The Heritage Foundation

Backgrounder #973 on Russia

January 7, 1994

January 7, 1994 | Backgrounder on Russia

Beyond the Partnership for Peace: An Action Plan for the NATO,Prague, and Moscow Summits

(Archived document, may contain errors)

973 January 7,1994 L AN ACTTONPLAN FOR THE NATO, pRAGuE,ANDMOSCOW SUMMITS INTRODUCTION president Bill Clinton leaves this week for Europe to discuss the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and U.S.-Russian relations. At his meetings in Brussels a nd Prague, Clinton should insist that NATO continue to be the premier collective security organization in Europe, able to defend America's vital economic and security interests in Europe into the 21st century. To do this, he should assure NATO allies that the U.S. will maintain an adequate military pmence in Europe. He should also reach out to Central and Eastern European nations that suffered Soviet domination for nearly half a century and help to restore their nghtfbl place in Western security institutio ns. Finally, while in Moscow, Clinton should encourage democra!s to continue with reforms at home and choose cooperation over confrontation with the West.

The NATO "Partnership for Peace PFP) will provide the framework within which al liance transformation can take place.The PFP was proposed by Secretary of Defense LRs Aspin October 20,1993, at a meeting of NATO defense ministen inTravemfinde, Ger mauy, and endorsed by NATO foreign ministers on December 9,1993, in Brussels.

NATO heads of state will give fi nal approval at their summit meeting in Brussels on Jan uary 10-11 NATO leaders arc expected to approve at the Brussels summit a process by which some, but not necessarily all, members will be able to use NATO facilities and capabili ties for non-NATO con tingencies, such as peacekeeping and humanitaiian operations.

The process, known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF will allow the United States to avoid military involvement in missions which have little bearing on U.S. national hter as. Permitting the u se of NATO bases, logistics networks, and communications capabil ities will encourage America's Ewopean allies to continue regarding an American-led NATO as the only viable collective security organization in Europe.

Clintons Partnership for Peace and the Combined Joint Task Force concept are neces sary first steps toward eventual expansion of the alliance that acknowledges the dramatic changes Europe has seen in the past five years. They properly place the responsibility of membership on those nations, s u ch as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, that claim they are ready for membership. These nations will be given the time they need-at their own pace and initiative-to modify their national security structures, armed forces and budgets so that they ca n contribute to, rather than be a burden on, the alliance.

The Clinton Administrations proposals preserve the stability of the alliance at a time of great uncertainty in Europe and Eurasia. The recent elections in Russia in which hard line nationalists, co mmunists, and other non-democrats polled well, underscore the need for NATO to be deliberate in expanding its security umbrella eastward.

During his trip to Europe, President Clinton can use approval of the PFP and CJTF as the framework within which to bu ild a new transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe for the 21st century. While at the NATO summit in Brussels, he should r/ Support partnership offers only to nations of the former Warsaw Treaty Or ganization or the European republic s of the former Soviet Union, and exclude traditionally neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland V Announce that the U.S. will support NATO membership for key democratic partners as soon as they are ready for the military and financial respon sibil i ties of alliance r/ Encourage key allies to establish bilateral ties of assistance with democratic partners that best demonstrate the initiative toward partnership and eventual membership r/ Commit to a 1995 European Security Summit of NATO and PFP partne r s to as sess the progress toward additional membership r/ Oppose partnership for Ukraine until Kiev honors its international obligations to ratify the START I Treaty without qualification and the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty NPT humanitarian operation s which have no bearing on its vital national interests r/ Declare Americas intention not to participate militarily in peacekeeping and While meeting with Central and Eastern European leaders in Prague, Clinton should r/ Declare the US. desire to see Polan d , the Czech Republic, and Hungary enter NATO as soon as they are ready r/ Offer US. assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as they con vert their national security structures and armed forces to be compatible with NATO membership 2 From Jan u ary 12-15, Clinton will meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. While in a/ Declare his desire to see a democratic Russia join NATO as soon as it is ready a/ Offer US. assistance to Russia to convert its national security structure and a/ Make no joint declarations of security guarantees for Central and Eastern r/ Discourage President Yeltsins request for relaxation of combat strength limita tions imposed by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Moscow, Clinton should armed forces to be compatible with those of NATO nations Europe with President Yeltsin NATO UBER AUS: EUROPE COMES FULL CIRCLE By the time NATO defense ministers gathered at Travemiinde, Germany, in October 1993 to lay the groundwork for the January 1994 summit, European an d U.S. attitudes toward the Atlantic Alliance had come full circle since the end of the Cold War. The hope of many in 1989 that it was only a matter of time before a United States of Europe would provide for its own defense had given way by 1993 to frustra t ion, high lighted by the failure of the European Community to stop the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and a monetary crisis in the fall of 1992 that caused the collapse of the European monetary system. By the October 1993 meeting at Travemiinde, the c o nsensus sentiment was that NATO was here to stay, but that it also needed a redefinition of mem bership and mission Euphoria Turns to Frustration. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, there was widespread satisfaction that NATO had done its job. As Presiden t George Bush noted in February 1990, the Eastern European countries are throwing off the yoke of com munism. The policy of NATO has prevailed. What followed was an undeniable sense of euphoria. One analyst questioned whether or not communisms collapse and triumph of democratic capitalism marked the resolution of the Hegelian dialectic and, thus, the end of history.2 Responsible observers of Americas Cold War foreign policy suggested that the U.S. military presence in Europe could soon be reduced to a token level as a united Europe shouldered greater responsibility for her own defense?

