On
July 19, 2006, The Heritage Foundation presented a panel
discussion on the G-8 Summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia,
earlier that month.
In recent
years, Russia has regained some of its former status, primarily
through becoming a global energy and raw materials supplier and
boasting a sustained economic growth rate of over 6 percent a
year since 2000. Along with its elevated status, Russia has also
begun to display some of its former Soviet-era hostility toward the
West in general and the United States in particular, which may lead
to unnecessary frictions and confrontations in the future. The
moderator and the expert panelists assessed what the
outcomes of the G-8 summit reveal about U.S.-Russian
relations, as well as the future challenges and the opportunities
for cooperation between the two countries. Although each
speaker had distinct ideas as to the nature of U.S.-Russia
relations, all four seemed in agreement that the best option for
the U.S. and Russia is a pragmatic and realistic relationship based
on the cooperative pursuit of common interests. Their
presentations are summarized below.
Russia
Cannot Be Isolated
David Kramer
There has
been a loud debate for months about U.S.-Russian policy on concerns
of democracy backsliding, the problems encountered by NGOs,
worrying internal trends, and Russian policy towards its
neighbors. These concerns are balanced with Russia's
potential as a partner with the United States and Europe, as
well as Asia, in dealing with a whole host of challenges from
Iran to the Middle East to North Korea.
The
promise of strategic partnership post-9/11 has not been fulfilled,
but important work has been accomplished between our two countries
and our two governments.
We feel
that Russia cannot be ignored or isolated or treated as an
adversary. On the contrary, we seek to work with Russia on the many
areas where we share common interests and to push back, strongly if
necessary, on issues where we disagree. What we have with the
Russians is a realistic partnership and relationship.
President
Bush has stressed the importance he places on keeping lines of
communication open with President Putin, and went to St. Petersburg
a day early last week so he could spend more time with President
Putin, both formally and informally, in advance of the full G-8
program. The President used those opportunities to promote our
interests and express our concerns, including over the
trajectory of Russian democracy and civil society and its
relations with its neighbors. The President also discussed ways we
can work together on many problems that require our
cooperation.
We feel
we made significant progress on some areas but of course less than
hoped for in other areas, and in particular on the WTO bilateral
negotiations. In addition to the various G-8 agreements on
energy security, health, and education, President Bush and
President Putin announced the extremely important Global
Initiatives to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an important step in our
counter-terrorism cooperation with Russia that has been a
pillar of our relationship since 9/11.
Through
this initiative, we join together to prevent terrorists and
dangerous regimes from threatening us with the world's most
deadly weapons. Our cooperation will include the physical
protection of nuclear materials, suppressing illicit
trafficking of those materials, responding and mitigating the
consequences of any acts of nuclear terrorism, and cooperating on
the development of the technical means to combat nuclear terrorism,
denying safe haven to terrorists, and strengthening our national
legal frameworks to ensure the prosecution of such terrorists
and their supporters.
The two
presidents also announced new initiatives on the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy and countering nuclear proliferation, expanding
on initiatives that were already underway and which will
include other nations.
There are
areas where our two presidents don't see eye to eye, including on
Russia's democratic development. President Bush has a regular
dialogue with President Putin on the internal dynamics in
Russia. Promoting civil society in Russia is key and will over the
long run help transform Russia into a country where our values
converge, which will make it easier and more productive for us to
work together.
We know
that nations that share values also share interests. A Russia that
embraces pluralistic political institutions, personal liberty, and
a transparent, empowering economic approach would be a Russia
that shares European and American-and I believe
universal-values.
Yet, to
many Russians, democracy is a discredited concept because it
unfortunately is associated with the chaos and weakness of the
1990s. The collapse of the state in the 1990s under Yeltsin
and now the reemergence of the state under President Putin reflect
the Kremlin's tendency toward a pendulum approach in the way
it exercises control.
Because
promoting democracy is central to the foreign policy of the Bush
Administration, the President has raised it with President
Putin in private meetings, which we believe is the most effective
approach. Where necessary, we speak out publicly on this issue, but
we do so as a friend who raises concerns in a way designed to steer
development in Russia in a positive direction.
The
President underscored our concern by meeting with a diverse,
outspoken group of Russian civil society activists representing the
democracy, human rights, environmental, and health communities in
Russia. The President's meeting came after a meeting that was
called "Other Russia" in Moscow that Assistant Secretaries Daniel
Fried and Barry Lowenkron attended for the U.S.
government.
