The
question I was asked to address is whether the U.S.-ROK alliance is
at risk. The short answer is "yes," but the reasons why and the
ensuing prescriptions are far from simple. Thus, for the sake of
efficiency and clarity, I will begin with my conclusion and then
provide an explanation: The maintenance of a strong U.S.- ROK
alliance is absolutely in the short-,
mid-, and long-term strategic interests of the United
States.
Every few
years, usually in response to public disagreements between
Washington and Seoul, vocal critics will call for an end to the
U.S.-Korea alliance and American disengagement from the Korean
peninsula. While such views are not new in the half century of
the alliance, they have increasingly gained credence in recent
months, with headlines on both sides of the Pacific predicting the
imminent end of the formal relationship.
The
American supporters of ending the alliance make an argument akin to
the following: We should withdraw all U.S. forces from the
peninsula and abrogate the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty due to
rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, a growing tendency by the
government in Seoul to appease Pyongyang, and the Korean penchant
for blaming the United States for blocking unification. By ending
the alliance, they argue, we would be able to walk away from North
Korea because the problems that the Pyongyang regime
poses-nuclear and missile proliferation, conventional military
provocations and threats, illicit activities, and even human rights
abuses-are too difficult and challenging for the United States
to handle.[1]
On the
Korean side, those who cry "Yankee, go home!" are increasingly
confident in their national sovereign abilities, find the hosting
of U.S. troops intrusive, fear that U.S. policies toward North
Korea will cause instability or even a war, and are overall
resentful of Korean dependence on the United States.
Our
response to these arguments should not be to end the alliance, but
precisely the opposite: We should strengthen our bilateral
relationship with South Korea by confronting these issues directly
and forthrightly. Legitimate differences about the function,
purpose, and utility of the alliance have arisen due to dramatic
shifts in the domestic, regional, and global environment. But
just as the alliance is not the cause of tensions in the
bilateral relationship, we should also not allow it to become the
victim. Rather, both governments must endeavor to reassess the
current configuration and create a new alliance that meets the
needs of both allies. If we do not invest energy in renewing the
alliance, it will end sooner rather than later. And this would have
devastating consequences for America's future, not just in
Asia but around the globe.
America
has experienced the bitter consequences of choosing isolation
from the troubled world after World War I, and as a nation, we have
chosen not to repeat that mistake. After the attacks on Pearl
Harbor, and more than a half century later, after September 11,
2001, we could have again chosen the path of isolation, but we did
not. Instead, we made the difficult choice to engage the world and
troubled regions with even greater vigor. We must meet the current
and future challenges in East Asia with similar fortitude and
energy.
The
Alliance: The Past
Any
discussion about the future of the alliance must begin with a
proper understanding of its past. There is no doubt that the Korean
peninsula has presented one of the most challenging issues
confronting every major power in the East Asia region in the
20th century, including the United States. It continues to do so in
the 21st century despite being eclipsed by other pressing issues in
the Middle East and the global war on terrorism.
Yet, what
makes Korea both so profoundly challenging and interesting is
that, ironically, it has been more often than not overlooked,
underestimated, and even completely ignored until too late.
Korea was at the fulcrum of all the major wars engulfing East Asia
in the 20th century, beginning with its first "modern" war, the
Sino-Japanese War (1894), in which influence over the Korean
peninsula was the prize between one great declining power
(China) and an "upstart" emerging one (Japan); the Russo-Japanese
War (1904), in which Japan gained world stature by being the first
Asian country to defeat a great Western imperial power; World War
II, in which Korea was the foothold for Japanese ambitions to
control mainland Asia. Then came the Korean War, the first real
"hot" war of the Cold War era, and even the Vietnam War, in which
the United States arguably became entrenched because it had failed
to thwart the spread of Communism on the Korean
peninsula.
In each
of the first four cases, Great Powers fought over the Korean
peninsula not due to the intrinsic value of Korea-its people, its
culture, or its heritage-but rather for its strategic value. In
large part due to its geographic fate, Korea has always been a pawn
for Great Power games. Yet today, there is no doubt that Korea (at
least the southern half) has managed to forge a new place for
itself in Asia and, indeed, the world. Today, South Korea is the
tenth-largest economy in the world, and perhaps East Asia's most
vibrant democracy. The North has tragically chosen the opposite
path to become a desperate, failed industrial state, led by a cruel
dictator and closed off from the world.
