Later this week, the United States Senate will vote on ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC is a multilateral
treaty that would bar the production and stockpiling of chemical
weapons by the countries that ratify it. Given its sweeping
provisions, the ratification of the CWC carries important
implications for U.S. policies on arms control, non-proliferation,
defense, regulation, and above all, national security. As a result,
Senators need to consider the CWC carefully and not assume that it
deserves support merely because it professes to outlaw chemical
weapons. In fact, the CWC will fail to achieve its stated goal of a
global ban on chemical weapons. Moreover, the CWC will make America
more vulnerable to chemical weapon attack in the future while
imposing an unwarranted and costly burden on American business.
If ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention would:
- Increase the risk of chemical weapons being used
By undermining the U.S. chemical deterrent, the CWC may
increase the likelihood that chemical weapons would be used. The
experience of World War II shows that an aggressor possessing
chemical weapons will hesitate to use them to attack a country that
also possesses such weapons. If the U.S. bans all of its chemical
weapons, as required by the CWC, outlaw states that retain them
will have a military advantage over the U.S. and other countries
that have banned them. This military advantage increases the
likelihood that chemical weapons could be used against the
U.S.
- Be unverifiable
Despite elaborate and burdensome verification provisions,
compliance with the CWC cannot be adequately verified. At a hearing
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then-Director of Central
Intelligence James Woolsey warned that "the chemical weapons
problem is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I
cannot state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect
noncompliance, especially on a small scale."
- Be unenforceable
Violations of the CWC are likely to go unpunished. If a
violation were to occur, the United Nations Security Council would
have to impose penalties severe enough to change the behavior of an
outlaw state. But the five permanent members of the Security
Council can veto any enforcement resolution lodged against them or
their friends. China and Russia, for example, can simply veto
resolutions imposing sanctions on them if they disagree with other
Security Council members.
- Impose a heavy regulatory burden on U.S. businesses
There are over 7,700 production facilities in the U.S. that may
be subject to CWC-related reporting and inspection requirements.
The direct cost to business could be as high as $200 million
annually, while indirect costs could run into billions of dollars a
year.
- Increase the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons
Article XI of the CWC requires cooperation among nations in the
peaceful uses of chemicals. In many respects, this provision
resembles the 1950s Atoms for Peace arrangement to foster the
peaceful uses of nuclear power. This is the approach to arms
control and trade that has been used to justify Russia's sale of
nuclear reactors to Iran. The last thing the world needs is a
"Poison for Peace" program that helps spread chemical weapons
around the world, as the Atoms for Peace did for nuclear reactors
to Iran and North Korea.
The chief lobbying group for the chemical industry, the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA), supports ratification of the CWC,
and the prospect for increased sales of dangerous chemicals to
countries like Iran may be the reason why. CMA member companies
that produce and export chemicals would be subject to stricter
limits on exports if the U.S. does not ratify the CWC. It would be
sad indeed if the CMA were putting its own economic interest ahead
of the nation's security in supporting ratification.
- Not enhance U.S. security
By making arms control an end in itself, the CWC will not
protect U.S. national security. Arms control is only one of several
means for achieving the goal of national security. America needs
the additional tools of deterrence, defenses, and even offensive
military operations. It makes no sense for America to give up its
chemical weapons if other nations still possess them.
- Be inconsistent with America's global responsibilities
The CWC, by treating all nations alike, fails to acknowledge
America's special role in global security. Superpower status
imposes important global responsibilities which the U.S. can
fulfill only by maintaining armed forces capable of projecting
overwhelming force around the globe. Because America has these
special responsibilities, it is treated as an exceptional case
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding the possession
of nuclear weapons. The same principle should apply to America's
chemical weapons arsenal.
Conclusion
Advising and consenting to the ratification of treaties is one
of the Senate's most solemn constitutional responsibilities. This
is particularly so when the treaty under consideration has profound
implications for the security of the nation. Given all that is
stake with the CWC, Senators should scrutinize carefully all the
provisions and implications of the treaty before they vote. This
will lead to an inescapable conclusion: Ratifying the CWC would
leave America less secure and would pose unreasonable costs on
American businesses.