Taiwan, long a special case when it comes
to U.S. foreign policy, deserves better treatment at the hands of
the Clinton Administration. Though its government is not officially
recognized by the United States, a far-reaching U.S. law--the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act--calls for maintaining extensive legal,
commercial, and defense relations with the people of Taiwan. Under
these unique circumstances, Taipei has made the most of
"unofficial" relations with Washington and a very positive
contribution to the advancement of U.S. interests in Asia.
Taiwan's new president, Chen Shui-bian,
made a significant effort to accommodate the United States and to
reach out to Beijing after his election. He proclaimed that he
would not declare independence unless Taiwan were attacked, and he
called for normalization of economic relations. He endorsed
Beijing's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO),
boosting the likelihood of its receiving permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR) status from the U.S. Congress, and abided by
strict State Department guidelines while visiting the United
States.
On
August 13, President Chen arrived in Los Angeles for a one-night
stopover on his way to the Dominican Republic. In exchange for his
transit visa, the State Department "requested" that Chen not engage
in any public activity or meet with any public officials during his
stay. Chen was even pressured into canceling a private meeting at a
private home simply because some Members of Congress planned to
attend. Although the State Department said that the restrictions on
Chen's activity were consistent with the unofficial nature of
U.S.-Taiwan relations and the private nature of his transit, they
were a clear example of the Administration's willingness to offend
American ideals to accommodate China's sensitivities.
For
all the people of Taiwan have done to advance U.S. interests, it is
time not only to challenge the legal and diplomatic basis for such
restrictions, but for the Administration to treat Taiwan's leaders
in a manner consistent with that nation's level of economic and
political success.
Poor
Treatment of Taiwan. The foundation for normal diplomatic relations
with China lies in three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués that
were issued in a different time and under dramatically different
circumstances. Tense Cold War competition, U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam, and martial law on Taiwan led U.S. officials to make
accommodations and concessions to China in those documents that
today seem unnecessary or counterproductive. Chief among China's
outdated notions was its desire to limit U.S. contact with Taiwan's
leaders and to isolate Taiwan from the world.
Tough treatment of Taiwan as part of
America's broader China policy is based on a particular
interpretation of two policy statements in the joint
communiqués. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the
United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a
part of China." This is the origin of the so-called one-China
policy, further refined in the 1979 Normalization Communiqué
when the United States recognized "the government of the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China" and vowed
within this context to maintain only "unofficial relations with the
people of Taiwan."
On
the basis of these diplomatic statements, some within the U.S.
government have circulated internal guidelines that severely
restrict contact with Taiwan officials in the United States as well
as travel to the United States by Taiwan's top leaders. These
internal guidelines have led U.S. officials to oppose Taiwan's
membership in most international organizations. The most formal
articulation of these guidelines is the Administration's 1994
Taiwan policy review. Such constraints undermine Taiwan's standing
in negotiations with Beijing and its ability to participate
meaningfully in international organizations--an explicit goal of
the 1994 review.
With
the Cold War over, democracy thriving on Taiwan, and China's
militarization of the Taiwan Strait, it is doubtful that a majority
of Americans or their elected officials agree with the weight
Washington currently gives to Beijing's opinion in the conduct of
U.S. diplomacy, or with the tough treatment accorded Taiwan.
Giving Taiwan Its Due.
To properly acknowledge President Chen's cooperative efforts and
to reward Taiwan for its vibrant democracy, the United States
should:
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See that China and Taiwan together join
the WTO. With President Chen's endorsement of PNTR, the Senate
should not find it difficult to support permanent extension of
China's normal trade status. Washington should seek the WTO
accession of both China and Taiwan and should ensure that Beijing
lives up to its accession commitments and does not stand in the way
of Taiwan's simultaneous accession. Successful integration of both
countries should enhance cross-Strait relations and be a boon to
American interests.
-
Support Taiwan's participation in
international organizations. Membership in international bodies
should not be viewed as part of a tit-for-tat struggle with
Beijing. Handled wisely, support for Taiwan's international
participation can lead to greater confidence in cross-Strait
relations while allowing Taiwan to invest more of its talents and
resources to the benefit of China and the world.
-
Enshrine "the assent of the Taiwan people"
as a key tenet of U.S. policy. On March
8, President Clinton declared that "the issues between Beijing and
Taipei must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the
people of Taiwan." This important acknowledgement of Taiwan's
democratic success should remain a key pillar of U.S. policy.
-
Remove onerous restrictions on activities
of Taiwan officials in the United States. If Hong Kong's Martin
Lee, Tibet's Dalai Lama, Palestine's Yasser Arafat, and Sinn Fein's
Gerry Adams can meet with the President in the White House, then
surely Taiwan's democratically elected president should be allowed
to do more than stay in his hotel while visiting the United
States.
Such
steps will require a change in thinking in Washington. Fortunately,
consideration of PNTR in Congress offers the best opportunity in a
long time to take steps to improve U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Stephen J. Yates is former Senior
Policy Analyst in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.