(Archived document, may contain errors)
446 July 23, 1985 PERU'S FLEDGLING DEMOCRACY NEEDS Urns; HELP
INTRODUCTION On April 14, Peruvians went to the polls and elected
Alan Garcia their new President. This election marked Peru's
first constitutional succession from one civilian government to
another in 40 years. It is a considerable achievement and
demonstrates strong popular support for the electoral process.
democracy still remains threatened. In addition, there are qu e
stions about the affect of the Garcia government on U.S. interests
in the /region Yet Peru's Among'the worst enemies of Peruvian
democracy are such terrorist organizations as the Sender0 Luminoso
and the Tupac Amaru, which openly oppose,any form of democx a cy.
Other groups such as the many Marxist parties comprising the United
Left coalition inherently oppose democratic rule but participated
in the election because they view it as their surest route to power
Peru's prospects for maintaining a stable democra c y are also
Workers' threatened by the.worst economic crisis in its history.
strikes, political assassinations, and terrorist attacks, on top of
a debt crisis that has brought economic hardship, could in time
diminish the legitimacy of the government and p roduce an
increasingly alienated citizenry. Meanwhile, there is still an
intellectual and ideological legacy from the pro-socialist military
government that ruled from 1968 to 19
80. Most political parties The results of the April 14 election
did not give Alan Garcia the constitu tionally required 50 percent
of votes; he fell short with 49 percent.
But after considerable debate, on June 2, the Electoral Board
pronounced Garcia to be President, thus circumventing a costly
second round of elec tions 2 and politicians advocate a statist, if
not socialist, approach to the economic crisis.
The loss of Peru to undemocratic forces could have serious
consequences for U.S. and hemispheric security. Peru offers the
only friendly Pacific port for U.S. Navy ships between San Diego,
California, and Valparaiso, Chile. Should the Panama Canal be
unavailable during a global or regional crisis, U.S. ships would be
forced to sail around the tip of S outh America to join Atlantic
coast forces, and access to Peruvian.ports would be crucial U.S.
policy toward Peru and the Andean region must derive from a
strategy reflecting a long-term commitment to Latin American
economic growth and political stability . At the same time, the
U.S. must appreciate the varied political and cultural realities of
each nation In the immediate term for Peru, however, Washington
should provide assistance in the form of bridge loans to meet
shortfalls of external debt payments, c redits for private sector
development, and technical training and educational opportunities
for Peru's students, professionals, and military personnel. The
U.S. should also provide technical and financial assistance to Peru
in its efforts to reform the ju d icial system and combat
terrorism. Corruption in the courts and some abuses by the military
in the war against terrorism should concern Washington but should
not result in its denying or cutting back aid. Its economic crisis
leaves Peru with few resources to manage its critical problems; to
deny aid would only weaken the new government's efforts.to grapple
with these issues.
In 1984, total U.S. assistance to Peru was $107 million; this
year the Reagan Administration has requested and Congress should
approv e $223 million. It is particularly important, moreover, that
the U.S. avoid joining the creditor banks and the International
Monetary Fund efforts to force Peru to pay its $13.5 billion debt
without considering the political and long-term economic repercu
ssions. U.S. aid and advice for Peru should aim at economic growth,
not austerity.
HOW THE REVOLUTION STARTED Since the 1930s, leftist ideology has
played an important role in Peruvian politics. Two major leaders in
Peru's modern political development, Vic tor Raul Haya de la Torre
and Jose Carlos Mariategui have greatly influenced the perceptions
and actions of Peru's politicians. ism for Peru but in a form that
would reflect Peruvian reality.2 Both essentially advocated social
Many writers have tried to u n derstand the appeal of Marxism to
many Latin American leaders that: "As a philosophical construct
Marxism has made substantial Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz are
two who believe 3 Considered one of the most important Marxist
theoreticians of Latin Americ a, Mariategui founded the Peruvian
wing of the Communist International in 19
23. Although he was denounced just before his death by the
Peruvian Communist Party because of doctrinal differences,
communists and socialists in Peru today claim him as their so urce
of in~piration Haya de la Torre, the founder of the American
Popular Revolu- tionary Alliance APRA also advocated socialism for
Peru. He felt that the most critical issue facing Latin America was
North American or llYanquill imperialism and that its instrument,
inter national capitalism, was to blame for the retarded
development of most Latin American countries.