For their part, throughout 1990 and 1991 the nations of the European Community negotiated the Treaty of European Union, signed at Maastricht, The Netherlands, in December 199

1. The treaty established a common foreign and security policy, the forerunner of a European collective security body that would also serve as a European pillar within NATO. The unspoken but obvious sentiment was that the Atlantic Alliance was anachronist i c; the new world order demanded new European institutions that did not 1 2 3 From a February 25,1990, news conference, as cited in Kim R. Holmes and Jay Kosminsky, eds Reshaping Europe Strutegiesfor u Post-Cold War Europe (Washington, D.C The Heritage Fou ndation, 1990 p. 202.

Francis Fukuyka, The End of History? The Nutionul Interest. Summer 1989.

See Holmes and Kosminsky. op. cit p. 55ff. necessarily include the United States, and Maastricht was the first step toward estab lishing such institutions.

Col d War had ended and the Soviet Union was gone, it was too early to tell what the final complexion of Europe would be. European public opinion was the first to reflect this: Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty when it was put to a referendum in Ma y 1992, while France-traditionally the country most desirous of a diminution of American influence in Europe-approved.the treaty by just a narrow 5 1 percent to 49 percent in September 19

92. Moreover, NATO retains overwhelming public support when compared with the Western European Union, the moribund security organization founded after World War II and designated in the Maastricht Treaty as Europes defense This euphoria began to give way by 1992 to the unsettling recognition that, while the component of t heEuro ean Union.

The in ability of the European to resolve its own political and military crisis in the former Yugos lavia also has contributed to the sense that a united Europe with a community Western European Publlc Ophlon on Security More Confidence I n NATO than Western European Union Britain France Germany Italy 71% 72 Great Deal or Fair Amount of Not Much or No Confidence common foreign and security policy remains a distant hope. And as each member of the community struggles out of economic recessio n the natural tensions of separate economic and social policies have led to dramatic anti-union actions, including the withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Monetary System in September 1992 Finally, disturbing 1993 election results in Eastern Euro p e, the Baltics, and Russia have poured cold water on immediate hopes for a fundamentally new security order in Europe. In Poland and Lithuania, reconstituted versions of the former Communist Party won national elections, while nearly half of the parliamen t ary vote in the December 1993 Russian elections went to extremist parties of either the left or the right Plus p change Thus, by the fall of 1993, the terms of the European security debate had shifted from a gradual decline in NATOs influence to a search f or a new U.S.-European strategic bargad using the Atlantic Alliance as its foundation. Senator 4 5 Dechmtion of the Western European Union on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, p ara 2. Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Lamabee, America and Europe: A New Bargain, A New NATO 4 Richard Lugar (R-IN) acknowledged the obvious in September 1993 when he noted that NATO is seen b European leaders as the only credible organiz a tion that could make any differencein post-Cold War European stability. Lugar spoke for many in the Atlan tic Alliance when he asked Why are we [in NATO That is the basic question that has to be argued by the administration and by the Congress I would say we are there because Ameri a must lead. There cannot be European secu rity without the United States. i Reflecting the new consensus, NATO defense ministers met at Travemunde in October 1993 to lay the groundwork for a revitalization of the alliance. Whil e at Travemunde, the ministers had to grapple with three principal realities 0 The U.S. wished to continue its significant military presence in Europe.The Clin ton Administration was committed to a presence of at least 100,OOO troops 8 The transition to de m ocracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was not complete, and should not be assumed. Just three weeks earlier, an anti-reform coup in Moscow led to the occupation of the parliament build ing by the armed forces Europe faced securi ty challenges different from those of the Cold War, including regional and ethnic conflicts.

The Clinton Administration proposed the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Com bined Joint Task Force concept at Travemunde in response to these realities. The pr oposal met with broad support by the NATO defense ministers, and the run-up to the January 1994 NATO summit began in earnest. NATO foreign ministers endorsed the proposals in December 1993, and heads of state are expected to approve them at the sum mit.

