June 1, 1987

June 1, 1987 | Lecture on Europe

INF Arms Control: Imperiling NATO's Future


(Archived document, may contain errors)

INF ARMS CONTROL: IMPERILING NATO'S FUTURE

by Representative Jack Kemp We are here today to discuss a challenge to America@s freedom, democracy, and peace-the distinct possibility, after many contentious discussions, of reaching an agreement UWon to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles in shoul d . There should be one ck@estion, one criterion, at the heart of this debate: Will such a treaty bring greater secufit@ to the West, or less? All of us share a deep desire to reduce the burden of armaments, and one day to lay down the weapons of war. We wa n t peace, not a phony peace, but secure peace, lasting peace-real peace with freedom and justice. We know that peace in Europe has been maintained, not by Western goodwill, but by Western will, and-by the power of our nuclear deterrent. Recall the clear-ey e d and commonsense warning of Teddy Roosevelt 80 years ago: Anything in the nature of general disarmament would do harm@ and not good, if it left e civilized and peace-loving pepples, those with the highest standards of international obligation and duty, u n able to check the other peoples who have no such standards, who acJmowledge no such obligation. Glasnost' Means Tublicity." Yet some today point with great hope to, the first 9firrings of change inside the Soviet Union. The West is fascinated by this thin g called glasnost', what the Soviets refer to as "openness," but which translated literally means "publicity." Ile Soviet Union, they say, may finally be embarking on a new path to open its society, to attenuate its aggression, and, as the proposed IMF tre aty is intended to signal, to co-enst in greater harmony with the West. Is that true? To get the right answers, we need to ask the right questions. Have we seen a basic change in human rights, in the oppression of political and religious dissidents?

New Restrictions. We have seen the release of a few prominent individuals such as Andrei Sakharov from internal e)dle, and of Natan Shcharansky, who was permitted to leave the country. We have also seen the KGB assault innocent demonstrators in the

Congressman Kemp, a Republican, has represented the 31st District of New York since 1971.

He spoke at The Heritage Foundation on May 22, 1987.

ISSN OZ72-1155. Copyright 1997 by The Heritage Foundation.

Kremlin; and we have heard Shcharansky cautionthat, while half a million Soviet Jews may wish to emigrate, under Gorbachev's new restrictions, the total number may be capped indefinitely at 11,000. Have we seen any reduction of Soviet arms shipments and support for pro-Soviet dictatorships, any slowing of their driv e to expand and fortify their colonial empire? We have seen Soviet force levels in Afghanistan increase to 120,000, permanent military -bases-erected, and attacks that have resulted in terrible human carnage--over a million killed, over five million exiled . We have seen Soviet planeloads with fresh Cuban troo s ,p and an additional billion in military hardware landing in An*ola; military delegations from the Soviet Union, East Germany, and North Korea arrivin$ in Mozambique; and stepped uZsupport for the di c tatorship in Ethiopia, which has conducted a campaign of genocide t has claimed the fives of a million Ethiopians. We have seen new co munist guerrilla attacks in El Salvador, and shiploads of Hind helicopters arriving in the fortress nation of Nicaragua, all continuing a relentless buildup of Soidet bloc presence, power and subversion in our own hemisphere. Have we seen any let-up in Soviet attempts to destabilize and exploit Western and Third World economies?

Subsidizing Soviet Buildup. Even while seekin g membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Soviets have backed Castro's campaign to convince Third World nations to repudiate their loan payments to the West. We have seen the Soviets increase dramatically their own untied loa n s from Western banks--dver $6 billion last year in hard cash. And then we saw the Soviet Union turn around and illegally purchase from Norwegian and Japanese firms Aingrican propeller technology1hat will make Soviet attack submarines even more difficult f or our Navy to detect--while we subsidize wheat sales to the Soviet Union.

Fianlly, have we seen any good faith attempt by the Soviets to comply with treaties we know they are violating? We have seen the deplorable pattern of cheating on major treaties con tinue uninterrupted-on SALT 1, on SALT H, on the ABM Treaty, on the Helsinki Accords, and on the Chemical and Biological Convention. Dangerous Advantage. Actions do gseak louder than words. Can any of us ignore the stark presence of an occupy, 'at dominat e s half the countries of Europe and a an nv y 0 power threatens the rest? Ca us ignore the hard truth that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces hold a decisive and dangerous advantage over the defenses of NATO? When we see a real renunciation and reduct i on of aggression, real curtailments of ram ant Soviet esyionage, real cut-backs in their overwhelming military buildup, then we can telieve. Un then, we must not repeat the mistakes of the 1930s, when Winston Churchill ticians dared not undeceive the po s aid 0 pulation. We must have the courage to see and e the truth; and we must approach this latest Soviet initiative with more caution and ex it with more care.

