For most Americans, housing quality has been climbing for
decades. This is obvious by looking at almost any measure. From
1960 to 1987, for example, dwellings lacking complete plumbing
facilities fell from 13.2 to 2.4 percent. Those with central air
conditioning rose from 1.9 to 35.8 percent. More important,
perhaps, the fears that the nation would not be able to provide
housing for the huge baby boom generation were unfounded. By now,
the baby boom population almost entirely has found and moved into
their own housing. Not only is this good news for the baby boomers,
it also means that America need not build as much housing in the
next decade as it has in the past. The projected growth in new
households during the 1990s will be almost one-tenth slower than
during the 1980s.
Yet despite these cheerful indicators, there are cries on
Capitol Hill that America confronts a menacing housing crisis.
Within the past two months, the House and the Senate have passed
housing bills which rest, to a great extent, on such an assumption.
The House bill (H.R. 1180) would spend $28.7 billion and the Senate
Bill (S. 566) $27.9 billion for fiscal 1991. Both far exceed the
$23.7 billion requested by the Bush Administration.
Shifting the Focus
Championing the congressional measures, predictably, are
the beneficiaries of big federal housing outlays: builders and
realtors, "professional advocates" for the homeless, and state and
local officials. Even their arguments, however, reveal how much the
American housing situation has improved. No longer do they
denounce, as they used to, the quality of housing. Instead they
have shifted their focus to affordability, charging that the
private sector produces many houses and apartments that few can
afford. They claim, incorrectly, that millions of young adults face
the prospect of never being able to buy their first home. As
evidence, they cite the slight decline in the ratio of owner-
occupied dwellings during the first half of the Eighties (which has
since been reversed), the "high" rent burdens on low-income
households, and the prospect of federally-subsidized owners of low-
income housing projects preferring not to renew their government
contracts.
Federal Construction No Answer
To be sure, there are housing problems in America. But
they are not the sort addressed by the recently-passed House and
Senate bills and certainly not the sort that can be solved by
enormous new sums of federal construction money. This is especially
true for poor renters. What they need is greater purchasing power
for housing, jobs near where they live, and a reduction in crime
and other factors that make their neighborhoods unlivable. This is
much more essential than constructing tens of thousands more
publicly-subsidized units that lock the less fortunate into the
same apartment indefinitely, and at high taxpayer cost.
For homeowners and first-time homeseekers, the problem is not
getting more government-built housing, but reducing regulation and
other barriers that discourage private investment. Rent control,
unreasonable building codes, and exclusionary zoning all restrict
the housing choices of homebuyers.
In the present housing situation, several realities cannot be
ignored: The supply and condition of America's housing stock is
adequate; demand over the next decade for new housing will lessen;
and the current national housing market is not "tight" with respect
either to availability or cost.
America's Housing Situation: The Supply
Abundant Housing Stock
During the past two decades, America has created more housing
than households. In 1987, the U.S. had an inventory of 102.7
million dwellings, a 49.5 percent increase over the 68.7 million in
1970. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Housing Reports, Series
H-150-87, "American Housing Survey"; biannually. All figures from
the American Housing Survey are taken from the 1987 survey unless
otherwise noted. Results from the 1989 survey will be published in
late 1991.)
In fact, over one-third of America's current standing housing
stock has been built during the past two decades (assuming new
additions since 1987), the very period when pronouncements of a
housing shortage were becoming commonplace.
During this same 1970-1987 period, the number of households grew
by about 26 million, and the total population by about 39 million.
("American Housing Survey.") For each net additional household,
America produced 1.3 dwellings, and for each net additional person,
America produced almost 0.9 dwellings -- and these figures already
allow for demolitions and other inventory losses. The supply of
housing thus has kept pace with need.
Few Housing Deficiencies
Standards as to what constitutes "good housing" typically rise
with improving technologies and rising real incomes. Early in this
century, for instance, a three-room cold-water flat was regarded as
adequate housing for a young middle-class family -- at least as
starter housing; it would be unacceptable today even for a few
months.
Write George Sternlieb and James Hughes of Rutgers University's
Center for Urban Policy Research: "When we were rich we threw away
housing; when we were of modest circumstances we found it charming.
