Edward L. Hudgins
Speakers often open their talks with a joke. However, I have a
bit of a problem doing that in this particular case. For example, I
could ask, "Did you hear about the bureaucrat who wanted all hard
hats worn on construction sites to be sterilized before use?" Or,
"Did you hear about the regulator who wanted to force dentists to
dispose of children's teeth as toxic waste, rather than allowing
them to return the teeth to the children for a later exchange with
the Tooth Fairy?" Or I could ask you, "Did you hear about the
bureaucrat who wanted automatic teller machines at drive-through
banks to be made accessible to blind drivers?"
Now the good news is that these regulations, though they were
actually proposed within the last year or two, did not go into
effect. They were headed off by Vice President Dan Quayle's office,
especially by his Council on Competitiveness. But, unfortunately,
the joke is still on the American people. Many more regulations
from Washington, turned out by the same system that has given rise
to the absurd examples just mentioned, are in effect today. And
more are always being concocted.
Over the last three and a half years regulations have grown at
an alarming rate after declining in the 1980s. In 1980, for
example, the Federal Register, the publication in which regulations
are listed, was approximately 87,000 pages long. By 1988, Ronald
Reagan's last year in office, the number had gone down to about
53,000. Unfortunately, last year that number had jumped up to
67,700. In 1980 there were 121,000 federal employees involved
directly in issuing and enforcing regulations. In 1988 that number
had dropped down to 104,360. Well, guess what? It is now up to an
all-time high of 124,994.
The plague of growing federal regulations, like the more direct
kind of taxes that we are getting all too used to, have a weakening
and debilitating effect on the American economy, harming both
consumers and businessmen and -women. But unlike a direct tax,
regulations are a kind of silent killer. The public might see an
extra form to fill out here and perhaps a ban on interstate banking
there. The public might see, for example, a restriction on their
use of their own land today and perhaps a mandate to businesses
requiring wheel chair ramps tomorrow.
But there is a pattern here. The federal government turns out
regulations with very little or no regard for their costs or their
consequences, which often more than offset any benefit that the
public gains from the regulations. The government, as it were, is
like someone to whom you give a hammer: he is going to find
something to bang. Giving the government the power to regulate the
economy assures that it is going to find that something always
needs more regulating. That seems to be the nature of
government.
Regulations often are administered in a very arbitrary manner.
But at other times, there is no leeway whatsoever given to
regulators. Thus, even if they want to do the right thing and
administer regulations responsibly, regulators must treat
businesses and individuals in a manner that most objective
observers would describe as simply stupid. And of course,
regulations are so voluminous that no business, individual, or
regulator really knows exactly what they face and must comply
with.
I am going to talk about some of the generic problems with
regulation. Next, Bill Laffer will talk more about the cost of
regulations. Finally, Brink Lindsey will examine how regulations,
in fact, undermine this country's tradition of freedom.
Let me now examine a number of harmful attributes found in most
regulations.
1) A major problem with the regulatory process is that members
of Congress and the Administration often fail to ask if the free
market can offer a better or a cheaper way to provide the kind of
public benefits or protection that they seek with regulations. For
example, the government of the city of Paris did not develop and
enforce building codes the way we did in the U.S. In this country,
of course, we have lots of government building codes. In Paris,
however, insurance companies have the primary responsibility for
building safety. How is this done? A builder seeking a loan from a
bank will be told by the banker that the proposed building must be
insured before the banker will hand over the money. This is very
logical. The insurance company will not insure the building unless
the builder takes proper steps to assure the safety of the
building. After all, the insurance company has a very strong
incentive to see that the building does not collapse or does not
burn down. That would be money out of the pocket of the insurance
company. The point is, there is a simple, non-governmental way of
providing for the public safety, as opposed to the government means
that we use in this country.
2) A second generic problem with regulations is their sheer
volume. This means that no one actually can understand what is
there. Going back as far as the ancient Greeks, one of the main
attributes of law is that it must be publicly known and
understandable. Hammurabi, the King of Babylon, set up his famous
Code of Laws before 2000 B.C. This was one of the first times that
the public actually was told what the monarch decreed an individual
could and could not do. Unfortunately, our system does not function
that way, at least not in terms of regulations. I mentioned that
the U.S. has some 68,000 pages of regulations. These are just the
generic regulations. There are thousands and thousands of pages of
additional regulations specifying exactly how bureaucrats are to
regulate, what procedures they must follow, and so forth. Thus, we
are drowning in paperwork.
