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888 while the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries
busily are trying to introduce market incentives into their housing
systems, midents of Americas public housing projects continue to
live under stifling bureau cracy and perse economic incentives.
These Americans have little or no incentive to find work, form
intact families, or move to better neighborhoods. In too many
instan ces, families find themselves trapped in housing projects
where few people, of any inc ome level, would want to live.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Semtary Jack
Ikmp last December unveiled a proposal intended to help public
housing tenants over turn some ofthis dispiriting system. Kemp
calls his new program ~smika.
The R ussian wdpereszroiku means restructuring. Frequently
invoked by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in his effm to
revamp the ailing Soviet economy, Gorbachevs perestroika proved to
be far more rhetoric than reality. He found himself battling-unsucc
essfully-a huge, entrenched govern ment bmaucracy conmlling the
availability of virtually all goods and services.
In applying the concept to American conditions, Kemp
specifically takes aim at the public housing bureaucracy
MarCb26,1992 JACK KEMPS PERESTRO IKA A CHOICE PLAN FOR PUBLIC
HOUSING TElS INTRODUCTION Chance for Tenants. Kemps Perestroika
plan was inmduced by George Bush in his proposed fucall993 budget.
The plan would give public housing tenants a chance to replace
public housing authorities (As) a s managers and owners of their
xespective projects. With a proposed budget authorization of $373.1
million far fiscal 1993, all of it financed out of existing HUD
programs, the new program would complement Kemps Homeownership and
Oppormnity for People Eve rywhere (HOPE) program,.enacted in 1990
as part of .the National Affordable Housing Act.
The public housing program is becoming expensive and unworkable.
Budgeted at a record $6 billion for the current fiscal year, with
$5.25 billion going to sup port the operation and modernization of
existing projects, a good many housing authorities, especially in
large cities, have myriad troubles. Drug use, violent crime,
vandalism, and maintenance breakdowns characterize all too many
projects. PHAs.often aidthis proc ess through indifference;
corruption, and inep titude in their management.
Consider the following Detroits public houslng projects have a
cumulathre vacancy rate of 44 percent Past due rents in Washington,
D.C.s proJect8 outnumber present due rents by a do llar figure of
almost four=tosne Newarks public houslng system has more than
double the number of main=
tenance_emp~~~s-it.actually-needs,.desaite the fact that It has at
least 22 corn pletely vacant high-rlse buildings Perestroika is one
solution to thes e breakdowns in the operation of housing projects.
The program would grant tenants of housing authorities on HUDs list
of troubled authorities a chance to vote in new managers or owners.
Only authorities with at least 250 apartments would be affected by
th e program. Some 23 authorities, encompassing 18 percent of the
total public housing stock, would qualify under this program in
fiscal 1993.
The Kemp proposal has three components 1) Choice in Management,
which would give tenants the right to vote in new ma nagers of
their projects 2) Choice In Ownership, which would give tenants the
right to vote in themsel ves, another nonprofit group, or a
public-agency as new owners of their projects; and 3) Take the
Boards Off, which would transfer ownership of vacant p r ojects or
project sections to tenant groups or statebcdagencies The political
battle for housing perestroika is certain to be uphill. The liberal
controlled Congress, heavily allied with various public housing
organizations, can be counted upon to resist. They know that the
very idea is a threat to their busi ness-as-usual approaches that
have brought the public housing program into so much disarray State
of the Union address: We must empower the poor with the pride that
comes from owning a house, getting a job, being a part of things.
Perestroika gives Bush the opportunity to put these noble words
into action This is why it is essential for Bush fully to back
Kemp. Said Bush in his recent 2 A RECORD OF MISMANAGEMENT The
recent performance of many public ho u sing authorities is a
scandalous catalog of waste, fraud, and mismanagement. The hard
evidence for this comes from IUDs internal audits, and from a
report released last September by the Na tional Center for
Neighborhood Enterprise (NCNE a Washington, D.C. - based re search
organization specializing in inner-city issues, which heavily
relied on these audits. The NCNE report is especially damning,
concluding that public housin management frequently suffers from
shocking ineptitude and outright abuses weaknesse s Padded
payrolls. Troubled housing authorities often have more employees on
5 These revi ws of Americas public housing authorities =veal
several recurrent f their payrolls than needed. The extra workers
draw paychecks, courtesy of the taxpayer, but do lit t le or
nothing to earn them. During fiscal years 1989 to 1991, for
instance, 22 of the 23 troubled housing authorities were
overstaffed with administrative employees, and 19 of the 23 were
overstaffed with main tenance employees The Cuyahoga Metropolitp (C
l eveland), Kansas-Cty Missouri Newark (New Jersey), Springfield
(Illinois), Washington, D.C and Virgin Islands PHAs averaged more
than double the number of expected administrative employees.