T HE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE The Partnership for Peace (PFP) is an invitation to non-members to begin working closely with NATO organizations-to become a partner of the alliance-and learn both the opportunities and responsibilities of membership in that compl ex organization.

The offer envisions that each partner will negotiate with NATO to identify its desired level of participation.

For example, the Czech Republic may offer NATO use of an ordnance firing range in exchange for the opportunity to learn NATO firing procedures.

At the same time, NATO will establish a planning cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SKAPE) in Mons, Belgium, so that staff officers fiom partner nations can participate in NATO training and exercise planning unpublished st udy. The authors are RAND Corporation policy analysts; a published version can be found in The Future of NATO Foreign Affuirs, Fall 19

93. Address to the 1993 National Policy Forum,The Hudson Institute. September 8,1993. 6 7 lbid 5 The strength of the PFP is that it is self-selective; it creates a free market for even tual NATO membership, depending on a partners willingness to participate in alliance diplomatic and military institutions and to transform its national security structures to resemble those o f alliance nations. For example, while no specific criteria have been es tablished, a partner hoping to be considered for NATO membership must satisfy basic re quirements. These are Leaning Forward. Until the PFP was announced, many in Europe and the U.S b elieved that NATO must do something* for former Warsaw Pact countries in Central and Eastern Europe that had suffered under Soviet domination. Many continue to feel that NATOs security guarantees should be extended to such countries as Hungary Poland, and the Czech Republic. Typical of this sentiment was an opinion article from the Prague daily newspaper Lidova Demokrucie, in which the author asserted that the Yalta Accords on the post-war division of influence in Europe between the West and the East have n ot yet been replaced with anything else The same article compares the Travemunde meeting to the 1938 Munich Conference, at which British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain betrayed Czechoslovakia in the face of imminent Nazi occupation of the German-popul ated regions.

As understandable as such sentiment is, its advocates ignore the fact that the British and French capitulation at Munich came despite security guarantees each had made to Czechoslovakia In fact, it was precisely because Britain and France wer e in no position to honor their guarantees that they sought a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Neither country was ready for war with Germany, and leaders in both countries felt Hitlers desire for territorial expansion would be satisfied with portions of Czechoslovakia 1 X Maintaining civilian control of military forces 1 Publishing defense budgets X Reorganizing force structures and command authorities, while developing equipment and communications capabilities to make them compatible with NATO 8 Edit orial, Frosty Wind From Yalta, Lidova Demkracie, October 22, 19

93. Cited in USIA Daily Digest of Foreign Media Reaction October 22, 1993 9 For an excellent discussion, see Paul Johnson, The End of Old Europe, in Moder n Times: The World From the Twenties to the Nineties, Revised Edition (New York Harper Collins Publishers. Inc.. 1991 10 See Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries 1970-19

91. NATOReview. February, 1991,Table 3, p. 32, and Report to the United States Cong ress by the Secretary of Defense on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, May 1993, Table A-3, p. A-12 6 With public interest in NATO waning and defense budgets shrinking, European cries of another Munich sellout fall on deaf ears. The Partnership f o r Peace plan is, in fact ahead of public opinion in most NATO countries. There is little or no public pressure in the U.S. and Western Europe to expand NATO beyond its current membership COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES If the Partnership for Peace takes a firs t, albeit tentative, step toward NATO member ship expansion, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept addresses the need for the alliance to redefine its missions for the threats it must face in post-Cold War Europe.

NATO will find itself having to add ress crises that are short of the armed attack by hos tile forces envisioned in the NATO treaty, including regional and ethnic conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations will also become more common, and NATO shou ld have the capability to respond to such requirements.

The Combined Joint Task Force concept is a step towards redefining future alliance mis sions How CJTFs Will Work. Details remain to be worked out, but CJTFs will probably be established as permanent s hadow organizations within existing major subordinate com mands in NATO, existing on paper only until they are needed to respond to an emergen cy. For example, the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Central (AFCENT) will direct a senior officer within hi s command (a general or admiral of 1- to 3-star rank) to develop a standing contingency task forcestaff within the organization to respond, for ex ample, to a regional crisis involving a mass exodus of refugees.

The CJTF would be available for crises to wh ich NATO as a whole chooses not to respond. Such crises might be peacekeeping or humanitarian operations not covered in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which provides for collective security against an armed attack against one or more members. As envisioned by NATO planners CJTF activities may not even be in NATOs area of operations as described in treaty Article 6 Under these conditions, the CJTF would be activated and separated from its parent command (Allied Forces, Central in the example above), but augm e nted with NATO and non-NATO personnel as may be necessary given the crisis. For example, if a peacekeep ing mission were established by the Commander of the CJTF he may ask for and receive forces from non-NATO countries that wish to contribute. Furthermor e, if the U.S. had chosen not to participate, it may still choose to lend non-combatant support in areas in which it has unique expertise, such as airlift and certain communications capabilities.

