June 16, 2003 | Lecture on Department of Homeland Security

Budgets and Threats: An Analysis of Strategic Priorities for Maritime Security

The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued by the Bush Administration in July 2002, identified six critical mission areas. These areas were established to focus federal efforts on the strategy's objectives of preventing terrorist attacks, reducing America's vulnerabilities to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. Maritime security issues cut across each of these functions, and it is worth examining how well federal investments match strategic guidance and how effectively these initiatives may be in addressing threats to the United States that might emerge in the future. The six critical mission areas are:

  1. Intelligence and Early Warning
  2. Border and Transportation Security
  3. Domestic Counterterrorism
  4. Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
  5. Defending against Catastrophic Threats
  6. Emergency Preparedness and Response

The national strategy intended for these mission areas to provide a framework for aligning the resources of the federal budget to the task of securing the homeland.1 An analysis of spending priorities suggests that most of the proposed major programs fall into one of the six critical mission areas. It is not clear, however, that in every case the level of resources requested is adequate to meet the critical goals the Administration has established in its strategy or that these efforts are appropriate to address future threats. In particular, while notable progress has been made in virtually every critical mission area, shortfalls in maritime security top the list of concerns.

The Bush Administration's fiscal year (FY) 2004 budget request includes $41.3 billion for homeland security.2 This represents a decrease of about $0.3 billion from the Administration's FY 2003 budget request ($41 billion) in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The FY 2004 request, however, represents a substantial increase from federal spending before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, more than two and a half times the FY 2001 budget in real terms.3

About $23.9 billion of this request is allocated to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (the department would also receive $12.2 billion for other missions, such as maritime safety). Another $6.7 billion would be provided to the Department of Defense (DoD), for its homeland security-related programs and activities. The remaining $10.7 billion would be divided among the Departments of Health and Human Services ($3.8 billion), Justice ($2.3 billion), and Energy ($1.4 billion). These five departments account for 92 percent of the proposed homeland security budget, forming the core of the federal domestic security effort. Measuring the future federal contribution toward ensuring maritime security can for the most part be tracked by examining their budgets.

This paper, in turn, looks at major funding proposals for each of the homeland security missions, highlighting the programs that could have significant impact on protecting ports, monitoring coastal waters, and safeguarding domestic waterways. It also looks in greater detail at specific maritime security initiatives. Finally, the assessment goes on to evaluate significant future maritime threats in each of the major mission areas that may not adequately be accounted for by current budgets.

Intelligence and Early Warning

Funding for intelligence and early warning initiatives primarily resides in the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department. Investments focus on the Administration's top three priorities in this area: enhancing the analytic capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); establishing the Homeland Security Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate; and implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System.4

Budget Highlights and Issues
The budget for the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate includes $32 million to access, analyze, and share threat assessments and $30 million for developing and issuing warnings and advisories through the Homeland Security Advisory System.5 These programs represent substantially new funding.

The Department of Justice's FY 2004 budget request also includes additional funding initiatives, including $63 million to hire more analysts and surveillance personnel, $1.9 million for an Internet tip line, and more funds for field support activities and information technology programs.6

These major initiatives only indirectly address issues of maritime security. Still, a better overall intelligence effort could dramatically affect security in ports and waterways if the federal government developed a more effective system for promptly sharing information among federal agencies, as well as state and local governments and the private sector, including, for example, port intelligence and security committees.

Although there are some important ongoing initiatives, such as the establishment of a national terrorist threat integration center, the Administration has not yet proposed an overall plan for how it will share information more effectively. Even within the newly established Department of Homeland Security, significant integration efforts are not as of yet underway. The department's entire proposed information technology budget for FY 2004 is $1.7 billion, with only about $200 million earmarked specifically for information integration. This obviously does not reflect the magnitude of future needs. The department plans on releasing its overall plan for integrating the information technologies of its various agencies in September. This should give the first glimpse of the overall strategy and also some insights on future funding requirements for information technology investments. These could run well over $10 billion and put substantial pressure to either increase the department's budget or reprioritize funding.

While the overall integration campaign has made only modest progress, some individual efforts, virtually all of them programs begun long before the September 11 attacks, are forging ahead. One important initiative already underway that will have a direct impact on intelligence collection and early warning is the Coast Guard program designed to expand maritime domain awareness. The Coast Guard is investing substantial resources to establish a "maritime awareness" zone around the United States.7 New initiatives for FY 2004 include leased satellite channels and equipment and further development of the prototype Joint Harbor Operations Center at Hampton Roads, Virginia.8 The pending request totals about $34 million. This is about half the amount in the FY 2003 budget request, principally because the service received significant additional funding from a supplemental budget request in FY 2002.

Another important program is the Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS). PAWSS is intended to automatically collect, process, and disseminate information on the movement and location of ships in ports and on waterways through the use of a network of radars and onboard ship transponders. Initially designed to support the Coast Guard's maritime safety and environmental protection mission, it could also assist with the service's homeland security responsibilities by identifying and tracking all ships transiting the port area. Port authorities will be able to quickly recognize those ships that have transponders and expedite the port-of-entry process. The Coast Guard can then pay closer attention to vessels requiring more detailed evaluation. The service requested $1.7 million for FY 2004. This largely funds the initial capitalization costs of the program.

Maritime domain awareness programs should significantly expand the Coast Guard's ability to physically track craft operating in U.S. waters. However, gaining greater transparency about crews, passengers, cargo, operators, and owners, and turning the data over to intelligence centers remains a great challenge. In more than any area, intelligence systems for maritime security have to link federal, state, local, and private sector systems to critical information.

Interfacing with the maritime private sector brings a unique dimension to the tasks facing the federal intelligence effort. Different types of ports and port operations may require different information-sharing solutions. Landlord and full-service ports, for example, could have different data capture and reporting needs. They may have dissimilar container tracking, cargo, equipment, property management, warehouse and port service systems, and different requirements for scheduling and billing. In addition, in many cases the technologies employed by the private sector are not state-of-the-art. This could be a problem. The success of maritime intelligence collection and early warning will, in large part, rely on access to up-to-date commercial systems that can supply vast amounts of tracking data. Equally important, whatever system does evolve will have to give due care to protecting privacy and other civil liberties as well as proprietary information.9

Concerns for the Future
There is some question over whether the current level of funding will be adequate to address threats that may emerge in the future. Of particular concern should be the ability of intelligence and early warning systems to counter novel strategies that an enemy might employ. In the future, any regional conflict could result in threats to the homeland. An enemy unable to match American conventional military power, might instead attack vulnerable targets on U.S. territory as an alternative means to coerce, deter, or defeat the United States. For example, a state might strike the American homeland as part of an anti-access campaign, attacking or threatening targets to prevent the deployment of U.S. forces. The overwhelming bulk of American military power is still moved around the world by ship. Most military supplies and hardware move through just 17 seaports. Only four of these ports are designated specifically for the shipment of arms, ammunition, and military units through Department of Defense-owned facilities.10 Attacks that interfered with port operations during the height of a foreign crisis could limit the access of combat forces to overseas theaters by preventing them from leaving the United States.11 In short, a future enemy might believe that America's maritime system could be a real target of choice in the next conflict.

Assessment
While this critical mission area has seen substantial growth in both the Justice and Homeland Security Departments, it appears to remain a rather modest component of overall homeland security funding. In total, these initiatives represent about 3 to 5 percent of the homeland security budget.12 The adequacy of resources in this area will no doubt be a subject of some debate, particularly with regard to pressure for further intelligence reforms in the wake of the
9/11 attacks.13

It is unlikely the United States will have a long lead time to ramp up its intelligence and early warning networks for future conflicts. These systems will need to be both robust and maintained in a fairly high state of readiness to provide for U.S. security over the long term.

Border and Transportation Security

Intelligence and early warning are also the key enablers for the second critical mission area of homeland security: providing border and transportation security assets that can move quickly to interdict threats or focus on anomalies and high-interest targets. The strategy outlined five key security objectives in the border and transportation security function, including ensuring accountability of border and transportation security; implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001; creating "smart borders"; increasing the security of international shipping containers; and recapitalizing the Coast Guard.14

Budget Highlights and Issues
The Department of Homeland Security, with some assistance from the Department of Defense, has primary responsibility for this critical mission area. The pivotal role of the Homeland Security Department is the result of the federal reorganization which placed the Customs Service, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard, and enforcement functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service under the new department. Most programs within this mission area can be found in the Homeland Security Department's Border and Transportation Security Directorate. Proposed budgets for the key agencies within the directorate are $6.7 billion for the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, $2.8 billion for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and $4.8 billion for TSA. These combined budgets represent a decline in real spending of about 3 percent from the FY 2003 budget request (total of $14.6 billion).15

The proposed TSA budget accounts for the largest reduction in spending ($526 million). The Homeland Security Department attributes reductions to $685 million in efficiencies gained in the new department and one-time, start-up costs which included instituting 100 percent inspection of checked baggage, hiring tens of thousands of security personnel, and expanding the air marshal program. The department asserts that, subtracting these outlays, the TSA's proposed budget represents an increase in real, inflation-adjusted dollars of about 2 percent ($160 million) from the FY 2003 request.16

Spending on new initiatives appears extremely modest given the TSA agenda to expand its efforts in improving security in the areas of airfreight, ports, and railways. In particular with regard to maritime commerce, the Administration has neither the money, the management, nor the expertise to pursue an aggressive program. TSA's most substantial maritime initiative is Operation Safe Commerce. Launched in November of 2002, the program divides $28 million among the ports of Seattle-Tacoma, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and New York-New Jersey to test technologies and practices including cargo-tracking, anti-tampering, information protection, and real-time data reporting. This program is a relatively modest component of TSA's new spending, particularly when compared with the $75 million requested to test and develop systems for screening air cargo and improving computer-assisted air passenger screening.17 In part, this disparity is understandable. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 placed the lion's share of responsibility for aviation security in federal hands; in contrast, maritime security responsibilities are shared by the federal, state, and local governments and the private sector.

Still, the limited scope of the Safe Commerce program makes its future impact on maritime security unclear. Some commercial ports are moving ahead and selecting their own technologies for container security. One private sector initiative, Safe and Secure Tradelanes, was launched in the summer of 2002 using a commercial version of the Defense Department's Total Asset Visibility Network.18 Other ports may be reluctant to make new investments in technology at all, fearing Safe Commerce may lead TSA to adopt standards and technologies that might not be compatible with the off-the-shelf systems they can purchase today.