Haya later tempered his anti-Americanism, largely as a result of
the improving U.S. image under the Good Neighbor policy of the
1930s Then in the late 1950s, desirous of official status and a
chance at the 1962 presidential elections, Haya formed an alliance
with the conservative Manuel Prado government in what became known
as the concordancia. This shift to the right caused major
defections f r om Hayals party and undercut much of its support
from the left. But APRA's original revolutionary ideas continued to
find fertile ground among the various leftist organizations.
Although the left was barred from actively parti- cipating in
Peru's politics , the influence of its ideas steadily grew,
particularly among the educated.
By the 1960s some members of the-military and the Catholic
Church began to accept the idea of reform and even revolution4 and
to argue for a larger role of the state in achieving social
and,economic equality through redistributive state economic
policies. The extent to which the military embraced socialist
ideology during this period surprised most observers. When the
military overthrew the democratically elected government of Fer n
ando Belaunde Terry in 1968, it launched a program of reform
inroads upon the thinking and attitudes of Latin America of
non-revolutionary emphasis upon planning and economic progess, it
has been faithful to the deep rooted cultural bias favoring
collecti v ization and centralized control by the state Insofar as
Marxism advocates economic centralization and industrial
development, its acceptance is widespread Thought and Ideology
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina
Press 1970 p. 27 6 Mariategui also provided the origin for the name
given to Peru's terrorist group "Sender0 Luminoso," which means
"Shining Path when he wrote that Marxism-Leninism will open the
shining path to revolution A leading exponent of liberation
theology, Gustavo Gutierrez, is a Catholic priest of considerable
influence in Peru. Adherents of liberation theology of whom there
are many in Latin America, seek to give Marxist-Leninist practices
legitimacy by applying to them the language of Christian theology
Taken i, n terms Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz, Latin American
Political 4 so far-reaching that it was hailed by the left as a
genuine revoluti~n THE MILITARY ERA Headed by General Juan Velasco,
the new military government proclaimed, in 1969, a
llrevolutionaryll program. It was to include the expropriation of
the International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil
Corporation, and the establishment of state enterprises to direct
the most important economic sectors, such as mining, fishing,
banking, and f oreign trade. Foreign investment was subject to
strict control and in many cases entire- ly prohibited. Most of
Peru's arable land was confiscated and The result: in several swift
steps, mainly in the form of expro- priations, state participation
.in Peru 's economy increased drama tically In 1965, its share of
total investment had been 16 percent; a decade later it was 50
percent.
The revolutionary military government also expropriated the
major newspapers and placed all communications under strict governm
ent control. Political parties were outlawed. Breaking I with
traditional anti-communist foreign policy, the new military
government established relations with Cuba and the Soviet
Union.
These ties were enhanced when Lima turned'to Moscow for military
hardware after-the Nixon Administration refused to sell Peru the
spare parts needed on U.S. equipment it had already purchased.
The U.S. was upset by the leftward shift in Peru's foreign
policy. In 1974, General Velasco stated that his administration
sought a phased revolutioni1 that would lead to a "Peruvian
socialismll that would be neither capitalist nor communist turned
over to peasant cooperatives supervised by the state. 6 This
revolution, not surprisingly, failed to improve the economic
well-being of m ost Peruvians; in fact, by 1975 conditions had
worsened considerably. Emphasis on public spending and I external
financing, along with the inefficient and wasteful management of
state enterprises, a stagnant export market, and the decline in
private inves t ment, accounted for much of the economy's decline
in 1975 in favor of a new military government led by General In the
face of these problems, General Velasco stepped aside Jorge del
Prado, Secretary General of the Peruvian Communist Party, wrote at
the ti me By virtue of our Marxist-Leninist analysis, we Peruvian
Communists hold that the changes now in process affect the
socioeconomic structure, that is, possess revolutionary content
World Marxist Review January 1971, p. 17.