The very elevation of America's housing standards and the real
estate boom that characterized the era [the Seventies] joined
together in an enormous level of demolition and nonresidential
use." (George Sternlieb and James Hughes, "Private Market Provision
of Low-Income Housing: Historical Perspective and Future
Prospects," in Preserving Low-Income Housing Opportunities:
Principles for a 1990s Housing Preservation Strategy, Fannie Mae
Annual Housing Conference (Washington, D.C.: Federal National
Mortgage Association, 1990), p. 7.) The authors point out that the
U.S. produced housing during 1970-1987 at a rate high enough to
raze many older, rundown dwellings without diminishing the
supply.
Good Housing Overall
The American Housing Survey data in Table 1 highlight the
overall good condition of the U.S. housing stock. Among the major
categories of housing deficiencies, only water (primarily faucet)
leakage occurred to any significant extent. Less than 5 percent of
housing units had either holes in floors, open cracks or holes,
broken plaster, or exposed wiring. Less than 0.1 percent had no
electrical wiring.
Table 2 demonstrates, using traditional measures of housing
quality, how far the nation has come in eliminating substandard
housing. These figures are for housing conditions of
below-poverty-level households only. (The Census Bureau defines
poverty level status according to a family of four's cash income.)
Over 95 percent of all poverty-level households in 1987 had
complete bathroom facilities, complete kitchen facilities, sink,
refrigerator, and stove/oven. Almost 50 percent had air
conditioning.
New Homes and Homebuyer Expectations
During 1970-1988, the median price of a new single-family home
in constant (1988) dollars rose from $71,783 to $112,500, an
increase of 56.7 percent. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction
Reports, Series C-25, "New One-Family Houses Sold and For Sale,"
annually.) While a good share of this may be plain housing-cost
inflation, a large part of the cost increase pays for increased
quality, as is clear from Table 3. Median interior square footage
increased by over 30.7 percent, and the percentage of dwellings
with central air conditioning, one or more fireplaces, and more
than 2.5 bathrooms all increased by at least 85 percent. The boost
in home prices, therefore, largely reflects features which are
increasingly viewed as minimum amenities by American
homebuyers.
To assess potential homebuyers' higher expectations, a survey
last year of present homeowners by the National Association of Home
Builders asked: "If you cannot afford to buy the type of home you
want, what would you give up to make it more affordable?" (National
Association of Home Builders, What Home Buyers Want: Executive
Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Home Builders,
1989).) Some 36 percent chose a house with unfinished rooms, and 35
percent would live farther from work or shopping. Only 18 percent
would accept a smaller house, and only 11 percent would accept
fewer amenities.
America's Housing Situation: The Demand
Slower Population Growth
During America's baby boom from 1946 through 1964, the annual
birth rate averaged nearly 25 births per 1,000 population. From
1965-1975, the rate declined to just under 15.0, climbing only
slightly to between 15.5 and 16.0 in the 1980s. (U.S. National
Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics, annually.) The
Census Bureau projects that from 1985 to 2010, the total U.S.
population will rise 29.0 million. (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1018, "Projections of
the Population of the United States by Age, Sex, and Race, 1988 to
2080," Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.)
Those in the 35-54 age bracket -- mainly today's baby boomers --
make up over 90 percent of the increase. These are overwhelmingly
people who by the close of the 1980s had established their own
households; they are not seeking housing for the first time. By
contrast, the number of people aged 18-34 will decline by about 8.6
million.
As a result of these population shifts, the demand for quality
housing (especially owner-occupied) will increase, but the demand
for new housing units (especially renter-occupied) will be lower
then during the 1980s. In every five-year interval during 1985-
2010, the number of people aged 35-54 will increase. Among persons
aged 18-34 and 55-64, the cumulative population will decrease over
the whole period.
Also noteworthy, during 1985-1990, the gain will be over 11
million people; during 1990-1995, it will be less than 10 million;
and during 1995-2000, barely over 8 million. Therefore, because
population will be increasing at a steadily slower rate, future
housing demand, other things held equal, will be lower than at
present.
Slower Growth in Number of Households
The Census Bureau projects that the number of households will
increase by 11.7 million between 1990 and 2000 (1.17 million per
year), with those aged 35-54 accounting for 11.2 million of the
increase. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P-25, No. 986, "Projections of the Number of Households and
Families: 1986 to 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1986).) Households headed by persons 34 and under will
decrease by 1.0 million. By contrast, the number of households
increased by 1.25 million per year between 1980 and 1988 (a total
of 11.3 million). Total households will grow by 6.1 million during
1990- 1995, and 5.6 million during 1995-2000. Because of this
smaller growth in the number of households, America will need less
new housing in the 1990s than in the past two decades. New housing
will have to focus more on single-family needs than before.