It is clear that TSA has yet to fully expand its mandate to provide broader oversight of other transportation systems. It is unlikely that the FY 2004 budget will allow the Administration to aggressively fulfill this agenda, particularly in the area of maritime security. Not only has the TSA budget been reduced, but it is worth noting that approximately one-half of annual revenues come from passenger and airline security fees. It is yet unclear how war in Iraq and concerns about terrorism in general and the global economy may depress passenger travel and exacerbate the Administration's financial concerns by reducing the revenue it receives from taxes and fees. In addition, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act suspended fee collections this year for the period June 1 to September 30.

There is some good news in this area. Programs within the Border and Transportation Directorate, particularly related to the objectives of using technology to create "smart borders" and enhancing the security of shipping containers, have been increased significantly in the FY 2004 budget request. These include $120 million for additional inspection technology and $480 million for the development of an "entry-exit" system that can assist in tracking foreigners who overstay their visas (an increase of $100 million). Additionally, the budget includes $62 million in new funding for the Container Security Initiative. The directorate will also invest $18 million in the Customs-Trade partnership, a joint initiative between government and business requiring importers to enhance shipping security in exchange for expedited processing of goods and conveyances.19

In addition, over $307 million ($24 million less than FY 2003) has been requested for the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) which will facilitate Customs oversight of lawful international commerce by streamlining data entry and information exchange between Customs and the trade community and facilitate cargo inspections and clearances. ACE could be a tool not only for trade enforcement but also for preventing terrorists from exploiting legitimate commercial traffic as a means of moving illicit material. The current level of funding should support fully deploying the system within three years.

On the other hand, questionable progress is being made towards the objective of recapitalizing the Coast Guard, which operates as an independent service within the department but works closely with the Border and Transportation Directorate. The Coast Guard's proposed budget for FY 2004 is $6.7 billion, an 8 percent increase in real terms over the Administration's FY 2003 request ($6.1 billion). While it should be noted that less than half the Coast Guard's budget is related to homeland security activities, it is apparent that some of the service's budget increases can be attributed in part to border and transportation security programs, including $53 million for the procurement of nine additional coastal patrol boats to escort ships into port.20

There are, however, significant areas of concern within the Coast Guard budget, particularly with regard to funding for Integrated Deepwater, a long-term modernization program designed to recapitalize the service's fleet of cutters, aircraft, sensors, and command and control. Even before September 11, it was widely held that the service's fleet was old, expensive to operate and maintain, and not well suited for some homeland security missions.21 The Coast Guard intended replacement systems to be funded at a rate requiring $330 million in the first year of the program and $530 million a year in the following budgets (in 1998 dollars). This level of funding would have meant a budget for FY 2004 of $579 million (in current dollars). The FY 2004 budget request for Deepwater was $500 million, substantially less than initial projections and a decline in real spending of about $9 million from the FY 2003 request (also $500 million). Meanwhile, the increasing operational tempo of the Coast Guard and its expanding future mission will likely wear out the fleet faster than anticipated, putting the modernization program even farther behind schedule. Over the long term, this could have significant implications for the program since the Deepwater initiative addresses both procuring new capabilities and sustaining the current fleet. An additional concern is that the elements of the program delayed as a result of current spending levels included the procurement of vertical unmanned air vehicles and maritime patrol aircraft. Both these systems are integral to the service's effort to extend its reach and speed of response in the maritime domain.

Concerns for the Future
While the border and transportation security effort certainly represents real progress, the question remains whether this level of funding is adequate to address technologies that enemies might employ in the future to deliver catastrophic attacks from U.S. waters. Through the employment of covert, seaborne launch platforms an enemy could avoid the challenge of smuggling weapons into U.S. ports under the eyes of law enforcement, intelligence, customs officials, and the Coast Guard, or other border or port security. Short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could be fashioned into effective weapons for attacking the United States and could be launched from platforms disguised as commercial or private vessels. These attacks could be fielded by many state and some non-state actors, a fact that is not widely understood or appreciated.22 DoD has only begun to address these challenges. In addition, while meeting such threats might be primarily a defense mission, other maritime security assets could well play a key role in rooting out and countering innovative tactics that employ covert seaborne platforms.

To field a covert-missile platform, an enemy could adapt an existing short-range missile, such as a Scud, which has a large throw-weight (i.e., can carry a very heavy warhead) and could easily deliver a weapon at close range. Scuds were originally built by the Soviets in the 1960s to carry 100 kiloton nuclear warheads or 1,600 kilogram bombs.23 Since that time they have been proliferated around the world. They can be purchased at a cost of between $500,000 and $1 million per missile.24 In addition, several countries have modified Scuds to extend their range and improve accuracy or built their own missile forces.25 Scuds could be outfitted with virtually any kind of warhead from relatively inexpensive high-explosive bombs, to a cargo of small explosive bomblets with radiological, chemical, biological, or toxin agents, or even nuclear arms. The missiles themselves, compared to intercontinental-range missiles, are relatively cheap and widely available. In fact, in 1998, U.S. Customs officials seized an operational Scud-B that had been imported by an American military vehicle collector.26 In December 2002, a Spanish warship temporarily halted a North Korean freighter with a concealed shipment of Scud missiles bound for Yemen, an incident that demonstrated the continuing ongoing global trafficking in missiles and missile parts.27 Obtaining and employing a few Scuds is perhaps not beyond the abilities of some reasonably well-financed non-state actors, as well as many states.

Currently, only a few countries have land-attack cruise missiles that are specifically designed to find and hit stationary, surface targets. Converting to anti-ship cruise missiles, which are widely available, into short-range weapons that could be employed against targets on U.S. soil is a possibility, though they would need to be outfitted with guidance and flight control systems suitable for engaging land-based targets.28 Converted anti-ship missiles would also likely have limited range, under 300 kilometers, and restricted payloads, between 100-500 kilograms.29 Some analysts argue that only a small portion of the world's cruise missile inventory is suitable for conversion into effective land attack missiles. Indeed, the expenses of such a conversion are not insignificant. For example, the ubiquitous Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missile reportedly costs in the range of $200,000 to $300,000 and can be obtained from a number of states. By one estimate, adding a land-attack navigation system would require about $30,000 in parts, plus a one-time cost of $150,000 for the computers and software to map planning and programming.30 In addition, imagery and mapping data would have to be obtained and the system would require systems integration and flight testing to ensure that the missile would work as planned. Thus, in addition to the costs of obtaining the launch platform and warhead, a program could easily run into a million dollars or more to field the first operational missile. Still, such a capability is not beyond the reach of many states and some non-state groups.

Configuring UAVs to be weapons is a capability that could be employed by a wide range of state and non-state enemies. The great availability of UAV technology is a serious problem. The UAV capabilities available from commercial vendors vary considerably. The R4E Skyeye manufactured by BAE Systems North America, for example, has a range of over 1,000 kilometers with a payload of about 80 kilograms. Each Skyeye costs about $1 million and a complete system (including 4-6 air frames) costs on the order of $15-20 million. In contrast, MLB Company's Bat UAV has a range of about 24 kilometers with a payload of 0.5 kilograms. Each Bat costs about $35,000.31 In addition to the cost of purchasing a UAV delivery system, an enemy would have to incur the expense of developing a suitable warhead which might include chemical, biological, or toxin agents, radiological material, or high explosives. The total cost of developing a weapon could range from under $100,000 to millions. Sea-based launch platforms for UAVs offer a particularly attractive option. Offshore attacks might best avoid the attention of intelligence, law enforcement, the Coast Guard, and border security. A UAV directed from a commercial or private ship covertly configured as a launch platform might provide the best combination of security and surprise for an effective short-range attack.

UAVs would have limitations as a delivery vehicle. Readily available systems, not covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, have only limited range capability and payload capacity. Most available UAVs can carry payloads of about 100 kilograms or less. One method to mount a major strike with UAVs could be to conduct a swarming attack. For example, launching ten small UAVs from a commercial freighter outside U.S. territorial waters would enable an enemy to conduct a short-range strike on a coastal city, massing over 1,000 kilograms of warhead payload over a single point.

In addition to planning for these threats, more work probably needs to be done to assess future covert undersea threats that might be used to penetrate U.S. territorial waters or to attack underwater infrastructure, including pipelines and telecommunications cables. Using cheaply modified commercial or scientific platforms married with sensors and explosives an enemy could well field a small weapons platform that would be difficult to detect and could be used to attack a wide range of maritime targets.32

Assessment
Together, the proposed budgets for border and transportation security-related programs in the Border and Transportation Directorate, the Coast Guard, DoD, and other agencies account for about 50 percent of the national homeland security budget. The level of effort projected in FY 2004 is substantial and appears consistent with the FY 2003 request. Future threats, however, such as the employment of covert-launch platforms carrying short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or UAVs may present additional challenges that will have to be accounted for in future budgets.

Domestic Counterterrorism

Priorities in this critical mission area include improving intergovernmental coordination, apprehending terrorists, continuing investigations, and prosecutions, completing the restructuring of the FBI, targeting terrorist financing, and tracking foreign terrorists.33

Budget Highlights and Issues
By far, most initiatives in this area can be found within the proposed budget of the Department of Justice. These include $89 million to support FBI-led task forces to identify and locate terrorists and their supporters; $28 million for new staff; $12 million to help federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to share information; and $2 million to assist the U.S. Attorneys in counterterrorism prosecutions. In fact, the lion's share of the proposed increase ($669 million) in department counterterrorism and counterintelligence spending falls under this critical mission area.

As for issues specifically related to maritime security, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency in this area, responsible for protecting the maritime domain and transportation system and preventing its use and exploitation as a means for attacks on U.S. territory.34 This includes $65 million for deploying six additional Maritime Safety and Security Teams (a $615 million program initially begun in 2002 with an investment of $47.5 million).35 However, the success of their operations it can be argued, could be greatly dependent on the support and cooperation of other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and with many competing requirements in the global war on terrorism, this dependence could represent the real Achilles' heel in maritime security.