Undoubtedly,
the United States played a pivotal role in creating the opportunity
for South Korea to achieve its current status. Without American
intervention in June 1950, North Korean forces would have
easily overwhelmed the South. But America's interest in Korea was
late (some believe too late). It was January 1950 when Secretary of
State Dean Acheson famously excluded Korea from the U.S. defense
perimeter, which served to embolden North Korean ambitions to
invade the South.[2]
For South
Korea, the alliance was born out of desperate necessity after
the Korean War; for without American commitment, the precarious
Armistice agreement would surely not have lasted long. For the
United States, the alliance was a product of the regional and
global context of the Cold War and its geo-strategic rationale of
containment and deterrence. The bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty was
a pointed effort at reversing Acheson's miscalculation by declaring
to the region and the world that the United States was going to be
involved and present in Asia.
Over the
decades, the U.S.-ROK relationship has far exceeded expectations,
proving to be one of the best in America's history and often touted
as an exemplary model for other alliances. It has successfully
served not only to deter North Korean aggression but also as
one of the pillars of U.S. security strategy in East Asia: to
promote stability and prosperity in the region. The alliance
has also been the basis for direct and indirect U.S. economic
assistance to South Korea, which has reduced its
security expenditures and facilitated continuous and rapid
economic growth. Furthermore, creating a stable security
environment has allowed foreign investors and trade partners to
have greater confidence in the economic future of
Korea.
South
Korea has contributed its share to the alliance. The ROK has
been a staunch American ally in numerous military operations
throughout the decades, including contributing more to the U.S. war
effort in Vietnam than any other American ally: 50,000 South Korean
troops fought and more than 4,400 sacrificed their lives in the
jungles of Vietnam to pay back the debt they owed to
America.
More
recently, the ROK contributed to Operation Desert Storm during
the first Gulf War, peacekeeping operations in Somalia,
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the current war in
Iraq. South Korea's force presence in Iraq of 3,600 has been the
highest contribution of any coalition partner after Great
Britain.
Despite
the remarkable success of the U.S.-ROK alliance-or perhaps because
of it-we often forget that this half-century relationship has
weathered serious periods of tension in the past.
For
example, the Nixon Doctrine, declared on July 25, 1969, laid out a
new direction for the U.S. role in Asia as that of supporter, and
placed the primary responsibility for defense on the countries
directly involved. As a result, in early 1971 Washington
withdrew the Seventh Infantry Division from South Korea, reducing
the American military presence from 62,000 troops to 42,000.
Combined with President Nixon's efforts at rapprochement with China
and the withdrawal of American forces in Vietnam, South Korea was
shaken by fears of abandonment and insecurity.
In
response to these changes, the South Korean leadership shifted its
strategy away from a primary focus on economic development toward
giving equal weight to creating a self-reliant national defense
structure including restructuring the military, improving the
armed forces, fostering a viable domestic defense industry, and
acquiring modern weapons. In 1974, the Korean government launched
its first Force Improvement Plan, and by the 1980s, the
"Koreanization" of Korean defense was well underway, resulting in
positive changes for the role of the U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK).
Another
crisis in the alliance erupted in 1977, when President Carter
announced that he would unilaterally withdraw the Second Infantry
Division from Korea. As a result, the two governments began serious
talks to combine the operational command system in order to
effectively enhance the defense capability of Korea. While the
withdrawal would eventually be scrapped, the plans led to the
establishment of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command
(CFC) in 1978, in which the responsibility of defending South Korea
was ceded from the United Nations Command (UNC).
More
recently, tensions in the alliance once again came to the fore with
the U.S. decision to redeploy 3,600 members of the Second Infantry
Division to Iraq as part of an overall plan to draw down 12,500 of
the USFK by the end of 2006. Along with the efforts currently
underway to dismantle the CFC, these troop reductions and
redeployment of existing troops away from the demilitarized
zone were met with suspicions that these decisions were
retaliation or punishment against the South Korean government
for encouraging rampant anti-Americanism and for its sharp
criticism of U.S. policy toward North Korea.
I do not
believe these accusations to be true, but of greater relevance is
that these questions of American motives reveal the extent to which
strategic dissonance has pervaded the alliance. While this
condition qualifies as a bona fide crisis in the alliance, it does
not necessitate a termination of the formal relationship. It does,
however, require a careful examination of the sources of diverging
strategic priorities.
The
Present: Purpose of the Alliance
When
faced with common external threats, countries form alliances
in order to provide mutual security through a formally binding
commitment that ensures military and political cooperation. The
initial rationale for the U.S.-ROK alliance was no different, and
was composed of three specific key elements: to meet direct threats
to the peninsula, to provide a framework for cooperation to
increase regional stability, and to provide a framework to
contribute to global security
What has
profoundly changed, however, is that the two allies are no longer
unified in their strategic perceptions of the primary threat to
South Korea: the North. This divergence in threat perception has
led to serious political and public developments that question and
even threaten the very existence of the alliance.
