(Archived document, may contain errors)
D.C. Statehood: Not Without A Constitutional Amendment
By R. Hewitt Pate Statehood proposals for the District of Columbia
have been around for years. Today, how- ever, we have a President
pledged to support D.C. statehood. Congress is controlled by the
Democrats, whose platform supports statehood. Eleanor Holmes No r
ton, the so-called non-vot- ing delegate to'the House of
.Re3resentatives from D.C., has .mtr6ddc'ed a state.hood proposal
in the current session of Congress. Jesse Jackson, the "Shadow
Senatoe' from the District, was re- cently arrested while leading a
g r oup of pro-statehood protesters blocking an intersection near
the Capitol.2 And readers of The Washington Post received an
Independence Day issue of the Post's Sunday magazine devoted to the
statehood cause.3 In short, statehood matters may be coming to a
head in the political arena. What most statehood proponents ignore,
however, is a fundamental question that should pre- cede their
political campaign: even if it were a good idea, can Congress make
D.C. a state without a constitutional amendment? As a par t isan
matter, support for statehood is almost exclu- sively Democratic,
as would be New Columbia's congressional delegation. As a
constitutional matter, however, the Justice Department under both
Democratic and Republican administrations has consistently a g reed
that statehood for the District requires a constitutional
amendment; it can- not be done by mere majority vote in Congress. A
review of the District's history, the terms of the Constitution,
and the practicalities of making D.C. a state, reveals that
statehood legislation is ill-conceived at best.
The Political History of the District As most of us learned in
grade school, the District was created in 41790 from ten square
miles of land ceded to the federal government by Maryland and
Virginia. The purp ose of the District is stated in Federalist No.
43. The Framers of the Constitution believed that the federal
govern- ment needed to have control over the seat of
government-over the place where it was to conduct its business-so
that it would not find its elf beholden to a particular state
government for its day-to-day needs. The states, after all, are (or
at least were then) independent sovereigns jealously guarding their
political power against federal intrusion from Washington.
1 H.R. 5 1, "To provide f or the admission of the State of New
Columbia into the Union" (introduced January 5, 1993). 2 Jenkins
& Efuntade, Statehood Protest Results in 32 Arrests, The
Washington Post, July 2, 1993 at Cl. 3 Washington Post Magazine,
July 4, 1993. 4 The history and rationale of the District's
creation, as well as a thorough review of the legal issues
surrounding statehood, can be found in a report issued by the
Justice Department in 1987. See Office of Legal Policy, Report to
the Attorney General: The Question of St a tehoodfor the District
of Columbia (1987) [hereinafter Report to the Attorney General];
see also Cochran, District of Columbia Statehood, 32 How. L.J. 413
(1989);. Franchino, The Constitutionality of Home Rule and National
Representationfor the District o f Columbia, Part H, 46 Geo. L.J.
207 (1957-58), Part H, 46 Geo. L.J. 377 (1958); Hatch, Should the
Capital Vote in Congress? A Critical Analysis of the Proposed D.C.
Representation Amendment, 7 Fordharn Urb. L.J. 479 (1979); Perry,
The State of Columbia, 9 Geo. L.J. 13 (192 1); Raskin, Domination,
Democracy, and the District: The Statehood Position, 39 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 417 (1990); Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionality of D.C.
Statehood, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 101 (199 1); Schrag, The Future of
District of Colum bia Home Rule, 39 Cath. L. Rev. 311 (1990).