There are real questions over whether domestic law enforcement resources are up to the challenge of combating global terrorism and meeting all the other myriad responsibilities, particularly in the maritime domain. In the area of law enforcement several concerns loom large. Manpower is one. An announced restructuring of the FBI offers a case in point. Combating terrorism is now the bureau's primary mission, but even after the proposed reorganization more than two-thirds of its agents will remain focused on investigating traditional crimes, and the agency's top ten priorities are equally split between homeland security and other tasks.36 In comparison, the investigation of the September 11 attacks required over 6,000 agents, more than half of the agency's special agent force.37 Thus, even after reorganization, if the agency has to conduct another major counterterrorism initiative it might once again have to disrupt its workforce, abandon ongoing investigations, and ignore other responsibilities. Whether the FBI, or the half dozen other major federal law enforcement activities that will be outside the new Homeland Security Department, are sufficiently manned and properly organized to meet all their obligations remains debatable.38

Concerns for the Future
As to the capacity of domestic counterterrorism programs to meet future needs, one area requiring more focused attention is the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking. When the Administration drafted its strategies for counterterrorism and homeland security, it intentionally did not include operations to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Similarly, in the federal reorganization after 9/11 which created the Department of Homeland Security, there was no effort to move the Drug Enforcement Administration to the new department. There may be, however, good reasons to closely coordinate homeland security and drug-interdiction operations. Terrorist attempts to infiltrate illicit material into the United States may well mimic drug smuggling. In addition, transnational criminal organizations can exacerbate homeland security threats in several distinct and important ways. Criminal gangs may facilitate, fund, supply goods and services, or even act on behalf of other transnational groups. The line between them can be vague. In some instances money gained from drug trafficking funds terrorist operations.39 One recently discovered plot, for example, involved attempting to trade heroin for shoulder-fired, ground-to-air missiles.40 Such activities may be the trademark of many future terrorist activities.

The employment of drug interdiction missions are somewhat controversial. It has always been difficult to measure their effectiveness and the value of the interdiction program overall.41 Drug interdiction has not proven an effective deterrent or eliminated the threat. In 1999, for example, an estimated 300,000 kilograms of cocaine were smuggled into the United States.42 On the other hand, analysis of these programs suggests that an integrated strategy and increased resources might make the challenge of smuggling material without fear of interdiction more difficult.43 Currently, however, there is some legitimate concern that drug interdiction operations are suffering at the expense of domestic counterterrorism efforts. A recent report from the U.S. General Accounting Office, for example, found that there has been a substantial decline from the traditional levels of time and resources the Coast Guard has dedicated to drug interdiction missions. While the service intends to return all law enforcement missions to 95 percent of the pre-September 11 levels by the end of 2004, GAO is skeptical that it can achieve these goals, particularly with ongoing contingency operations like Iraq Freedom and Liberty Shield.44 Although drug seizures by the Coast Guard actually rose in FY 2002, due in part to more efficient programs and operations, sustaining these activities in the future remains a subject of concern.

Assessment
Overall, the levels of proposed spending for FY 2004 call for real growth in domestic counterterrorism programs. Yet, this category remains a small percentage of the total homeland security budget, accounting for about 5 percent of federal programs.45 Of greatest concern in this area may be not the robustness of domestic counterterrorism initiatives, but the state of traditional law enforcement, which provides a valuable supplement to the counterterrorism effort. In addition, failure to maintain an active drug-interdiction program could also leave a significant gap in the nation's domestic counterterrorism campaign.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure
and Key Assets

The national strategy called for major initiatives in this mission area. Top priorities include consolidating federal efforts in the Department of Homeland Security, assessments of critical infrastructure46 and key assets, partnering with state and local governments and the private sector, and securing cyberspace.47 While this effort has shown substantial growth over pre-September 11 spending, initiatives are scattered over a wide range of areas. Maritime infrastructure is only one of many competing priorities and it is clearly not near the top of the list.

Budget Highlights and Issues
The creation of the Homeland Security Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate consolidated a number of disparate federal critical infrastructure programs. The directorate's proposed FY 2004 budget is $829 million, a substantial increase over the FY 2003 request ($177 million). About 75 percent of the directorate's budget is related to infrastructure protection initiatives. These include $200 million to develop and maintain a critical infrastructure database; $289 million to work with states, local government, and the private sector; and $155 million for national security and preparedness communications.48

Many of these activities relate indirectly to maritime security and could have important consequences for protecting the flow of goods, people, and services. This mission area, for example, includes some funding to protect the Internet and computer systems from terrorist cyberattacks. Overall, the government's information technology budget for cybersecurity is about $4.7 billion. This level of funding is significantly higher than pre-9/11 budgets.

This category also includes assurance programs that inspect and monitor critical infrastructure in the private sector. The Department of Health and Human Services, for example, plans to spend about $500 million on infrastructure protection. The department's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one of the few agencies to see significant new spending in this area. Under the FY 2004 budget request the FDA would receive new funds to implement measures required under the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, including an additional $15.5 million to implement a registration system for domestic and foreign food production, $5 million to improve laboratory preparedness, and $5 million to improve food monitoring. The FDA will also receive $116 million for food safety and $7 million for security upgrades.49

Finally, Defense and Energy Department efforts to safeguard critical infrastructure, including the protection of defense installations and nuclear facilities, are also included in this mission area. These efforts, as well as investments by other departments and agencies to improve the physical security of their services and facilities and implement assurance programs to enhance the safety and security of critical infrastructure in the private sector, round out federal spending.

More specifically in the area of maritime security, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 contained several provisions relating to the role of maritime infrastructure protection. MTSA mandated creating a U.S. maritime security system and required federal agencies, ports, and vessel owners to take numerous steps to upgrade security. The MTSA also directed the Coast Guard to develop national and regional maritime transportation security plans and requires that seaports, waterfront terminals, and certain types of vessels develop and submit security and incident response plans to the Coast Guard for approval. However, in an effort to streamline the performance of Port Vulnerability Assessments, the Administration's FY 2004 budget request redirects $11 million from the Coast Guard's base operating funds to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The remainder of the costs associated with MTSA mandates were not accounted for in the service's FY 2004 budget and the funds for reviewing and approving plans and training staff to monitor compliance will have to be drawn from its general budget.50

Concerns for the Future
Of greatest concern in this critical mission area is the fact that even with additional funding, current programs may not be adequate to protect maritime infrastructure from a new class of emerging threat. Little attention has been paid to the fact that civilian targets are vulnerable to precision weapons, arms that can engage specific targets with great accuracy at stand-off ranges. Many targets related to maritime infrastructure, including ships, pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks, navigational systems, and material handling equipment, might be particularly vulnerable.

The United States has scant experience with the precision strikes that have been used in terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world. A surprise attack would find the U.S. homeland largely unprepared. While technologies to counter precision weapons have been used by the military, few provisions have been made to protect civilian targets from short-range, stand-off precision attacks. There is a vulnerability gap in most defensive plans that does not address threats from weapons that could attack at ranges from a few hundred meters to several kilometers. These weapons represent a distinctly different class of threat. They include various man-portable systems, relatively short-range weapons (upwards of 6,000 meters or less) that fire a rocket equipped with a small high-explosive warhead (usually one to two kilograms or less in size). When the rocket hits the target the explosive charge detonates. Because they are widely available, they may be employed by virtually any state and many non-state actors.

There is a vast global inventory of man-portable weapons with a variety of capabilities, including some that are wire-guided or armed with infrared seekers. One system of special concern should be the ubiquitous RPG-7, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. It is widely available and fairly simple to employ. The weapon can be aimed and fired in seconds. It is also cheap. Weapons can be obtained for a few hundred dollars or less. The RPG-7 is effective at about 500 meters against a stationary target and 300 meters when fired at a moving target with a maximum time-of-flight of about 5 seconds.51

A weapon like an RPG-7 can be made increasingly effective by volley firing several weapons on a single target. Various means and technologies might be used to further advance the effectiveness of short-range precision weapons by improving assessments of target vulnerabilities, providing more accurate locations, or enhancing accuracy. Commercial satellite imagery, for example, is readily available and could provide important details that might assist in planning a precision strike. For example, Quickbird 60-centimeter, panchromatic imagery can provide images of 120 U.S. cities with sufficient detail to distinguish fences, driveways, trees, and sidewalks.52 Powerful computer programs can provide sophisticated tools for target analysis. The MetaCarta Geographic Text Search Appliance, as an example, searches and organizes a wide variety of publicly available documents that could help terrorists make a detailed study of urban targets. Systems can be purchased for as little as $25,000.53 Laser designators are now commonly used for directing attacks with military munitions, but there are also readily available commercial products that could be used to make terrorist weapons more accurate. For example, a Swedish company, Laseroptronix, offers a wide-variety of laser systems with potential for military, as well as commercial, applications. The company advertises that its products are for sale to anyone, even private individuals. Even innocuous laser systems used by mapmakers and surveyors could be used to fashion more accurate weapons.

Assessment
Proposed funding in this critical mission area represents about 12 percent of the homeland security budget. But it is not clear if this is sufficient to help bridge the prodigious gap between security needs and the total investments required by federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector in ensuring adequate security for all critical infrastructure, let alone the needs of U.S. ports. In August 2000 the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports estimated that the costs to upgrade security infrastructure at the nation's 361 ports ranged from $10 million to $50 million per port. Congress funded $93 million for security improvements with the passage of MTSA, but received grant applications for as much as $697 million in the first year of the program alone.54 The Coast Guard recently estimated that it will require at least $1.4 billion in the first year and $6 billion over 10 years for private port facilities to meet the baseline mandates in the new federal port security laws under MTSA. Federal spending is unlikely to contribute in a major way to closing this gap in the near term and there is some doubt whether the measures currently underway can keep up with an innovative enemy employing short-range, precision weapons.55

On the other hand, addressing the considerable vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure may not necessarily call for a dramatic infusion of federal dollars. For example, effective intelligence and early warning, domestic counterterrorism, and border and transportation security programs can help to reduce risks to critical infrastructure by limiting the opportunities for terrorists to reach America's ports. In addition, the overwhelming preponderance of maritime infrastructure is in private hands. Initiatives that enable and encourage the private sector to take a more expansive and proactive role should be central to any protection program.56 In short, taking a more holistic approach to the challenge of protecting maritime infrastructure might significantly reduce the fiscal challenges.

Defending against Catastrophic Threats

Initiatives supporting this mission include developing better sensors and procedures to detect smuggled nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons, improved decontamination and medical responses to chemical and biological weapons, harnessing scientific knowledge and tools for counterterrorism efforts, and implementing the Select Agent Registration Program.57 These investments should be of key interest to the maritime security community since they will provide the next generation of sensors and countermeasures that will allow for increased screening of the people, goods, and services that transit U.S. ports and waterways without creating bottlenecks that impede the flow of American commerce.