Newarks program has 106 percent the number of maintenance employe e
s that HUD deems appropriate. Yet administration and maintenance
still were neglected or inadequate UncOlleCted rents. Rent
delinquency is a habitual problem in troubled public hous ing
authorities. In 22 of the 23 troubled authorities, audits find that
u n col lected rent constitutes at least 15 percent of all rents
due? In the Chester Pennsylvania), Philadelphia, and Washington,
D.C. PHAs, the cumulative backlog of uncollected rents is 374
percent., 269 percent, and 396 percent respectively, of the total r
e nt due for each month. Few landlords in the private market could
survive long with such a pattern of rent skipping Hlgh vacancy
rates. HUD has set 3 percent as the acceptable maximum vacancy rate
in calculating operating subsidies for a PHA, it considers a
nything higher excessive. Yet the cumulative rate for the 23
troubled authorities is 14 percent, almost five times this
standard. These PHAs account for over 36,000 vacant units6 The
Detroit, East St. Louis, and Newark housing 3 4 The Silent Scandat:
Mana gement Abuses in Public Housing (Washington, D.C National
Cenier for Neighborhad Enterprise, 1991 p. i.
Unless otherwise indicated, all figms here taken from the fid
1993 budget document, Expanding the Opprrunities for Empowerment:
New Choices for Residents (washingtosl, D.C U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 1992).
The one exception was the East St. Louis Housing Authority.
About 104,OOO units in the public housing system are vacant. See
The Silent Scandal, p. 7 c 5 6 4 patching of walls and floors in a
project before the pipes behind and beneath were repaired; and the
repainting of a building just prior to its demolition.
The Washington D.C. housing authority has had ten directors
since 1980 Many admit the existence of severe problems, yet claim
to be powerless to stop them. Former director Alphonso Jackson, for
instance, complained in 1987 that he had plumbers on the payroll
who knew nothing about plumbing and en gineers who were creating
havoc in our boiler moms. The current director, Ray Price,
observes-that project managers often hirefriends and relatives over
better qualified applicant s for maintenance jobs.I2 Washingtons
system is but one example of an almost complete breakdown of
responsible enancy and management. Similar stories abound in other
troubled authorities. These massive management problems do not
happen by chance, but becau s e of the very nature of project
control This control is in the hands of bureaucrats, who lack the
incentives of an owner and in practice are not account able to
tenants, HUD, or indeed anyone. While PHAs are the owners of
projects they care little about m aintaining their assets because
the federal government provides a stream of subsidies. Thus, many
PHA bureaucracies are guided more by local political patronage than
by financial prudence.
What is required to make public housing liveable is a dramatic
tran sformation in management and ownership of Americas public
housing authorities-a shift from the bureaucrats to the tenants
they ostensibly serve. Even housing authorities run by honest,
competent administraton axe limited in their capacity to patrol
hallwa y s and project grounds, and to take a personal interest in
the well being of tenants. HUDs version of Perestroika is a frontal
assault on business-as usual management in the most onerous of
these fiefdoms If3 HOW HUDS PERESTROIKA WOULD WORK Under the HOPE l
egislation, HUD awards grants of up to $200,000 on a com petitive
basis to resident management corporations (RMCs) and resident
councils RCs) in public housing projects. The grants can be used to
develop a plan for tenants to manage and eventually to own t heir
projects. Recipients of these funds must match every $4 of federal
money with $1 of their own 12 IW. Washingtons directors are not the
only ones who have been openly critical of local PHA management
Recently, Jonathan A. Saidel, chairman of the Phila d elphia
Housing Authority (also on the HUD troubled list depicted the
Authority 85 paralyzed by patronage and unable to perform even the
simplest tasks of repairing windows or cutting grass at housing
developments. Quoted in HUD (Again) Roves Government Ca n t Do It
Best, Washington Inquirer, February 21,1992. p 1. For a Nl
analysis, see Matthew My, HUD Freezes Funding for Southwark.