Household Type
The types of households accounting for the growth are as
important as the increase in the number of households. Chart 1
indicates that there was a smaller ratio of households of married
couples with children in 1988 than in 1980. In 1980, some 60.8
percent of all households consisted of married couples, of which
slightly over half had at least one child under 18. In 1988, this
figure declined to 56.9 percent, of which slightly under half had
at least one child under 18. Single-parent families accounted for a
larger share of all households in 1988; collectively, single-parent
families with children increased from 12.9 to 14.6 percent of the
total. (.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P-20, No. 432, "Households, Families, Marital Status, and
Living Arrangements: March 1988," (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989).)
Over the past decade, the portion of non-family households
increased, and close to one-fourth of all households now consist of
one person. A number of factors account for this increase in
single-person households. Because the median age of first marriage
has steadily gone up for men and women since 1970, more single
young adults have their own households before marriage. A more
important factor is the decline in the remarriage rate by about 20
percent during the 1980s among both divorced men and women. (The
median age of first marriage was 22.5 and 20.6 for men and women,
respectively, in 1970; it rose to 25.1 and 23.3 in 1986. Vital
Statistics.)
Incorrect Interpretation
Some critics complain that the growth in the proportion
of non-family households signals an increase in the number of those
who are among the least well-off, and therefore an increase in
those in need of government assistance. These critics incorrectly
interpret the statistics. Non-family and other non-traditional
households have emerged partly because they can meet their housing
costs. The median household income of single- person households in
1987 was $12,544 while per capita household income for married
couple households (with a national median of 3.27 persons per
household) was only slightly over $10,000. Among female-headed
families with children, with 3.13 persons per household, the per
capita income was $4,926, the lowest for any category. Having no
husband present reduces the family's median income by over half.
And while it is true that the availability of subsidies helps the
family afford housing, it is likewise true that the incentive of
the mother to marry or remarry may be reduced in the process. (See
Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-80 (New
York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 154-166.)
According to Martha Riche, editor of American Demographics, most
people will get married, but will remain so for a shorter period of
their adult lives. This is especially true for women. As a result,
"the very definition of a house -- a single-family dwelling -- is
going to change because at any given time a greater share of adults
with money in the bank and a desire for a house will not be in
families." (Quoted in H. Jane Lehman, "Future Shock: Society
Redefining the Home Buyer," Washington Post, May 12, 1990.) If her
argument is valid, then if anything, the changing household
composition would indicate a lessened need for subsidies.
America's Housing Situation: The Market
Fewer Persons Per Dwelling
Very little housing overcrowding remains. In 1960, the average
household size was 3.33 persons; in 1980, it fell to 2.75; and in
1988, to 2.62. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, P-25, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office)
annually.) The current housing stock affords individual privacy for
more people than ever before. Even among the poor, fewer than 8
percent live in dwellings where there is more than one person per
room. ("American Housing Survey," Public Use Sample.)
Increasing Vacancy Rates
One of the effects of the high level of construction during the
past two decades has been a substantial increase in the vacancy
rate for rental units. This has been especially noticeable in the
past few years. In 1983, the total rental vacancy rate stood at 5.7
percent; in 1988, it was 7.7 percent.
Advocates for the homeless who press for expanded
federally-subsidized new construction ignore the fact that there
are almost 9 million vacant housing units for rent or sale
year-round. This is about fifteen dwellings for each homeless
person, based on last year's Urban Institute estimate of close to
600,000 homeless persons nationwide. (Martha R. Burt and Barbara
Cohen, America's Homeless: Numbers, Characteristics, and Programs
That Serve Them (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1989).) These
vacant units are not "tenements" or "slums." They contain a median
of 4.3 rooms; 95 percent have at least one complete bathroom; and
close to half are single-family homes. ("American Housing
Survey.")
The Myth of Declining Owner-Occupancy
Possibly the most enduring illusion about housing in the 1980s
is that Americans, particularly first-time home buyers, can no
longer afford to buy a home. Those who lobby for publicly-financed
new construction use one statistic to particularly great effect: In
1980, some 64.4 percent of all occupied units were owner-occupied;
in 1985, the figure fell to 63.5. ("American Housing Survey:
1985.") From this modest decline in homeownership, federal program
advocates conclude that young Americans no longer can afford to own
their homes and thus that America's first-time buyers need massive
new federal assistance.
This shift is misleading. For one thing, from 1985 to 1987, the
decline in homeownership rate reversed, increasing to 64.0. For
another, even had the rate not risen, the homeownership rate
depends upon demographic trends that are ignored in the critics'
analysis. Typical of this failure is the 1988 report by the Joint
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. (William C. Apgar
and H. James Brown, The State of the Nation's Housing (Cambridge,
MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 1988).)
It claims that if the homeownership rate since 1973 had held steady
for under age 35 households, 2 million additional households would
now be homeowners. This proves, says the study, that homeownership
is becoming more elusive for young households. This study is cited
extensively by the real estate lobby in pushing for
federally-subsidized new construction such as those contained in
the Senate legislation. Non-Family Households Growing. The problem
with the Harvard report is that it fails to take into account the
proportional growth of non-family households. Irving Welfeld,
policy analyst at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, points out that the homeownership rate for both
married and single households under 35 increased during 1980-1985.
The rate for married households increased from 74.7 percent to 78.8
percent, and for singles households from 45.0 percent to 46.9
percent. Welfeld concludes, "The modest decline in the overall
homeownership rate reflects the strong shift in the 1980s toward
more single-person households with a lower propensity to own."
(Irving Welfeld, Where We Live: The American Home and the Social,
Political, and Economic Landscape, from Slums to Suburbs (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 223.) The changing household
composition rather than prohibitive housing costs explains the
apparent decline in the homeownership rate in the 1980s.
Exaggerated Cost Burdens: Homeowners
On balance, the evidence from a number of sources indicates that
with the exception of a few metropolitan markets on the East and
West coasts, a home was one of the economic bargains of the past
decade. The 1987 American Housing Survey reveals that the median
monthly housing cost for homes with a mortgage was $621; the
monthly cost for homes owned free and clear was $203. The
respective inflation-adjusted figures for 1980 were $504 and $176.
("American Housing Survey.")
Data from Chicago Title and Trust Company's annual home buyer's
survey reveal that the monthly mortgage payment for home buyers
increased from $599 to $1,054 during 1980-1989, (Who's Buying
Houses in America: Chicago Title's 14th Annual Survey of Recent
Home Buyers (Chicago: Chicago Title and Trust Company, 1990); also
see 1980 edition.) but the ratio of monthly cost-to-gross income
decreased from 32.4 percent to 31.8 percent. Even more revealing,
the portion of home buyers who were buying for the first time
increased from 32.9 percent to 40.2 percent, with one-third of the
increase occurring during 1988-1989. The median purchase price for
first-time buyers increased from $61,450 to $105,200 (71.2 percent)
over 1980-1989, but during the same period the median income of the
first-time buyer increased from $27,430 to $50,700 (84.8
percent).
Declining Home Prices
Also noteworthy are figures from the National Association
of Realtors' monthly, Home Sales (formerly Existing Home Sales),
which focuses on the cost of existing homes rather than new
construction. The median price of an existing single-family home in
1980 was $93,600, and in 1989 it declined to $93,100 in constant
(1989) dollars. Many housing experts, in fact, predict that home
prices in the 1990s will rise more slowly than in the 1980s because
of the plentiful supply. (Gary Blonston, "Era of Big Profits on
Sales May Be Over," Washington Post, May 12, 1990.)
Recent data in the Home Sales Housing Affordability Index also
contradict the notion of "unaffordable" homes. In 1984, a median
income family had 89.1 percent of the income necessary to qualify
for a conventional 80 percent mortgage loan; in 1989, this same
family had 106.1 percent of the necessary income. (National
Association of Realtors, Home Sales, Vol. 4, No. 4 (April 1990),
p.12.) Incomes relative to home prices therefore increased by
nearly 20 percent.
For first-time buyers, the Index increased from 64.9 to 74.2.
This means that the typical renter family in the 25-44 age bracket
in 1984 had 64.9 percent of the income required to qualify for a
mortgage on a typically priced starter home, assuming a 10 percent
downpayment; by 1989, this typical renter had 74.2 percent of the
requisite income. Viewed from the standpoint of either all home
buyers or first-time buyers, a home has become less expensive over
the past decade due to increases in family income.