Budget Highlights and Issues
Most of the goals for defending against catastrophic terrorism relate to investments in scientific research and development. The proposed federal budget for research and development is $123 billion. According to the Administration about $3.2 billion, or roughly 3 percent of the research and development budget, is for homeland security programs. This is an increase in real terms of about 5 percent over the FY 2003 budget ($3 billion). Much of this research may only indirectly affect maritime security. About half of the funding for homeland security research and development ($1.6 billion) is within the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health (NIH). The vast majority of homeland security research in NIH relates to bioterrorism.58

The next largest share of research and development funds is proposed for the Homeland Security Department ($803 million). This represents a substantial ($242 million, or 29 percent) increase in inflation-adjusted dollars over the FY 2003 budget proposal. Part of this growth reflects a transfer of programs from other agencies. New investments, however, are significant and account for virtually all of the growth in the homeland security research and development effort. These funds include $350 million to initiate the operations of the Homeland Security Advanced Projects Research Agency, which is charged with exploring high-risk, but potentially high-payoff antiterrorism technologies. Also included are $365 million for biological countermeasures for civilian populations and agricultural systems.59

Concerns for the Future
Perhaps, it is too soon to expect a robust homeland security R&D program. There is a question of how fast new research and development efforts can absorb additional funds. Throwing too much money at a problem, too fast only wastes scarce resources. Still, given the need to root out nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, and explosive materials before they transit the U.S. maritime system or can be used as a weapons against port facilities and the surrounding communities argues for a more concerted effort. This challenge is indeed daunting. Most experts agree that such threats are likely to proliferate in the future and they could be very hard to find. For example, the greatest gap in U.S. defenses is not the widely discussed possibility of smuggling in commercial shipping containers, a threat that may be reduced somewhat by new procedures and technologies, but the tactics favored by drug smugglers, infiltrating contraband in ocean-going vessels with concealed compartments capable of storing 30-70 kilograms of material.

Adopting new technologies for screening containers, packages, luggage, and other cargo for dangerous materials faces significant challenges. Many new systems appear promising, but issues of cost, practicality, and the maturity of the technology call into question whether they could provide dramatic new capabilities in the near term. Absent significant breakthroughs in new methods of manufacturing, it is unlikely that innovative detection systems will appear in the near future that provide tremendous improvements in imaging and detection at significantly lower costs than current detectors.

Assessment
Total initiatives in research and development account for about another 8 percent of the federal homeland security budget. The FY 2004 budget proposal reflects little real growth. Still, this is a healthy percentage of homeland security funding and it is necessary if new technologies are to provide the nation with a decisive competitive edge in the future. There is much work to be done. Unfortunately, only a small portion of this substantial amount of funding is going to technologies that might dramatically affect the state of maritime security. In addition, there is a great deal to be done in coordinating the Defense and Homeland Security Departments' research and development efforts where they can provide benefits to both. It would seem there are many opportunities in the maritime realm where research agendas could be harmonized.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

In this critical mission area, among the top priorities are supporting first responders, including police, firefighters, emergency management technicians, and health care support personnel; integrating federal response plans; creating a national incident management system; augmenting the national pharmaceutical stockpile; building a citizen corps; planning for military support to civilian authorities; and improving tactical counterterrorist capabilities.60 This mission should be of particular concern to the maritime security community as many facilities and craft are not only vulnerable targets themselves, but are also close to high-density civilian population areas.

Budget Highlights and Issues
The newly created Homeland Security Department will play by far the largest role in supporting state and local first responders. In particular, the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate will manage programs that provide needs assessments, training, and new equipment. ODP's proposed budget for FY 2004 is about $3.5 billion, down from the FY 2003 request ($3.6 billion), a decline of approximately 2 percent in inflation adjusted dollars. The ODP budget proposal provides $2.5 billion for grants, including $500 million for local law enforcement, and $500 million for firefighters.

In addition to supporting first responders, the proposed budget of the Emergency and Preparedness Response Directorate within the Homeland Security Department also contributes significantly to this critical mission area. Much of the directorate's budget, however, does not represent new spending, but reflects the federal reorganization which placed the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the new department. Previously, FEMA was responsible for coordinating the federal response to both natural and manmade disasters, as well as dealing with the consequences of a terrorist attack. As a result, probably less than half of the directorate's proposed FY 2004 budget ($6.8 billion) directly concerns spending related to homeland security. For example, the budget includes $3.2 billion for disaster relief. This amount, is consistent with the average required to respond to non-terrorist events over the past five years.61

Major homeland security spending within the Emergency and Preparedness Response Directorate's budget includes $890 million to purchase vaccines or medication for biodefense as part of the Administration's recently proposed "Project Bioshield," a ten-year, $5.6 billion program to develop biomedical countermeasures.62 In addition, the budget calls for $400 million to maintain the strategic national stockpile of drugs, vaccines, and other medical equipment.63

The Health and Human Services Department's proposed budget also includes significant investments in biomedical defense. Over $1.7 billion of the department's $3.8 billion proposed homeland security budget for FY 2004 supports this mission area.64

In addition to major biomedical initiatives, other programs contribute to emergency preparedness and response. For example, spending on volunteer groups that could support homeland security efforts cuts across several departments and agencies. It includes $181 million from the Department of Homeland Security, as well as $118 million from the Corporation for National and Community Service budget (USA Freedom Corps), $15 million from the Department of Justice, and $10 million from the Health and Human Services Department.

Finally, despite consolidation, many departments and agencies also provide response teams and capabilities to support first responders and conduct or participate in training. DoD, for example, provides Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, which can aid in the detection of radiological, chemical, and biological agents. It has also established the U.S. Northern Command to coordinate military support to civilian authorities in the event of a weapons of mass destruction attack. The Department of Justice budget includes $24 million for FBI response units including aviation support, crisis response, and hostage rescue/SWAT teams.65

Concerns for the Future
While there is some apprehension over the adequacy of emergency responder assets, the greatest area of concern over the long term should be the ability to respond to truly catastrophic attacks. While much attention is given to weapons of mass destruction, it is possible that catastrophic attacks could also be inflicted through the use of unique tactics. These attacks would incorporate existing weapons and delivery systems, but maximize their effects by conducting orchestrated strikes. Such attacks might combine different targets and weapons into a single coordinated operation at one or several locations. By placing the same amount of effort dedicated to several attacks into one synchronized operation an enemy might achieve far greater effects than what could be achieved by several disparate attacks. Even without inflicting mass casualties, a well-orchestrated series of strikes could be a significant threat, in effect creating "weapons of mass disruption" without employing weapons of mass destruction. Maritime targets, with their high population density, vast amounts of hazardous and combustible material, and proximity to transport nodes would be particularly choice targets.

To complicate consequence management, small attacks might be launched at hospitals, police stations, and emergency operations centers. Many state and city emergency operations centers are particularly vulnerable. Often they lack physical security protection and redundant communications. Back-up centers and mobile command posts usually do not exist.66 For example, the New York City Emergency Operations Center was on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center. When the building was destroyed during the 9/11 attacks, the city had no adequate secondary command and control capability available. It took three days to reconstitute all the functions and capabilities lost by the destruction of the emergency operations center.67

Another vulnerability that might be exploited is the tendency of local first responders to rush to the scene of a disaster. Often people, supplies, and services are spontaneously mobilized and sent into a disaster-stricken area. This phenomenon is called "convergence."68 It can lead to congestion, create confusion, hinder the delivery of aid, compromise security, and waste scarce resources. This proved to be a major concern during the response to the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. When the first tower was struck, firemen, policemen, emergency medical technicians from all over the metropolitan area streamed to the site, leaving other parts of the city vulnerable and, after the towers collapsed, created tremendous problems in accounting for emergency personnel.69 By sequencing strikes, responders can also be targeted, creating additional casualties and chaos.

Employing small amounts of various chemical, biological, toxin, or radiological agents in the ancillary strikes against first responders might further confuse a coordinated response. In this manner, an enemy lacking robust delivery systems, such as cruise missiles and UAVs, or large amounts of deadly agents could still achieve the disruptive effects and psychological casualties that might be caused by the use of unconventional weapons.

Information warfare could be a particularly useful instrument to supplement an attack. For example, in 1992, the London Ambulance Service installed a faulty computer dispatch service. Delays resulting from dispatching snafus resulted allegedly in the deaths of 20-30 patients. An intentional disruption of computer dispatching services during a crisis might result in even far greater chaos. Alternatively, electronic jamming might be used to interrupt emergency frequencies. Meanwhile the Internet, as was the case after the 9/11 attacks, could be employed to spread rumors and disinformation or be the target of denial-of-service attacks.70 In fact, this should be expected as a matter of course. The increasing likelihood of cyber-strikes following physical attacks appears to be becoming an established trend.71 Additionally, as after the September 11 strikes,72 such an attack would likely generate unprecedented local levels of user demand, severely stressing servers and some Web sites such as popular news portals.

A serious concern for the future, however, is whether state and local responder assets will be sufficiently robust to deal with such attacks. Only 13 percent of U.S. fire departments, for example, can handle a hazardous material or an emergency medical incident involving chemical and biological weapons inflicting more than 10 casualties. Only 25 percent of the departments have sufficient equipment to communicate with federal, state, and other local officials.73 These shortfalls persist despite a recent upsurge in spending on emergency preparedness. By some estimates spending on homeland security by states and major cities alone has already increased by $6.6 billion.74 These costs are being placed on already strained budgets and there is little likelihood that states and cities can, by themselves, sustain major new initiatives in the years ahead absent a significant upturn in the national economy.75

Assessment
Considering all the federal agencies contributing to this critical mission area, proposed program budgets represent about 20 percent of the homeland security budget. Overall these investments appear little changed from the FY 2003 budget proposal. Whether steady state funding for first responder support, as envisioned by the Administration, is sufficient is a subject of some debate. On the other hand, the call for dramatic increases in federal funding may be premature. The true scope of unfunded requirements in this area is a great uncertainty. Currently, there are no national standards to gauge the state of readiness and assess the adequacy of capabilities. The Administration has yet to develop a system to efficiently and effectively distribute federal funds. Nor is there common agreement on how to appropriately share responsibilities between federal, state, and local governments.76 Of greatest concern to the maritime community should be the fact that federal resources are not disbursed in a timely manner nor do they generally reflect any priority in terms of vulnerabilities, risks, population densities, and density of critical infrastructure and transportation nodes. A distribution scheme that reflects these priorities would be essential for ensuring ports and waterways receive adequate coverage by emergency responder assets.

