amnesty for past human rights abuses. Although there was an
enormous public outcry against the extension, legislators afterward
admitted that they had voted for it because of threats from the
generals. Juwono Sudarsono,
Indonesia's first civilian defense minister, admitted that he is
powerless against the TNI: "The Ministry of Defense is not directly
in charge of the chain of command. I cannot order them around." Most informed
observers have concluded that the Indonesian military is, in fact,
the most intransigent obstacle to the development of democracy.
Constraining the Economy
In Indonesia, government intervention in the economy through
state-owned enterprises has skewed entrepreneurial choices and
stunted economic development. The TNI now
controls many businesses and "foundations." Ostensibly, this was a
way to augment Indonesia's tiny defense budget and improve
soldiers' welfare, but coupled with rampant corruption, such
involvement in the economy distorts economic incentives and impedes
progress.
The
military-owned enterprises date back to the 1950s, when many
military units seized Dutch businesses during the decolonization
period. They justified their larceny by citing political
disagreements with their former colonial masters. Generally,
businesses grew rapidly because of their relationship with the
TNI.
The
armed forces made liberal use of the resources they gained,
including considerable political clout. Over time, the TNI's
dependence on these enterprises has grown to the point that today,
the government's defense budget covers only an estimated 25 percent
of military expenditures. The rest of the military's funding comes
from the foundations and businesses it owns, both legally and
illegally.
There are about 50 military-owned
businesses and seven foundations associated with each of the armed
services and major commands, but it is almost
impossible to measure the size of these foundations and businesses
or their economic impact. The government
began its first-ever audit of the TNI businesses in June 2000 and
already has uncovered many irregularities, especially in the areas
of bookkeeping and procurement. The government's response: Under
pressure from the army leadership, it relieved from duty a
prominent reform-minded general who had pursued an investigation
into the financial dealings of his unit's foundation too
enthusiastically. It appears unlikely that the government will
prosecute any officer for mismanaging or stealing funds from these
enterprises.
Legitimate business activity has often
served as a front for illegal business dealings, including unlawful
logging and animal poaching in West Papua, fuel smuggling across
the archipelago, and marijuana production and smuggling in
Indonesia's westernmost province. Army Chief of Staff General
Tyasno Sudarto stands accused of coordinating the largest
counterfeiting operation in Indonesia's history, and many other
officers are believed to be involved in illegal activities and
innumerable questionable businesses independent of their military
duties. Many observers
regard this widespread corruption as a leading cause of the TNI's
rampant disorder and factionalism today.
A NEW U.S.-INDONESIA POLICY
Washington should reevaluate U.S. policy toward Indonesia based on
U.S. national interests, such as enhancing security, bolstering
economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights. To that end, the
United States should support Indonesia's nascent democracy and
bruised economy while working to isolate the errant Indonesian
military. It should assist Indonesia's process of democratization
and support its newly elected president.
However, the Clinton Administration has
chosen another path. It is rewarding the TNI with renewed military
engagement even as it condemns the government for not keeping
order. For example, in May and July 2000, Indonesian military
officers and units participated in military exercises in Thailand
and Indonesia, respectively, at the Pentagon's invitation. These
exercises are a prelude to a much larger military-to-military
engagement program that the Clinton Administration hopes to send to
Congress soon. Then, in
September, when Indonesian militias reportedly backed by the TNI
killed three U.N. aid workers in West Timor, President Clinton and
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright criticized Jakarta for
neither meeting its obligations nor restoring order. The President
also dispatched Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Jakarta to
tell Indonesia's leaders that if the government did not restore
order, it might lose international support, economic assistance,
and military ties.
Support for Indonesia's government is not
equivalent to military-to-military engagement with the TNI. For
professional military organizations such as the U.S. armed forces,
it is practically inconceivable that officers who are duty-bound to
protect and defend their country would act as officers of the TNI
have acted. While the TNI is a large and sophisticated institution
with a national monopoly on the use of force, it is not a
professional military.
Therefore, in order to increase security
in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, the United States should encourage
the subordination of Indonesia's military to the legally
constituted civilian government. Specifically, the United States
should:
-
Cut off
military-to-military contact at all levels. TNI officers
are likely to view any contact with the uniformed members of the
U.S. military as American military validation of the TNI and its
activities. The only way to convince Indonesia's military officers
that there is no latent sympathy for their activities and to
impress upon them the importance of democratic values is to
restrict all TNI contact with uniformed American officers. The
current policies toward the Burmese military should serve as a
model.
-
Review the
necessity of having a TNI representative accredited to the Embassy
of Indonesia in Washington, D.C. As long as the Indonesian
military retains a direct political role and acts as an obstacle to
democratic reform and a cause of regional instability, there is no
reason to credit the TNI with an official representative to the
United States.
-
Use current
assistance dollars to train Indonesia's legislature to conduct
proper legislative oversight of the military. After
decades of the legislature's rubber-stamp acquiescence to the
regime and fear of reprisal, Indonesia's new democratic parliament
is not increasing oversight of the military. In one respect, it is
unfamiliar with appropriate means and methods to oversee military
activities. Providing U.S. expertise on legislative oversight to
members of the Indonesian legislature would enhance civilian
control, increase respect for the rule of law, and create necessary
transparency in the TNI's activities. Experts from other Asian
parliaments that have armed forces oversight committees could be
included in these training sessions.
-
Train a cadre of
civilian defense experts to staff a future Ministry of
Defense. The creation of a civilian-led Indonesian
Ministry of Defense should be a priority for U.S. policy. An
immediate obstacle is the lack of a cadre of indigenous civilian
experts on defense management, budgeting, and acquisitions that
could staff a Defense Ministry once it has been put in place. The
United States should use current security assistance to train a
cadre of civilians who could be selected to occupy positions in a
Ministry of Defense.
- Resume
military-to-military training only when the TNI is firmly under
civilian control and is disengaged from political
activities. Reform of Indonesia's armed forces, following
more than 40 years of corruption and political association with
authoritarian dictators, will be a Herculean task. At a minimum,
the TNI should be subordinated to civilian authority; otherwise,
professional military standards will have no meaning. As long as
the Indonesian military has a direct political role, any assistance
rendered by the U.S. military would prove to be little more than
giving assistance to a specific, albeit heavily armed, political
party.
Thus, no training program should begin
until (1) the Indonesian military has surrendered all seats in the
legislature, (2) the Defense Ministry is legally superior to each
of the services and functions as the commander in chief of the
armed forces, and (3) members of the military are subject to
civilian courts. Milestones for restoration of military-to-military
engagement with the TNI should be attainable and worthy, but not
mobile.
CONCLUSION
The problem of controlling the military in Indonesia stems in part
from the lack of political will in Jakarta. The United States can
help by showing disfavor toward the unrestrained behavior of
members of the TNI and showing support for the democratic
government of Indonesia. American leaders should look very
carefully at any proposal to expand military-to-military engagement
with the TNI; in fact, U.S. policy leaders should refuse to work
with the TNI at all levels unless it is fully subordinate to
civilian authority. Not only will this benefit the citizens of
Indonesia, but it also will support U.S. interests over the long
term.
Dana R. Dillon is a Policy Analyst on
Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.