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WHY THE U.S. IS IN NATO

Following World War H, the United States assumed the obligation t o defend Western Europe because we understood that Europe was a forward defense of the United States. And we saw that Europe could not stand, nor the U.S. long endure, if we were divided. Ilttle wonder, then, that over the past.40 years, the Soviet Union' s primary. aim has been to split the NATO alliance at mid-Atlantic. Whether in times of cold war or detente, whether under the tyranny of Stalin or the glasnost' of his student Gorbachev, the Soviets have sought to intimid e and separate Western Europe fro m the U.S. They w!mt an isolated America; and they want to raid the treasure chest of Europe's economic and technological resources free of alliance cons nts. Wedge to Break Up NATO. The Soviets have followed a dual strategy to divide the U.S. and Europe: a n "paralleled military buil combined, in recent years, with a major peace offensive. As their military superiority has own, the Soviets have tried to use arms control as a wedge to break up NAM and neu Western Europe. And they would like nothing better th a n to decouple the U.S. nuclear guarantee from Europe. Judging from the debate over this INF proposal, Moscows strategy is wor By calling-NATO's bluff on the so-called zero option, Gorbachev now has most eo le the West believing that he is serious about ar m s control, while a substantial er of voices are questioning the U.S. commitment to NATO'. k AN OFFER TOO GOOD TO REFUSE? At -first Vance, the proposed INF.agreement is the best arms control deal the West has ever seen-indeed, an agreement weighted strongl y in our favor, -an offer too good to refuse.

The Soviets have 1,400 deployed warheads (not counting reloads) on their SS-20 and SS-4 launchers. We have a total of only 316 Pershing-Hs'and ground-launched cruise missiles. Under the proposed agreement, both sides would reduce to 100 warheads, to be deployed in the U.S. and Soviet Asia. That is an exchange ratio of more than six-to-one in our favor, bringing us to a position of numerical equality. What more could we ask? Risky Assumptions. Proponents point o u t that this agreement would be the first in history to bring about deep reductions in nuclear forces. Few people realize, or remember, that the U.S. and NATO unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons in Europe by 2,400 over the past seven years. Nevertheless, m erely getting the Soviets to agree to reduce their arsenal, it can be argued, would be an important accomplishment. But that argument assumes that we believe the Soviets will honor their promise to destroy the SS-20s and SS-4s; and that the resulting Mili tary balance will enhance the security of Europe and help ensure the peace. Neither proposition is self-evident.

VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE: "THE ACHILLES' HEEV king 'ZU p n m

W e have over a decade of experience with Soviet cheating on arms control agreements to convince us that verification and compliance with any new agreement must be ironclad. Here many uncertainties remain.

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For example, if the Soviets are permitted t o retain 100 SS-20 warheads, they will also retain production and s@p ,,,?ort facilities for those warheads. How are we to know whether they honor their 100 limit. How will we identify the production facilities that are to be shut down? Will we have the t e chnical ability and the resources to carry out the verification activities we would need to conduct? And what will happen to Soviet short-range INF systems?,WM they be destroyed, or -simply-withdrawn so- that they can be brought back at a later date? Fina l ly, how will we know that our data base on Soviet weapons.is correct? it is U..+ +@@" + SAR - "b " -, at the Soviet Union has never provided their own accounting of deployed F& systems. They have simply asked us how many we know about. We have duffilly to l d them, and together we have proceeded on the assumption that the U.S. count is accurate. But the Soviets could be-and indeed we have reason to suspect they are-hiding additional missiles in warehouses and deployment areas we know nothing about. As one ex p ert on Soviet deception pointed out, we have never found anything the Soviets have successfully hidden. RVPs Achilles' Heel. Many will argue that verification need not be perfect, oril, "adequate." In otherwords, verification provisions hinge on the willi n gness of the @Vest to accept what few things the Soviets agree to let us see. But just what is an acceptable confidence level in dealing with a government that has a demonstrated, consistent record of cheating? These are some of the reasons why Ambassador Ed Rowny has called verification the "Achilles' heer of any INF agreement. Still, difficult as the problems of verification may be, enforcement would be even more difficult. VVhile most commentators appear to take Gorbachev at his word, there are sobering reasons to doubt the Soviets intend to honor an INF agreement. They have just deployed their SS-20s at a frantic pace and at a large investment of resources. Why should they now destroy them if they can find a means of hiding these missiles? The new mobil e SS-25 ICBM--produced in violation of SALT 11--is actually an advanced SS-20 with an added third stage. And some SS-25s have been deployed at former SS-20 sites. Yet the SS-25s would not be limited under an INF accord. What is to keep the Soviets from mai n taining an INF force in the guise of mobile ICBMs? Soviets Gain Enormously. And the follow-on to the current SS-20 is already undergoing flight testing. As yet, it is unclear whether or not this new generation weapon would be included in the proposed agre e ment. True, such circumventions or violations could be discovered. Soviet planners would have to take that into account. But the Soviets have gained enormously and paid absolutely nothing for violating and circumventing past agreements. Why should they ob serve future ones?

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The bottom line is that unless we insist that existing violations cease before we sip new treaties, our insistence that the Soviets comply with new agreements will be treated with contempt.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Setting asid e the serious problems of verification and compliance, we still need to ask, where would this agreement leave us? What does Gorbachev stand to gain? What does he expect to achieve? And what would be the impact on the military balance and the security ofEu r ope? Let us assume that the Soviets actu destroyed their INF ballistic missile forces. The threat to Europe would be little change b cause the Soviet Union would be left with a variety of fallback options not av *.ab e us. First, while the U.S. would be r e quired to destroy all of its ground-launched cruise missiles, the Soviets would be permitted to keep all of theirs. The new Soviet GLCK the SSC-4, has a 3,000 kilometer range and is currently being d9loyed in unknown numbers in a mobile configuration much like that of the SS-20. Where is the mutuality or equity in this?

The "Double-Zero" Formula. Second, the Warsaw Pact has a formidable short-range INF nuclear arsenal, which theg are modernizing, and which can cover Europe from the Rhine to the Cliffs of D over. some "double-zero" formula is accepted, under which these are withdrawn, Soviet tactical nuclear weapons-under 300 miles--would remain, holding West Germany acutely at -risk and powerless to respond in kind. In addition, the Soviets can always. reta r get a small fraction of their ICBM force to cover e is now targeted by their INF forces. Indeed, NATO plamiing has ah!ays assumed that some part of the Soviet intercontinental and submarine force is 'intended tor use ag - t -Europe. Getting rid of the SS- 2 0s and SS-4s will not change that. Finally, the conventional balance is weighted so heavit in favor of the Warsaw Pact that there is little hope the West can catch up--a three to one ead in tanks, tactical aircraft, and artillery. We and our allies would h ave to add about 90 divisions to match the Pact's strength. The U.S. share would be 18 divisions-an increase larger than today's entire army. And even if we were prepared to expend the vast sums to field a credible conventional deterrent, how would we jud g e how much is enough? What the allies judged was adequate conventional strength in years past brought us two world wars. These questions fill me with profound concern and apprehension. Nevertheless, I realize fulf well that we may sign an IN a F . greemen t with -the Soviet Union. Therefore, let me set out what I consider to be four min n ns, four critical provisions, any sH U'Paperdottsioe enate. agreement must incorporate before it is ubmi Verification and Loopholes. First, any INF agreement must provide f or a true global zero in all IMF forces. Soviet ground-launched cruise missiles must be included if NATO's are to be banned. And we must not permit a 100 warhead lo9phole. Verification would be hopeless if the Soviets are permitted to retain mobile SS-20s in Asia which they can move

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about at will. The NATO ministers have made true zero a condition of their supporL And our Asian friends have already objected to accepting 100 SS-20 warheads targeted against them.

Second, any agree ment must include verifiable and equal limits on short-range INF systems, and a NATO guarantee to deploy compensatory short-range forces as necessary. Third, any agreement must mandate effective verification including on-site inspection pf suspect sites o n demand. Outgunning the U.S. And fourth, any agreement must establish a timetable for the destruction of deployed INF systems that first equalizes force levels and then ninposes a simultaneous drawdown of weapons. In other words, the Soviets greatly outgu n us. Uwe are agreed on reducing to equality, then let them reduce first to our level before we irrevocably begin destroying our few launchers. But even if these four conditions are met, the agreement may still not be in our interest. It must be judged *in the context of Soviet behavior and the overall strategic and theater military balance. ,

"COUPLING": MILITARY AND POLITICAL BONDS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

In 1979, NATO embarked upon its two-track decision to deploy Persh ing Hs and ground-launched cruise missiles. This decision grew out of Western Europe's alarm over the rise of Soviet military power, the loss of American strategic superiority, and the uncertain leadership of the U.S. Administration. Yet the dual track de c ision was intrinsically self-defeating. Even aswe were working with our allies to improve NATO's defenses, we 'were negotiating with the Soviets over how to undo what we accomplished. Political Costs. Just as the olitical push for an agreement might outwe i gh its military soundness--which was true of Te zero-option as it was first proposed--so can the political cost of an agreement outweigh its real military cost. No one in the West questioned the military and political coueling of U.S. defenses to European security before the INF systems were deployed. And I see abundant evidence that America's military commitment remains, with or without INF: U.S. nuclear weapons on our forward deployed aircraft and submarines, battlefield tactical nuclear weapons, plus, m o st important, the presence of 300,000 American troops and all of their dependents. But this question of coupling has two dimensions--military and political. Key Link in Escalation Ladder. From the beginning, the value of the Pershing Us and GLCMs lay less in their direct military utility than in the strategic fact that, for the first time, nuclear weapons stationed on European soil could within minutes reach Soviet territory in response to an attack. Western Europeans-rightly or wrongly--have come to view INF as a key link in the escalation ladder tying the defense of Europe to America's strategic nuclear guarantee.

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Remove that link--tear down that @ymbol that has been erected at such high political cost-and the appearance of a U.S. disengagement fro m Europe Ls nearly inescapable. Now that we have expended great olitical capital to get the M forces deployed, we will pay a huge political price if we pulthem out. There is no mystery why all this makes Europeans nervous. They have lived through a patter n of reversals in U.S. military commitments. The Thor and Jupiter missiles in the U.K, Italy.and Turkey were withdrawn in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis -after-just- three years in place. The enhanced radiation ("neutron bomb" de loyment decision was reversed only two years after NATO agreed to it. And the 9norces were de loyed only after exacting a high political cost, yet now we are on the verge of PT y, ing them out. No Advance Consultation With Allies. Along with this turbulent trend, the 1983 SDI decision mitially provoked gross misunderstandings ---- our NATO allies. At first, the center and right in Europe mcorrectly interpre I as heralding a new Fortress America, retreating behind an anti-nuclear shield and leaving Europe exposed to great risk. At the same time, the European left saw SDI as the sword that would bring down the ABM Treaty and the entire arms control regime. And all members of the European political spectrum shared the fear that the U.S. was disengaging from Europe and embarking on a course that would jeopardize the peace. The Reylqavik summit exacerbated these concerns. Europeans stood by in wonder, while negotiations in Iceland contemplated a drastic restructuring of the W est's defense posture, transcending any arms control propo s al ever before contemplated-with little to no advance consultation with the allies. Add to this record a growing minority of neo-isolationists in the U.S., and calls for withdrawing American troops from Europe issued by the new chairman of the Senate Arme d Services Committee among others, and one can begin to understand the tinge of "de-coupling!' hysteria in Europe. What is at stake for the Europeans in the EKF neptiations is more than an assortment of missiles, it is the political commitment those missil e s have come to represent at a time when the strategic balance is shifting increasingly in favor of the East. Indeed, French Defense Minister Andre Giraud has severely renounced the proposed INF agreement as a throwback to Munich because of the colossal fa ilure of will it would seem to reflect.

ARMS CONTROL AND PUBLIC POLICY

Too many in this Administration have taken the easy way out of overselling arms control and fostering false hopes about the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. And Europeans have in dulged in pro-arms control rhetoric to appease peace movements while placing the onus of responsible conduct on the U.S. Calling America' Bluff. Together we have exaggerated the virtues of arms control to calm the voices of dissent. And now the Soviets ar e calling our bluff.

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The lesson here is that it is far easier to be for arms control in the abstract than it is to negotiate a real arms control agreement that strengthens the security of the West. For too lon European leaders have averted their eye s from the decline in the )u Y@ mi large part, by the West's misplac of safety bror t about, ed faith in arms control. e the Soviet ars;nal has grown four times greater than it was at the I, while the Soviets have doubled the number of their strategic re- e ntry vehicles since signing ---SALT-111; imol while the Soviets are putting the finishing_touches on their nationwide ABM defense network in violation of the ABM Treaty, our allies have scolded us for declaring the expired SALT agrements null and void. Th e y have yet to criticize the Soviet Union for any ofits pervasive arms control violations. Voices of Realism. There are a few voices of realism and concern, who understand Gorbachev's ploy for what it is: an attempt to isolate and neutralize Western Europe . But they are all but ignored in the quest for a new agreement and the advancement of the arms. control process. This Administration should know better. If Gorbachev -truly were sincere about reducing international tensions, as ppposed to reducing the Wes t 's competitiveness, then we should see this change reflected in Soviet foreign policy. Instead Soviet aggression continues. Soviet espionage has become more brazen, and Soviet terrorism and subversion more widespread. And yet, the Speaker of the House ret u rned from Moscow predicting the bestprospects for peace since the Russian Revolution. Then Mr. Wriyht and the new isolationists in the Congress pushed through a defense bill that combines deep cuts in spending with unilateral arm control restraints-the li b eral Democrats' new defense platform of peace through weakness. If I thought the proposed INF agreement would serve as a basis for improving defense and deterrence and the security of the West, I would be all for it. But Western defense depends, in the fi r st instance, on the public's understanding of the threat we face. 'How are the democracies to sustain the political basis for correcting m@litary disparities and repamng our defense shortcomings in a climate of treaty signing ceremonies, summit handshakes , and self-congratulatory smiles? Killing SDI. I am also deeply concerned about how an INF agreement might affect America's SDI. While Gorbachev appears to be offering an INF deal that would be SDI-free, in reality, it is not SDI-free at all. As I observed from this very stage at The Heritage Foundation on the eve of the Reykjavik summit, the Soviet' emier arms control objective has been to kill America!s Ugat goal. Indeed, one could make the case that with this SDI. They have not abandone Congress, they ar e very close to achieving it. At Reylqavik we saw Gorbachev fight for the right to preserve a Soviet first strike capability and a monopoly on defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. President Reagan rightly said no. But how long can we expect to su stain support for SDI in the midst of expectant arms control negotiations, much less in the afterglow of a new agreement in Europe? SDI is clearly Moscows real target of opportunity: if we were willing to make

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concessions to reach an INF agreement, surely, SDI opponents will argue, common ground can be found on this question as well. Already the Soviets have renewed their call for extending the ABM Treaty, which is up for its five-year review this month. And the Democratic Party's leadin spokesmen o n defense are playing right into Soviet hands. They are legislating cony ance with the Kremlin's preferred interpretation of the ABM Treaty and showing little concern for the U.S.- Conkitution--or for-U.S. security.. Rather than spending our time engrossed in the details of an INF accord, our State Department, arms control and defense establishment should be concentrating on the ABM Treaty review, issuing demarches, to the Soviet Union for its extensive violations of that treaty, and laying the legal and po l itical groundwork for our imminent withdrawal. MonI Disarmament. Instead, our negotiators have pledged to the Soviets that they will not leave Geneva until they have an INF verification regime in hand. And the five-year ABM Treaty review--which is critica l to our deployment of SDI-is receiving only perfunctory attention here at home by Secretary Shultzs State Department. The real danger I fear is the moral disarmament that accompanies arms control euphoria. If we sip a new INF treaty we will be issuing a w a rrant of res pectability for Gorbachev. We will be helping the Soviets hide be&6J arms control while they are embarked on aggression throughout the world. NATO governments will come under increasing pressure to accept a nuclear-free Western Europe, with a ll the dangerous vulnerabilities that would entail. And at home, we may find that it will be more difficult to earn public support for modernizing our forces in the future, conventional or nuclear, or to build SDI.