The program for agrarian reform instituted by the Velasco
government was considered by the radical left and the Communist
Party of Peru to be "the most progressive in Latin America, after
Cuba See Cesar Jimenez Seeking Radical Changes," World Marxist
Review, March 1984, p 70 ti 5 Morale s Bermudez. Announcing a
program of Ilmoderation, I' the new government removed the more
radical officials in the administra- tion, although it did not
attempt to undo the major policy changes of the previous
government.7 Then, in recognition of the erodin g legitimacy of the
military, the new government called for Consti- tuent Assembly
elections, to be followed by yeneral elections in 1980 in which all
parties could participate DEMOCRACY IN PERU The five years of
democratic rule under the administration of Fernando Belaunde
Terry, who won the 1980 presidential elections with a substantial
majority, was beset with serious problems, many beyond his
government's control A depressed world market for Peru's major
export, copper, soaring interest rates, severe dr o ught and floods
added greatly to Peru's foreign debt and the consequent economic
crisis. In addition, the Belaunde government inherited a host of
deficit ridden state enterprises and a massive military spending
program that have compounded problems in res o lv ing the debt
crisis I Under the weight of these problems, many social and
economic programs had to be shelved. Belaunde's efforts to
liberalize and reactivate the statist economy were plagued by the
lack of govern ment resources and the scarcity of cap i tal needed
for private sector investment. His policy of free trade and
openness to foreign direct investment helped improve Peru's
relations with the:U.S. but led to few economic benefits because of
Peru's economic emergency. government efforts to control drug
traffic and corruption and to reform the judiciary. Although
Belaundels term was marked by only modest success, Peru for the
first time enjoyed political and press freedom. These were
maintained despite the steady onslaught of:vicious terrorism and c
o ntinous attacks by inter national human rights organizations over
government efforts to stop terrorism Lack of government resources
also weakened a Although the leftists were dismayed by the
"revolutionary setbacks caused by the overthrow of the Velasco g o
vernment, they gave their support to the new government because
"there are still enough revolutionary forces mobilized during the
radical period eventually to retake political positions and
continue the process in the future Luis E. Aguilar Marxism in Lat i
n America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1978 p. 304
Members of the far left and particularly those in the Communist
Party of Peru criticized this move toward elections as an effort by
a "reactionary military" to institutionalize control by the ol i
garchy and the domination and oppression of the masses 6 THE NEW
GOVERNMENT Alan Garcia was elected President as head of the
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance or APRA. It is Peru's
oldest and largest political movement, but this election marked the
f irst time that it won the presidency and a majority of both
houses of the National Assembly APRA's bids for power in the past
have been thwarted by military coups and fraud, and in 1980, it
lacked political support APRA's overwhelming success this year is
the result mainly of Garcia's charismatic leadership, which
attracted considerable support from those dissatisfied with his
predecessor's policies. In addition, he mobilized APRA's
deep-rooted strength throughout Peru.
Garcia has gained control over his p arty, removed much of the
old guard that surrounded Haya de la Torre, and replaced them with
personally loyal younger men As such, he has created an image of a
modern, forward-looking party patterned after present- day social
democratic parties in Spain a n d elsewhere in Latin America.
Garcia has been careful, however, to keep intact APRA's doctrines
of anti-imperialism, Latin American integration, and economic
planning APRA's Domestic Policy Alan Garcia's approach to domestic
issues probably will reflect l e ss party ideology and more the
economic realities of Peru. Like the socialist Felipe Gonzalez of
Spain, whom Garcia admires, Garcia likely will have to set aside
socialist goals in favor of a more pragmatic and less ideological
course to solve the problem s of his country. Garcia's party in a
break with much of the past, has indicated an interest in
denationalizing state-owned enterprises and encouraging the private
sector. The extent to which Garcia and his colleagues proceed
toward a market oriented econo my and eliminate subsidies and
protectionist measures will depend on their control of political
and social forces.