Exaggerated Cost Burdens: Renters
Renters are less well-off financially than homeowners. As such,
low-income renters face higher housing costs than individuals who
are able to buy a home. Yet there is little evidence that there is
a critical shortage of low-cost rental units.
The 1987 American Housing Survey indicates that renters had paid
a median monthly gross rent of $399. In 1980, this median rent,
when adjusted for inflation, had been $335. The increase was 19.1
percent in real dollars. This, however, was largely offset by
increases in income. According to the Census Bureau, after
adjusting for inflation, the median income for all households rose
from $25,426 to $27,139 during the 1980-1987 period, or 6.7
percent, excluding the rapid growth in nontaxable fringe benefits
such as medical insurance. This offsets the 19.1 percent real
increase in rents by over a third. The median rent-to-income ratio,
meanwhile, rose only from 27 percent to 29 percent. (U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, annually;
"American Housing Survey.")
"Unaffordable" units are generally defined as those that
generate rents (excluding utilities) exceeding 30 percent of
household income. According to Table 4, some 50 percent of the
rental stock is readily affordable. Housing advocates read into
this that the other 50 percent is "unaffordable." This is not true,
at least with respect to the housing. It may be true with respect
to the income of the poor. This distinction is extremely important.
It determines whether improving the housing situation of low-income
renters requires building more housing or increasing the income
that the poor can spend on housing.
Underreporting Income
The professional housing lobby, moreover, significantly
underrestimates the income which poor families have available to
pay rental costs. Housing interest groups frequently note that
according to U.S. Census data, over half the poor pay more than 50
percent of their incomes for rent. Yet federal data also show that
the total annual expenditures on all items by low- income
households equals 320 percent of the alleged income of those
households. Obviously, there is a problem with the statistics. The
problem is not that poor households lack income to pay for rent,
food, and other necessities. The problem is that the Census Bureau
dramatically underreports their income. (U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey: Quarterly
Data, 1984-1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1989), p.16.)
A key factor in the Census Bureau's miscalculation of the income
of the poor and near-poor households is that the Bureau excludes
non-cash incomes. This enormously distorts the poor's income
because 73 percent of all government assistance to the poor now is
in such noncash forms as Medicaid, food stamps, and housing
subsidies. In 1988, federal, state, and local governments provided
over $173 billion in welfare assistance to low-income households.
(Vee Burke, Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with Limited
Income: Eligibility Rules, Recipient and Expenditure Data, FY
1986-88 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, October 24, 1989), p.6.)
Of this total, only about $27 billion is counted as "income" by
the Census Bureau. Cash and non-cash welfare assistance, which the
Census Bureau and housing lobbyists fail to include in calculating
the income of American families, equals about $10,000 for each poor
household in the U.S. (Robert Rector and Kate Walsh O'Beirne,
"Dispelling the Myth of Income Inequality," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 710, June 6, 1989.)
Generous Subsidies
Housing aid is a significant part of support for the poor
and thus must be part of any assessment of whether the poor can
afford rents. According to a national study by the Urban Institute,
roughly half of all poverty renter households receive government
assistance in the form of housing subsidies, welfare payments or
both. (Sandra J. Newman and Anne B. Schnare, Subsidizing Shelter:
The Relationship between Welfare and Housing Assistance
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1989).) Indeed, roughly 20
percent of the 7 million low-income renter households receive both.
In the mid-1980s, the period of the study, these transfer payments
amounted to about $20 billion annually, or almost $6,000 per
subsidized poor renter household. (Newman & Schnare,
Subsidizing Shelter, pp. ix, 2.)
Evidence from the latest study by Harvard's Joint Center for
Housing Studies reveals a similar pattern. In 1987, some 54.4
percent of all poverty-level renters were receiving a subsidy, and
19.0 percent received both housing and income subsidies. (William
C. Apgar, Jr., Denise DiPasquale, Jean Cummings, and Nancy McArdle,
The State of the Nation's Housing, 1990 (Cambridge, MA: Joint
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 1990), p. 35.)
Subsidized low-income renters paid $188 in monthly rent in 1987
(1989 dollars); unsubsidized low-income renters paid $360. (Apgar,
et al., p. 21.) This housing assistance is ignored by housing
advocates who press for new construction subsidies.