CJTFs would replicate an arrangement that already exists, fo r example in the former Yugoslavia. The NATO major subordinate commander-the Commander in Chief of Al lied Forces South (AFS0UTH)-has a French deputy commander, even though France is not a part of NATOs integrated military command. A French general wasass igned to this post because France has ground troops involved in the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia. In a similar fashion, non-NATO members such as Poland or Hun gary could serve on CJTF staffs in some future contingency.

The CJTF will provid e an avenue for participation in operations involving NATO members using NATO facilities for those nations pursuing the Partnership for Peace. For example, if the Czech Republic becomes a NATO partner, Prague may decide to assign 7 Czech staff officers an d a Czech infantry battalion to a CJTF performing a peacekeeping operation in Romania.

At the same time, the CJTF preserves NATO as the premier security organization in Europe, giving it (and, thus, the United States) the right of first refusal on future c on flicts. If the U.S. did not choose to participate in a peacekeeping operation in Romania for example, then that operation could be conducted by a CJTF using NATO facilities without being considered as a NATO operation. As adjunct staffs to NATO major s u bor dinate commands, CJTFs will have full access to and use of NATO facilities: head quarters, communications, tactical publications and procedures, and logistics. Thus, the European Union (formerly the European Community) will have a defense component as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, but one that has its roots in the Atlantic Alliance.

Whether that defense component is an ad hoc collection of forces, a coalition of two or three willing European Union nations, or the entire ten-nation Western Europe an Union will depend on the nature of the crisis. But if it is organized as a Combined Joint Task Force, it will be an outgrowth of NATO, and the transatlantic nature of European security will be perpetuated RUSSIA AND NATO EXPANSION Russian official atti t ude toward NATO expansion has been erratic. In August 1993 President Boris Yeltsin made state visits to Poland and Slovakia, and said then that he would not object to NATO membership for either country. This understandably raised ex pectations in Central and Eastern Europe that the alliance would make offers of member ship to the larger nations in the region.

Shortly after the anti-reform coup attempt in early October 1993, though, Yeltsin wrote a letter to NATO Secretary-General Manfred W6mer advising tha t Russia would per ceive alliance expansion as a threatening gesture from the West. Many Russia observers believe that Yeltsin gained the support of the armed forces during the coup in part by agreeing to a harder line regarding foreign policy in the near abroad, as the area of the former Soviet Union is called in Russian military doctrine. That harder line presumab ly includes resistance to an Atlantic Alliance reinvigorated with new members from Central and Eastem Europe.

Reaction in aspiring NATO member states was to perceive Yeltsins letter as a veto over the ultimate disposition of the alliance. The West apparently respects more the views of Russia than the wishes expressed by former Soviet satellites..!2 was the way one Czech newspaper expressed the w idespread sentiment in the region. Thus, when the NATO defense ministers met to discuss the American Partnership for Peace proposal in late October 1993, the belief throughout Central and Eastem Europe was that a more ag gressive offer had been precluded b y the Yeltsin letter to Womer 11 William E. Odom, Yeltsins Deal with the Devil, Hudson Opinion, Number 29, November 1993 12 Aspin: Healerof Illusions. Svobodne Slovo, October 22, 1993, as cited in USIA Daily Digest of Foreign Media Reaction October 22,199 3 8 In a December 1993 trip to Brussels, Yeltsin discussed the plan with Worner, who sub sequently said he believed that there is a chance that Russia will participate in the partner~hip But just as Russia was warming to the idea of a closer relationship w i th NATO, the disappointing election results in Russia have reminded NATO of its core function: to defend the nations of Western Europe against an expansionist threat from the East. Such a threat can no longer be ruled out, given the strong support shown f o r the xenophobic and belligerent Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic Party AN ACTIVIST AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON The PFP and CJTF concepts are a credible response to the demands for the transforma tion of NATO. They are certain to be approv ed by the alliance during the January 10-1 1 summit in Brussels.

But President Clinton should seize the opportunity at the NATO summit to outline a vision for NATO that goes beyond these transition arrangements. Poland the Czech Republic, and Hungary were forcibly pulled from their traditional Western orientation after World War n. With the defeat of Soviet communism in the Cold War, the United States can now correct that tragedy by encouraging these important countries to become not only partners, but eve ntually members of NATO.