THE REAL AGENDA FOR FREEDOM AND PEACE Tod ay, I appeal to the President: we must not sign a nuclear Munich that could imperil NATO's future. Instead, let us harness these justifiable concerns over the INF proposal, arismg on both sides of the Atlantic, and use them to forge a stronger alliance an d a more secure peace. There are seven specific steps we can and should begin taking right now to strengthen peace: First, while it is fine to talk with the Soviets, it is even more important that we in the affiance talk with one another. No more shocks, o r sudden shifts; no more arms control s. Let us lay out the essential conditions precedent to) r a ement, and move did y. gre V. as an alliance united. Then let us also discuss, can y and completely, the other responsibilities we must meet together. Prepos t erous Proposals. I am speaking, secondly, about renewing a real commitment to provide adequate resources for our defense--peace through strength. Without question, the allies must contribute more to our common defense. The idea that we will leave American men and women stationed in Europ@, while those countries move toward the policies of unilateral disarmament and concessions proposed, for example, by Britain!s Labour Party and the Greens in Germany, is preposterous. We need to make this position

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dear and to lend our steadfast support to those upholding NATO's pledge to increase defense spending 4 percent per year. Third, whether or not we have an INF agreement, we need to deploy strategic defenses in the United States and anti-tactical ballistic m issile defenses 'in Europe. German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has forcefully presented the case for what he calls "extended air defense" to offset Soviet ballistic missile capability--whether conventional or nuclear. The deployment of strategi.c def e nses in Europe should be NATO's highest defense -priority. ATBM systems are essential to deterfing war and maintaining the peace, and the only reliable safeguard against Soviet cheating on an INF agreement. Fourth, battlefield theater nuclear force modern i zation and conventional force improvements are long overdue. If one good thing comes out of this INF debate, it may well be increased NATO sensitivity to these defense requirements. Isolationist Libemls. Fifth, the defense of Europe depends ultimately on t he strength of the United States. We cannot, in good conscience, demand more of Europe while we are cutting back ourselves. U.S. defense spending declined 2 percent last year, 6 percent the year before, and held at no growth the year before that. Just two days ago, the House adopted a defense authorization bill cutting overall defense spending to 5 percent below last year's level. What began as a critical defense buildup under President Reagan is crumblin under the reckless hands of isolationist liberal De m ocrats who never learned the lessons ofthe 1970s. Nor have they learned the lessons of the. 1930s-that weakness invites aggression. Sixth, as we address these militar; threats to our Security, we must also address the nancial ted ;estem cash support and b a ilouts of the Soviet empire. C@Ve West agree on a common policy to restrict the billions in cut-rate, untied loans that are propping up Marxist economies and subsidizing the Soviet military buildup. Seventh, we have the right to expect our allies to suppo r t the U.S. in other areas critical to our security--such as challenging Soviet treaty violations, comb ttin gy communist expansion in our hemisphere, and opposing terrorist regimes such as adhafi's Libya. And when Americans put their lives on the line to d efend sea lanes and strategic resources vital to the Free World-such as the Persian Gulf-they should not have to stand alone. Our allies must share that duty. I I Urge the President. The time has come to put these issues on the table of the leaders of the Free World. I will urge the President to take up these matters with his fellow heads of state at the economic summit in Venice next month. All of us should understand that under the resourceM Chairman Gorbachev, the Soviets are simply adopting more clever tactics to carry out the same strategy set down by Lenin--global expansion masked a dialogue of deception. Arms control overtures to disarm the West, a new infusion ol"Westem cash and credit to strengthen their economy and military, and a steged up campai gn of aggression across the Third World add up to a Soviet Union potenti y far more powerfid, more menacing, more dangerous than before.

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The prospect genuinely worries me, and I am highly skegtical of the value of any INF agreement to the defense o f the West, for all the reasons I ave outlined today. Not ObU;ed to Surrender. But we need not despair. We do not have to accept a awed arms control agreement. We are not obliged to surrender piecemeal our security and our children's future. We can take h e art and resolve that we vAll use this debate over INF to rekindle our courage and unity on our common defense requirements, so that, in Churchill's words, the freedom of the West will be built on firmer foundations. As we do, let us never forget that nucl e ar weapons are in NATO Europe to keep the Face. If any are withdrawn, it should not be because we have trapped ourselves in the ill-chosen logic of our own arms control rhetoric, but because we have finally found the will and the way to make peace with fr eedom more secure.

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