Most
Americans tend to attribute the strategic dissonance in the
alliance to the dissipation of the "North Korean threat" altogether
in South Korea. They cite the Sunshine Policy, the emergence of a
younger generation with no first-hand experience of the Korean War,
and a government in Seoul seemingly limitless in its willingness to
accommodate the Pyongyang regime, including the omission of
the official label "enemy" from its national Defense White Paper
and even the refusal to discuss human rights
abuses.
But as
many South Koreans (both young and old) are quick to point out,
they do feel threatened by the North, only the threat has
metamorphosed into a completely different kind of peril than that
perceived by Americans. Today, the majority of South Koreans no
longer view North Korea as an invincible, evil enemy intent on
conquering the South. Rather, the greatest threat posed by the
North is the instability of the regime which could lead to a
collapse (whether through implosion or explosion), thereby
devastating the South's economic, political, and social
systems. What explains South Korea's sudden shift to fearing the
North's weakness rather than that regime's strengths?
The
Sunshine Policy and the ensuing historic summit between the two
Korean leaders in June 2000 marks the proximate symbol of a
profound shift on the Korean peninsula, but the true causes are
more complex and lie in the previous decade. They include the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China in the early
1990s, as well as the devastating floods and famines of 1994-1995
that produced shocking pictures of starving, skeletal North
Korean children.[3]
These images "humanized" a traditional enemy and caused South
Koreans to feel a connection to what they see as poor, starving,
and weak brethren, who at best are victims of a bad regime and at
worst are misguided, but certainly have neither the capability nor
intent to truly harm their Southern relatives. Most
importantly, they were viewed as fellow Koreans.
The
significance of this psychological mind-shift cannot and should not
be underestimated. After all, who can blame South Koreans both
young and old? They are tired of being the last remaining victims
of the Cold War, and they too want to reap the "peace dividend"
that the rest of the world enjoyed. South Koreans now want the
freedom to not fear that their very way of life is in constant
danger, a life that is built on prosperity, material well-being,
physical comfort, and freedom.
The
problem is that for the United States and many others in the region
(including Japan and Australia), North Korea largely remains an
unchanged Cold War threat based on its continued pursuit of a
military-first policy despite mass starvation and a failed
economy; its pursuit of nuclear weapons, missile proliferation, and
illicit activities including counterfeiting; its record of
state-sponsored terrorism; its continued hostile stance toward
the South and other countries in the region; and even its continued
brutality toward its own people through widespread human rights
violations.
For the
United States, the source of the threat lies in the strength of the
North Korean regime, while for South Korea, the threat now lies in
the regime's fundamental weakness and its potential for collapse.
Given this vastly different assessment, the divergence in
policy prescriptions is predictable. Seoul wants to mitigate the
potential for greater instability by engaging the Pyongyang
regime in the hope of coaxing it gradually toward positive regime
transformation. Washington, in contrast, views engagement
efforts as part of the problem if it contributes to augmenting the
regime's existing strengths rather than seeking ways to further
weaken it.
This
chasm between the American and South Korean perceptions of the
North Korean threat and how to address it is at the heart of rising
tensions between the two allies. It is also an important
contributing factor to anti-American sentiment in South Korea
because the uncompromising U.S. stance toward North Korea is seen
as the cause of instability on the peninsula and a primary barrier
to inter-Korean reconciliation.
While
nothing could be further from real U.S. interests and
intentions-after all, peaceful reconciliation and unification
of the two Koreas is the ultimate solution to preventing future
conflict and instability on the peninsula-this is a dilemma that is
embedded in larger strategic differences confronting the
alliance today. For the United States, the ROK alliance has always
been one critical piece of a broader regional and global
perspective, while for South Korea the alliance serves more limited
peninsular goals. These two objectives, while discrete, were
not openly contradictory during most of the alliance's history
because the Cold War dynamic caused local and regional views to
converge. In other words, the immediacy of the Communist
threat along with a near convergence of the two allies'
classifications of the sources of that threat-the strength of the
North Korean regime- allowed disparities in security interests to
be suppressed.
Today,
changes on the peninsula, in the region, and around the globe are
accelerating faster than our ability to manage them. Vigorous
inter-Korean exchanges, China's dynamism and the revitalization of
Japan, and the new and urgent threat of global terrorism have
allowed the differing strategic priorities of the two allies to
emerge and even conflict in the public arena. Moreover, these rapid
changes raise profound questions about the utility of U.S. regional
alliances in their existing configuration.