For example, at a panel here at The Heritage Foundation this
spring, the operator of a factory in Baltimore complained that he
had about five-and-a-half feet on his bookshelf filled with
government regulations. He admitted that he was not exactly certain
what was contained in these regulations. How can a businessman find
time to read five-and-a-half-feet worth of books to figure out
exactly what he can and cannot do? In another interesting
conversation, a representative of a major U.S. corporation told me
that his corporation might erect a separate building simply to
store its copies of the paperwork that it must submit to the
government. Does this not suggest that the system has simply broken
down, that no one knows what regulations demand or permit?
3) A third generic problem with regulations is that they often
contradict one another. This is in part because there are so many
of them. How can anyone know exactly what is permissible and what
is not? How can a lawmaker know whether the regulation he is
passing now contradicts something that another regulation is doing?
For example, the Baltimore factory manager I just mentioned said
that he had one government agency telling him that, for health
reasons, he must have the floor in his plant wet-mopped every two
hours. Yet he had another government agency telling him that the
floor, for safety reasons, must be dry at all times.
Another example is found in federal regulations mandating fuel
efficiency. The principal ways to increase a car's fuel efficiency
often involve technologies that are more polluting. Thus, they can
violate other government standards meant to reduce pollution. The
point is, one often finds regulations pushing business in opposite
directions. One is reminded on the one hand of federal programs
warning that smoking is bad for you, and on the other hand, of
programs paying the tobacco farmers money to support their crop
production. It makes very little sense.
4) A fourth generic problem with regulations is that there is
often little or no relationship between the penalties that they
mandate and the public interest they allegedly serve. Let me give
you several examples. Watertown, a city in upstate New York that I
visited late last year had had a multi-year EPA-mandated project
underway to replace the capacitors in its electric grid, because
these capacitors contained the chemical PCB, which is banned by the
EPA. The city officials, however, discovered they would be a few
months late completing this project. They asked the EPA not to fine
them, arguing that they had made a good-faith effort to complete
the project. In any case there was no real immediate threat to the
public safety and health.
Well, not only did the EPA fine this city $3,000 for being two
months late, it also fined the city $20,000 additional -- $10,000
for each of two years -- because the city did not have a specific
piece of paper in the paperwork for the EPA. The city had in its
records the location of all of the capacitors, identifying the ones
that had been replaced, and their replacement dates, and the ones
still to be replaced, with the dates of the scheduled replacements.
But they did not have a separate piece of paper saying, "To the
city," that is, the owner of the electric grids, "From the city,"
that is, the local political authority: "This is to remind you that
you still must replace the following capacitors." The result: a
$20,000 fine.
Consider another example of a penalty that has little to do with
protecting the public health or safety. I spoke last year to a
union leader from Seattle, working in a Boeing plant. He told me of
an incident in which he entered the plant's cafeteria after being
in the plant and ate a cup of chicken soup. After he finished the
soup, he used a napkin that he had been carrying with him to wipe
his mouth and then proceeded to throw the napkin away. It happened
that an EPA bureaucrat was there at the time. The EPA
representative said, "Sir, you cannot do that. I'm sorry." "Why
not?" asked the union leader. The EPA man's response: "Given the
regulations around here and where you have just been in the
factory, this napkin now is officially classified as toxic waste."
In other words, the EPA bureaucrat was telling the union man that
he was supposed to go through an expensive process of disposing of
a napkin that was clean enough for him to wipe the chicken soup
from his mouth.
Other examples of how the penalties and the regulations have
virtually nothing to do with protecting the public health and
safety are far more serious and tragic. John Poszgai, n Hungarian
immigrant in Morrisville, Pennsylvania, purchased land on which he
planned to build a garage. He cleaned up some twenty years' worth
of illegally dumped tires, parts of junk cars, and other debris,
and began to put down fill dirt as a base on which to construct his
garage. Now, the property was not listed as a wetland; indeed, it
was dry through most of the year. However, EPA bureaucrats
apparently found certain kinds of vegetation on that land that are
associated with wetlands. They secured a restraining order against
Mr. Poszgai, ordering him to stop dumping in the fill dirt. Now
Poszgai actually began to erect a fence to keep out the local
contractor whom he had hired to dump the dirt. But apparently some
dirt was dumped after the restraining order was issued. Poszgai was
convicted of 41 counts for violating the Clean Water Act and
sentenced to three years in jail for polluting a "navigable
waterway."
What on Earth does this penalty have to do with protecting the
public health and safety? It is clearly an arbitrary act by
bureaucrats. And it is interesting that Poszgai, who had managed to
survive the Nazi occupation of Hungary and subsequent communist
takeover, was not able to escape the EPA bureaucrats, who arrested
him at gunpoint for putting some fill dirt on his own property.