Conclusion

The FY 2004 budget proposal suggests the Administration has made considerable progress in its goal to centralize and consolidate homeland security programs. Nevertheless, after the creation of the Homeland Security Department, domestic security still remains an activity in which virtually every federal agency continues to participate. The establishment of the new department, however, has had a dramatic impact on how the government funds programs to protect the nation. In FY 2004, the overwhelming share of homeland security tasks will be performed by a handful of federal agencies. According to Administration figures, the Department of Homeland Security now covers about 58 percent of the national homeland security budget. Adding in the homeland security budgets of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy accounts for all but 8 percent of federal funding in this area.

Much of the proposed homeland security spending appears to align with critical mission areas established by the Homeland Security strategy. In several areas, however, it is unclear whether these investments are adequate to achieve national objectives. In particular budgets for intelligence, recapitalization of the Coast Guard, maritime critical infrastructure protection, and funding for emergency responders could well become issues of serious contention as Congress debates future funding for protecting the nation.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security at The Heritage Foundation. He delivered this paper at the Maritime Homeland Security Conference sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement, in Arlington, Virginia, on May 21, 2003.


1. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, p. viii.

2. The Administration defines homeland security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." Ibid.,
p. 2.

3. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), Table S-5, p. 315. Approximately 7 percent, or $2.9 billion, of the budget is devoted to mandatory expenditures; the remaining $38.5 billion is discretionary budget authority or fee-funded activities. The FY 2001 budget for homeland security-related activities was about $15.9 billion ($16.1 billion in current dollars). These figures do not include supplemental appropriations after the September 11 attacks. Office of Management and Budget, memorandum, "Additional Information Requirements for Overseas Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security for the FY 2004 Budget," August 8, 2002, p. 13. Steven M. Kosiak, "Funding for Defense, Homeland Security, and Combating Terrorism Since 9/11," Security After 9-11: Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs (Center for Defense Information, January 2003), pp. 7-8, at www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/sec_after_911.pdf.

4. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. viii.

5. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," February 3, 2003, pp. 13-14.

6. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 187.

7. Bruce B. Stubbs, "The Coast Guard and Maritime Security," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 26 (Autumn 2000), pp. 95-99.

8. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," p. 10; United States Coast Guard FY 2003 Report, p. 12.

9. See, for example, Testimony of Paul Rosenzweig before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 9, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/lm6.cfm.

10. For an overview of the military's reliance on ports and associated security risks, see U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports," GAO-02-955TNI, July 23, 2002; Statement of William G. Schubert before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Senate Government Reform Committee, July 23, 2002, at www.marad.dot.gov/Headlines/testimony/homesecurity.html. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports," GAO-03-15, October 2002, pp. 5-10. In another example of the application of an anti-access strategy, in January 2003, U.S. officials claimed to have credible evidence of a plot to sabotage commercial airliners transporting U.S. troops to the Middle East. During major military mobilizations most forces are deployed by contract carriers. Thom Shanker, "Officials Reveal Threat to Troops Deploying to Gulf," The New York Times, January 13, 2002, p. A1. Even if this report proves unfounded, it nevertheless illustrates ways that an enemy could attempt to interfere with the deployment of U.S. forces.

11. A series of recent Army war games postulated various options for employing attacks on the homeland as a component of an anti-access strategy. In one game, for example, the enemy forced the United States to withhold troop deployments until terrorist sabotage cells throughout the country had been neutralized. Richard Brennan, Protecting the Homeland: Insights from Army Wargames (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 2002), pp. 21-22.

12. This rough estimate does not include contributions from national intelligence assets such as the National Security Agency or the Administration's plan to establish an independent Terrorist Threat Integration Center under the Director of Central Intelligence to merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad. White House, "Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America," January 28, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html.

13. For example, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks a joint panel of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees released a report on December 20, 2002, recommending a number of reforms and additional spending. That same month a panel appointed by the President, the Gilmore Commission, also recommended major reforms. See Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Implementing the National Strategy, December 16, 2002, p. iii, www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4execsum.pdf.

14. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. viii.

15. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," p. 9.

16. Ibid., p. 8.

17. Ibid., p. 8.

18. Eileen Cuneo, "Safe at Sea: Private Industry Takes the Lead with Technology to Secure Nation's Ports," Information Week.Com, April 7, 2003, at www.informationweek.com.

19. Sara Michael, "Budget Commits to Immigrations Systems," FCW.Com, February 6, 2003, at www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0203/web-ins-02-06-03.asp; U.S. Customs Service, "Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism," at www.iirusa.com/g/docs/J_Hynespres_FS2.PDF.

20. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 150-151.

21. Ronald O'Rourke "Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations-Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, RS21125, November 22, 2002, p. CTS-2; Independent Assessment of the United States Coast Guard "Integrated Deepwater System," Acquisition Solutions, Issue Brief, July 14, 2001, p. 6.

22. For example, the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate does not even address the threat of missiles delivered by surface naval vessels. See National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, at www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.pdf.

23. Duncan Lennox, "Inside the R-17 `Scud B' Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1991, p. 302.

24. K. Scott McMahon, The Pursuit of the Shield: The U.S. Quest for Limited Missile Defense (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997), p. 74.

25. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace lists 15 countries with operational Scud-B missiles. Prior to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the Taliban also maintained an arsenal of Scud-B, though the weapons may not have been operational. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "World Missile Chart," at www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm. At least 12 countries outside the United States have the capability to manufacture short-range missiles. See U.S. Department of Defense, Military Critical Technologies List, p. II-1-9.

26. CNN.com, "U.S. Seizes Scud Missile Imported by Weapons Collector," September 25, 1998, at www.cnn.com/US/9809/25/missile.seizure.

27. Thom Shanker, "Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea," The New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A1. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "Reluctant U.S. Gives Assent for Missiles to Go to Yemen," The New York Times, December 12, 2002, p. A1. The transfer of Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen was legal under existing international law. North Korea is not a participant in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

28. On the other hand, some existing anti-ship cruise missiles, such as the Israeli Gabriel II with a range of about 40 kilometers, use a video-guided terminal system, and might be suitable for attacking land targets without major renovation in guidance systems. See A.D. Baker III, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1998-1999: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis: Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 364.

29. Steven J. Zaloga, "The Cruise Missile Threat: Exaggerated or Premature," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 2000, pp. 47-51.

30. Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 31-33.

31. Figures obtained through www.uavforum.com/vendors/systems.htm.

32. Maritime Futures: The Undersea Environment, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment Workshop Report and Insights, January 2003, p. 50.

33. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. ix.

34. Statement of Thomas H. Collins before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, March 13, 2003.

35. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 150-151. Each team consists of 71 people. The teams are equipped with high-powered boats that can reach speeds of up to 50 knots (almost 60 mph). The boats are mounted with twin 350-horsepower engines and an M-60 machine gun. Crew members tote M-16s. They are supported by helicopters, equipment to detect weapons of mass destruction, and bomb-sniffing dogs.

36. Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation at a Press Availability on the FBI's Reorganization, May 29, 2002, at www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech052902.htm; FBI Strategic Focus, May 29, 2002, at www.fbi.gov/page2/52902.htm.

37. Testimony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Senate Judiciary Committee, June 6, 2002.

38. For a discussion of the various federal law enforcement agencies involved, see William Wechsler, "Law in Order: Reconstructing U.S. National Security," The National Interest, No. 67, Spring 2002, pp. 25-28.

39. Statement for the Record of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on International Crime before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, April 21, 1998.

40. Nicholas Kulish and Matt Pottinger, "U.S. Seeks Extradition Of Men It Says Schemed To Sell Stingers To Terrorists," The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2002, p. A13.

41. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Can the Military's Effectiveness in the Drug War be Measured?" Cato Journal, No. 14 (Fall 1994), pp. 243-265.

42. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999, August 2001, p. 8.

43. See the results of the cocaine interdiction program. Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2002 Final Report on the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy, Performance Measures of Effectiveness, February 2002, at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/02pme/pmepdf/PME.pdf , p. 24.

44. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for all Missions," GAO-03-544T, March 12, 2003, p. 2.

45. This does not including classified national security programs.

46. Critical infrastructure includes telecommunications and information systems; energy, banking and finance, and water systems; government operations; emergency and public health services; the chemical industry and hazardous materials; the defense industrial base; postal and shipping services; agriculture; and national monuments and icons.

47. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. ix.

48. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," pp. 13-14.

49. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY 2004 Budget in Brief, p. 11; American Society for Microbiology, "Summary of Proposed FY 2004 Research and Development Budgets," at www.asmusa.org/pasrc/fy2004.htm.

50. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for all Missions," p. 20.

51. Lester Grau, "A Weapon for All Seasons: The Old but Effective RPG-7 Promises to Haunt the Battlefields of Tomorrow," paper from the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998, pp. 1-7.

52. See, for example, David K. Nale, Quickbird Aerial Product Comparison Prepared by EMAP International for Digitalglobe, August 2002, pp. 32-34, at www.digitalglobe.com.

53. Information on the system is available at the company's Web site, www.metacarta.com.

54. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges," GAO-03-616T, April 1, 2003, pp. 5, 16.

55. For example, only a small portion of homeland security funding in the Administration's FY 2003 supplemental appropriation was designated for port security. A proposal in the Senate to add $1 billion dollars specifically for port security was defeated in April. The Administration's request for the FY 2004 budget totaled only $500 million for enhancing both border and port security, although the Senate passed a resolution in March to add $2 billion to the FY 2004 budget.

56. See, for example, Larry Wortzel, "Securing America's Critical Infrastructures: A Top Priority for the Department of Homeland Security," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 787, May 7, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl787.cfm.

57. National Strategy for Homeland Security, pp. ix-x.

58. American Society for Microbiology, "Summary of Proposed FY 2004 Research and Development Budgets."

59. "Protecting the Homeland Sets the Tone for 2004 Budget," Science, No. 299 (February 7, 2003), p. 808; American Society for Microbiology, "Summary of Proposed FY 2004 Research and Development Budgets."

60. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. x.

61. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 153.

62. White House, "President Details Project BioShield," February 3, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html.

63. "Protecting the Homeland Sets the Tone for 2004 Budget," p. 808.

64. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY2004 Budget in Brief, pp. 16-17, 27.

65. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 187.

66. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002), pp. 8-2, 8-3.

