(Delivered July 26, 2006)
The U.S. economy
includes a significant number of unlawfully present workers who are
undocumented and unaccounted for. Research by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) indicates an alarming degree of
collaboration on the part of employers in hiring illegal workers.[1] This
excessive acceptance of a shadow workforce encourages illegal
border crossings, encourages other companies to break the law, and
forces states and local communities to subsidize cheap, illegal
labor by bearing social costs such as uncompensated emergency room
care, education, and social services.
Both the House and the
Senate have proposed legislation for strengthening workplace
enforcement. Both envision using the Basic Pilot program, created
in 1996 under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, as a principal tool for denying unlawfully
present workers employment.[2] This
approach fails on a three counts:
-
It is unlikely that
Basic Pilot will prove to be an effective tool;
-
The implementation of
the program will place excessive and unnecessary burdens on the
U.S. economy; and
-
There are practical and
more effective means to enhance workplace enforcement.
I propose an
enforcement strategy that could be implemented without creating
more government and a huge and expensive information technology
program. This strategy could be implemented by revising the U.S.
tax code to facilitate cooperation between federal agencies in
enforcing the law. I propose amending the tax code in a way
that will protect privacy rights and still allow the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with the cooperation of the
Social Security Administration (SSA) and Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), to find those large employers who intentionally
violate the law by hiring illegal workers and giving the
government incorrect information.
What's Wrong with the
Basic Pilot Program?
The Basic Pilot program
was created in 1996 as a part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act-along with the Citizen
Attestation Verification Pilot, and the Machine Readable Document
Pilot-with the purpose of electronically verifying the employment
legitimacy of newly hired employees. One year later it was
implemented in the five states with the largest immigrant
populations (California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and
Texas) in order to test its ability at detecting false claims
to U.S. citizenship, fraudulent documents, and stolen identities.[3]
Basic Pilot requires
employers to send the work information of all newly hired employees
to the Social Security Administration and to the then Immigration
and Naturalization Service for work authorization. For each newly
hired worker, the employer must first tap, via computer, into the
SSA database to verify the worker's Social Security number. If
the number matches the information in the SSA records, the worker
is a U.S. citizen and no further action is required. If the
worker has immigrant status, the employer must use the DHS database
for further information, and if that information matches the
DHS records, the employee may continue to work. In the case that
the employer's information for the new employee does not match SSA
or DHS records, the employer is responsible for giving the employee
written notice of that fact. If the worker does not contest his
non-confirmation status with SSA or DHS, the notice becomes final
and the employer is required to fire the worker.[4]
In June of 2002, at
Congress's request, the Institute for Survey Research at
Temple University and Westat evaluated Basic Pilot's competency
from the three perspectives of employers, employees, and federal
agencies. In evaluating Basic Pilot's ability to reduce fraudulent
claims, the evaluation team concluded that about 10 percent of
cases submitted to Basic Pilot were undocumented workers, not
including those who were deterred from applying to Basic Pilot
employers by the risk of getting caught. They also discovered that
most employers engaged in prohibited practices. For example, 73
percent of employees who should have been informed of work
authorization problems never received notice of non-confirmation
from their employers.[5]
Essentially, Basic
Pilot could not and cannot identify imposters or stop
unauthorized workers from creating false documentation, nor can it
hinder employers from illegally hiring unauthorized
workers.
The evaluation team
also found that Basic Pilot does not protect against privacy
violations. According to the 2002 report, the current design
of the system does not prevent employers from illegally accessing
employee information. The cost of the program has also become a
burden for many employers, who cannot afford the $500 annual cost
for operating the program. Those expenses do not include the
approximately $10 million the federal government spent to set up
the Basic Pilot program.[6]
Although Basic Pilot is
"potentially a valid concept," it cannot be implemented on a
large scale.[7] As a
volunteer program, Basic Pilot already has some constraints.
Building the infrastructure for a government electronic information
system to handle millions of transactions itself is costly
enough. The necessary training, insurance for loss or leakage
of data, oversight, and redress would cost millions more and
take years to implement. Additionally, Basic Pilot does not address
the principal means illegal workers use to get jobs. There are
many ways an undocumented worker can get around the issue of work
authorization.[8] These
include:
-
using fraudulent
documents;
-
using information that
belongs to another, thereby committing identity theft;
and
-
being hired by an
employer who does not follow the law.
Basic Pilot did not
prove efficient at eliminating any of these. Basic Pilot cannot
stop undocumented workers from falsifying information or using
someone else's information, thereby disallowing those
legitimate workers whose information was stolen the authorization
to work.
Furthermore, trying to
enforce and make mandatory a worker verification system to
ensure that every unlawfully present individual is denied a job
would unnecessarily hamper American business and the U.S. economy.