A vibrant
civil society also requires a vibrant entrepreneurial sector rooted
in the rule of law, which can contribute to the modernization of
the Russian economy. And to support one of the underpinnings
of democracy-a strong and independent middle class-the President
announced our intention to create the "U.S.-Russia Foundation
for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law," which stands as
a successor to the successful U.S.-Russia Investment Fund, known as
TUSRIF, which was established in 1995 to promote the growth of the
Russian independent entrepreneurship and improve the climate for
private investment.
But I
won't pretend that we achieved all that we could. Concluding a
bilateral WTO accession agreement was a high priority for President
Bush. U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and her team
negotiated around the clock last week in an attempt to close on
such an agreement. They were not successful, but only because they
insisted on an agreement that would be commercially viable and pass
muster with Congress. We will continue to work toward the goal of
completing bilateral negotiations with the Russians and hope
to do so in the coming months.
Now that
the G-8 leaders have departed St. Petersburg, Russia will focus its
attention on upcoming elections for the Duma and for the new
President in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Democracies, of course,
consist of more than just good elections, but the run-up to these
elections-including the state of independent media and equal access
for all parties and candidates to the press, as well as a level
playing field and the help of civil society during that
period-all of this will be a telling gauge by which we can
measure Russia's democratic progress.
We will
continue to encourage Russia to take the steps necessary to become
a strong, democratic, and prosperous member of the international
community, and we will press for healthy, constructive
relations between Russia and Russia's neighbors.
Working
with Russia is not always easy, but it requires a long-term
approach. Through increased engagement including expanded
people-to-people exchanges, we can build a foundation for better
understanding for the years ahead, which will pay dividends for our
broader, long-term relations.
We hope
that Russia will define its role in the world in a way that allows
us the possibility of genuine partnership, and not retreat
into a world view defined by balance of power strategies and
checking U.S. moves wherever possible. The U.S. is not
Russia's problem, and a democratic West and democratic
neighbors are not a threat.
Our two
countries and the entire world are safer as a result of our working
together, and we would welcome even more the cooperation with
Russia with whom our shared values would open the way to a complete
and fruitful strategic partnership.
-David
Kramer is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and former Associate Director
for the Russian/ Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Hezbollah
Hijacked the G-8 Summit
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
The G-8
event overall went well. Russia handled the management and public
communications aspects of the summit very professionally. It had
high-level representation from the G-8 countries, as well as from
India, Brazil, China, and Kazakhstan. It also had a "Youth G-8," in
which President Putin met with young Russians and foreigners to
hear their concerns, and a "Civil G-8," where representatives from
Amnesty International, Oxfam, and other organizations engaged in a
real dialogue with President Putin on public policy. This is
the "Clintonization of Vladimir Putin." He charmed the leaders
of these NGOs into having tea with him in his dacha, held four
press conferences in St. Petersburg, and the agenda that the Russia
side formulated-energy security, education, infectious diseases-was
front and center.
Unfortunately,
for the second year in a row, the G-8 Summit was hijacked by
terrorists. Last year, in Gleneagles, it was al-Qaeda; this year,
it was Hezbollah. Realizing the sophistication of Hezbollah's
leadership and their tight coordination with the Iranian
leadership-their founders, funders, trainers, and suppliers-I
cannot exclude the possibility that they were well aware that
killing and kidnapping Israeli soldiers would lead to retaliation
and escalation, diverting attention from the G-8 agenda.
The G-8
rose to the occasion and published a joint statement on the Middle
East which included the following:
The
immediate crisis results from efforts by extremist forces to
destabilize the region and to frustrate the aspirations of
Palestinian, Israeli and Lebanese people for democracy
and peace. In Gaza, elements of Hamas launched rocket attacks
against Israeli territory and abducted an Israeli soldier. In
Lebanon, Hezbollah, in violation of the "Blue Line," attacked
Israel from Lebanese territory, killed and captured Israeli
soldiers, reversing the positive trends that began with the
Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and undermined the democratically
elected government of Prime Minister Fouad Seniora.
The G-8
leaders demanded:
The
return of the Israeli soldiers in Gaza and Lebanon unharmed, the
end of the shelling of Israeli territory, the end to Israeli
military operations, and the early withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Gaza after the soldier is released….