67. James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, "Elements of Resilience in the World Trade Center Attack," Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, pp. 6-9, at www.udel.edu/DRC. See also, Brian A. Jackson, et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 2002).

68. For a discussion of convergence, see Julie L. Demuth, Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 2002), p. 7.

69. The problem of organizations, units, and individuals "self-dispatching" themselves without the knowledge or permission of the on-scene incident commander was also a problem at the site of the attack on the Pentagon. Arlington County, After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon, (Arlington, VA: Arlington County, 2002), p. 12.

70. National Infrastructure Protection Center, "Cyber Protests Related to the War on Terrorism: The Current Threat," November 2001, at www.nipc.gov/publications/nipcpub/cyberprotests1101.pdf. This report concluded that post-9/11 illicit computer activity was not particularly damaging.

71. "Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis," Institute for Security and Technology Studies, September 22, 2001, p. 1.

72. The Internet Under Crisis Conditions: Learning From September 11 (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 2.

73. A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, U.S. Fire Administration, FA-240, December 2002, pp. vii, viii.

74. The National Governors' Association estimated that homeland security spending by the states could top $4 billion per year. The National Conference of Mayors estimates that in total the 200 largest cities will spend an additional $2.6 billion.

75. See, for example, National Governors' Association, National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of States, May 2002, p. 1, at www.nasbo.org/Publications/fiscsurv/may2002fiscalsurvey.

76. Michael Scardaville, " Emphasize How, Not How Much, in Domestic Preparedness Spending," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1628, February 27, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1628.cfm.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure
and Key Assets

The national strategy called for major initiatives in this mission area. Top priorities include consolidating federal efforts in the Department of Homeland Security, assessments of critical infrastructure46 and key assets, partnering with state and local governments and the private sector, and securing cyberspace.47 While this effort has shown substantial growth over pre-September 11 spending, initiatives are scattered over a wide range of areas. Maritime infrastructure is only one of many competing priorities and it is clearly not near the top of the list.

Budget Highlights and Issues
The creation of the Homeland Security Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate consolidated a number of disparate federal critical infrastructure programs. The directorate's proposed FY 2004 budget is $829 million, a substantial increase over the FY 2003 request ($177 million). About 75 percent of the directorate's budget is related to infrastructure protection initiatives. These include $200 million to develop and maintain a critical infrastructure database; $289 million to work with states, local government, and the private sector; and $155 million for national security and preparedness communications.48

Many of these activities relate indirectly to maritime security and could have important consequences for protecting the flow of goods, people, and services. This mission area, for example, includes some funding to protect the Internet and computer systems from terrorist cyberattacks. Overall, the government's information technology budget for cybersecurity is about $4.7 billion. This level of funding is significantly higher than pre-9/11 budgets.

This category also includes assurance programs that inspect and monitor critical infrastructure in the private sector. The Department of Health and Human Services, for example, plans to spend about $500 million on infrastructure protection. The department's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one of the few agencies to see significant new spending in this area. Under the FY 2004 budget request the FDA would receive new funds to implement measures required under the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, including an additional $15.5 million to implement a registration system for domestic and foreign food production, $5 million to improve laboratory preparedness, and $5 million to improve food monitoring. The FDA will also receive $116 million for food safety and $7 million for security upgrades.49

Finally, Defense and Energy Department efforts to safeguard critical infrastructure, including the protection of defense installations and nuclear facilities, are also included in this mission area. These efforts, as well as investments by other departments and agencies to improve the physical security of their services and facilities and implement assurance programs to enhance the safety and security of critical infrastructure in the private sector, round out federal spending.

More specifically in the area of maritime security, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 contained several provisions relating to the role of maritime infrastructure protection. MTSA mandated creating a U.S. maritime security system and required federal agencies, ports, and vessel owners to take numerous steps to upgrade security. The MTSA also directed the Coast Guard to develop national and regional maritime transportation security plans and requires that seaports, waterfront terminals, and certain types of vessels develop and submit security and incident response plans to the Coast Guard for approval. However, in an effort to streamline the performance of Port Vulnerability Assessments, the Administration's FY 2004 budget request redirects $11 million from the Coast Guard's base operating funds to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The remainder of the costs associated with MTSA mandates were not accounted for in the service's FY 2004 budget and the funds for reviewing and approving plans and training staff to monitor compliance will have to be drawn from its general budget.50

Concerns for the Future
Of greatest concern in this critical mission area is the fact that even with additional funding, current programs may not be adequate to protect maritime infrastructure from a new class of emerging threat. Little attention has been paid to the fact that civilian targets are vulnerable to precision weapons, arms that can engage specific targets with great accuracy at stand-off ranges. Many targets related to maritime infrastructure, including ships, pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks, navigational systems, and material handling equipment, might be particularly vulnerable.

The United States has scant experience with the precision strikes that have been used in terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world. A surprise attack would find the U.S. homeland largely unprepared. While technologies to counter precision weapons have been used by the military, few provisions have been made to protect civilian targets from short-range, stand-off precision attacks. There is a vulnerability gap in most defensive plans that does not address threats from weapons that could attack at ranges from a few hundred meters to several kilometers. These weapons represent a distinctly different class of threat. They include various man-portable systems, relatively short-range weapons (upwards of 6,000 meters or less) that fire a rocket equipped with a small high-explosive warhead (usually one to two kilograms or less in size). When the rocket hits the target the explosive charge detonates. Because they are widely available, they may be employed by virtually any state and many non-state actors.

There is a vast global inventory of man-portable weapons with a variety of capabilities, including some that are wire-guided or armed with infrared seekers. One system of special concern should be the ubiquitous RPG-7, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. It is widely available and fairly simple to employ. The weapon can be aimed and fired in seconds. It is also cheap. Weapons can be obtained for a few hundred dollars or less. The RPG-7 is effective at about 500 meters against a stationary target and 300 meters when fired at a moving target with a maximum time-of-flight of about 5 seconds.51

A weapon like an RPG-7 can be made increasingly effective by volley firing several weapons on a single target. Various means and technologies might be used to further advance the effectiveness of short-range precision weapons by improving assessments of target vulnerabilities, providing more accurate locations, or enhancing accuracy. Commercial satellite imagery, for example, is readily available and could provide important details that might assist in planning a precision strike. For example, Quickbird 60-centimeter, panchromatic imagery can provide images of 120 U.S. cities with sufficient detail to distinguish fences, driveways, trees, and sidewalks.52 Powerful computer programs can provide sophisticated tools for target analysis. The MetaCarta Geographic Text Search Appliance, as an example, searches and organizes a wide variety of publicly available documents that could help terrorists make a detailed study of urban targets. Systems can be purchased for as little as $25,000.53 Laser designators are now commonly used for directing attacks with military munitions, but there are also readily available commercial products that could be used to make terrorist weapons more accurate. For example, a Swedish company, Laseroptronix, offers a wide-variety of laser systems with potential for military, as well as commercial, applications. The company advertises that its products are for sale to anyone, even private individuals. Even innocuous laser systems used by mapmakers and surveyors could be used to fashion more accurate weapons.

Assessment
Proposed funding in this critical mission area represents about 12 percent of the homeland security budget. But it is not clear if this is sufficient to help bridge the prodigious gap between security needs and the total investments required by federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector in ensuring adequate security for all critical infrastructure, let alone the needs of U.S. ports. In August 2000 the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports estimated that the costs to upgrade security infrastructure at the nation's 361 ports ranged from $10 million to $50 million per port. Congress funded $93 million for security improvements with the passage of MTSA, but received grant applications for as much as $697 million in the first year of the program alone.54 The Coast Guard recently estimated that it will require at least $1.4 billion in the first year and $6 billion over 10 years for private port facilities to meet the baseline mandates in the new federal port security laws under MTSA. Federal spending is unlikely to contribute in a major way to closing this gap in the near term and there is some doubt whether the measures currently underway can keep up with an innovative enemy employing short-range, precision weapons.55

On the other hand, addressing the considerable vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure may not necessarily call for a dramatic infusion of federal dollars. For example, effective intelligence and early warning, domestic counterterrorism, and border and transportation security programs can help to reduce risks to critical infrastructure by limiting the opportunities for terrorists to reach America's ports. In addition, the overwhelming preponderance of maritime infrastructure is in private hands. Initiatives that enable and encourage the private sector to take a more expansive and proactive role should be central to any protection program.56 In short, taking a more holistic approach to the challenge of protecting maritime infrastructure might significantly reduce the fiscal challenges.

Defending against Catastrophic Threats

Initiatives supporting this mission include developing better sensors and procedures to detect smuggled nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons, improved decontamination and medical responses to chemical and biological weapons, harnessing scientific knowledge and tools for counterterrorism efforts, and implementing the Select Agent Registration Program.57 These investments should be of key interest to the maritime security community since they will provide the next generation of sensors and countermeasures that will allow for increased screening of the people, goods, and services that transit U.S. ports and waterways without creating bottlenecks that impede the flow of American commerce.

Budget Highlights and Issues
Most of the goals for defending against catastrophic terrorism relate to investments in scientific research and development. The proposed federal budget for research and development is $123 billion. According to the Administration about $3.2 billion, or roughly 3 percent of the research and development budget, is for homeland security programs. This is an increase in real terms of about 5 percent over the FY 2003 budget ($3 billion). Much of this research may only indirectly affect maritime security. About half of the funding for homeland security research and development ($1.6 billion) is within the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health (NIH). The vast majority of homeland security research in NIH relates to bioterrorism.58

The next largest share of research and development funds is proposed for the Homeland Security Department ($803 million). This represents a substantial ($242 million, or 29 percent) increase in inflation-adjusted dollars over the FY 2003 budget proposal. Part of this growth reflects a transfer of programs from other agencies. New investments, however, are significant and account for virtually all of the growth in the homeland security research and development effort. These funds include $350 million to initiate the operations of the Homeland Security Advanced Projects Research Agency, which is charged with exploring high-risk, but potentially high-payoff antiterrorism technologies. Also included are $365 million for biological countermeasures for civilian populations and agricultural systems.59

Concerns for the Future
Perhaps, it is too soon to expect a robust homeland security R&D program. There is a question of how fast new research and development efforts can absorb additional funds. Throwing too much money at a problem, too fast only wastes scarce resources. Still, given the need to root out nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, and explosive materials before they transit the U.S. maritime system or can be used as a weapons against port facilities and the surrounding communities argues for a more concerted effort. This challenge is indeed daunting. Most experts agree that such threats are likely to proliferate in the future and they could be very hard to find. For example, the greatest gap in U.S. defenses is not the widely discussed possibility of smuggling in commercial shipping containers, a threat that may be reduced somewhat by new procedures and technologies, but the tactics favored by drug smugglers, infiltrating contraband in ocean-going vessels with concealed compartments capable of storing 30-70 kilograms of material.