5) A final point about the problems of regulation. Because of
their arbitrary and damaging nature, regulations have undermined
our system of law, and, indeed, have given rise to what I call
regulatory terror. Businessmen, and often private citizens, will
complain to us at Heritage about the regulatory burden. They will
give us examples such as the ones that I have related in this talk.
"Can you write that down?" I will ask. "Can you put that in writing
so that we can tell other lawmakers and the public about these
abuses?" The individuals and the businessmen are often very
reluctant to do that. Why? Because they say, "Look, you will go
back to Washington, but I have got to live with that federal
bureaucrat. And I am scared that he is going to use his arbitrary
power to get back at me, to punish me, for what I have said in
public."
I have suggested to some Congressmen and Senators that they
should hold town meetings in their various state capitals and
provide a darkened booth for witnesses, or allow witnesses to wear
masks or hoods to protect their identities. This approach might be
necessary since people have become so frightened of federal
regulators that they will not step forward and say in public, "This
is what this bureaucrat has done to me. This is what he has done to
my business. This is why my business is shutting down -- because of
the arbitrary actions of this federal regulator."
Incidently, in an off-the-record conversation with one of my
researchers doing background work, one particular federal regulator
bragged of having driven 100 enterprises out of business with high
fines. So the fear among the public of the regulators is not an
idle fear at all.
These are some of the generic problems with regulation. I have
considered these problems especially from the level of the small
businessman and the small property owner. I want to add that we
here at The Heritage Foundation are interested in stories of
regulatory abuse. Please call us and tell us your problems.
The burden of regulations on the economy is heavy and will grow
heavier in the years to come. And this is on top of an already weak
economy. To lift this burden, to fight back, it is important for
Americans to realize that the abuses I have discussed are not
isolated incidents. They are part of a pattern of federal
regulations that impoverish us and restrict our freedoms. It is
time for the victims of regulation to stand up for their prosperity
and for their liberty.
William G. Laffer
My goal today is to give you a sense of the scope of the problem
of regulation, and also a sense of the amazing variety of forms
that the cost of regulation can take. It is easy to become bogged
down in numbers. The eyes can glaze over with different figures and
estimates of the total cost of regulation.
There are two dangers I want to try to steer you away from. One
is the danger of getting so bogged down in total cost figures that
you do not have an appreciation for what they mean. Thus, I am
going to try to make the magnitude of the damage concrete. The
other danger is that in looking at the specific effects of
different regulations, it is easy to miss the forest for the trees.
There is a whole other dimension of regulation that you see only
when you step back and look at regulation in total. So, I am going
to try to give you each of these perspectives.
Let me start by reviewing a few of the ways that regulation can
harm the economy as a whole and each individual in particular.
There are as many different ways that regulations create harm as
there are different regulations, and each has its own specific
effects. For example, there are restrictions on agricultural
imports and federal crop price support programs that restrict what
farmers can produce, how much of it they can sell, and what prices
they can charge. These sorts of market entry restrictions and
regulations reduce the availability of goods to American consumers
and raise prices. Another example would be restrictions on imports
of sugar that raise the price of that commodity, forcing households
to substitute other products, such as corn syrup or other sugar
substitutes that they do not like as well, or to spend more money
to purchase the sugar.
Destroying Jobs
Other regulations generally raise the cost of doing
business in the United States, thus harming America's
competitiveness and reducing the number of jobs available to
American workers. Imagine yourself in the position of a
multi-national corporation or in the position of a foreign investor
who is trying to decide where to build a factory or where to invest
his money. You can choose between the United States or some other
country that does not have all of the regulations that America has.
The regulations that are imposed here raise the total cost of doing
business in the United States, and hence naturally reduce the
profitability of investments made in the United States. Thus, some
factories are going to locate outside of the United States, and
investment capital will be steered toward countries with a less
stringent regulatory climate.
Regulatory compliance costs, for example, those mandated by
environmental regulations and occupational safety and health
regulations, divert corporate funds away from investments in new
machines that would increase worker productivity, reduce prices to
consumers and increase the workers' take-home incomes. Instead,
businesses must channel the money into compliance costs. For
example, some might be forced to add special equipment onto their
factories to reduce emissions, because they are told to reduce
emissions in a particular manner, even though there may be some
other alternative method to achieve the same effect that costs the
manufacturer less. Or others might find it necessary to keep extra
people on the payroll whose only job is to supervise compliance
with regulation. All of this represents waste. In the lingo of
economists this is called a "dead weight loss" to the economy.
Funds are expended, and yet no added value is provided to
consumers. Often little or no improvement in workplace safety is
achieved by such regulations.