During the District's early period, it was governed for a time by
five separate local jurisdic- tions-Washington tGeorgetown,
Alexandria, and the unincorporated Washington County and Alexandria
County. In 187 1 , Congress created a territorial form of
government for the District with its own governor and assembly, and
the District held a three-day celebration of its "new era."6 But
after three years of corruption, wanton spending, debt, bankruptcy,
and public ou t cry, Congress abolished the territorial government
without debate.7 It was replaced with an appointed commission form
of government which remained in place until 1967.8 The rationale
for this form of local government was Congress's view that the
small Dis t rict, sparsely populated by per- sons connected to the
new federal government, could as easily be administered by Congress
itself. After the seat of the national government was moved to the
District in 1800, District residents were not allowed to vote in n
ational elections.9 This reflected Madison's view that the
proximity of the District's citizens was enough in itself to ensure
that their concerns were well represented to the Congress and
President. 10 Residents of the District would probably have a grea
t er say than citizens of a distant state, such as Georgia or Rhode
Island, that could send voting representa- tives. Today the same
observation might be made in comparing the influence of District
residents -whose local paper is Congress's local paper, and who
might greet the President on Georgia Avenue-with that of rural
North Dakotans. By the 1950s, support for some form of local and
national representation for the District's resi- dents began to
swell. President Eisenhower supported Home Rule-the grant o f
certain powers of local administration to officials elected from
the District. I IIn 1961, the states ratified the 23rd Amendment,
giving District residents for the first time the right to vote for
President and Vice 12 President. The District was grante d Home
Rule in 1974, and Walter Washington, previously the Commissioner of
the District, became its first modem elected mayor. 13 The most
significant modem initiative to provide national voting rights for
the District oc- curred in 1978. A constitutional a mendment was
proposed, not to make D.C. a state, but rather to grant it a
state's full voting strength in Congress while retaining its legal
status as the federal seat of government. The proposed amendment
was passed by Congress with the required two- thi rds margin and
sent to the states for ratification. During the seven-year
ratification period, however, only sixteen states approved, so the
amendment failed. 14 Eleanor Holmes Norton has
5 See Report to the Attorney General at 9; Voting Representation
in Congressfor the District ofColumbia: Hearings on H.J. Res. 46;
H.J. Res. 253; H.J. Res. 470 Before Subcommittee No. I of the House
Committee oil the Judiciary, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 232, 234-35
(1971) [hereinafter 1971 House Hearings]. After 1820, the may o r
of Washington, which originally had been appointed, became a
popularly elected official. Report to the Attorney General at 8 n.
28. 6 1 C. Green, Washington, Village and Capital, 1800-1878 336,
338 (1962). 7 Id. at 357-62. 8 Report to the Attorney Gener a l at
9-10 (citing Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 116; Act of June 11,
1878, 20 Stat. 102). 9 C. Green, supra at 24. 10 See Federalist No.
43; 12 Papers ofJames Madison 329 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds.
1981). 11 New Columbia Admission Act, H.R. Rep. No. 90 9 , 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 House Report]. 12 Report
to the Attorney General at 11. The 23rd Amendment figures
prominently in the District's present constitutional status. 13 See
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973); 1992
House Report at 9. 14 See Report to the Attorney General at 12;
Hatch, Should the Capital Vote in Congress? A Critical Analysis
of
2
sponsored the most recent bills, which seek to grant full
statehood without an amendment: H.R. 4718 in the last Congress, and
the now-pending H.R. 5 1.
The Mechanics of Statehood Statehood proponents correctly point
out that Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution pro- vides that
the Congress may admit new states to the Union. That has obviously
been done 37 times since the Constitution was adopted. Twenty of
these 37 added states achieved admission after first obtaining an
enabling act from Congress giving congressional approval of the
plan. En- abling act s allowed Congress to examine -whether the
territory seeking admission had the economic viability and the
other attributes that made statehood appropriate. Following this
en- dorsement, the process of drawing up a state constitution,
having it ratified, an d creating a structure of state government
went forward. 15 The District has pursued a different path, one
taken by only six of the 37 states admitted to the Union after the
Constitution was ratified. This process of seeking statehood is
known as the "Ten- nessee Plan." Traditionally, the Tennessee plan
involves four steps. First, a state constitutional convention is
convened and a constitution drafted. Second, the constitution is
put to a vote and ratified by the voters of the territory seeking
admission. T hird, a petition is sent to Congress re- questing
statehood. Finally, "shadow" senators and representatives are
elected to lobby Congress, in hopes of a congressional vote for
admission. 16 The District's Tennessee Plan approach, however, has
now run off t he rails. A proposed consti- tution was ratified by
D.C. voters in 1982. But this 1982 constitution came under attack,
not least from the ACLU. 17 It contained extraordinarily broad
antidiscrimination language forbidding any kind of exclusive groups
or cl u bs, even if entirely private. Not only would the proposed
constitu- tion have outlawed all-male or all-female clubs, it would
have equally proscribed a black pre-law club at local universities
or a gay men's chorus. Even more astonishing was a prohibition
against discrimination based on wealth, which as written would have
barred a movie theater from "dis- criminating" against anyone who
could not afford a ticket. 18 Criticism of these problems got the
attention of the D.C. City Council, which has amended t h e
constitution and deleted some of the more troubling provisions. 19
The problem is that the current constitution has never been
ratified by the voters, so D.C. is now seeking admission without a
rat- ified state constitution. But this may not be a seriou s
obstacle in Bill Clinton's Washington given the historical
precedent. Since 1821, only Arkansas has been admitted to the Union
without a popularly ratified constitution. 20
Constitutional Barriers to Legislated D.C. Statehood The
District's mechanical problems with its statehood drive are not, of
course, the critical issue. The fundamental barriers facing the
current proposals to make the District a state by legis- lation ar
ise from the federal Constitution. Basically, there are three.