Philadelphia Inquirer, February 5,1992 13 For a graphic description
of how decrepit public housing conditions have PJ. ORourke,
Parliament of Whores: A Lone Humorist Attempts IO Explain the
Entire U.S. Government (New Yok Atlantic Monthly press, 1991 pp.
123-U. See also Nieves, Delays Paralyze Newarks Efforts in Newark,
for example, see 6 Under Kemps newperestroika .plan, public h o
using residents in housing authorities that have at least 250 units
and that have been designated by HUD as troubled for at least three
consecutive years would have the chance, on a project by-project
basis, either to vote in new managers, vote in new own e rs, or
assume ownership of projects with high vacancy rates. At present,
23 public housing authorities, including those of Boston, Chicago,
Detroit Los Angeles, New Or leans, Newark, and Washington, D.C fall
into this eligible category. These projects con tain about 18
percent of Americas public housin units. Many of the apartments are
in poor condition, and 14 percent are vacant.
Perestroika would extend consumer choice to public housing
tenants, where market competition is most needed. It would serve
noti ce on poorly run PHAs that their days are numbered. The plan
consists of thnx components 1 Component #2: Choice in Ownership
Tenants would have the right to assume ownership of the project.
Unlike the Choice in Management component, which requires approva l
by a simple majority among tenants of a project, Choice in
Ownership would require approval by two thirds of affected tenants.
Residents could select a tenant management carpara tion, another
non-profit group, or a public agency other than the current PH A to
be the new owner. The group would have to be approved by HUD prior
to receiv ing title to ownership. In cases where more than one
group applied for ownership HUD would select the one that it felt
could do the best job I Component #1: Choice In Managem ent.
Residents of public housing would be guaranteed the right to
choose, through majority vote, new managers of their housing
projects. The PHA would retain ownership, but a public, private, or
non-profit group could be selected by tenants to take over ma
intenance, rent collection, and all other management respon
sibilities. The new management staff would have to demonstrate
continually that it could run rental housing because the residents
would have the right to fm as well as hire Component #3: Take the
Boards Off (TBO TBO would transfer ownership of substantially
vacant projects, or portions of projects, from the housing
authority to one of two types of groups: 1) groups rep resenting
tenants who plan to return the buildings for use as habitable
public h ous ing or 2) state and local agencies pledging on behalf
of nonprofit housing or ganizations to expand affordable rental or
homeownership opportunities to low-in come families and
individuals. HUD would issue transitional subsidies to 14 There we=
253,02 7 units in these projects in 19
91. Interestingly enough, almost 25 percent were in Puerto Ria
and thevirgin Islands. Excluding projects in these two U.S.
possessions, the overall vacancy rate within the troubled housing
authorities was 17 percent 7 tenant s-over a
three-year.period,.after which.the PHA would be required to give
tenants vouchers or low-income housing rent stamps, to ensue that
families could secure housing for themselves.
The proposed combined budget for Choice in Management and Choice
in O wnership is $100 million, to be used for modernization of
buildings. The proposed budget forTake the Boards Off is $273.1
million, with $192 million to be used for modernization, and the
other $8 1.1 million going for 2,500 vouchers.
All modernization mon ey.would come out of the fiscal 1993
public housing mod ernization budget, The money for new vouchers
would come from the Section 8 voucher program. Up to 5 percent of
the funds in each of the programs can be used for technical
assistance.
Kemp understand s that families who live in poverty, like
families who do not benefit from exercising direct and personal
control over their immediate living en vironment. Without this
element of control, creating stable communities is impos sible in
what are now welfare - dependent, highcrime public-housing
projects, un less residents gain some proprietary control over
their neighborhoods. To do this they must be able to determine how
their projects will be run Givhg low-income tenants a financial
stake in their housing al s o lessens their isolation from the rest
of American society. Public housing residents under Perestroika
would be running real estate enteqnises. Micials of the new Russian
government understand this better than Washingtons liberals.