Adopting new technologies for screening containers, packages, luggage, and other cargo for dangerous materials faces significant challenges. Many new systems appear promising, but issues of cost, practicality, and the maturity of the technology call into question whether they could provide dramatic new capabilities in the near term. Absent significant breakthroughs in new methods of manufacturing, it is unlikely that innovative detection systems will appear in the near future that provide tremendous improvements in imaging and detection at significantly lower costs than current detectors.

Assessment
Total initiatives in research and development account for about another 8 percent of the federal homeland security budget. The FY 2004 budget proposal reflects little real growth. Still, this is a healthy percentage of homeland security funding and it is necessary if new technologies are to provide the nation with a decisive competitive edge in the future. There is much work to be done. Unfortunately, only a small portion of this substantial amount of funding is going to technologies that might dramatically affect the state of maritime security. In addition, there is a great deal to be done in coordinating the Defense and Homeland Security Departments' research and development efforts where they can provide benefits to both. It would seem there are many opportunities in the maritime realm where research agendas could be harmonized.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

In this critical mission area, among the top priorities are supporting first responders, including police, firefighters, emergency management technicians, and health care support personnel; integrating federal response plans; creating a national incident management system; augmenting the national pharmaceutical stockpile; building a citizen corps; planning for military support to civilian authorities; and improving tactical counterterrorist capabilities.60 This mission should be of particular concern to the maritime security community as many facilities and craft are not only vulnerable targets themselves, but are also close to high-density civilian population areas.

Budget Highlights and Issues
The newly created Homeland Security Department will play by far the largest role in supporting state and local first responders. In particular, the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate will manage programs that provide needs assessments, training, and new equipment. ODP's proposed budget for FY 2004 is about $3.5 billion, down from the FY 2003 request ($3.6 billion), a decline of approximately 2 percent in inflation adjusted dollars. The ODP budget proposal provides $2.5 billion for grants, including $500 million for local law enforcement, and $500 million for firefighters.

In addition to supporting first responders, the proposed budget of the Emergency and Preparedness Response Directorate within the Homeland Security Department also contributes significantly to this critical mission area. Much of the directorate's budget, however, does not represent new spending, but reflects the federal reorganization which placed the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the new department. Previously, FEMA was responsible for coordinating the federal response to both natural and manmade disasters, as well as dealing with the consequences of a terrorist attack. As a result, probably less than half of the directorate's proposed FY 2004 budget ($6.8 billion) directly concerns spending related to homeland security. For example, the budget includes $3.2 billion for disaster relief. This amount, is consistent with the average required to respond to non-terrorist events over the past five years.61

Major homeland security spending within the Emergency and Preparedness Response Directorate's budget includes $890 million to purchase vaccines or medication for biodefense as part of the Administration's recently proposed "Project Bioshield," a ten-year, $5.6 billion program to develop biomedical countermeasures.62 In addition, the budget calls for $400 million to maintain the strategic national stockpile of drugs, vaccines, and other medical equipment.63

The Health and Human Services Department's proposed budget also includes significant investments in biomedical defense. Over $1.7 billion of the department's $3.8 billion proposed homeland security budget for FY 2004 supports this mission area.64

In addition to major biomedical initiatives, other programs contribute to emergency preparedness and response. For example, spending on volunteer groups that could support homeland security efforts cuts across several departments and agencies. It includes $181 million from the Department of Homeland Security, as well as $118 million from the Corporation for National and Community Service budget (USA Freedom Corps), $15 million from the Department of Justice, and $10 million from the Health and Human Services Department.

Finally, despite consolidation, many departments and agencies also provide response teams and capabilities to support first responders and conduct or participate in training. DoD, for example, provides Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, which can aid in the detection of radiological, chemical, and biological agents. It has also established the U.S. Northern Command to coordinate military support to civilian authorities in the event of a weapons of mass destruction attack. The Department of Justice budget includes $24 million for FBI response units including aviation support, crisis response, and hostage rescue/SWAT teams.65

Concerns for the Future
While there is some apprehension over the adequacy of emergency responder assets, the greatest area of concern over the long term should be the ability to respond to truly catastrophic attacks. While much attention is given to weapons of mass destruction, it is possible that catastrophic attacks could also be inflicted through the use of unique tactics. These attacks would incorporate existing weapons and delivery systems, but maximize their effects by conducting orchestrated strikes. Such attacks might combine different targets and weapons into a single coordinated operation at one or several locations. By placing the same amount of effort dedicated to several attacks into one synchronized operation an enemy might achieve far greater effects than what could be achieved by several disparate attacks. Even without inflicting mass casualties, a well-orchestrated series of strikes could be a significant threat, in effect creating "weapons of mass disruption" without employing weapons of mass destruction. Maritime targets, with their high population density, vast amounts of hazardous and combustible material, and proximity to transport nodes would be particularly choice targets.

To complicate consequence management, small attacks might be launched at hospitals, police stations, and emergency operations centers. Many state and city emergency operations centers are particularly vulnerable. Often they lack physical security protection and redundant communications. Back-up centers and mobile command posts usually do not exist.66 For example, the New York City Emergency Operations Center was on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center. When the building was destroyed during the 9/11 attacks, the city had no adequate secondary command and control capability available. It took three days to reconstitute all the functions and capabilities lost by the destruction of the emergency operations center.67

Another vulnerability that might be exploited is the tendency of local first responders to rush to the scene of a disaster. Often people, supplies, and services are spontaneously mobilized and sent into a disaster-stricken area. This phenomenon is called "convergence."68 It can lead to congestion, create confusion, hinder the delivery of aid, compromise security, and waste scarce resources. This proved to be a major concern during the response to the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. When the first tower was struck, firemen, policemen, emergency medical technicians from all over the metropolitan area streamed to the site, leaving other parts of the city vulnerable and, after the towers collapsed, created tremendous problems in accounting for emergency personnel.69 By sequencing strikes, responders can also be targeted, creating additional casualties and chaos.

Employing small amounts of various chemical, biological, toxin, or radiological agents in the ancillary strikes against first responders might further confuse a coordinated response. In this manner, an enemy lacking robust delivery systems, such as cruise missiles and UAVs, or large amounts of deadly agents could still achieve the disruptive effects and psychological casualties that might be caused by the use of unconventional weapons.

Information warfare could be a particularly useful instrument to supplement an attack. For example, in 1992, the London Ambulance Service installed a faulty computer dispatch service. Delays resulting from dispatching snafus resulted allegedly in the deaths of 20-30 patients. An intentional disruption of computer dispatching services during a crisis might result in even far greater chaos. Alternatively, electronic jamming might be used to interrupt emergency frequencies. Meanwhile the Internet, as was the case after the 9/11 attacks, could be employed to spread rumors and disinformation or be the target of denial-of-service attacks.70 In fact, this should be expected as a matter of course. The increasing likelihood of cyber-strikes following physical attacks appears to be becoming an established trend.71 Additionally, as after the September 11 strikes,72 such an attack would likely generate unprecedented local levels of user demand, severely stressing servers and some Web sites such as popular news portals.

A serious concern for the future, however, is whether state and local responder assets will be sufficiently robust to deal with such attacks. Only 13 percent of U.S. fire departments, for example, can handle a hazardous material or an emergency medical incident involving chemical and biological weapons inflicting more than 10 casualties. Only 25 percent of the departments have sufficient equipment to communicate with federal, state, and other local officials.73 These shortfalls persist despite a recent upsurge in spending on emergency preparedness. By some estimates spending on homeland security by states and major cities alone has already increased by $6.6 billion.74 These costs are being placed on already strained budgets and there is little likelihood that states and cities can, by themselves, sustain major new initiatives in the years ahead absent a significant upturn in the national economy.75

Assessment
Considering all the federal agencies contributing to this critical mission area, proposed program budgets represent about 20 percent of the homeland security budget. Overall these investments appear little changed from the FY 2003 budget proposal. Whether steady state funding for first responder support, as envisioned by the Administration, is sufficient is a subject of some debate. On the other hand, the call for dramatic increases in federal funding may be premature. The true scope of unfunded requirements in this area is a great uncertainty. Currently, there are no national standards to gauge the state of readiness and assess the adequacy of capabilities. The Administration has yet to develop a system to efficiently and effectively distribute federal funds. Nor is there common agreement on how to appropriately share responsibilities between federal, state, and local governments.76 Of greatest concern to the maritime community should be the fact that federal resources are not disbursed in a timely manner nor do they generally reflect any priority in terms of vulnerabilities, risks, population densities, and density of critical infrastructure and transportation nodes. A distribution scheme that reflects these priorities would be essential for ensuring ports and waterways receive adequate coverage by emergency responder assets.

Conclusion

The FY 2004 budget proposal suggests the Administration has made considerable progress in its goal to centralize and consolidate homeland security programs. Nevertheless, after the creation of the Homeland Security Department, domestic security still remains an activity in which virtually every federal agency continues to participate. The establishment of the new department, however, has had a dramatic impact on how the government funds programs to protect the nation. In FY 2004, the overwhelming share of homeland security tasks will be performed by a handful of federal agencies. According to Administration figures, the Department of Homeland Security now covers about 58 percent of the national homeland security budget. Adding in the homeland security budgets of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy accounts for all but 8 percent of federal funding in this area.

Much of the proposed homeland security spending appears to align with critical mission areas established by the Homeland Security strategy. In several areas, however, it is unclear whether these investments are adequate to achieve national objectives. In particular budgets for intelligence, recapitalization of the Coast Guard, maritime critical infrastructure protection, and funding for emergency responders could well become issues of serious contention as Congress debates future funding for protecting the nation.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security at The Heritage Foundation. He delivered this paper at the Maritime Homeland Security Conference sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement, in Arlington, Virginia, on May 21, 2003.


1. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, p. viii.