To work lawfully in the United States, those who are not U.S.
citizens must receive DHS authorization. A national-level Basic
Pilot program would question the legitimacy of documented workers'
right to work. Even a small percentage of stolen identities would
negatively affect millions of Americans with a legitimate right to
work, which could result in a dramatic loss of billions of dollars
in industrial productivity.[9]
Additionally, building
a government information system to handle transactions could fall
prey to a plethora of problems-technological failures,
violation of privacy rights, and leaked information are just
some among the many costs taxpayers would have to bear. [10]
For all its other
shortfalls, Basic Pilot fails most because it represents a bad
strategy. It is:
-
Unnecessary.
Undocumented
workers are not distributed uniformly throughout the economy.
They are concentrated in a few sectors, including construction,
agriculture, and some service industries. Saddling the entire
economy with the costs of electronic verification makes no
sense.
-
Inefficient.
Given the often
inaccurate and outdated data in SSA records, as well as
limited technology, chances are that a small percentage of false
records would affect millions of Americans who have a
legitimate right to work. This would also cause an unacceptable
loss of productivity totaling in the billions of
dollars.
-
Intrusive.
The program would
run afoul of legitimate privacy concerns. Both the government
and employers would have access to massive databases of
information, which would surely tempt some to traffic in identity
theft.
-
Costly.
An electronic
verification of every single U.S. worker would end up costing a
lot. Not only would the infrastructure of building a
technology system that could handle millions of transactions
be expensive, but providing training, insurance, oversight,
and redress would take years to implement and be incredibly
expensive. In the event of lost or leaked data, more unwanted
privacy issues would occur.
What Is the Right
Strategy?
The right strategy
would give DHS the resources and authority to target large-scale
employers in the sectors of the economy where undocumented workers
are most present (e.g., agriculture, services industries, and
construction). It would provide a complement of incentives and
enforcement measures to wean employers from the shadow
workforce. And it would be a set of tools that could be
implemented quickly, so that in conjunction with increased border
enforcement and legal alternatives for South-North migration, the
government can redress the balance between the attractiveness of
legal and illegal entry into the United States now- not years from
now.
The Department of
Homeland Security has already taken a step in the right direction.
In an effort to strengthen immigration enforcement, DHS recently
expanded its worksite enforcement efforts. In April 2006, DHS
announced an interior enforcement strategy that comprises
increased efforts to target employers who hire unauthorized workers
and immigration violators and who tap into criminal networks
of illegal immigration. DHS has been bringing criminal charges
against these offenders, rather than relying on administrative
fines. The GAO reports that DHS has increased its numbers of
worksite enforcement arrests from 160 in 2004 to 176 in 2005, and
its numbers of criminal convictions from 87 to 160 over the
same period. DHS plans on expanding worksite enforcement
manpower by 206 positions in 2007.[11]
In addition to these
recent initiatives, past efforts at targeted workplace enforcement
have proven effective as well. The lesson is clear. Targeted
workplace enforcement works and it does not require millions
of dollars of new technology, more intrusive government, or
expensive new programs to make it happen.
What Has to
Change?
Congress can help by
giving DHS the tools it needs to gain effective interagency
cooperation with the SSA and the IRS. The top priority here must be
addressing the prohibition against sharing Social Security
mismatch data. Currently, Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue
Code does not allow the IRS to release any taxpayer information,
even to other government agencies for purposes of workplace
verification. According to the GAO report and the Temple University
evaluation, approximately 10 percent of Social Security
numbers submitted by employers do not match SSA master
records.[12] Ten
percent amounts to nearly nine million workers. Granted,
some mismatches are innocuous and result from misspelling, but most
have no other explanation than an employer's attempt to avoid
the law and hire undocumented workers.
The SSA and the IRS
should have to share information, such as relates to Social
Security number mismatches or identity thefts, with the Department
of Homeland Security. DHS has the authority to take action not only
against employers, but against illegal immigrants. If DHS is given
access to SSA and IRS information on cases of mismatched or
stolen Social Security numbers, DHS could better fulfill
its immigration law enforcement. Within a few years, DHS could
feasibly target one-third of the illegal workforce-close to five
million unauthorized workers.
In order to make the
most efficient use of Social Security mismatch information, DHS
should focus its enforcement efforts on worst offenders and abusers
of that system. The most practical way of dealing with fraud would
be to identify the employers who abuse the system in order to hire
illegitimate workers. While it may not be possible to track all of
the employers who turn a blind eye to the law, the worst violators
could easily be caught using the information they release to SSA.
Those who, according to GAO, give at least 10 new employees the
same Social Security number throughout a year obviously are in
collusion with their illegal workers and should be prosecuted for
non-compliance with the law.[13]
Employers must also
respond to the mismatch letters from SSA when their employees'
information does not match master records. Most
mismatches are probably harmless, due to misspellings or name
changes, but some mismatches are intended to hide the
employment of undocumented workers. Employers who do not
respond to SSA's non-confirmation letters could be easily tracked.
I believe cracking down on the worst abusers of the system is the
most efficient way of tracking fraud and punishing it.