At the same time, Russia must be encouraged to continue on the path of democratic reform. President Clinton must balance Russias concerns about an expansionist NATO with the need to check a revanchist Russia should reforms fail. By fostering a NATO partnership with Moscow, perhaps toward eventual membership in NATO as well, the US-led Atlantic Alliance can straddle the gulf of mistrust that continues to exist be tween Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Clinton must demonstrate the leadership Europe expects from the United States as the only superpower. The Presidents comments throughout his trip will be closely watched for the signals that will determine the success or failure of the Partnership for Pea c e and Combined Joint Task Force initiatives rhus, while in Brussels at the NATO summit, President Clinton should d Support partnership offers only to nations of the former Warsaw Treaty Organiza tion or the republics of the former Soviet Union The interna t ional organizations in Europe comprise a confusing alphabet soup threatening to cancel each others effectiveness: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Western European Union (WEU the European Union (EU the European FreeTrade Association (EJTA), to name but a few. Unlike these organizations, NATO has the clarity of purpose and the diplomatic and military structures to plan, equip, and train for collective security 13 Russia Is Likely t o Join NATO Nations in 1994 Exercises, The Los Angeles Times, December 10,1993, p. 2 9 To prevent NATO from becoming another talking salon within Europe, where much is discussed but little accomplished, future membership in the alliance should be limited t o those European nations that experienced Soviet domination and in vasion. Doing so will limit the number of potential new NATO members, thus precluding an overextension of NATOs borders and commitments. It will also permit NATO to focus on those countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary that are best suited to participate in NATO planning and training activities. Russia should be offered partnership and considered for eventual membership as should the European republics of the former Soviet Union. A useful precedent is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which applies only to those republics west of the Urals. This would properly preclude former Soviet Central Asia from considera tion for future NATO membership In addition to t rying to keep participation limited for practical considerations, there is an ideological consistency If such Cold War neutral nations as Switzerland and Sweden could avoid the great clashes of ideals that World War II and the Cold War represented, then t h ey ought not be offended by not being invited to take part in the partnership that will define the transatlantic security order into the 21st century.14 d Announce that the US. will support NATO membership for key democratic partners as soon as they are r e ady for the military and financial responsibilities of alliance The PFP announcement at Travemiinde in late-October 1993 was met in Central and Eastern Europe with disappointment. The widespread belief among policy makers in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest w a s that the U.S. decided not to offer them immedi ate membership because it did not to want to appear to threaten Russia in the wake of the anti-reform coup attempt there three weeks before. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe fear being marginalized in a balance of power conflict between NATO and Russia as expressed by Jiri Payne, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Com mittee in the Czech Parliament, The United States would like to have Russia as a strategic partner in Europe.

Such sentiment, while unde rstandable, implies that the U.S. gets whatever it wants within the alliance, thus overstating the degree to which the U.S. is able to control events at NATO. The Partnership for Peace and Combined Joint Task Forces are the most that can now be expected o f the alliance because of NATO public opposition to expanded defense commitments.

NATO aspirants will need time to become an asset rather than a burden to the al liance by converting their armed forces to make them compatible with those of their future all ies. Moreover, NATO leaders will need time to prepare their publics for the additional commitments required by the expansion of NATO. The Partnership for Peace will provide that time, and should be used by NATO and the partners to pursue 15 14 Austrian ne utrality was a condition imposed by NATO and Soviet Union in 19

55. Nonetheless, at least for the initial moves toward NATO expansion that the PIT represents, Cold War neutrals are and ought to be of secondary priority behind the captive nations of the for mer Warsaw Treaty Organization and former Soviet Union 15 Closing of NATO Door Makes CzechThink About Spheres of Interest, Prague News, December 2-16,1993. p. 3 10 an aggressive plan that can lead to membership. At Brussels, though, President Clin ton sho u ld state unequivocally that future membership in the alliance will be deter mined by the initiative shown by PFP participants, and that the United States will sup port enlarging NATO not only when participants have made the necessary changes to their nati onal security structures and armed forces, but when NATO determines that allowing them to join is in the collective interest of the alliance.

Poland, and Russia the incentive to work closely with NATO to forge a partnership that transcends the need for ear ly and overt security guarantees, which the allies are simply unprepared to make now. While no such guarantee would be implied by a unilateral U.S. declaration of this nature, it would give clear direction toward the goal of membership for those countries looking for U.S. leadership. Said the ambassador to the U.S. of one of these countries Such a declaration will give countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Brussels summit should unambiguously reiterate that the Atlantic Alliance is an open org a nization ready to accept new mem rs whenever it sees the circumstances appropriate for such an expansion IF d Encourage key allies to establish bilateral ties of assistance with democratic partners that best demonstrate the initiative towards partnership a nd eventual mem bership Those partners that wish to fulfill partnership agreements quickly and move toward NATO membership will need assistance on many fronts: advice, training, and equip ment.17 Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary already have strong bilateral relationships with a number of key NATO allies, including the United Kingdom France, Germany, and Italy; there are several East-West officer exchange programs for example.

