When
the People's Republic of China unleashed its unprecedented economic
reforms almost 20 years ago, no one could have imagined the effect
it would have on China--or the world. Finally freed from the
shackles of an inefficient Soviet-style command economy, China
would experience a remarkable expansion in economic growth,
including near double-digit growth for the last 10 years, according
to PRC government statistics.
These economic reforms have transformed
China into a rising power in world politics. In fact, some would
argue that, today, China is no longer a "rising power"--but a
"risen power." Chinese leaders believe that if its economic growth
continues apace, China will overcome 150 years of "humiliation" at
the hands of foreign powers, returning to its past glory as the
"Middle Kingdom."
China's Grand Strategy
In
China's view, eventually, this economic growth will allow it to be
able to challenge the world's most powerful nations, including the
United States, for control of the international system. China is
well on its way to doing just that. Today, China, the world's most
populous nation, also has the world's second largest economy and
the world's second largest defense budget, allowing China to play
key, central roles in Asian geopolitics.
But
China is also becoming an increasingly important player on the
world stage. Although it has long been a permanent member of the
U.N. Security Council and a nuclear weapons state, its expanding
economic might is resulting in growing political influence beyond
Asia as well.
It
is hard to find a major international issue in which China is not
playing a role: From weapons proliferation, to human rights, to
energy security, to North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and the United
Nations, China is present, and Beijing is increasingly confident of
its high-profile role in world politics.
With
increasingly well-developed power derived from economic growth,
political stability, and a growing military capability, China sees
its re-emergence as a global power, on its own terms, as a
certainty. If all goes according to Beijing's plans, in the next
few decades China will take its "rightful place" among the great
powers in the international system--if not atop the international
system.
A
subset of China's grand strategy is an "opportunistic" foreign
policy aimed at its main competition for preeminence in the
international system, the United States. China is pursuing a
foreign policy that aims to support China's national interests
while attempting to balance--or, perhaps, more accurately,
unbalance--the predominance of the United States across the
globe.
China is looking to "quietly" use its
growing economic strength to build new political relationships
abroad while exploiting dissatisfaction with the United States
wherever possible. Eventually, in Beijing's estimation, once China
has gathered as many allies and friends as possible, and developed
its economic and military strength to near that of other major
powers, it will be able to challenge the United States directly if
necessary.
Put
simply: China is using its burgeoning economic power to gain
political and economic influence internationally, at America's
expense wherever possible, in an effort to succeed the U.S. as the
world's most powerful nation. For example, China has indicated that
it would not support taking Iran to the U.N. Security Council over
its nuclear weapons program while signing a 25-year, $100 billion
oil/gas deal with Iran. China's decision obviously pleased
Tehran.
Likewise, China also worked hard against a
strong U.N. resolution on the genocide in Sudan, which would have
placed economic sanctions on the Sudanese government, in an effort
to protect its $3 billion oil investment there. Khartoum could not
have been happier with China's support.
The
PRC has taken advantage of trans-Atlantic tensions arising from the
Iraq war, too. China has seemingly convinced the European Union,
led by France and Germany, to lift the EU's 1989 Tiananmen Square
arms embargo. China wants absolution for the Tiananmen Square
crackdown, and Europe hopes that ending the ban will result in
large commercial deals--and, perhaps, arms deals--for European
firms. The U.S. strongly opposes lifting the ban.
Bottom line: China is pursuing a "realist"
foreign policy in order to advance its national interests. The
existence of dissatisfaction with Washington or American policies
in global capitals only makes it easier. China's grand strategy
certainly applies to Latin America and the Caribbean, too.
China's Grand Strategy in the Western
Hemisphere
The
importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to China is
multifold, but two issues predominate: Taiwan and access to raw
materials, especially energy.
Taiwan
The
PRC will not feel its rise to power is complete without returning
Taiwan to the Mainland's political control. Taiwan and China have
been separated since the 1949 civil war, and it is Beijing's view
that Taiwan is a "renegade province" that must be "reunified" with
the PRC.
To
the tremendous frustration of the PRC, the Chinese view of Taiwan's
sovereignty is increasingly in the minority of public opinion on
Taiwan. As a result, China is employing every instrument of its
national power to effect unification with Taiwan, including an
unwillingness to renounce the use of force to resolve Taiwan's
future.
One
of China's tactics is an effort to politically isolate Taiwan
internationally by enticing countries that currently diplomatically
recognize Taiwan to shift allegiances to the PRC. The majority of
the countries that recognize Taiwan are in Latin America, Africa,
and the Pacific Islands.
At
present, six nations in Central America--Panama, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala--retain full
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Beginning with Chile in 1970, all
but one South American state--Paraguay--have moved to recognize
Beijing. In the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts
and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have relations with
Taiwan. Dominica switched allegiances to the PRC last year.