And they
continued:
We extend
to the government of Lebanon the full support in asserting
sovereign authority over all its territory in fulfillment of UN SCR
1559.
United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 is a resolution that
demands the disarmament of Hezbollah and the deployment of Lebanese
armed forces to all parts of the country, in particular the
south, for the disarming of militias.
The
flare-up in the Middle East derailed an agenda which had Iran front
and center as a joint diplomatic effort of the State Department,
the NSC (National Security Council), Russia, the E-3 (Great
Britain, France, and Germany), the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and the Security Council. The challenge for the U.S.,
Russia, the E-3, China, India, and the rest, is to make sure that
the Middle Eastern crisis does not divert our attention from the
real threat to the Middle East and the whole world today-the
Iranian nuclear program.
During
the escalation of hostilities, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan came
out, for the first time, squarely against Hezbollah and its Iranian
sponsors. They recognize that a nuclear-armed Iran will
threaten the very fabric of nation-states in the Middle East.
Radical Islam, whether Sunni or Shi'a, does not recognize
national borders. It seeks a Caliphate, a sectarian-based
trans-border entity. We can see the effects of sectarian-based
violence in Iraq today.
The
Middle East is in a process that goes way beyond the
Israel-Hezbollah confrontation. Radicalization by Sunni
extremists, such as al-Qaeda, and Shi'a extremists, including those
in the Iranian government, are polarizing the Middle East,
threatening not just the state of Israel but the moderate
regimes of Saudi Arabia, of the Gulf States, Jordan, and Egypt. The
G-8 countries need to address this trend in the future, building
coalitions with moderate Arab regimes and other nations,
including Israel, India, and Turkey.
An
unstable Middle East threatens our survival both economically, as
the region produces more than 40 percent of the oil the world
consumes, and geopolitically and geostrategically, with the
potential for a nuclear arms race triggered by Iran. This is
not a Middle East that is in our national interests, or the
international interests of any of the G-8 countries, including
Russia.
The
summit ended with a sense of foreboding. For two years running, the
G-8 Summit has been derailed by terrorist attacks. This indicates
that the G-8 must turn its attention to fighting terrorism on a
security level, an economic development level, and a level of
ideas. It must engage the world, especially the Muslim world,
in the realm of hearts and minds and public diplomacy.
The G-8
format today may not be sufficient, and may need to seek further
engagement with India, China, Brazil, and perhaps South Africa or
Nigeria. An expanded format for the G-8 may be the key to providing
truly global solutions to truly global challenges. A solid and
productive U.S.-Russian relationship is needed to underpin
such an enlargement.
-Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is
Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and
International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at
The Heritage Foundation.
"Vladimir
the Lucky"
Andrew Kuchins, Ph.D.
The
history of Russia and East Central Europe is replete with colorful
figures with catchy titles like "Vladimir the Apostle," "Sviatopolk
the Accursed," "Vlad the Impaler," and "Ivan the
Terrible."
The
current Vladimir in the Kremlin is neither terrible nor saintly,
and we have no grounds to conclude that Vladimir Putin is
accursed. On the contrary, he may be the luckiest guy in the
world today, and I do hereby anoint him "Vladimir the Lucky." Mr.
Putin is lucky because he happened to become president of Russia
when oil prices were rising and then skyrocketed, and this has been
the main factor behind Russia's macro-economic "miracle" and its
resurgence as a great power.
Only
eight years ago, in 1998, the ruble collapsed. Russia
defaulted on much of its debt and was virtually bankrupt. With oil
at less than $15.00 a barrel, Russia received less than $40 billion
a year in revenue from oil and gas sales, the most important
source of economic growth. By 2000, when Mr. Putin took office, the
average crude price was about $28.00 a barrel and Russia brought in
about $75 billion. This year the U.S. Energy Information
Administration projects that crude will average $61.00 a barrel,
and Russia's revenue from oil and gas sales may exceed $200
billion. Furthermore, Russia has more than $250 billion in reserves
and a stabilization fund projected to reach close to $100 billion
by the end of the year.
Vladimir's good
fortune extends beyond his petro-luck. On the eve of the G-8
Summit, Russian's enemy no. 1, Shamil Basayev, was blown up
preparing for a terrorist attack that might have spoiled Vladimir's
party in St. Petersburg. It's likely that Mr. Putin created
some of this luck for himself when his colleagues in the secret
police finally took out the elusive Mr. Basayev just in time to
burnish his reputation as a partner in the war on terror. Accidents
don't really happen accidentally in that part of the
world.
