(Archived document, may contain errors)
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.A SECRET COMMUNIST DOCUMENT REVEALS THE REAL GAME PLAN FOR SOUTH
AFRICA
United States policy toward the Republic of South Africa (RSA) has
reached a turning point. For five years the Reagan Administration
has used private diplomacy and quiet pressure to encourage the
Pretoria government to speed the dismantling of apartheid, i ts
institutionalized system of racial segregation. But under heavy
pressure from groups in the Congress and the international
community, the Administration has begun a high-level review of this
policy. Beyond short-term considerations such as whether or n o t
the U.S. should impose harsh economic sanctions on Pretoria, the
policy review is considering questions of more significance for the
long term, including U.S. policy toward the best-known South
African opposition group, the African National-Congress (AN C ).
Before coming to their conclusions, Administration strategists
should study closely a May 1986 secret discussion document of the
South African Communist Party Politburo, captured recently by South
African authorities. The report discusses at length the attitude of
the Communist Party toward the negotiations between the ANC and
South African reformist elements. The document not only reveals the
close links between the ANC and the communists and the way in which
the communists exploit the ANC to manipulat e Western opinion, but
it also echoes the success that Communist Parties have had in the
past in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and elsewhere
in fooling the West by hiding behind the respectable' front of
"genuine" reformist national liberatio n movements.
The South African communist document begins by noting the increased
stature of the so-called "liberation front." The document points
out that no longer is the Communist Party-ANC alliance viewed
merely as an "agitational opposition"; instead, it is seen
increasingly as "the immediate alternative power." Because of this
change--and, specifically, the increased visibility of the ANC--the
Party has felt it necessary to reassure its membership that it
still controls*what it calls the revolution in South Africa. Is
While the ANCIs own literature claims as its ultimate goal a
"national democratic revolution," the secret communist document
rejects this thesis. Instead, the national democratic revolution is
described as "a stage towards the struggle fo r social emancipation
in
the epoch of the world transition from capitalism to socialism
and within the context of the struggle against imperialism." The
document discusses the breakdown of consensus among the white
ruling elite'. noting.that "there appea rs to be a proliferation of
new groupings which consider themselves to be part of the forces
for change." Then the document cautions that these new groups
"cannot necessarily be embraced as part of ... the revolutionary
forces." The meaning: the Communist Party is willing to use these
groups for what they can offer, and then cast them aside. This, of
course, is what communist parties have done in a dozen other
countries since 1945. The Politburo study states candidly its view
of these liberal South African reformers: "Let us be clear. The
'liberal' bourgeoisie seek transformations of the South African
society which go be@ond the reform limits of the present regime but
which aim to preempt the objectives of the revolutionary forces
.... They seek transformat i on through negotiation and not the
kind of conflict which would culminate in a revolutionary seizure
of power." That is, the liberal reformers seek peaceful, negotiated
change. This does not serve the interests of the Communist-ANC
liberation front, becau s e it does not allow for the seizure of
power by the revolutionaries. Though it is essential for the
liberation front to be seen by the international community as
sincere in its desire for peaceful change, this must not divert
attention from the the main g o al: "Nor must a genuine desire to
project a-public image of 'reasonableness' tempt us to paddle
softly on the true nature of the liberation alliance and its
revolutionary socioeconomic objectives .... The main thrust of our
present strategy remains a revo l utionary seizure of power." The
talks which so far have taken place between the ANC and reformist
elements in South Africa therefore are only tactics in a much
broader strategy. What the Communist Party confidentially has been
telling its members is that t he'only real negotiations the
Communist-ANC liberation front is interested in are surrender
terms. Before that, there is-to be no real negotiation and no real
compromise. The Reagan Administration must understand this when
reviewing its'policy toward the ANC. It may rediscover what it has
known to be true all along--that when it comes to negotiation with
the ANC, the best negotiation is no negotiation.
William W. Pascoe, III Policy Analyst
For f urther information:
"The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, a nd East bermany in Fomenting
Terrorism in Southern Africa," Hearings bcf ore the Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th
Congress, 2nd Session, March .1982. Alan Cowell, ".Wild Card in
South Africa: Communist Party," The New York Times June 26, 1986.
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