the Proposed D. C Representation Amendment, 7 Fordham Urb. L.J. 479
(1979). 15 See 1992 House Report at 59 (Minority Views). 16 Id. at
20-2 1. 17 See id. at 60-63 (Minority Views) (citing 1986 hearing
before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House
Committee on the District of Columbia). 18 See id. at 60-61
(quoting testimony of Arthur Spitzer, Legal Director of the
National Capital Area ACLU). 19 Id. at 61-63. 20 Id. at 62 n . 10
(Minority Views).
3
Article 1, Section 8: Permanent Congressional Power Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution gives the Congress plenary authority
over the District. The exact language reads:
The Congress shall have Power... To exercise exclusiv e Legislation
in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States....
The Supreme Court has construed this clause as giving Congress
permanent and plenary power over the District.21 Congress can
delegate various powers of home rule, as it has done in the past,
but remains free to resume full control of the District at any
time. What problem does this crea t e for legislated D.C.
statehood? Once a district becomes a state, statehood is permanent.
It can never be revoked, as the Supreme Court recognized in shortly
after the Civil War in Texas v. White.22 Making the District a full
state, therefore, would be an abrogation of power that the
Constitution explicitly assigns to Congress alone. This was the
constitutional problem that Attor- ney General Robert Kennedy found
most troubling when a proposal to retrocede the District to
Maryland was advanced in the early 1960s. 23 To address the
apparent permanence of the Constitution's grant of total
congressional author- ity over the District, statehood proponents
point to the fact that Congress has already apparently given up
part of the District. In 1846, the Congress ave back the part of
the District ceded by Virginia-what is now Alexandria and
Arlington.2f Statehood supporters suggest that a Su- preme Court
case from the 1870s, Phillips v. Payne,25 validates the
retrocession to Virginia.26 There are at least a couple of
interesting points to be made about Phillips. First, the plaintiff
taxpayer sued seeking to be considered a resident of the District
instead of Virginia so he could take advantage of the District's
lower taxes. The irony is apparent to anyone who has l i ved in the
District. Second, the taxpayer's challenge in Phillips was brought
over 25 years after the retroces- sion. The Court held that
plaintiff was estopped to bring such a late claim. It did not rule
on the merits. So the validity of the retrocession (and Congress's
ability to reassert control) remains an open question, at least in
theory. As a practical matter, of course, it is hard to imagine
that Con- gress would try to take back the Virginia part of the
District.
21 See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S.
100, 109 (1953). 22 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1868), overruled on
other grounds, Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476, 496 (1885).
23 Letter and Memorandum of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to
Hon. Basil Whitener, House C o mmittee on the District of Columbia,
Dec. 13,1963, reprinted in Home Rule, Hearings on H.R. 141 Before
Subcommittee No. 6 of the House Committee on the District of
Columbia, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 341, 345 (1964). 24 An Act to
Retrocede the County of Alexa n dria, in the District of Columbia,
to the State of Virginia, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35 (1846). 25 92 U.S. 130
(1875). 26 See Raskin, A Constitutional Path to a New Columbia,
Washington Post, December 16, 1992 at A27 ("The constitutional
authority of Congress to redraw the District was hotly debated-and
resolved. Both Congress and President Polk, who signed the bill,
agreed that Congress has such power, and the Supreme Court later
refused to overturn to retrocession.")