They must proceed cautiously because the new power of the left
in Congress and the huge Communist Labor Federation (CGTP) are
likely to oppose free market policies. For APRA, the road to
privatization and a free market system could be politically
treacherous.
Garcia's majo r focus will be on,food production, rather than on
the export industries, to offset Peru's substantial food imports.
While he wisely has eschewed the large development projects of the
previous government and promised more assistance i to small
producers, he has not yet rejected the farm cooperative model
established by the socialist military government.
Garcia promised during the campaign to tackle guerrilla
insurgency with social, economic, and military measures. He also
stated, somewhat ambiguously, that he would ban "anti-constitu-
tionql" counterinsurgency measures 7 Foreign Policy Garcia has
articulated three principles to guide Peru's foreign policy 1)
anti-imperialism 2 Latin American integra- tion, and (3) Third
World nonalignment.
Anti-imperialism forms the basis of ApRA's nationalism and is
primarily directed against the U.S. While Garcia and his party
accept the need for foreign capital to develop Peru's oil
production, mining, and agriculture, he has stated that foreign
investment will be stric t ly controlled by the government to
protect Peru's perceived interests and natural resources. APRA
spokesmen specifically have stated that the government will try to
reduce deficits and improve revenue income by eliminating tax
exemptions to foreign oil co m panies such as Occidental Petroleum
and Belco. ing foreign investors and has rejected the left's
immediate call for outright nationalization of foreign-owned
companies in Peru the shift back to protectionist controls and a
state-planned economy will disco u rage potential investors
integration, this time to deal with the debt situation. Despite the
repeated failure of Latin American debtor governments to form a
debtor's cartel, Garcia asserts that Latin American unity is
essential "to negotiate the debt on a n equal footing with the
industrialized countries and the international banking system."Q
Two days after his election, Garcia told foreign correspondents
that his government would bypass negotiations with the Inter I
While Garcia appears pragmatic enough t o avoid alienat Garcia has
tapped APRA's traditional call for Latin American I I national
Monetary Fund and would promote joint action by Latin American
countries to seek new conditions for debt repayment.
Garcia has said that he will reject IMF policies t hat would
reduce tariff barriers to imported manufactured goods. He claims
that such imports would,destroy the country's industry and agricul
ture and eliminate jobs. IMF monetarist and neoliberal economic
policies have been, he asserts, imposed on Peru t o obtain debt
payment to creditors without regard for the impoverishment and
political instability such policies cause. The new government he
says, will seek to negotiate separately with each creditor and will
pursue the soft loans available from the multi lateral banks.
To improve Latin America's bargaining power in negotiations with
the U.S. and other industrialized countries, Garcia has called for
reactivated and strengthened regional organizations such as the
Andean Pact and the Latin American Economic S ystem SELA An
independent organization based in Caracas, SELA would serve as an
intermediary in political and economic negotiations with the U.S
while the Andean Group would function as a regional common market
that would enhance economic independence fro m the U.S FBIS Latin
America, April 23, 1985, p. J1. 8 Although he has said little so
far about specific U.S Peruvian relations, Garcia has been very
critical of U.S.-Latin American policy, particularly with respect
to Central America He also charges that W ashington lacks long-term
strategies for Latin American economic development. With regard to
Nicaragua, Garcia has gone farther than any other democratic leader
in Latin America in his stated support for the communist regime,
which he has called the "prog r essive affirmation of democracy in
Central America If The Strength of the United Left The first
runner-up in the election was Alfonso Barrantes, the mayor of Lima.