Nevertheless,
Vlad's luck continued when hostilities broke out in Lebanon,
diverting attention from the question about Russia's fitness to
host the G-8. The Middle East crisis ensured that Putin would be
less isolated from his other "summiteers" than if the Iranian
nuclear program had dominated the agenda. On Iran, Vladimir
finds himself at odds with the Americans and the Europeans, whereas
on Lebanon, Mr. Putin's position is closer to that of his
European colleagues. Overall, the G-8 Summit went well for Vladimir
Putin. I don't think that he wanted it to ever end.
In the
bilateral meetings between Presidents Bush and Putin, both men
certainly wanted to smooth out some of the differences in the
U.S.-Russian relationship, but tensions were nonetheless on
display.
The
positive results of these meetings included two nuclear agreements:
one to negotiate for cooperation on civilian nuclear
technology, and one to extend the Proliferation Security Initiative
to establish a global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.
These are both areas where Russia has capabilities to bring to the
table and where we can cooperate.
But there
was failure on the WTO agreement, which both presidents definitely
wanted and worked very hard to reach. This failure reflects
several things. On the U.S. side, Russia will have to come up
for PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations) status and the
Senate must approve whatever agreement is reached. It may have been
calculated that with the current negative attitude toward Russia in
Congress, it would be worse for Mr. Bush, Mr. Putin, and the
U.S.-Russian relationship if the bilateral agreement on WTO
were reached this past weekend and then got shot down in Congress.
Failure to reach an agreement also may reflect President
Bush's lessened authority, even within his party.
On the
Russian side, there may have been a miscalculation in
negotiating strategy. The Russians may have expected that they
would not have to make the kinds of concessions and agreements that
they needed to on the core technical issues that were blocking the
agreement, thinking that the U.S. really wanted this deal. They had
advised the U.S. that the decision about the Shtokman gas field and
the selection of partners for Shtokman were being held up by the
WTO agreement and another large commercial transaction, the Boeing
deal.
Right
now, Russia has a very cynical attitude toward democracy and toward
our efforts to promote democracy around the world. We do
believe that democratic governments are more capable and more
effective and, as I wrote in a letter to Mr. Putin that was
published in Kommersant last week, implementing the
institutions of democracy will make Russia more sovereign, but that
is not how the Russians see it for a variety of reasons,
including the legacy of the 1990s and current oil prices.
Petro-states don't typically undertake democracy campaigns when oil
prices are very high.
And on
the democracy question, Mr. Cheney's comments in Vilnius, combined
with President Ilham Aliev's visit from Azerbaijan to Washington
the week before and Mr. Cheney's subsequent trips to
Kazakhstan to meet with President Nursultan Nazarbayev, where
the issues of democracy, civil society, and human rights were not
on the public agenda, gives Russians the impression that democracy
promotion is just a fig leaf for expansion of American hegemony and
regime change in favor of pro-American forces.
We too
easily believe that countries that share values and are democracies
are going to agree with us on major foreign policy issues. Two of
the most mature democracies and two of our oldest allies, France
and Germany, did not agree with us about Iraq. I am very skeptical
that if Russia were a mature democracy today that it would reach
much of a different conclusion about Iran.
The G-8
summit emphasized that we are in a moment of transition in
international relations from a unipolar world to a multipolar world
and an erosion of the era of Western predominance. Mr. Putin and
the Russians are thinking this right now. It was very telling that
Mr. Putin met with the Chinese and the Indians, among others,
after the formal G-8 meeting, and he expressed his most open
support for their joining the G-8 in the future.
I predict
that within five years, the G-8 will either expand or cease to
exist as it looks more and more like an anachronism. In the 1970s,
when the G-7 was formed, those seven economies commanded over 60
percent of the world's GDP. Today, including Russia, the G-8
commands less than 45 percent of world GDP, and that percentage
will probably fall in the coming years as large emerging market
economies grow faster than the G-8 economies.
-Andrew
Kuchins, Ph.D., is Senior Associate and Director of the Russian and
Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
and former director of the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow
Center.
Russia
Is
Back on the World Stage
Angela Stent, Ph.D.
I regard
the G-8 as a success both for the United States and for Russia.