There is one kind of non-economic cost of regulation I would
like to highlight, namely the toll of regulation on health and
safety. Regulation tends to discourage innovation and the
introduction of new products. One area where this is especially
true is in the development of new drugs. Federal drug regulations,
in conjunction with state product liability laws, have had a
devastating effect on the rate of introduction of new drugs in this
country over the last twenty or thirty years. One study, done by
economists at the University of Chicago, shows that before the
federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was amended in 1962 to increase
the federal Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) enforcement
powers, an average of 46 new drugs were introduced each year in
this country. After the 1962 amendments, the figure dropped off to
an annual average of about 16, about a two-thirds reduction. Yet
the same study showed that there was no change in the effectiveness
or safety of the drugs. Drugs were safe before the amendments, they
were safe after.
Deadly Effects
Another example of how regulations can harm the public is
federal fuel economy standards that require manufacturers to
increase the average fuel economy of all the automobiles they sell.
One way the manufacturers achieve their targets is by making their
cars smaller and lighter. But this makes the cars more accident
prone and provides less safety in the event of an accident. The
narrower wheel base in smaller cars makes it easier for the car to
flip over. With lighter cars there is less body mass and less steel
in the frame of the car to absorb the impact of the blow. Thus
accidents that would have been minor end up producing major
injuries, while accidents that might have been major but non-fatal
end up killing people. A study done by Brookings Institution
economist Robert Crandall and Harvard University professor John
Graham estimates that the current federal fuel economy standards
each year cause between 2,000 and 4,000 additional deaths, and an
additional 11,000 to about 19,500 serious injuries.
Taken together, all the regulations produce the equivalent of a
huge hidden tax, raising the cost of doing business, raising the
cost of employing workers, and raising the cost of producing goods.
The problem with the tax is that precisely because it is hidden,
its harmful effects are not clear. But if you take these additional
effects into account, there is another dimension of regulation that
often is overlooked. Regulations do more than divert resources to
unproductive uses and cause people to waste time complying with
government paperwork requirements. Regulations also prevent
economic activity from occurring and jobs from being created. What
we do not see is the GNP that does not occur or the economic growth
that never takes place because of regulation.
Studies have added up the direct compliance costs of the
regulations and the direct consumer welfare costs due to higher
prices or fewer available goods. The most recent and comprehensive,
done by Thomas Hopkins at the Rochester Institute of Technology,
found this cost to range between $475 billion to $600 billion. But
his study did not take account of the indirect costs and the
reduced growth.
When taking into account the indirect costs and the reduced GNP
growth caused by regulations, several points must be kept in mind.
One is that the cost of each regulation increases with the total
number of regulations in the economy. That is, the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts. And second, the cost of regulation
increases over time. Regulations initially might reduce the growth
rate of the economy by a small amount. If this slower growth rate
lasts for only a year or two, then two years later GNP will be just
a little bit lower than it otherwise would have been. But, if you
have a slightly slower growth rate for ten or twenty years, it adds
up to a considerable sum.
It is very difficult to estimate these indirect effects, but in
a recent study for The Heritage Foundation, Nancy Bord and I tried
to take those factors into account as well. We found a staggering
cost imposed by regulations on the economy, somewhere between $800
billion and $1.6 trillion. That is a stunning figure when one
considers that the total size of the economy right now is only
about $5.7 trillion. To put it on a more personal level, the cost
of regulation comes out to between $8,000 and $17,000 per
household. Now, this does not mean that if all regulations were
done away with overnight each household would be making that much
more money. It does mean that if the economy had not been saddled
with these regulations for the past twenty or thirty years, each
household today would be on average somewhere between $8,000 and
$17,000 better off.
It is important to note that in calculating our figures we
specifically took account of the fact that regulations occasionally
produce benefits as well as costs. In the case of a regulation that
produced certain costs but produced even greater benefits, we did
not count those costs. Thus the cost of $8,000 to $17,000 per
household is what you would have left over even after taking
account of the benefits of regulations.
Brink Lindsey
I want to spend my time talking about some of the broader social
and political costs of regulation. In particular, I want to look at
three things: one, the connection between regulation and special
interest abuses; two, the connection between regulation and the
quality of democratic self-government; and three, the connection
between regulation and the follies of the so-called transfer
society.
Now in the first place, it inevitably is the case that a large
and complicated regulatory structure such as the one in Washington
will be shot through with special interest abuses and corruption.
In other words, in countless ways and on a massive scale, public
power is being diverted to serve purely private ends. Our Founding
Fathers called this the problem of faction. This is a problem that
today has spun completely out of control.
In many cases regulation exists and thrives in the absence of
any legitimate public purpose whatsoever. Probably the most glaring
example of this is the entire category of regulation known as
economic regulation. This kind of government intervention is
premised on the existence of so-called market failures which
government regulators supposedly must step in to correct. Probably
the most oft-cited category of market failure is natural monopoly.
The existence of such a monopoly is cited as the theoretical
justification for electric utility regulation, for telephone rate
regulation, for gas pipeline regulation, for cable TV
re-regulation.
Another category of supposed market failure of great historic
significance is excessive competition. Excessive competition served
as the rationale for the government creation of cartels in the
airline and trucking industries with market entry and prices
controlled. A popular form of alleged market failure these days is
"unfair" competition. This "error" is supposed to be corrected by
anti-trust laws which prohibit American businesses from cooperating
even in the face of foreign competition. Unfair competition also is
used as an excuse for many international trade restrictions. It is
argued that imports, which allegedly are dumped in the U.S. market
at less than the cost of production or subsidized by other
governments, enjoy an unfair advantage over domestically produced
goods. Therefore, the imports of these goods are restricted.
In fact, however, in all of these cases there is clear and
abundant evidence that regulation harms, rather than helps,
economic performance. Thus, the only purpose served by these
regulatory structures is to benefit particular special interests at
the expense of their competitors and of the general public. This,
basically, is the conclusion of the public choice school theory of
economic regulation. The public choice school seeks to understand
and explain regulation basically as the offspring of the unholy
union between rent-seeking companies and power-seeking bureaucrats.
In effect, businesses can extort higher profits from the public by
enlisting the government to act against competitors.
Phoney "Public Goods"
There are other forms of regulation, such as those
covering health, safety, and the environment, that seek to promote
a legitimate public purpose. But even here, it is all too often the
case that this public purpose serves as a front for
behind-the-scenes special interest maneuvering. A notorious example
of this resulted from the Clean Air Act of 1970. This Act set
certain emission standards for utilities to meet, but left it up to
them to decide how best to meet these air quality standards. Many
utilities found it economical to meet these enhanced air quality
standards by switching from high sulfur dirty coal mined in the
East, to low sulfur clean coal mined in the West. Well, this just
wouldn't do for the Eastern states' dirty coal industry. It lobbied
furiously and, with the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments, the law was
changed. Under the new requirements, utilities had to meet certain
percentage reductions in sulphur emissions, regardless of the
original sulphur content of the coal. In effect, it was all but
mandated that utilities meet regulatory requirements by installing
expensive scrubbers on smoke stacks rather than through the use of
the more economical method of switching to less polluting coal.
This meant that it made no difference if industries used clean or
dirty coal. So here, on the surface, is what looks like a
public-spirited environmental regulation designed to clean our air.
In fact, under the surface, it is an attempt by miners of dirty
coal, a special interest group, to use state power for their own
selfish gain and at the expense of environmental quality.
Another example is the recent stringent EPA landfill regulations
which, oddly enough, were supported by giants in the waste
management industry. Why would companies ardently support new
regulatory initiatives that might cost them millions of dollars?
The large waste disposers figured out they would be able to
shoulder these additional costs much better than their smaller and
pesky competitors. Here again you have on the surface what looks
like public-spirited regulation, but behind the scenes it is just
special interest maneuvering.
The reason why this kind of corruption is inevitable becomes
clear when you contrast regulation with a form of legal control
that it replaces, namely the fundamental, common law rules of
property, contract, and tort. It is important to realize that the
absence of all regulations does not mean anarchy. These fundamental
common law rules protecting private property and governing
contracts still form the basic legal framework for a market
economy. These rules are, for the most part, truly general. That
is, they apply to everybody in all walks of life and all
industries.
While, of course, these rules produce "winners" and "losers,"
generally it is very difficult to tell in advance who the winners
and losers are going to be. This is not the case with modern
regulation. Such regulation is highly complex and technical, and
hence, highly specific. Accordingly, particular economic interests
and industries, and even particular companies, are going to know in
advance whose ox will be gored by any given regulatory proposal.
Therefore, this complex regulatory structure provides a perfect
breeding ground for well-heeled, well-organized special interests
to capture the regulatory process for their own benefit.
This is not a new insight. Over 200 years ago the authors of the
Federalist Papers had this to say about overly complex and
fast-changing laws:
Another effect... is the unreasonable
advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the
moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people.
Every new regulation... presents a new harvest to those who watch
the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not
by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of
their fellow citizens. This is the state of things in which it may
be said with some truth that laws are made for the few and not for
the many.
I am not arguing here that all regulation is unnecessary, or
that common law rules alone can solve all social problems. What I
am saying is that when you abandon those fundamental common law
principles of generality and neutrality, and instead attempt to
micromanage social problems through highly specific, technical, and
targeted regulation, you inevitably will open a Pandora's box of
special interest abuses.
Undermining Self-Government
The problem of special interests is related to another
problem of over-regulation: Its overwhelming complexity is
fundamentally incompatible with the health of democratic
self-government. This is a deeper problem than the Keating Five
scandal in which a banker sought to bribe members of Congress in
exchange for a bailout, or than honoraria paid by lobbyists to
members of Congress for speeches, or even than vote buying
masquerading as constituent services. This problem goes to the
fundamental structure of the regulatory state. Basically, the sheer
bulk of current regulation overwhelms the capacity of democratic
institutions to oversee and control them. Under democracy, laws are
supposed to reflect public opinion. They can do this two different
ways: one, directly, when some public outcry forces legislative or
administrative change; and two, indirectly, through the decisions
of elected representatives who are supposed to represent the public
that elects them. Because current regulation is so horribly
complex, both of these mechanisms of democratic control are
breaking down.
If you hand an average citizen a copy of the Federal Yellow
Book, which is the telephone directory for the federal government's
executive branch, he could not tell you what half of the
departments, divisions, agencies, offices, and commissions even do,
much less express an opinion about the specific regulations that
they administer. Public opinion cannot constrain political action
when there is no public opinion. And there cannot be public opinion
when the public has no idea what is going on. Every day there are
thousands and thousands of trees falling in the Washington, D.C.,
forest, but almost none of them make a sound outside of the
Beltway. In fact, our regulatory system has become so overgrown
that even our elected officials do not know what is going on.
Congress routinely passes regulatory legislation that is hundreds
of pages long, pages written mostly by staffers and lobbyists,
pages that many members of Congress have not even read. This shows
Congress's incapacity to keep up with new regulatory emissions.
Congressional oversight of regulations thus at best is a hit or
miss process. This isn't just a problem of personnel; it is a
fundamental problem of system overload. Even with the best of
intentions, if you had a Congress full of saints, there is only so
much that 535 people can do in 24-hour days. Here again, the
authors of the Federalist Papers were prophetic. They saw that
over-regulation and self-government don't mix.
It will be of little avail to the
people that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the
laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent
that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised
before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that
no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be
tomorrow.
From Producers to Parasites
Finally, I would like to point out one of the broader
social costs of regulations. More and more of our energies,
talents, and manpower are being swallowed up in the tar pits of the
regulatory state. As a result, the dynamism and vitality of wealth
creation are giving way to the sterility and sclerosis of wealth
re-allocation. Basically, our free society is degenerating into a
transfer society.
One way to measure the growth of what National Journal
contributing editor Jonathan Rauch recently called the "parasite
economy" is to look at trends in the number of lawyers. There
numbers have risen dramatically as the regulatory state has
expanded. In 1970 there were 1,200 lawyers for every million
Americans. Today there are 3,100 lawyers for every million
Americans.
And the problem is not just one of numbers. It is also the sad
fact that the best and the brightest increasingly are going into
what are fundamentally non-productive pursuits. In the 1940s, only
5 percent of Phi Beta Kappa college graduates went on to become
lawyers and judges. Today, over 20 percent of Phi Beta Kappa grads
go into the legal profession. Of Rhodes Scholars graduating in the
1940s, only one-eighth became lawyers; now one-third do.
I could offer a host of other numbers -- explosions in the
number of trade associations, public interest groups, Washington
offices, and hired lobbyists. All of these point to the large and
growing extent to which our social energies are being frittered
away in complying with regulations, attempting to circumvent
regulations, attempting to stop the circumvention of regulations,
lobbying for and against regulations, interpreting regulations and
changing regulations -- all of which add nothing to the
productivity or well-being of the country.
Let me close by suggesting that a greater appreciation of and
emphasis on these non-economic, broader social costs may be useful
ultimately in the battle to bring regulation under control. As this
political year has demonstrated vividly, there is widespread public
disgust with our present political leadership and with the sorry
state of our political institutions. This disaffection could
provide powerful momentum for sweeping regulatory reform -- if only
the connection can be made between special interest abuses,
out-of-touch government, frustrating, intractable gridlock, which
are the objects of public discontent, and their underlying cause,
which is overgrown and over regulating government.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
Q: Ed, you touched on an interesting point, the
prospect of the unknown. For instance, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, which is now being phased in, is very sketchy on
actual details. It says that an employer must make certain
provisions for a handicapped person if these provisions do not put
too great a hardship on the business person. What exactly this
means will be decided in the courts. When the first phase of the
Act went into effect, there was an article in the paper about a
handicapped person who went around town looking at different
businesses that he could sue. Do you want to elaborate on this?
Hudgins: You are exactly right on this point.
If a businessman does not know what the law is going to be
tomorrow, then he cannot plan ahead. In the 1970s, for example, one
of the problems American auto makers faced was that they did not
know what kind of environmental regulation, or other regulation,
might come out in six months. When a businessman is making
investments for five or ten years in the future, and he does not
know what is going to happen in six months, he might say, "I am not
going to invest a lot of money."
Here at The Heritage Foundation we had to bring in a lawyer to
give us a briefing on exactly what the Americans With Disabilities
Act means. And to questions, the lawyer often replied, "Look, we
don't know. The courts will decide." It seems that we are moving
toward a society in which you will have to have a lawyer next to
you at all times so that you can make sure you are doing the right
thing. The people must hold the policy makers accountable for such
laws and ask the hard questions about who is being helped before
such laws are passed.
Many cities, for example, would find it much less expensive to
provide free door-to-door van service for people in wheelchairs.
However, the Americans With Disabilities Act says that cities must
equip their buses with wheelchair ramps. In other words, rather
than having door-to-door service, people in wheelchairs may be
forced to sit out in the rain or snow in Manhattan or in some other
city waiting for a public bus. Now, which approach really helps the
handicapped? I think that is a question that should be asked.
Another example: Airlines are being required to take the seats
out on one side of the aisle in each plane and put in extra-wide
seats. Now, as it happens, only one flight in 25 carries a person
who needs a special seat because he or she is in a wheelchair. It
would be less expensive for the airlines to give such a passenger
an automatic upgrade to first class, because the first class seats
are wider, or for that matter, simply to give all people in
wheelchairs a free first class ticket. These are the kinds of
issues that are not discussed but which deserve public
attention.
Another good example is that in the future your local grocery
store will be required to have to wider aisles and lower shelves.
This, of course, means that it will carry far fewer goods and,
because of the narrow profit margins for these stores, food prices
will rise. Very likely the handicapped, who tend to have lower
incomes, will suffer most from high prices. In essence, regulations
often hurt the people they are trying to help.
Q: I want a clarification. You say regulations
cost households $8,000 to $17,000. Over what time period is this
cost?
Laffer: That is an annual rate. But we would
not increase household income by that much overnight if we repealed
all destructive regulations and replaced others with common law
rules of contract. The point is that the economy has grown so much
slower over the last twenty or thirty years as a result of the
decidedly unenlightened regulations with which the economy has been
saddled that, as of today, household income has been reduced by a
sizeable chunk. If we did not have destructive regulation and
allowed the economy to grow faster for twenty or thirty years, each
family today would have a total income on the order of $8,000 to
$17,000 higher per year before taxes.
Of course, if household income did go up because of a lighter
regulatory burden on the economy, some of that additional household
income would be paid to state, local, and federal governments in
the form of taxes. But that is not necessarily a reason to oppose
deregulation. The effect of less regulations on the budgets of the
federal government and the state governments is substantial. By our
reckoning, federal tax revenues per year would be somewhere between
$80 billion and $200 billion greater than they are right now. At
the same time, outlays for welfare and unemployment benefits would
be lower since the economy would have more jobs. Thus, with less
regulation of the economy, tax revenues would be higher and
government expenditures would be lower, and the deficit would be
reduced sharply.
Q: Part of the regulatory problem is that
administrations fill in definitions and particulars of general laws
that Congress passes. Couldn't the Supreme Court help in
deregulating by limiting administrative laws and requiring the
Congress to set such definitions.
Lindsey: There was a doctrine of constitutional
jurisprudence called the "non-delegation" doctrine which said that
Article I of the Constitution establishes and invests legislative
power in the Congress and in nobody else. It is not
constitutionally permissible for Congress to delegate legislative
power to a non-legislative body. This doctrine was used to strike
down certain sorts of broad, sweeping delegations of effectively
legislative authority to federal agencies. This non-delegation
doctrine has fallen into disfavor in the courts with respect to
protecting economic rights. But there are a few lonely voices from
all parts of the political spectrum that think the non-delegation
doctrine would be a healthy thing to revive, not only for
protecting individual liberty, but for enforcing democratic
accountability.
The problem, however, is that Congress can get around this. In
the typical old-style form of regulatory legislation Congress would
create an agency. This was effectively a delegation of legislative
power. Now Congress passes 1,000-page monster size bills that cover
every subject under the sun, and usually in mutually contradictory
ways. This kind of tactic is less amenable to constitutional
challenge.
Q: The Administrative Procedures Act requires
public hearings and other procedures to prevent some of the obvious
problems that you have discussed. The fact is that industry and the
public in general have a right to comment on rules, which seems
contrary to what you have said. Many of us in the Bush
Administration have been very involved in addressing regulatory
problems under the President's moratorium on new rulemaking. I
would like to get your comments on that particular effort.
Hudgins: Supposedly, agencies do have
safeguards against economically irresponsible policies. For
example, most are required to do a cost-benefit analysis of their
procedures. Yet one of the things that we have found is that
agencies very rarely do a genuine cost-benefit analysis. Rather,
agency officials might take a superficial look at a proposed
procedure and assume that they have done a cost-benefit analysis
when in fact they have not.
Concerning the Administrative Procedures Act requirement for
public hearings, how many people listening to this talk, with the
exception of representatives of larger businesses, can afford to
keep a constant watch on hundreds of federal agencies and offices,
or can come to Washington and complain that this rule or that law
is going to adversely effect him? Bureaucrats know that most
individuals and businessmen cannot come to Washington from all over
the country to say that this particular regulation is going to do
something terrible.
I support the moratorium that President Bush has placed on
regulations. I think that the Competitiveness Council in Vice
President Quayle's office has done a wonderful job. Yet an
indication of the confusion on this issue is found in President
Bush's speeches and the public's reaction to them. Bush claims as
some of the great achievements of his Administration: the Americans
With Disabilities Act; the Clean Air Act which does not clean up
the air as much as it provides employment for bureaucrats; and a
Civil Rights law, which Bush says is not a quota bill, even though
it was a quota bill. Bush also says that American businesses are
over-regulated. I do not know if the public fully appreciates this
contradiction.
Lindsey: The point the questioner raises about
procedural fairness of our federal agencies is an interesting one.
It is fair to say that our regulatory process is more open, more
legalistic, more rule-bound, more transparent, more amenable to
public participation than any other regulatory regime of any other
country. Nevertheless, there are ample opportunities inside those
rules for arbitrary, and even tyrannical, behavior to take place.
Still, on the whole, the federal agencies are open to public
pressure and bound by rules.
But that cuts in another way. It is precisely because the
American regulatory process is so open to agitation and lobbying
that we have this gigantic explosion of trade associations,
Washington representatives, hired lobbyists, and so forth. And this
entire parasitic economy feeds off the combination of gigantic,
sweeping regulatory powers and openness to lobbying. So, while
openness to lobbying solves some problems with regard to democratic
fairness, it opens up a whole different set of problems elsewhere.
And it is the nature of the problem that even an honest business
finds that it has to play the game in Washington, otherwise it is
going to get eaten up by the other businesses.
Q: The federal government often provides
subsidized insurance, which might cost as much as $30,000, for
individuals building in environmentally sensitive areas. What do
you think of this practice?
Hudgins: I would say that an individual or
businessman should purchase his own insurance without government
subsidies. The federal government should not rebuild someone's
mansion because he built it on a flood plain or because he was too
cheap to get insurance for it. The taxpayers should not bail him
out.
Q: A lot of wetlands are filled in because of
this government insurance practice. The recent Lucas case, decided
by the Supreme Court, involved a property rights question but also
an environmental question. Could you comment?
Laffer: David Lucas is a real estate developer
in South Carolina. He bought two beachfront lots and planned to
build a house on each of them, one to live in, the other to sell.
Most of the beach-front lots already had houses on them, though
some were still empty. At the time he bought the lots Lucas had a
clear right to build.
After Lucas made his purchase, the state of South Carolina
passed a law restricting the right to build new houses on the beach
because houses there would be vulnerable to floods and hurricanes.
Lucas was, in effect, deprived of the use of his property.
Right now the federal government provides heavily subsidized
flood insurance for many people who build in flood areas. The
questioner points out that without his federal program, Lucas might
not have wanted to build so close to the shore in the first place.
That is correct. This and other federal intrusions give people an
incentive to take actions that they might otherwise avoid, for
example, to fill in some wetland for activities that are not
economically justified. Our goal here should be to have a level
playing field, a policy of neutrality from the state and federal
government. They should neither restrict the uses of property nor
subsidize certain uses of property.
Hudgins: I just want to say that we at The
Heritage Foundation and our friends at the Cato Institute are very
concerned about the re-regulation crisis. We are interested in
hearing your horror stories of dealing with regulations. We want
businesses and individuals to go on the record. Our system of law
is being eroded and interest groups more and more dominate the
policy process in Washington because of their regulations. This is
a problem which affects people in their everyday lives. So we hope
that people heed our call and let us bring your concerns to the
attention of your Congressmen and Senators.