His party, the United Left, is a coalition of Marxist groups with
strong ties to Peru's mai n Communist Party. Barrantes received
approximately 22 percent of the total vote, while his party gained
16 of the Senate's 60 seats and 48 of the Chamber of Deputies 180
seats. If the United Left's seats are combined with the majority
held by APRA, itself left of center, the left will have an
unprecedented voice in Peru's next govern- ment proclaimed an
exuberant.Barrantes just after the election tion on a number of key
issues. nationalization of the banks and foreign-owned companies,
especially oil and mi n eral extracting companies; higher tariffs;
expansion of money supply; and a moratorium on debt interest
payments to foreigners. Recog- nizing that the more pragmatic
Garcia is likely to resist many United Left proposals, Barrantes
has vowed that his party will be the ''democratic opposition force
that will check the actions of the future APRA government The right
has been erased from the scene in this country The United Left can
be expected to press Garcia's administra Among them FUTURE
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOC R ACY Internal Factors One of the critical
issues affecting the future of Peru will be the behavior of the
left, in both Garcia's APRA party and the United Left coalition.
While not espousing Marxism, Garcia has acknowledged APRAIs Marxist
roots emphasizing that APRA's Marxism is Peruvian. According to
him, this means that it is based on I'Indo-AmericanIl realities in
contrast to the European "realities" that Karl Marx originally
perceived. APRA, however, still has an influential old guard within
it that is m ore Marxist than democra- tic. Garcia is unlikely to
be challenged by this faction, at least initially. the pressure
from the left may force official policy leftward As the first party
leader to bring APRA to national power Should his policies fail and
Pe r u's problems worsen lo FBIS Latin America, April 29, 1985, p.
54. 9 This may provide the Marxists the opportunity to regain
control of the party Peru's Institutions Are Collapsing Peru's
institutions are breaking down under the weight of corruption,
centr a lism, and bureaucratic inertia. This has given rise to the
I'informal sectorll where commerce and trade is carried on
profitably in a kind of gray underground system operating beyond
the heavy-handed grasp of state control. common to all democratic
nation s , created to protect the individual in the pursuit of his
livelihood, have ceased functioning in Peru. The judiciary, for
example, is thoroughly corrupt and ineffective; a businessman
cannot hope for redress if he sues for breach of contract or if his
pro perty taken from him.
A study of the'informal se'ctor by Peru's Institute for Liberty
and Democracy, an independent think tank, observed The enormous
informal sector, the rigid social structures, the discri- minatory
use of the law to favor the privileged, the subjugation of the
Andean population, the restrictions on economic opportuni ties and
the lack of competition are not the result of laissez faire, but
the creatures of the present pattern of [state] regula- tion I1
Unless the Garcia government reduce s state barriers to the legal
economy and fully integrates the informal sector into Peruvian
society, the institutions of the state could lose their legitimacy
and cease functioning unable to redress this problem primarily
because it was stymied in its att e mpts to reform the inflexible
state bureaucracy. If Garcia fails to govern effectively, some
Peruvians in desperation may turn to radical solutions, possibly
even to such.extremist alternatives as the terrorists Sendero
Luminoso or the arising pro-Cubanfl oscow Tupac Amaru Those
institutions Peru then would be ungovernable.
The liberal democratic government of Belaunde Terry was l1 l2
Hernando de Soto, "Legacy of Mecantilism Stymies Market Creativity
in Peru The Wall Street Journal, Janaury 4, 1985, p. 15 A fter
nearly five years of waging a bloody terrorist campaign against the
government of Peru, the Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path has shown
no signs of weakening and is believed unlikely to participate in
any kind of negotiation with the new government at tacking and
targeting for assassination prominent citizens and officials.
See also Edward Lynch Is Peru Next The Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No 314, December 9, 1983 They have, however, changed
tactics The lesser known Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Moveme nt is
also staging attacks against the government; they are more orthodox
Marxist-Leninist and have ties with Cuba and Nicaragua.
Luminoso has refused Tupac Amaru's overtures to form an
alliance.