Despite the crisis in the Middle East, it played out as expected. I
would also agree that Russia achieved much of what it wanted to at
the G-8. The stakes for Russia were quite high, and it showed that
after 15 years of political turbulence and instability Russia
is back on the world stage. It is a major player, a stable,
influential country reaping the benefits of high energy prices. Its
economy has enjoyed a 6.1 percent average GDP growth rate since
2001 and it has a booming consumer market in which Americans and
Europeans want to invest. Moreover, President Putin enjoys a 79
percent approval rate that his other G-8 colleagues can only
envy.
How
should we characterize this newly self-confident Russia? Let
me quote from Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. In last Friday's
Izvestiia he referred to Russia as an "energy superpower"
and this is how he defined it: Russia is "a reliable and
predictable partner who efficiently carries out the obligations
assumed, especially in Europe." However, "energy superpower" is an
elusive and imprecise concept. When Western commentators talk about
Russia as an energy superpower, they imply that it uses energy
supplies as a form of political leverage, that it seeks to achieve
with oil and gas what it once sought to achieve with nuclear
weapons, namely greater global influence. On the other hand we
usually refer to energy as "soft" as opposed to "hard power,"
further confusing the metaphors. The real issue is where you draw
the line between politics and business in Russia in a system
characterized by a symbiotic nexus between political and economic
elites and presence of the heads of the major energy companies in
the Kremlin.
Last
January's gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia illustrates the
complexity of these issues. In addition to the political factors
involved, there were also economic elements, particularly the price
Ukrainians were paying. The other geographical fact of life is
Russia's control of the transit routes in Eurasia. 80 percent of
Russian gas that goes to Europe passes through Ukraine.
Despite
its new self-confidence, Russia faces major challenges including a
shrinking population. In 20 years time, where will the people come
from to man the armed forces, to provide the labor for the economy?
Moreover, one day energy prices will fall, as they inevitably do
and if Russia hasn't diversified its economy and invested more
in its oil and gas sector, it will not be able to fill the new
Asian pipelines it plans to construct. Moreover, the failure to
tackle problems of corruption will also have a corrosive effect on
the economy and society.
What is
the U.S.-Russian agenda beyond the G-8? We should continue our
cooperation on counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics and
counter-terrorism, the issues that have engaged us since 9/11.
But we should be realistic about the limits of our common
interests and of our influence. Public criticism of Russia's
domestic system has not produced the results that we would have
liked to have seen and therefore the conversation about democracy
is best pursued out of the public eye.
During
the next two years, succession issues will have a major impact on
our relationship. In the United States, we may not know who will
succeed President Bush, but we know the rules of the game for a
presidential election. In Russia, however, the succession process
is not predictable. The Kremlin is still defining the rules of the
game and this means that Russia may become a more inward-looking
and challenging partner.
The other
major challenge in the next two years, one that cries out for more
intense dialogue between Washington and Moscow is Russia's
neighborhood. Russia views "colored" revolutions as a Western
effort to interfere in its rightful sphere of influence and seeks
to minimize our influence there as we have seen in Central Asia. We
need to engage in a more direct discussion of what both sides view
as their legitimate interests in Eurasia. We have to try to
convince Moscow that it would be better off with stable,
prosperous, independent states on its borders, even if they don't
share the same domestic system as Russia, and even if at some point
they aspire to membership in the European Union or even
NATO.
Over the
next two years, we need to stay involved with Russia on every
level-with civil society, with trying to promote the middle class,
bringing more students and young politicians and young leaders
here. The amount of anti-Americanism among the young in Russia
is growing exponentially, and we have to try and do whatever
we can to counter that. We have to work with civil society there,
to the extent that we're able to, given the NGO legislation-we have
to take the long term view of this, we have to understand that this
process of transformation in Russia is a matter of decades. We had
an unrealistic timetable in the 1990s for how long it would take
for Russia to democratize, so we have to be engaged for the long
haul. If we do not take the long-term view, then we will face the
prospect of the U.S. and Russian orbits moving further apart and I
don't think that's in anyone's interest.
Angela
Stent, Ph.D., is Professor and Director of the Center for Eurasian,
Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University and the
former National Intelligence Officer for Russia and
Eurasia.
Co-editor
Conway Irwin is a 2005 graduate of the School for Advanced
International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Washington,
D.C.