The
current structure of the U.S.-ROK alliance presents a confounding
dilemma for both allies: Extended deterrence provided by the United
States allows for South Korea to pursue engagement with the North,
but at the same time is considered a hindrance to what Seoul
wants to achieve vis-à-vis the North. Moreover, Washington
can no longer utilize the alliance to leverage Seoul to fully
cooperate on policies toward the North. While Washington and Seoul
share overall interests regarding North Korea-elimination of
nuclear programs, reduction of the military threat, and improvement
of human rights-their prioritization of achieving these goals are
at odds; for the United States, WMD and proliferation clearly
are the top priorities, while for South Korea, preventing military
conflict and a collapse of the North are the overwhelming
objectives.
Thus, the
alliance is increasingly seen as a burden by both sides, and
both are resentful of responding to "demands" from the other,
moving the focus of the alliance from a military to a
political one. South Korea's rapid democratization, in
particular the boisterous expansion of its civil society, has
exacerbated the politicization of alliance management issues such
as environmental and labor impacts on local communities. While
creating more tensions for the alliance in the short term,
these developments should be assessed in the proper positive
context, and do not necessarily signal the end of the
alliance. Moreover, if properly managed, the end result will be an
alliance that is more mature and equitable. More importantly,
much-needed credibility in the alliance will be restored, sending a
strong message not just to North Korea but the rest of the
region.
The
Future: Long-Term Strategic Interests
At the
heart of our discussion about the state of the U.S. alliance with
the ROK today must be a broader consideration of future U.S. grand
strategy in Asia. Beyond the immediacy of the seemingly
intractable North Korean "problem" of today lie more
profound challenges for the United States, including the
eventual unification of the Korean peninsula, the rise of China,
and the resurgence of Japan.
It is
clear that the U.S. goal for the mid- to long-term future is to
play an active and positive role in maintaining stability in East
Asia. The promotion of prosperity, freedom, and cooperation in the
region are beyond a doubt integral to the American national
interest. The best and perhaps only way for the United States to
maintain its influence in the region is through its alliances with
key partners.
While the
primary goal of the U.S.-ROK alliance was and is to deter North
Korea through the American commitment to the Armistice, its
broader objective has always been to maintain regional
stability. It has done so by contributing to the strength of
the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only by dispersing the U.S. force
presence beyond Japan, but also by alleviating the Japanese burden
of managing instability on the Korean peninsula. The alliance
has also mitigated hostilities between the ROK and Japan and served
to counter China's growing regional influence and dissuade any
precipitous action on the peninsula.
But
perhaps most important, maintenance of a U.S.-ROK alliance will
continue to serve as a bedrock for America's commitment in the
region. An end to the alliance would undoubtedly jeopardize our
credibility with all our allies and partners in the region, from
Mongolia to Australia. And it will send the wrong message to China,
whose ambitions are to create a regional multilateral structure of
nominal equality but underlying Chinese dominance; the
strength of America's alliances with the ROK and Japan is the
single greatest factor thwarting Chinese regional hegemony. But
sole U.S. reliance on Japan will be problematic given the level of
mistrust for that country in the region.
Maintenance
of a strong U.S.-ROK alliance will not be an easy task given the
immense challenges that will inevitably confront the relationship.
Strong domestic support in both countries will be critical in order
to sustain any type of formal relationship but especially one
involving U.S. military forces, which requires sacrifices of those
at home and in the host country. This is not an impossible task if
the leadership of both countries rise to the
occasion.
As such,
Washington should work even more closely with the current and
future governments in Seoul to reach a deep understanding that
continuation of the alliance serves the mutual strategic
interests of both countries. This should then be communicated
clearly and unequivocally not only to the American and South Korean
publics, but to the regional audience as well.
Today,
there is strategic mistrust in the region, and our alliances are
contributing to, rather than alleviating, this dynamic. As a
result, we find ourselves in perhaps the worst possible
strategic configuration on the peninsula: The U.S.-ROK
alliance increasingly is being held hostage to the North- South
relationship, with North Korea ultimately gaining the most. Thus,
the United States must work to create a new relationship with South
Korea but also with the North.
Any
relationship that has endured for over a half century inevitably
experiences periods of turbulence and crisis. The U.S.-ROK
alliance has weathered its share, but the immense value it has
provided to both countries has made the investment mutually
worthy. It certainly deserves careful consideration and
preservation in the future.
Balbina
Y. Hwang, Ph.D., is Senior
Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation. This publication is based on her testimony
at the hearing "U.S.-ROK Relations: An Alliance at Risk?"
before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House
of Representatives.