During private talks with the leaders of key allies, Clinton should encou rage them to expand ties with aspiring NATO allies, including Russia. This could be achieved by coordinating activities that can foster the transition to NATO membership. These could include Officer exchange programs between headquarters staffs Exchange p r ograms at military academies and war colleges Joint training exercises at the company and battalion level Defense equipment sales from the NATO nations' stockpiles Training NATO aspirants in defense accounting and procurement procedures 16 "Comments on th e Expansion of NATO and the 'Partnership for Peace' Initiative Unpublished "non-paper" from a Central European Ambassador to the U.S., December 9,1993 17 A broad discussion of many of these areas can be found in Raoul Henri Alcala, Rapporteur. The United S t ates. NATO, and Security Relations with Centml and Eastern Europe, The Atlantic Council of the United States Policy Paper, September 1993. d Commit to a 1995 European Security Summit of NATO and PFP partners to assess the progress toward additional member s hip To prevent Clintons partnership offer from being seen as little more than a cynical ploy to buy time before erecting yet another roadblock to future membership, the United States should take the lead in establishing a systematic review process by whic h partners can evaluate their progress. As part of this process, a summit of NATO members and partners should be convened in 1995 to review the progress of countries aspiring to membership lantic security landscape with allies and their partners. At the sa me time, those part ners that have made sufficient progress can be considered for NATO membership.

NATO leaders might also consider establishing specific criteria for NATO member ship at that summit. These could include ceilings on defense spending as a pe rcentage of gross domestic product, publicly available defense budgets, and civilian control of the armed forces The 1995 European Security Summit would be an opportunity to review the transat d Oppose partnership for Ukraine until Kiev honors its interna t ional obligations to rat ify without qualification the START I Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT In September 1992, Ukraine freely acceded to the so-called Lisbon Protocol, named for the city in which the agreement between the U.S. and t h e four nuclear-armed re publics of the former Soviet Union was signed. Kiev thus committed itself to ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT In doing so, Ukraine became a successor state to the former Soviet Union, bound by the international obligations of those two treaties.

Despite repeated declarations that he would do so, President Leonid Kravchuk has found several reasons to avoid honoring the protocol. In November 1993, the Ukrai nian Parli ament ratified START I, but attached so many conditions and interpretations so as to make the action meaningless.

Whatever the reasons for these actions may be, Ukraine is failing to live up to an in ternational commitment. That alone should disqualify it from participating in the Part nership for Peace and, by extension, from membership in NATO. If Kiev cannot live up to existing international commitments, there is no reason to believe that it would comply with the new ones that the Atlantic Alliance wou l d impose. Therefore, until Ukraine ratifies START I and the NPT, it should not be invited to participate in the Since then, Ukraine has reneged on its commitment to ratify START I and the NPT PFP d Declare Americas intention not to participate militarily i n peacekeeping and hu manitarian operations which have no bearing on US. vital national interests One important aspect of the Combined Joint Task Force concept will be to permit the use of NATO facilities and capabilities for operations that do not consti tute an armed attack on a NATO member (as prescribed in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty 12 Such contingencies could include peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in places such as Bosnia or other areas of the former Yugoslavia.

Americans saw in 1993 the hi gh cost of U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations where no vital national interests are at stake. More than two dozen young men died needlessly in Somalia in a humanitarian operation that was destined for tragedy once the ob j ectives went beyond feeding the hungry. A cruel irony of America's superpower status is that such an expansion of objectives is all but inevitable once it chooses to become involved If the American people equate Combined Joint Task Forces with peacekeepin g , in asmuch as they now equate peacekeeping with what happened in Somalia, they will not support the expansion of NATO's missions the CJTFs represent. At the NATO summit, Clinton should declare that as a rule, the U.S. will not involve U.S. combat forces i n peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted by Combined Joint Task Forces. However, the U.S. may provide logistics and communications support While in Prague President Clinton should d Declare a U.S. desire to see Poland, the Czech Republic, and H ungary enter NATO as soon as they are ready NATO is not ready for new members. The instability in Europe argues in favor of some constancy, and NATO-the great Cold War agent of change-should be that constant. Moreover, the current member nations of the al l iance are not yet prepared for the additional security commitments of expanded membership as they reduce defense budgets in the wake of the Cold War ness In the words of Poland's Foreign Minister The great nations of Central and Eastern Europe understand t he need for &liberate It] is practically beyond dispute that the entry of any country into NATO cannot happen overnight, that it has to be a process TI he Partnership for Peace will meet our needs, and will have our support, if it opens the prospect 19 of NATO membership to partners President Clinton should state without equivocation while visiting Prague that the U.S. understands the importance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic par- ticipating in Western institutions such as NATO. He also should declare that the U.S. will support additional membership of NATO for democratic nations that participate in the Partnership for Peace and make the necessary changes to their security struc tures and armed forces that NATO requires.