Remarks Elena Kotova, h ead of the Moscow City Council Economic
Policy Commission: The salvation of housing cannot be distinguished
from privatization and private enterprise.15 Such is precisely the
spirit in which Russian perestroika must apply to Americas public
housing, yet h a s been missing from most housing policy debate in
this country TENANT CONTROL WORKS Experience shows that with
management or ownership in the hands of resi dents, projects are
less subject to bureaucratic des than projects run and owned by
professional ho u sing bureaucrats. Moreover, resident management
groups will do things that housing authorities are unable or
unwilling to do because they live with the consequences of
inaction. Kenilwd-Parkside is a Washington, D.C project that was
turned over to tenant management in 1982, and became in part a
resident-owned housing complex in 19
90. Says Kimi Gray, the president of the projects resident
management corporation: When my maintenance man doesnt fix the
boiler in the winters, he gets cold too.16 15 Quoted in Jack Kemp,
Houses to the People! An Open Letter to BorisYeltsin, Policy
Review, Number 59 16 Quoted in John Scanlon, People Power in the
Projects: How Tenant Ivlanagement Can Save Public Housing Winter
1992, pp. 4-5 Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 75 8 , March
8,1990, p. 9 8 These successes of tenant control of public housing
share a common ingredient when trust is placed in the ability of
residents to assume many or all of the tasks previously entrusted
to the housing authorities, management improves. Kemps Perestroika
initiative would give tenants the right to manage, or to select
managers, in projects where improvement is needed most
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION The Kemp plan is a
prescription for Americas ailing public housing system.
Yet p owerful opposition can be expected Those with a financial
or political stake in the system understandably feel threatened by
any attempt by the federal govem ment to demand greater
accountability from the PHAs. Typically, they argue that problems
in the p ublic housing program are exaggerated and sensationalized,
or that these problems, though real, result from inadequate
government funding rather than from any inadequacies in the program
itself.
According to supporters of the public housing program, the
program would be working well, were it not for a lack of money.
Ignoring all evidence that the dis mal condition of much public
housing is due to poor management, and ignoring the fact that the
av e rage annual cumulative operating and modernization budget is
currently $3,750 per apartment in the 1.4 million-unit system, they
argue that Con gress ought to be concerned with how to expand the
pie of federal funding, not with how projects are managed or owned
authorities, congressional liberals, and several housing
researchers who are called upon by the first two pups to tell them
what they want to hear t( Housing authorities Capitol Hill.
Organizations such as the National Association of Housing and Red e
velopment officials (NAHRO), the Council of Large Public Housing
Authorities (CWHA and the Public Housing Authorities Directors
Association PHADA), defend the current public housing system, and
oppose anything even resembling the Kemp plan. CLPHA executiv e
director Mary Ann Russ, for ex ample, denounces the Perestroika
initiatives as massive, draconian measures that we dont think are
justified.,*21 Adds Richard Y. Nelson Jr., executive director of
NAHRO: The demand for public housing is so pat that we cant affd to
sell a unit and take it off the rent rolls.22 This statement
wrongly assumes that low-income people have no desire Those with
the greatest stake in the current system are public housing The
arguments they use are depressingly familiar.
The public housing authorities employ one of themost powerful
lobbies on 20 Scanlon, People Power in the Projects, p. 5 21 Quoted
in Bill McAllisw. Kemp Urges Plebiscites for Projects, Washington
Post, December 23.1991 22 Quoted in Rita McWilliams. Dmm Houses for
th e Poor, Governing, July 1991. p. 57 10 to own their home, or
that their incomes will never be sufficient to do so, and that it
is better for people to be tended by a bureaucracy than to make
their own housing choices. It is an expression of liberal plantat i
on mentality, which views the poor as supplicants rather than
potential achievers X Congressional Liberals Liberal Congressmen
and their staffs long have opposed changes in the manage ment or
ownership of public housing. The tenant management and ownershi p
provisions enacted in the 1987 Housing and Community Development
Act, for ex ample, actually had watered down a version of an
earlier bill co-sponsored by Kemp, representing his New York
district in the House, and District of Columbia Delegate Walter Fau
n troy, a Democrat. The Kemp-Fauntroy bill had been passed but no
action was taken by House-Senate conferees whom liberal legislators
rely m especially blunt. Frank DeStefano, staff director of the
House Banking Subcommittee on Housing and Community Develop m ent
is characteristically dismissive. I dont think there is any prospec
Stefano, for it getting off the ground on the Hill- anywhere.Adds
Bruce Katz, staff director of the Senate Banking Subcommi e on
Housing and Urban Affairs: Its a fundamentally dumb an d stupid
idea.
Comments like these are dismaying, but hardly surprising.
Congress sees more public housing spending as an urgent necessity.