4
Article IV, Section 3: Maryland's Permiss ion Statehood's second
constitutional problem is Article IV, Section 3, which provides
that no new state may be created out of the territory of an
existing state without that state's permis- sion.27Under this
clause, doesn't Maryland need to give pem-iiss i on before a state
can be created out of the District? It gave the territory that
became the District to the federal government for use as the seat
of government, not for making a new state. The technical legal
aspects of this argument have been thoroughly addressed by one of
statehood's big est advocates, a George Washington University Law
Professor named Peter 58 Raven-Hansen. . He.dismisses the need.for
Maryland's consent. Professor Raven-Hansen argues that Maryland's
grant of the land to the federal gov e rnment was full, complete,
and final, with- out any reservation concerning the future use of
the land.29 But in the 1791 ratification of cession upon which
Professor Raven-Hansen relies, Maryland said it was granting the
territory "pursuant to the tenor a n d effect of the eighth section
of the first article of the constitution of the government of the
United States.,,30 Even textually, therefore, it is hard to sustain
Professor Raven-Hansen's argument. As for Maryland's intent, no one
questions the fact tha t Maryland gave this territory to the
federal gov- emment for the special purpose of a government
district. It was not contributing land for a new state. 31
Whether or not Maryland would today give approval to statehood
is an interesting question. Governor Schaefer has said he would be
willing to take the District back as part of Maryland. Judging from
the makeup of Maryland's congressional delegation, they might like
to have the Democratic colleagues that New Columbia would likely
send to Capitol Hill. Bu t matters are not so simple. One of the
first things the District government has suggested it will do
following state- hood is impose a commuter tax on suburban
residents who work in Washington, including those who live in
Maryland.32 Whether the people of Maryland (and their state
legislators) would sup- port statehood is surely open to doubt.
TheTwenty-third Amendment Perhaps the most difficult constitutional
problem facing the District is its very own constitu- tional
amendment. The 23rd Amendment, passe d in 1961, states that
2 7 The provision reads: New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of
the Congress. U.S. Const, Art. IV, 3, cl. 1. 28 See Raven-Hansen,
supra note 3. 29 Id. at 120. 30 The act of cession provides: That
all that part of the sai d territory, called Columbia, which lies
within the limits of this state, shall be and the same is hereby
acknowledged to be for ever ceded and relinquished to the congress
and government of the United States, in full and absolute right,
and exclusive juri sdiction, as well of soil as of persons
residing, or to reside, thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect
of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution of
the government of the United States.... 2 Laws of Maryland 179 1,
ch. 45, \u223\'a7 2 (Kilty 1800). 31 See Raven-Hansen, supra, at
122 ("Maryland's intent was to cede land for the seat of
government, not a new state."). 32 See, e.g., Henderson, Kelly to
Propose Taxing Suburban D.C. Workers, Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1993
at Al.
5
The District co nstituting the seat of government of the United
States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A
number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the
whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which
the Distric t would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event
more than the least populous State....
The language of the amendment obviously recognizes an existing
district of government of a particular size. And it refers to the
District as a permanent constitutional entity. Legislated D.C.
statehood would be an oddity to say the least when the Constitu
tion itself refers to the area "as if it were a State."
The 23rd Amendment also raises a conflict concerning the number
of electors to which a state of New Columbia would be entitled.
Every existing state is entitled under Article II, Section I of the
Cons titution to electors in proportion to its congressional
representation. Yet the terms of the 23rd Amendment provide that
D.C.'s electoral votes would be capped at the number granted to the
state with the lowest population (currently three), regardless of
D.C.'s own future population. Of course, this problem may be
somewhat abstract, since D.C.'s population continues to de- cline.
33
The Consistent Justice Department Position If you had to try and
find an issue on which Robert Kennedy, Pat Wald, and Ed Mees e all
agreed, you might be surprised to find it is the constitutionality
of legislated D.C. statehood. Every Justice Department that has
addressed the question, from the Kennedy Administration to the Bush
Administration, has concluded that the Constitutio n does not allow
for legislative alter- ation of the District's status. 34 Each
administration has addressed different proposals and emphasized
different constitutional problems, but the unanimity remains. The
legality of D.C. statehood, as opposed to its wisdom, simply is not
a partisan issue.