As part of the worksite
enforcement effort, Basic Pilot should continue to operate and
should remain a small-scale, voluntary program. To render it more
useful for enforcement purposes, DHS should have the authority to
randomly investigate and audit employers who participate in the
program. (DHS does not currently have access to Basic Pilot
participant information.) Additionally, to make the
program more cost-efficient and to alleviate the financial
burden on employers, Basic Pilot could utilize a protected
Web-based system for information submission. Basic Pilot
offers one more tool for DHS to employ in its efforts to enforce
immigration policies.
One additional
enforcement measure would be to strengthen the tax code to restrict
the ability of employers to file the wages of illegal workers as
tax-deductible. As part of targeted enforcement, Congress
should amend the tax code to remove the tax-deductibility of wages
paid to unauthorized aliens. This would further strengthen the hand
of DHS in securing the cooperation of American businesses by
creating the right incentives for employers to hire through the
legal channels.[14]
Increasing civil
penalties for intentionally hiring illegal workers should also be
considered.
Additionally, DHS
should be able to establish "safe harbor" information-sharing
systems and other incentives to work with employers who are
actively seeking to reduce their reliance on undocumented
workers.
To address privacy
concerns, DHS should assess the extent of information sharing it
needs from the SSA and the IRS, and establish how the information
will be utilized to conduct workplace enforcement. DHS also should
develop safeguards to protect taxpayer information against
misuse.
Immigration Reform Is
Also Required
Strengthening
enforcement of employer hiring practices is only one component of
what should be a comprehensive approach. Better border security is
also necessary. But just as important, legal opportunities for
migration have to be provided to give incentive to individuals not
to cross the border illegally and to encourage employers to
find legitimate workers. This could include the creation of a
temporary worker program to meet the needs of the American
economy. Some undocumented workers are in America temporarily with
the plan of increasing their monetary assets and then
returning home. A temporary worker program would create the
correct incentives for these immigrants to apply for
temporary documentation to work legally in the U.S.
The job market should
determine the allocation of temporary guest workers, not the
government. However, if employers go to great lengths to hide some
of their illegal employees and give SSA false Social Security
numbers, the odds are that their business does depend on these
immigrant workers, and the demand will be relatively high. I
believe the law should also require compliance bonds for employers.
Compliance bonds would mandate that employers arrange for
transportation and the room and board of guest workers, which adds
to the employer's expenses if the guest workers were to overstay
their visas. Over time, this should create incentives for employers
to ensure their guest workers leave the U.S. at the end of their
10-month visa term.
Any temporary worker
program should serve to strengthen, rather than undermine, the
value of citizenship and the health of civil society. In addition,
it must meet minimum security concerns, including appropriate
security, criminal, and health screening measures before
individuals enter the United States. No temporary worker program
should include amnesty. Individuals should have to return to their
place of origin to apply to enter the United States legally. This
is an essential deterrent to future illegal border crossing
and unlawful presence.[15]
James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National
Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation. This testimony was submitted to the House
Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on Regulatory
Affairs.
[1] U.S. Government
Accountability Office, "Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and
Limitations to Using Earnings Data to Identify Unauthorized Work,"
July 11, 2006, at /static/reportimages/DAA60920F9E77389DACFA290DA3781F5.pdf
(July 17, 2006).
[2] Institute for
Survey Research at Temple University and Westat, "INS Basic Pilot
Evaluation Summary Report," January 29, 2002, pp. v-vii at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/piloteval/
INSBASIC_summ.pdf (July 17, 2006).
[3]
Ibid., pp. 1-5
[4] Ibid.
[5] National
Immigration Law
Center,
"Basic Information Brief: DHS Basic Pilot Program," December 2003,
p. 4, at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/IWR_Material/
Attorney/BIB_Pilot_Programs.pdf (July 17,
2006).
[6] Institute for
Survey Research, INS Basic Pilot Evaluation Summary Report,
pp. 1-5.
[7] Ibid., p. vii.
[8] U.S. Government
Accountability Office, "Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and
Limitations to Using Earnings Data,"p. 1.
[9] James Jay
Carafano, Ph.D., "Immigration Enforcement and Workplace
Verification: Sensible Proposals for Congress,"
Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 999, April
4, 2006, p. 2, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/em999.cfm.
[10]
Ibid.
[11] U.S. Government
Accountability Office, "Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and
Limitations to Using Earnings Data," p. 4.
[12]Carafano, "Immigration
Enforcement and Workplace Verification," p. 2.
[13]U.S. Government
Accountability Office, "Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and
Limitations to Using Earnings Data," p. 4.
[14]Carafano, "Immigration
Enforcement and Workplace Verification," p. 2.
[15]James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., "The Spanish Trap: More Evidence on Pitfalls of Senate
Immigration Amnesty Proposal," Heritage Foundation WebMemo
No. 1106, June 5, 2006, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/wm1106.cfm.