They more autonomous Sendero The Military Given Peru's eno rmous
problems it is not likely that the military relishes the thought of
governing the country. The generals admit that they have no ready
solutions. Intervention may be their only option, however, if
Garcia attempts to trim government spending by cuttin g the
military budget, which repre- sents at least of fourth of the
national budget. Belaunde recog- nized this threat and gave in to
military requests for sizeable appropriations despite heavy
pressure from foreign creditors and the IMF to cut public expe n
ditures. There are, of course, security considerations that could
keep military outlays high. While Garcia advocates Latin American
disarmament, he is worried about the intentions of Chile's military
government the two countries have been strained since t h e
1879-1883 War of the Pacific in which Peru lost considerable
territory to Chile. Garcia also needs military support against
terrorism Relations between External Threats The efforts of
creditor banks, the IMF, and the Reagan Administration to extract
int e rest payments out of Peru's debili tated economy without
weighing the political consequences could undermine popular support
for democratic governments If economic crises continue writes Alan
Riding, chief of The New York Times's Rio de Janeiro bureau, Ir a
familiar scenario may be repeated: the radical left will feed off
the resulting frustration, demands for military intervention will
grow, and the centrist option will again disappear."13 difficulties
facing Peru, the U.S. and the financial community have been
unwilling to extend to Peru the same flexible terms for repayment
of its nearly 300 biIlion in loans that they extended to Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico Despite the immense political and economic
The debt situation inherited by the Belaunde governmen t in 1980
was critically affected by natural disasters, such as drought and
floods, and the escalating violence of the Sender0 Luminoso.
Making matters worse were high world interest rates and
plummeting world commodity prices for Peru's copper and silver As a
result, in 1984, debt service claimed 72 percent of Peru's export
earnings. Peru naturally has had difficulty making these payments
and meeting the economically austere conditions required by the
IMF. In retaliation, Peru has been cut off from furthe r IMF and
foreign bank credits, which in turn makes economic growth even more
difficult, thus ensuring greater poverty and political
instability.
But because Peru's foreign debt is small in comparison to the
$100 billion debt of Brazil, for example, the ba nkers and the U.S.
Treasury may not be worried about Peru's fate or the effect of its
default on the world financial system l3 The New York Times
Magazine, July 14, 1985, p. 23 11 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Countries
such as Peru point out, with considerable j ustifi- cation, that
U.S. foreign economic policy is crisis oriented and lacks a
coherent long-term perspective. The result is U.S inconsistency and
sporadic quick fixes that often do more harm than good. This
inconsistency undercuts those leaders and gro u ps in Latin
America, willing to cooperate with Washington, who share the
commitment to democracy, economic growth, and hemispheric security
Such inconsistency and shortsightedness is most evident in While
the the U.S. approach to the Latin American debt c risis.
State Department correctly follows the Reagan agenda for
long-term economic growth and democratic stability, the Treasury
undermines this by reflexively backing punitive IMF measures to
extract payments from already impoverished debtor nations like
Peru. T he Treasury's delegation at the IMF supports programs that
destabilize their political structures and weaken their productive
economic sectors--the opposite of what the Reagan White House
proclaims as U.S. goals in Latin ~merica.14 It is time for the U.S.
to end this contradiction in its policies. With a new government
about to take power in Peru, it may be possible to regain the
confidence of that country and the' rest of Latin America.
First, the U.S. must -be more flexible about the- role of the
IMF. It can assure Peru's new Garcia government that, while the
U.S. will continue within the IMF to negotiate Peru's debt repay
ment terms, Washington will not insist that IMF conditions be met
before U.S. assistance is given. By balking at unconditionally supp
o rting the IMF, the U.S. can induce the creditor banks to absorb
some loss on the loans to Peru, which these bankers now admit were
imprudent. The banks can absorb the loss on Peru's debt without
collapsing. This will impose badly needed market discipline o n the
banks and, more important, give Peru the chance to recover also
could thwart the left's attempt in these countries to blame the
U.S. and IMF for Latin America's economic ills, poverty, and
underdevelopment A more reasonable U.S. approach to the debt crisis
Second, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) programs
should no longer be linked to Peru's compliance with IMF
conditions. The AID programs are crucial to Peru's recovery from
severe drought and other debilitating circumstances beyond it s
control. in the urban and rural areas. Without continued U.S.