Current D.C. Statehood Proposals Many statehood proponents say
that it is easy to take constitutional potshots at statehood in the
abstract, but that recent statehood bills cure the problems. The
currently pending H. R. 5 1, for ex- ample, aims to shrink the
District rather than turn the whole thing into a state. The
"District of Columbia7 would become a tiny enclave, an area now
known as the National Capitol Services
3 3 See Report to the Attorney General at 60 (Distri ct population
was 802,000 in 1950; 764,000 in 1960; 757,000 in 1970; 638,000 in
1980; 626,000 in 1986). In 199 1, the figure was 598,790. See World
Almanac and Book of Facts 647 (1993). 34 See Letter and Memorandum
of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to Hon. Basil Whitener, House
Committee on the District of Columbia, Dec. 13, 1963, reprinted in
Home Rule, Hearings on H.R. 141 Before Subcommittee No. 6 of the
House Committee on the District of Columbia, 88th Cong., I st Sess.
341, 345 (1964) reproduced a s Appendix J to the Report to the
Attorney General); Representationfor the District of Columbia:
Hearings on Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Providefor Full
Congressional Representationfor the District of Columbia Before the
Subcommittee on Civil and C onstitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., I st Sess. 127 (testimony
of Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs); Testimony and Statement of Stephen J.
Markman, Assistant Attorney General, submitted to the Subcommittee
on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House Committee on the District
of Columbia.
6
Area. Essentially, this area incorporates the major federal
buildings and monuments, including the White House, Capitol, and
Supreme Court, as well as an area in and around the Mail. The re-
mainder of what is now the District would then become the state of
New Columbia. Despite its clever maneuvering, however, this
shrinkage approach leaves major constitutional objections. First,
shrinkage d o esn't remove the problem of Article 1, Section 8. The
language of the Consti- tution refers to the District in a manner
that suggests a fixed entity. True, the Constitution does not
mandate a particular size for the District as an initial matter,
but allo w s acceptance by Con- gress of a District of "not more
than" ten miles square. Once accepted, however, there is no
indication that the Constitution contemplates a District expandable
and contractible at Congress's whim. Even if the Constitution did
not def i ne the District as a fixed entity, the Framers clearly
in- tended a District large enough to accomplish the purpose of
giving the national government control over its place of
business.35 The plans for shrinking the District leave just a
little sliver of land. This federal enclave could not function as a
self-contained entity. It is inextricably con- nected by sewer
systems, water systems, roads, and other services to the rest of
what would become New Columbia.
Dependence on the New Columbia for fire prote ction, police
protection, and the like would raise any number of jurisdictional
problems. Indeed, the federal government would become de- pendent
on a state for the protection and hospitality extended to other
countries' embassies. This is exactly the sor t of unseemly
dependence the Framers sought to avoid. The second constitutional
problem, the need for Maryland's permission, remains about the same
under the shrinkage proposal. The suggestion has been made that
since part of the Mary- land land would cont i nue to be a federal
enclave, Maryland's intent in conveying the land to the federal
government for purposes of a capital would not be violated. The
problem, of course, is that the bulk of the land that Maryland
ceded would become a State. If Maryland's pe r mission is needed at
all, it is needed for this. Finally, the 23rd Amendment problem
under the shrinkage plan becomes perhaps even more disturbing.
Without a constitutional amendment repealing the 23rd Amendment,
the literal hand- ful of residents in the s hrunken "District
constituting the seat of government" would control their own three
electoral votes. For those who depict statehood as a matter of
"fair representation," this is a little embarrassing. Professor
Raven-Hansen has arizued that if Congress l e gislates D.C.
statehood, then the 23rd Amendment would become "moot."36 This idea
of mooting a constitutional provision is cer- tainly novel.