Despite the failure of public hous ing to improve the living
conditions of the poor, Congress has forced the Bush Ad
ministration to earmark money to build more projects. Despite the
Admin istrations call for some overdue restraint in the fiscal 1993
public housing budget, Congress may yet appropriate even more money
than in 19
92. Mmover many in Congress are hostile to any attempt to change
the way projects are run. In 1991, for example, the House Budget
ommittee claimed that selling public hous ing to tenants would be
misguided I Housing Researchers Congressional and special interest
opponents of change are aided by a number of influential housing
mearchers who argue that xesident management and owner ship in
public housing is doomed to fail. Among the most influential are
William Rohe and Michael Stegman, both of the University of North
Carolina City and Regional Plan n ing Department. In 1990 Rohe and
Stegman completed for HUD a full-scale evaluati n of its Public
Housing Homeownership Demonstration FWHD) program. The program was
launched in June 1985, and was intended Opposition to the
Perestroika plan may be umlenting . Key staffers upon says De 4 ZF
96 23 Quoted in McAUister, Kemp Urges Plebiscites.
U Quoted in Groups See Little Support for More of the Same HUD
Budget, Housing and Developmenf Reporter, February 17,1992, p. 760
25 See Ann Mariano, Closing the Door on Pu blic Housing? Washington
Post, March 6,1991 26 William M. Rohe and Michael A. Stegman,
Public Housing Homeownership Demonsnation Assessmenf Washington,
D.C U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, June 1990 see
also Rohe and 11 to enable tenants to become homeowners, while
allowing PHAs wide latitude in establishing resident homeownership
~rograms.2~ It also served as a prototype far potential large-scale
public housing privatization of the sort contemplated in
Perestroika.
Rohe and Stegman conclu ded that the kinds of resident ownership
proposals that Kemp has incorporated intd both HOPE and Perestroika
will not work be cause selling housing even at a discount to
tenants fails to include adequate safeguards against foreclosure;
and.appeals totenan t s with incomes well above those of public
housing tenants as a whole The authors claim that as a result of
such deficiencies, only 320 unit -one-fourth of HUDs goal-were sold
to tenants in the PHHD program Opponents Omissions. Yet Stegman and
Rohe admit t h at close to 400 addi tional home sales were close to
completion in the program. Equally significant the authors fail to
address the reality that neither public housing tenants nor tax
payers are well served by the existing public housing program,
ignoring PHA mis management as a factor in driving up
rehabilitation and other costs associated with sales. Finally, they
assume that tenant incomes are static, apparently finding it hard
to believe that owning a home is the kind of stimulus that spurs a
family to improve its economic condition If opponents of the plan
seem overly concerned about anything, it is the pos sibility that
it might work. Kemps proposal potentially threatens the jobs of
hous ing authority officials and contractors everywhere. Even more
ho rrifying for some opponents, the plan could trigger a wider
assault on bureaucratic organiza tions that have a strong stake in
blocking empowerment initiatives of all varieties.
Opponents of Perestroika can be expected to issue dire warnings
about the dis appearance of low-income housing. What they ignore is
that much of this hous ing already is disappearing, thanks to the
inept and often corrupt management by PHAs. It is time to put more
control of housing projects into the hands of resi dents themselves
21 Stegman, Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration Assessment:
Case Studies (Washington, D.C U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, June 1990 27 The
program was intended to last 36 months, but the 17 recipient
housing authorities typically w en still involved in PHHD well
after this deadline 28 See also, Michael A. Stegman, More Housing,
More Fairly: Report ofthe Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Afordable Housing (New Yok Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1991 pp.
57-96 12 CONCLUSION Jack Kem p describes his Perestroika approach
as radical. He is correct.
Giving public housing tenants the right to hire and fire their
managers and owners repsents an abrupt break with the status quo.
Ironically, Kemp simply wants to give public housing tenants th e
choices that Russian President Boris Yeltsin wants to give tenants
of state-owned projects in his country.
Aside from being a promising policy initiative, Perestroika
would be funded through existing HUD programs, not through new
spending authority. In the long run, it would save taxpayers money
by freeing these projects of their current management and
ownership, and subsequently, their high operating and modem ization
subsidies.
Escaping Despair. Giving residents of public housing greater
choice in the running of their projects has worked wherever it has
been tried, benefitting the poorest of the poor. It can and ought
to work on a much larger scale. If lawmakers are truly on the
si& of public housing tenants rather than public housing
bureaucracies, C ongress will see Perestroika as a way for tenants
to escape despair.
Carl F. Hmwitz, Ph.D. Policy Analyst 13