assistance Peru will be in an even weaker position to comply with
IMF require AID also must assist in developing the private sector
l4 See Edward L. Hudgins, "An Agenda for the IMF Conference T he
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 381, September 21, 1984. 12
ments and thus will not be eligible to receive the credits needed
to sustain investment and long-term economic growth. private sector
is the key to stable and long-term economic growth an d the best
insurance against a future debt crisis A healthy Immediately
following Garcia's inauguration on July 28 President Reagan should
invite him to Washington to discuss these issues. Responding to
Peru's concerns could defuse much of Garcia's critici s m of
Washington's policies and provide the common ground for cooperation
between the two countries. This is particularly important if Garcia
is to be dissuaded from pursuing protectionist economic programs
and embracing the rhetoric and policies of Third W orld radicals.
The U.S. should stress to Garcia that cooperation is essential to
make U.S. assistance programs work. For example, much of the aid
going to the agricul tural sector is targeted at private sector
development through financial and technical a s sistance. These
programs will be undekcut if Garcia's government emphasizes large
state-managed enterprises to increase agricultura1:production
standing of AID programs, their rationale, and their goals may
ensure the new government's support and helpful p articipation A
better under Third, the U.S. must redevelop targeted military aid.
In the early 1970s, the U.S. stopped giving military assistance to
Peru because it opposed Peru's foreign policy. Since then, the
Soviet Union has sold Peru enormous amounts of m,ilitary hardw,are
such as jets, tanks, and helicopters, and provided training and 150
advisors. While the influence of Soviet advisors on Peru's military
is difficult to gauge, their presence along with consid able
numbers of KGB and GRU espionage ag e nts could threaten U.S
security interests, particularly if Peruvian democracy should fail
I er The best way for the U.S. to undercut Soviet influence would
be by providing an alternative source of military training and
hardware. Some of Peru's military,le a ders have indicated a new
interest in Western suppliers and technical know-how. While the
U.S. should encourage Garcia's attempts at regional disarmament it
could, at the same time, foster closer ties through the U.S
international military and educational program (IMET). This program
offers Latin Americans an opportunity to participate in
U.S.-sponsored training and educational programs.
And .fourth, on the political level, the National Endowment for
Democracy should develop programs and grants to bolster Peru's new
democratic institutions and political parties. the role of the
Socialist International in influencing and assist- ing the
political groups in Latin American countries, the U.S should not
refrain from offering similar assistance Given CONCLUSION Without
significant U.S. assistance, Peru may be the first I new democracy
in the Western Hemisphere to fall. The impact I 13 would ripple far
beyond Peru and affect the region's other struggl ing democracies.
The failure of democracy in Peru also could h a rden attitudes
against democratic rule in Chile and Paraguay where peaceful
transition toward democracy seems less and less assured A breakdown
in Peru surely would encourage terrorist groups throughout Latin
America, many of which have been dormant for s o me time, to renew
their destabilizing activities. In such a scenario, the military
may feel compelled to retake power. More dangerous to the future of
Latin American societies is the possi bility that in those cases
where the protective role of the milita ry has lost its legitimacy
there will be a vacuum of power, and terrorism and violence will go
unchecked.
Support for democracy within Peru is strong. With encourage ment
from the U.S. and other Western democracies, Peru's democra tic
experiment could succ eed. President-elect Garcia has wide
political support and is believed by'many Peruvians and American
analysts to be essentially'pragmatic, despite his penchant for
left-wing rhetoric. Greater U.S. interest in Peru's concerns,
particularly the debt issue, could ensure that the next Peruvian
administration will be a significant and dependable ally in efforts
to bring economic and democratic stability to the Western
Hemisphere.
Esther Wilson Hannon Policy Analyst No Note: Nothing written
here is to be constr ued as necessarily reflecting the views of The
Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage
of any bill before Congress The Heritage Foundation 214
Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-4400