Professor Raven-Hansen points for support to the several provisions
of the Constitution that are no longer operat i ve, such as the
fugitive slave provisions. The distinction, of course, is that
these provisions of the Constitution have been "mooted" by
constitutional amend- ment, not mere legislation passed by
Congress. Professor Raven-Hansen acknowledges this, and of f ers
yet another proposal-that residents of the federal enclave be
defined by statute as residents of New Columbia for voting
purposes.37 Of course, the residents of the enclave might well
enjoy their right to control three electoral votes (and the resulti
ng attention at presidential campaign time). Since that right is a
constitutional
35 See Report to the Attorney General at 23-24; Kennedy
Memorandum at 347. 36 Raven-Hansen, supra note 3 at 125. 37 Id. at
127.
7
one, no mere statute can take it away. In short, this "solution"
merely creates another constitu- tional problem.
The Politics and Practicalities of D.C. Statehood
One thing that might surprise District residents is the lack of
interest in statehood outside the Beltway. This was illustrated the
during the last serious effort to grant greater representation to
District in 1978. Only sixteen states ratified the proposed 1978
amendment during the allotted time.
Opposition irfVirginia and Maryland is significant because-of
their proximity to the Dis trict (and therefore Congress). The
ranking minority member of the D.C. Committee is the senior con-
gressman from Virginia, Tom Blilpy. Congressman Bliley has been an
effective voice in opposition to statehood for years. 313 In
Maryland, there appears to be more support for retroces- sion of
the District to Annapolis's control than for creating a state that
would drain dollars from the Maryland economy through commuter
taxes. Then there is the issue of federal money. The District now
receives a $600,000,0 0 0 annual fed- eral payment for hosting the
national government. 39 Why, if D.C. becomes a full-fledged state,
should that sort of payment continue? Certainly no other state
receives such a payment. Even leaving the payment aside, the
District is far and a w ay the highest recipient per capita of
federal spending. For every tax dollar D.C. residents pay into the
federal treasury, about five come back to the District in various
forms of payments or programs. 40 In short, there is a serious
question about the v i ability of the District as a state. The
District is largely dependent on the federal government. Unlike
other states, the District does not possess the "multiplicity of
interests" Madison described in Federalist No. 51 as the essence of
civil gov- ernment . There is no rural or agricultural area. There
is no manufacturing. As several commentators have put it, the
District is a company town, and that company is the federal gov-
ernment.
Washington's own skyline provides a striking reminder of the
potential consequences of re- placing our shared national seat of
government with a New Columbia. Among Washington's most attractive
features are the monumental views made possible by the low bu i
lding heights Congress mandates. If a state of New Columbia is
created, Congress will lose this authority. 41 History confirms the
point: Oklahoma was admitted to the Union on the condition that the
cap- ital of the new state not be moved from Guthrie. Im m ediately
upon admission, the new state government moved its capital. The
Supreme Court held that Congress could do nothing to stop it. 42
Admission could not be conditioned upon limiting the sovereign
powers of the new state. Would the cash-strapped Distr ict perhaps
decide higher buildings could generate more tax reve- nue? If
Congress continues to prefer the current skyline for our national
capital, would Americans have to pay federal tax dollars to New
Columbia as the price?
3 8 See, e.g., Bliley, The Fede ral City Belongs to All, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, December 20,1992. 39 Even so the District still
operates far in the red. See Henderson, Kelly Counting the Ways to
Cut City's Deficit, Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1992 at C3 (citing
figures). 40 See 1992 Hous e Report at 52-53 (Minority Views). 41
See id. at 42 (Minority Views). 42 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559
(1911).
8
The basic question to be asked is this: if D.C. were made a state
(whether in its entirety or by shrinkage), could it continue to
serve t he Framers' intent in providing for a national seat of gov-
ernment? Would D.C. statehood allow the government to work in an
area under its own control without unseemly state interference and
dependence? Looking merely at the physical realities, the answe r
must be "no." Under the Constitution, if D.C. statehood is to come
at all, it must be through the amendment process. The people of the
fifty states, through their state legislatures, must have their say
on this fundamental change to our national capital and the
Constitution that created it.
R. Hewitt Pate is an attorney with Hunton & Williams,
Richmond, Virginia. He spoke at The Heritage Foundation on January
28, 1993. ISSN 0272-1155. 01993 by The Heritage Foundation.
9
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