Critics of Reagan Administration housing policies often forget
that during Ronald Reagan's two terms, the number of low- income
households receiving housing assistance climbed from about 3.1
million to 4.3 million. (Scott A. Hodge, The Myth of America's
Housing Crisis, Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1990, p. 6.)
Moreover, in 1987, about 5 million households, or over 70 percent
of the poor renters, paid less than the median monthly rent of
$399. Of this total, about 2 million paid less than $200. This
figure does not include any of the 600,000 poverty households who
paid no cash rent at all. ("American Housing Survey.")
The truth is that low-income rentals are, as a whole and by any
conventional definition, "affordable." Plenty of rental housing is
available. If there is shortage of anything, it is not of rental
units but of sufficient rental income to allow landlords to realize
a reasonable return on their investment and thus give them an
incentive to keep their property in good condition. Anthony Downs
of the Brookings Institution in his 1983 book, Rental Housing in
the 1980s, points out that in the inner city, rents often do not
even cover carrying costs. (Anthony Downs, Rental Housing in the
1980s (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 114.)
This is as true today as it was then. This problem can be addressed
only by giving the poor ways to increase their incomes -- through
greater opportunities for full-time work, through incentives to
maintain nuclear families, and through vouchers to be used as part
payment of rent.
Rental Market Absorption
How soon would newly-constructed rental housing be occupied if
it were completed today? The evidence indicates here as before that
the U.S. needs fewer new rentals now than a decade ago. In 1980,
some 75 percent of all new apartments (five or more units per
building) had been rented within three months of completion. In
1988, this figure had fallen to 66 percent, a decline occurring in
all regions of the country. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Housing Reports, Series H-130, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, annually.)
Sources of Allegations
The insistence in the face of all the evidence to the contrary
that America faces a critical housing shortage -- and thus needs
massive federal subsidies for housing construction -- comes from
three distinct special interests.
1) The real estate lobby. Realtors, builders, and lenders
benefit most from new production and below market interest rate
housing subsidy programs. Predictably, therefore, the National
Association of Realtors in 1988 called for the annual construction
of 2.1 million dwellings, and the rehabilitation of 313,000
additional units from 1988 through 2002, at a cost of $112 billion
annually in private and public investment. (Raymond J. Struyk and
Christopher Walker, America's Housing Needs to the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: National Association of Realtors, 1988).) This,
among other things, would build close to 500,000 more units than
the average annual production during the high construction period
of 1983 to 1987. The National Association of Home Builders in 1987
advocated a similar high-production program. (National Association
of Home Builders, A Blueprint for National Housing Policy
(Washington, D.C.: National Association of Home Builders,
1987).)
2) Federal housing program advocates. Repeatedly, they claim
that housing is prohibitively costly and that this causes
homelessness. Typical of such lobbies is the National Coalition for
the Homeless. A 1987 report issued by the organization, still
reflecting the way it thinks today, states, "By far the most
significant cause of widespread homelessness is the increasing
scarcity of affordable housing. Over the past few years, large
numbers of low- rent units in both the public and private housing
markets have been eliminated. As a result, poorer Americans are now
being squeezed out of their homes and onto the streets." (National
Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness in the United States:
Background and Federal Response (Washington, D.C.: National
Coalition for the Homeless, May 1987), pp. 5-6.) The Institute for
Policy Studies argues similarly in a 1989 monograph, "Most simply
stated, today for more and more Americans, the dream of an
adequate, affordable home is no longer attainable. On the contrary,
the dream is fading rapidly. In terms of choices, security,
neighborhood conditions, and especially costs, the housing
available to Americans is getting worse." (Institute for Policy
Studies, Working Group on Housing, The Right to Housing: A
Blueprint for Housing the Nation (Oakland, CA: Community Economics,
Inc., 1989), p. 2.) This monograph is the basis for H.R.1122,
introduced in February 1989 by Representative Ronald Dellums, the
California Democrat, that seeks eventual nationalization of the
entire housing stock.
3) State and local government officials, like the State Council
of Governments, the National League of Cities, and the U.S.
Conference of Mayors. Scarcely a month passed during the Eighties
without some mayor or governor blaming Congress and the Reagan
Administration for creating a nationwide housing crisis. At last
October's "Housing, Now!" rally in Washington, D.C., for example,
Ohio Governor Richard Celeste, a Democrat, said that a 75 percent
"cutback" in HUD's budget is the reason for homelessness. (Quoted
in Chris Spolar and Al Kamen, "Thousands March on Mall in Mass
Appeal for Affordable Housing," Washington Post, October 8, 1989.)