For
Taiwan, the states of Central America and the Caribbean, and
Paraguay, represent a relatively solid regional commitment to its
status as a state separate from China. These states represent
nearly half of Taiwan's diplomatic recognition around the world,
now totaling 25 nations.
Taiwan pays dearly to retain this
diplomatic recognition, and if these states were to switch
recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the damage to Taiwan's
political confidence and its claims of legitimacy as a state would
be seriously undermined in Taipei's estimation.
Resources
China's other interest, not surprisingly,
is access to natural resources, especially energy. China is
scouring the planet for resources to feed its economy's insatiable
appetite for raw materials. Since China's government is not
popularly elected, its claim to legitimacy has been its ability to
improve the standard of living of the 1.3 billion Chinese
people.
Stoking the economic furnaces also allows
China to continue its unprecedented military buildup, supported
primarily by Russian arms sales, and to provide overseas aid--often
without conditions--to countries of interest in an effort to spread
its influence.
China is broadly diversifying its energy
sources. It is trying to reduce its reliance on coal, which has
made China the world's second largest polluter. In its effort to
ensure consistent energy supplies, China is expected to divert its
overseas investments outside the Middle East to Russia; Southeast
Asia (e.g., Indonesia, Burma); Central Asia (e.g., Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan); Africa (e.g., Angola, Sudan); and Latin America (e.g.,
Colombia, Venezuela).
Petroleum leads the list of resources
South American states have to offer China. Venezuela is the world's
fifth largest producer of petroleum that produces 2.5 million
barrels per day, providing the United States with 13-15 percent of
its oil imports. China has invested over $1 billion in petroleum
projects in Venezuela and is positioning itself to invest nearly
$350 million to extract oil from eastern Venezuelan oil fields, as
well as an additional $60 million in natural gas wells. China is
also seeking to purchase petroleum from Ecuador, Argentina,
Colombia, and Mexico.
Latin America is an important source of a
variety of minerals and food items as well. Aluminum, copper, iron,
and soybeans constitute a large part of China's imports from Latin
America. For commercial purposes, China also obviously has a strong
interest in the Panama Canal and access to good port facilities in
the Caribbean.
During his visits to Brazil and Argentina
in November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced plans to
invest $100 billion in Latin America over the next decade,
primarily for infrastructure and energy projects. These investments
made by the Chinese government will undoubtedly bring political
influence as well.
Military and Security Issues
China is also on a military diplomacy
offensive across the globe. China has formed military diplomatic
ties with 146 countries and sent military attaches to 103
countries. China uses these exchanges to gather information on the
host country, as well as other countries if possible, for military
doctrine development as well as military intelligence purposes.
In
2004, more than 100 military exchange programs took place,
involving Chinese military leaders visiting more than 60 countries
and senior officers from about 50 countries visiting China. Some
exchange programs featured joint military exercises, security
sessions involving military officers from multiple countries,
combined seminars on defense and security, and field trips.
China has military and security interests
in Latin America as well. China's presence at Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) facilities in Cuba directed at the United States is
long-standing and well known, but China is also establishing
military ties in Latin America. For example, in 2004, Defense
Minister Cao Gangchuan paid a visit to Brazil. In April 2004,
Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou visited
Cuba and called on Cuban military units and training centers. Since
the late 1990s, at least one high-level visit has taken place every
year to Venezuela.
In
addition, Chinese intelligence services are undoubtedly active in
Latin America and the Caribbean, using Chinese front companies,
students, visitors, and intelligence officers to steal and exploit
technology and commercial secrets of interest to enhance their
military prowess and economic competitiveness.
Conclusion
China has achieved unparalleled growth in
its power, influence, and importance over the past 20 years. Its
grand strategy is to become the preeminent power in the
Pacific--and in the world--replacing the United States as the
world's most powerful nation.
Though that point is not here today, China
is making progress on both counts. The PRC is seeking friends and
allies to advance its agenda in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle
East--and Latin America.
Like
most other nations, China is committed to improving the performance
of its economy and spreading its political influence. Its actions
are worrisome in Latin America and the Caribbean because some
national leaders, such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, welcome
the arrival of another world power to offer an alternative to the
United States.
There are challenges to China's advance in
Latin America and the Caribbean, including geographic proximity,
culture, and language. But if Washington wants to neutralize
China's growing influence in the Western Hemisphere, it needs to
take action.
An
effective strategy would include expanding the U.S. free trade
network, helping friendly nations develop strong market economies,
and fostering closer, more cooperative security relations with our
Latin American and Caribbean neighbors.
Peter Brookes is Senior Fellow for
National Security Affairs and Director of the Asian Studies Center
at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were prepared for
delivery at a hearing of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
of the House Committee on International Relations.