Such a non-binding-decla ration from the United States will give these countries the hope they need: having once thrown off the communist yoke, they will not be ignored 18 For a full discussion, see Thomas P. Sheehy No More Somalias: Reconsidering Clinton's Doctrine of Military H u manitarianism Heritage Foundation Buckgrounder No. 968, December 20,1993 19 "Seven Statements on Poland's Security Unpublished Remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Dr. Andnej Olechowski. December 1993 13 by the one organizatio n that can prevent them from wearing that yoke of tyranny again which NATO is held Czech President Vaclav Have1 spoke for many when he expressed the esteem in If Western Europe can now enjoy such a measure of democracy and economic prosperity that it actua l ly enjoys, it is undoubtedly due to its having established together with the United States of America this security alliance as a 001 of protection of its freedom and of the values of Western civilization. *b d Offer U.S. assistance to Poland, the Czech R epublic, and Hungary as they convert their national security structures and armed forces to be compatible with NATO membership.

President Clinton should propose a series of bilateral assistance programs for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These pr ograms should include Officer exchange programs between headquarters staffs X Exchange programs at military academies and war colleges X Joint training exercises at the company and battalion level X Defense equipment sales from U.S. stockpiles Training in U.S. defense accounting and procurement procedures.

There are a number of potential funding sources for such programs, the cost of which would be minimal in any case. (Estimates of PFP costs per year vary from $5 million to $30 million?l) As part of estab lished security assistance programs, several million dollars a year are already available for foreign officer training under the auspices of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

There is yet another potential source of funding. Soon after the end of the Cold War, Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) developed legislation to provide funding for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

Since 1991, more than $1 billion has been authorized to assist Russia, Kazakhstan Belarus, and Ukraine in this way. The Clinton Administration should recommend that Congress authorize the use of Nunn-Lugar funds to support the Partnership for Peace.

Another potential source of funds is the President's defense conversion program.

The Clinton Administration has proposed $20 billion to help the U.S. defense industry convert from military to civilian production. Analysts at The Heritage Foundation have determined that Clinton's proposa l will do more harm than good by encouraging defense firms with skills and capabilities unique and vital to America's defense in 20 Manfred Womer, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit NATO Review, December 1991 p. 4 21 "Money is Next NAT O Hurdle In Integrating East Europeans Defense News, December 13-19,1993, p. 3 14 dustrial base to abandon defense production?2 The Heritage analysts concluded that much of the $20 billion will become little more than high-tech pork barrel funding for key c ongressional districts. This being the case, Clinton's defense conversion program should be canceled altogether, with a small amount of the money earmarked for the bilateral assistance programs described here While in Moscow, President Clinton should d De c lare his desire to see a democratic Russia enter NATO as soon as it is ready When he first articulated his vision of strategic defense in March 1983, President Ronald Reagan understood that even a system designed for purely defensive purposes could be see n as threatening to a regime as insecure as the Soviet Union. Acknow ledging this problem, Reagan boldly offered to share America's strategic defense tech nologies with the Soviet Union.

President Clinton can provide the same type of courageous vision by o ffering to bring Russia into the Atlantic Alliance In Moscow, he should announce that the PFP is open to Moscow on the same terms offered to Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and some nations of the former Soviet empire. Those terms include the prospect of future mem bership for those partners who restructure their armed forces and defense organiza tions to make them compatible with NATO.

Such an offer would undermine the sentiments expressed by such Russians as Yev geny Primakov, head of the Russian foreign intel ligence service, who noted last December that "an extension of NATO's krritory to [Russia's] doorstep" would be a threat to Russian security?' It would also encourage Moscow to continue on the path of democratic institutional reform by encouraging civilia n control of the armed forces and open defense budgets d Offer U.S. assistance to Russia to convert its national security structure and armed forces to be compatible with NATO President Clinton should make the same offer of assistance to Russia as recom me n ded for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. For funding, he should ask Congress to authorize the release of funds appropriated under the Nunn-Lugar legisla tion for denuclearization of the former Soviet Union. He should also use money saved from canc e lling his defense conversion program d Make no joint declarations of security guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe Some in Central and Eastern Europe have expressed disappointment with the limited goals of the Partnership for Peace. They fear being s o ld out by the West with President Yeltsin 22 See Baker Spring Supporting the Force: The Industrial Base and Defense Conversion Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 964, October 22.1993 23 "NATO Backs Broader Links With Ex-Soviet Allies The New Yonk Times, December 3, 1993, p. 7 15 which puportedly fears antagonizing Russia, openly comparing the proposal to the Western powers capitulation at Yalta during World War II Hungary are understandably leery of high-minded declarations from the West and Moscow regar d ing their future. Clinton should avoid granting Russia any special peacekeeping role in Central and Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. Russian offers to participate in European peacekeeping operations should be handled within the context of Combin e d Joint Task Forces, an extension of NATO Having lived through this experience, leaders in Poland, the Czech Republic, and d Discourage President Yeltsins request for modifications to theTreaty on Conven tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE The Treaty on Co n ventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE between NATO, the republics of the former Soviet Union, and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization was one of a series of historic agreements negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush that provided vivid, legal proof th a t the Cold War was over. The CFE Treaty, for ex ample, precludes the stationing of troops by one signatory on the territory of another without the latters approval. By reducing the number of conventional forces in Europe, and thereby eliminating the possi b ility of surprise attack, the treaty guaran tees stability in Europe and is thwa linchpin of the post-Cold War security order In September 1993, Russia asked her treaty partners for relaxations of provisions limiting the number of tanks and other combat e q uipment in the so-called flank regions. The flank regions are described in the treaty as the borders around the Atlan tic-to-the-Urals area in Europe to which the treaty applies. Relaxing the equipment limits in this way would permit the Russians to mass forces in such areas as the Transcaucasus, where there has been much ethnic and regional tension.

Thus far, NATO has resisted antagonizing Moscow by outright opposition to the Russian request, which has been bottled up by the treatys cumbersome consultativ e procedure. However, the U.S. should be bold in preserving a treaty as important as CFE. Clintons trip to Moscow offers an opportunity for the U.S. topublicly and une quivocall oppose a fundamental change to one of the pillars of post-Cold War Europe?The r efore, Clinton should advise Yeltsin that the U.S. will oppose the Rus sian request for treaty relaxation CONCLUSION President Clintons first year foreign policy has been characterized by neglect, incon sistency, and drift. In the former Yugoslavia, the P r esident antagonized Americas European allies by raising the expectation of U.S. action but failing to deliver In Somalia, the Administration allowed a humanitarian operation to become U.N.-led par 24 President Clinton should be particularly concerned abou t an unravelling of the CFE Treaty. While his defense drawdown is excessive and ill-advised, it is unattainable without the lower European forces levels provided for in the CFE Treaty. See LawrenceT. D.i Rita, et al Thumbs DownToThe Bottom-Up Review, Herit a ge Foundation Backgrounder No. 957 September 22, 1993, for a full analysis of the Clinton Administrations defense program 16 ticipation in a tribal feud, while a gang of Haitian thugs kept a U.S. warship from dock ing in Port-au-Prince to deliver U.S. and Canadian peacekeepers. Meanwhile, a conces sionary approach to North Korean nuclear intransigence has allowed the hermit kingdom the time it needs to continue developing a nuclear weapon.

Despite his inauspicious start, the President has the opportunity t o start his second year on a better note. To do this, he must exhibit fum leadership at the NATO summit and subsequent visits to Prague and Moscow. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) and Combined Joint Task Force CJTF) concept lay the groundwork for a transf o rmation of the alliance at a pace that responds to American priorities: preserving NATO as the premier collec tive security institution in Europe; addressing the regional and ethnic threats facing the al liance; and beginning the process of expanding memb e rship to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and perhaps even Russia threefold The strength of the proposals the Administration will sponsor at the NATO summit are 0 The PFP reaches out to former adversaries in the WarsawTreaty Organization and affords t h em the opportunity to work at their own level of interest and initiative with NATO political and military institutions, without offering security guaran tees or modifying the NATO Treaty in any way The CJTF concept preserves NATO as the point of departure for the European Unions defense component by permitting the use of NATO facilities and capabilities for non-NATO operations The PFP and CJTF together will put a NATO imprimatur on future peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union, even on those involving non-NATO participants in regions outside of NATOs traditional area of operations.

But the President must go further yet. Six months after the NATO summit, in June 1994, he will be in France for the 50th anniversary of the allied landings at Normandy Beach. The best possible tribute to the memory of the 10,OOO brave young men who rest at Normandy will be if the President next week goes beyond the modest goals of the Partnership for Peace and creates a vis ion for European defense and security built on an expanded but still effective Atlantic Alliance.

LawrenceT. Di Rita Deputy Director, Foreign Policy and Defense Studies 17

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