In reality, HUD's annual budget was not cut at all; it increased
from $14.9 billion to $20.3 billion between the years 1981 and
1989. In a speech last year to the National League of Cities,
Phoenix's Democratic Mayor Terry Goddard, blamed the same alleged
budget reduction for the current housing "shortage." (Quoted in
Karen Diegmueller, "Middle America: Priced Out of House and Home,"
Washington Times, March 15, 1989.) The National Association of
Housing and Redevelopment Officials argues that the U.S. will need
an additional 8 million new low-income units by 2000. (Ibid.) These
groups understandably insist that the assistance must come from
Washington, as few state and local officials want to raise taxes
themselves to pay for the housing.
These special interests all seek to discredit vouchers and other
consumer-oriented approaches for improving housing. Instead, they
want to return housing policy to the days of the costly Federal
Housing Administration (FHA)-insured, project-oriented commitments
for new construction and rehabilitation. While this has produced
good housing, it has helped only a handful of eligible low- income
beneficiaries, and at a high taxpayer cost. The FHA programs do
nothing for the vast majority of low-income Americans. The
government could have subsidized far more units through vouchers --
and with much less waste and influence-peddling.
Conclusion
By every reasonable set of indicators -- demand, supply, and
market -- America is not suffering a national housing shortage,
neither in quantity, quality, or in cost. To be sure, serious cost
problems exist, especially on the East and West coasts. Finding a
good single-family home at an affordable price in the Boston or Los
Angeles areas is far more difficult than finding one of equal
quality and space in the Cincinnati or Atlanta areas. Yet problems
of affordability, in whatever region or metropolis, are more linked
to barriers to supply, like overly strict building codes and
exclusionary zoning ordinances that inhibit the housing industry
and households from adapting to the market, than to an inherent
failure of the market.
The temptation for Congress to devise solutions to a trumpeted
but putative housing "crisis" eventually may help create a real
one. Proposals in the Senate bill, for instance, would increase the
federal government's liability for property foreclosures, high as
it is already. This may threaten stable growth not only in the
housing industry, but in the entire economy. (Ronald Utt,
"Cranston-D'Amato's S.565: Neglecting America's Poor," Heritage
Foundation, Issue Bulletin No. 152, September 22, 1989, p. 10.)
Only if housing problems are placed in historical and economic
perspectives can solutions to them be devised. The task for policy
makers is to enact a housing agenda that eliminates the factors
that inhibit the market from providing quality affordable housing
for all Americans.
On the supply side, localities should discard exclusionary
zoning ordinances which prevent new housing from being built;
anachronistic building codes that inhibit the adoption of new
cost-cutting technologies; and rent control. Even more important,
the federal government should adopt fiscal and monetary policies
designed to keep taxes and interest rates low. In a recession,
housing is one of the industries to suffer most heavily. If housing
is seen as an unprofitable investment, then with or without a web
of government enforcement or subsidies, potential investment will
eventually move elsewhere.
On the demand side, low-income individuals should be given
government assistance that gives them the freedom to live in
housing of their own choice. To achieve this, housing vouchers
(which help the poor) should replace housing projects (which help
wealthy builders). Jobs within reasonable commuting distance of the
poor's housing must be made as plentiful as possible. The
Enterprise Zone approach, for instance, has created many jobs in
Maryland, Michigan, and other states, and would be more effective
if instituted at the federal level. Conditions in inner-city
neighborhoods must be made hospitable to residents for housing
investment to be attractive. No neighborhood can flourish when fear
of crime is paramount. Hunter College Professor of Urban Affairs
Peter Salins, a veteran observer of New York City housing issues,
wrote in 1986, "The heart of the contemporary housing problem is
that many of the poor live in fairly decent dwellings in rotten
neighborhoods, and they have little money left over after they pay
their rent." (Peter D. Salins, "Toward a Permanent Housing
Problem," The Public Interest, No. 85 (Fall 1986), p. 29.) His
comment is as valid today as it was then. Housing policies,
therefore, ought to be geared toward enabling the poor to have more
money left over after paying rent, and to live in safe
neighborhoods of their choice.