2. The Administration defines homeland security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." Ibid.,
p. 2.

3. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), Table S-5, p. 315. Approximately 7 percent, or $2.9 billion, of the budget is devoted to mandatory expenditures; the remaining $38.5 billion is discretionary budget authority or fee-funded activities. The FY 2001 budget for homeland security-related activities was about $15.9 billion ($16.1 billion in current dollars). These figures do not include supplemental appropriations after the September 11 attacks. Office of Management and Budget, memorandum, "Additional Information Requirements for Overseas Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security for the FY 2004 Budget," August 8, 2002, p. 13. Steven M. Kosiak, "Funding for Defense, Homeland Security, and Combating Terrorism Since 9/11," Security After 9-11: Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs (Center for Defense Information, January 2003), pp. 7-8, at www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/sec_after_911.pdf.

4. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. viii.

5. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," February 3, 2003, pp. 13-14.

6. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 187.

7. Bruce B. Stubbs, "The Coast Guard and Maritime Security," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 26 (Autumn 2000), pp. 95-99.

8. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," p. 10; United States Coast Guard FY 2003 Report, p. 12.

9. See, for example, Testimony of Paul Rosenzweig before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 9, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/lm6.cfm.

10. For an overview of the military's reliance on ports and associated security risks, see U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports," GAO-02-955TNI, July 23, 2002; Statement of William G. Schubert before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Senate Government Reform Committee, July 23, 2002, at www.marad.dot.gov/Headlines/testimony/homesecurity.html. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports," GAO-03-15, October 2002, pp. 5-10. In another example of the application of an anti-access strategy, in January 2003, U.S. officials claimed to have credible evidence of a plot to sabotage commercial airliners transporting U.S. troops to the Middle East. During major military mobilizations most forces are deployed by contract carriers. Thom Shanker, "Officials Reveal Threat to Troops Deploying to Gulf," The New York Times, January 13, 2002, p. A1. Even if this report proves unfounded, it nevertheless illustrates ways that an enemy could attempt to interfere with the deployment of U.S. forces.

11. A series of recent Army war games postulated various options for employing attacks on the homeland as a component of an anti-access strategy. In one game, for example, the enemy forced the United States to withhold troop deployments until terrorist sabotage cells throughout the country had been neutralized. Richard Brennan, Protecting the Homeland: Insights from Army Wargames (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 2002), pp. 21-22.

12. This rough estimate does not include contributions from national intelligence assets such as the National Security Agency or the Administration's plan to establish an independent Terrorist Threat Integration Center under the Director of Central Intelligence to merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad. White House, "Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America," January 28, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html.

13. For example, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks a joint panel of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees released a report on December 20, 2002, recommending a number of reforms and additional spending. That same month a panel appointed by the President, the Gilmore Commission, also recommended major reforms. See Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Implementing the National Strategy, December 16, 2002, p. iii, www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4execsum.pdf.

14. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. viii.

15. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," p. 9.

16. Ibid., p. 8.

17. Ibid., p. 8.

18. Eileen Cuneo, "Safe at Sea: Private Industry Takes the Lead with Technology to Secure Nation's Ports," Information Week.Com, April 7, 2003, at www.informationweek.com.

19. Sara Michael, "Budget Commits to Immigrations Systems," FCW.Com, February 6, 2003, at www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0203/web-ins-02-06-03.asp; U.S. Customs Service, "Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism," at www.iirusa.com/g/docs/J_Hynespres_FS2.PDF.

20. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 150-151.

21. Ronald O'Rourke "Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations-Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, RS21125, November 22, 2002, p. CTS-2; Independent Assessment of the United States Coast Guard "Integrated Deepwater System," Acquisition Solutions, Issue Brief, July 14, 2001, p. 6.

22. For example, the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate does not even address the threat of missiles delivered by surface naval vessels. See National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, at www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.pdf.

23. Duncan Lennox, "Inside the R-17 `Scud B' Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1991, p. 302.

24. K. Scott McMahon, The Pursuit of the Shield: The U.S. Quest for Limited Missile Defense (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997), p. 74.

25. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace lists 15 countries with operational Scud-B missiles. Prior to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the Taliban also maintained an arsenal of Scud-B, though the weapons may not have been operational. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "World Missile Chart," at www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm. At least 12 countries outside the United States have the capability to manufacture short-range missiles. See U.S. Department of Defense, Military Critical Technologies List, p. II-1-9.

26. CNN.com, "U.S. Seizes Scud Missile Imported by Weapons Collector," September 25, 1998, at www.cnn.com/US/9809/25/missile.seizure.

27. Thom Shanker, "Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea," The New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A1. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "Reluctant U.S. Gives Assent for Missiles to Go to Yemen," The New York Times, December 12, 2002, p. A1. The transfer of Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen was legal under existing international law. North Korea is not a participant in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

28. On the other hand, some existing anti-ship cruise missiles, such as the Israeli Gabriel II with a range of about 40 kilometers, use a video-guided terminal system, and might be suitable for attacking land targets without major renovation in guidance systems. See A.D. Baker III, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1998-1999: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis: Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 364.

29. Steven J. Zaloga, "The Cruise Missile Threat: Exaggerated or Premature," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 2000, pp. 47-51.

30. Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 31-33.

31. Figures obtained through www.uavforum.com/vendors/systems.htm.

32. Maritime Futures: The Undersea Environment, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment Workshop Report and Insights, January 2003, p. 50.

33. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. ix.

34. Statement of Thomas H. Collins before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, March 13, 2003.

35. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 150-151. Each team consists of 71 people. The teams are equipped with high-powered boats that can reach speeds of up to 50 knots (almost 60 mph). The boats are mounted with twin 350-horsepower engines and an M-60 machine gun. Crew members tote M-16s. They are supported by helicopters, equipment to detect weapons of mass destruction, and bomb-sniffing dogs.

36. Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation at a Press Availability on the FBI's Reorganization, May 29, 2002, at www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech052902.htm; FBI Strategic Focus, May 29, 2002, at www.fbi.gov/page2/52902.htm.

37. Testimony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Senate Judiciary Committee, June 6, 2002.

38. For a discussion of the various federal law enforcement agencies involved, see William Wechsler, "Law in Order: Reconstructing U.S. National Security," The National Interest, No. 67, Spring 2002, pp. 25-28.

39. Statement for the Record of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on International Crime before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, April 21, 1998.

40. Nicholas Kulish and Matt Pottinger, "U.S. Seeks Extradition Of Men It Says Schemed To Sell Stingers To Terrorists," The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2002, p. A13.

41. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Can the Military's Effectiveness in the Drug War be Measured?" Cato Journal, No. 14 (Fall 1994), pp. 243-265.

42. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999, August 2001, p. 8.

43. See the results of the cocaine interdiction program. Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2002 Final Report on the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy, Performance Measures of Effectiveness, February 2002, at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/02pme/pmepdf/PME.pdf , p. 24.

44. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for all Missions," GAO-03-544T, March 12, 2003, p. 2.

45. This does not including classified national security programs.

46. Critical infrastructure includes telecommunications and information systems; energy, banking and finance, and water systems; government operations; emergency and public health services; the chemical industry and hazardous materials; the defense industrial base; postal and shipping services; agriculture; and national monuments and icons.

47. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. ix.

48. Department of Homeland Security, "The Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Fact Sheet," pp. 13-14.

49. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY 2004 Budget in Brief, p. 11; American Society for Microbiology, "Summary of Proposed FY 2004 Research and Development Budgets," at www.asmusa.org/pasrc/fy2004.htm.

50. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for all Missions," p. 20.

51. Lester Grau, "A Weapon for All Seasons: The Old but Effective RPG-7 Promises to Haunt the Battlefields of Tomorrow," paper from the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998, pp. 1-7.

52. See, for example, David K. Nale, Quickbird Aerial Product Comparison Prepared by EMAP International for Digitalglobe, August 2002, pp. 32-34, at www.digitalglobe.com.

53. Information on the system is available at the company's Web site, www.metacarta.com.

54. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges," GAO-03-616T, April 1, 2003, pp. 5, 16.

55. For example, only a small portion of homeland security funding in the Administration's FY 2003 supplemental appropriation was designated for port security. A proposal in the Senate to add $1 billion dollars specifically for port security was defeated in April. The Administration's request for the FY 2004 budget totaled only $500 million for enhancing both border and port security, although the Senate passed a resolution in March to add $2 billion to the FY 2004 budget.

56. See, for example, Larry Wortzel, "Securing America's Critical Infrastructures: A Top Priority for the Department of Homeland Security," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 787, May 7, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl787.cfm.

57. National Strategy for Homeland Security, pp. ix-x.

58. American Society for Microbiology, "Summary of Proposed FY 2004 Research and Development Budgets."

59. "Protecting the Homeland Sets the Tone for 2004 Budget," Science, No. 299 (February 7, 2003), p. 808; American Society for Microbiology, "Summary of Proposed FY 2004 Research and Development Budgets."

60. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. x.

61. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 153.

62. White House, "President Details Project BioShield," February 3, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html.

63. "Protecting the Homeland Sets the Tone for 2004 Budget," p. 808.

64. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY2004 Budget in Brief, pp. 16-17, 27.

65. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 187.

66. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002), pp. 8-2, 8-3.

67. James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, "Elements of Resilience in the World Trade Center Attack," Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, pp. 6-9, at www.udel.edu/DRC. See also, Brian A. Jackson, et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 2002).

68. For a discussion of convergence, see Julie L. Demuth, Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 2002), p. 7.

69. The problem of organizations, units, and individuals "self-dispatching" themselves without the knowledge or permission of the on-scene incident commander was also a problem at the site of the attack on the Pentagon. Arlington County, After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon, (Arlington, VA: Arlington County, 2002), p. 12.

70. National Infrastructure Protection Center, "Cyber Protests Related to the War on Terrorism: The Current Threat," November 2001, at www.nipc.gov/publications/nipcpub/cyberprotests1101.pdf. This report concluded that post-9/11 illicit computer activity was not particularly damaging.

71. "Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis," Institute for Security and Technology Studies, September 22, 2001, p. 1.

72. The Internet Under Crisis Conditions: Learning From September 11 (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 2.

73. A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, U.S. Fire Administration, FA-240, December 2002, pp. vii, viii.

74. The National Governors' Association estimated that homeland security spending by the states could top $4 billion per year. The National Conference of Mayors estimates that in total the 200 largest cities will spend an additional $2.6 billion.

75. See, for example, National Governors' Association, National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of States, May 2002, p. 1, at www.nasbo.org/Publications/fiscsurv/may2002fiscalsurvey.

76. Michael Scardaville, " Emphasize How, Not How Much, in Domestic Preparedness Spending," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1628, February 27, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1628.cfm.

About the Author

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow