Japanese Defense Policy

Report Asia

Japanese Defense Policy

May 6, 1981 32 min read Download Report

Authors: Guy M. and William Hicks

(Archived document, may contain errors)

141 May 6, 198 1 JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY INTRODUCTION During the late 1940s, the United States, responding to a variety of pressures occasioned by the Sovietization of Eastern Europe and the Comqunist takeover in China, came to desire Japan more as a stable friend than a s a defeated enemy most important manifestations of this new American policy..was an intensification of efforts from 1947 on to secure and negotiate a peace treaty with Japan was finally signed in San Francisco in 1951, a'bilateral security pact was simul t aneously entered into between the United States and Japan One of the On the same day that the Peace Treaty It has now been thirty years since that original Security Since that time .Japanese defense policy Treaty was initialed has been formulated on the a s sumption that the Soviet Union posed the principal potential threat, both externally and domestically to the security of Japan and that a continuing defense relation ship with the United States'was not only beneficial, but essential past thirty years have been reflected in the original Security Treaty of 1951, a subsequent revision The Treaty.of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960, and the reaffirmation of the latter in 1970 first appeared in the form of a document labeled Basic Policies For National D efense issued by a newly formed Japanese Government Defense Council in May 19

57. These principles have, in turn been elaborated in subsequent years through a series of defense plans and programs offered by the Self-Defense Agency four basic principles of defense enunciated by the Defense Council over two decades.ago continue to guide modern Japanese defense planning In specific, practical terms, these defense policies for the The essence of Japan's post-Occupation defense principles However 2 3 4 The eval u ate to support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation to stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's attachment to their country, thereby establishing a sound basis essential to national security I to build up effective defense capabilities progres sively within the limits necessary for self-defense with due regard to national resources and the prevailing domestic situation to cope with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-United States security agreem e nt pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression purpose of this paper is threefold 1) to discern and Japan's security relationship with the United States and the adequacy and effectivene s s of its- Self-Defense Forces 2) to discuss and assess the implications of the ever-changing military balance in the Far East and the Pacific and its impact on Japanese security; and 3) to suggest areas of possible improvement in Japanese defense efforts a nd the security relationship with the United States in order to meet potential threats in the, future JAPAN'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES In the aftermath of Japan's defeat and surrender in 1945 the ultimate objective of the Allied Occupa t ion forces stationed in Japan was to foster those conditions which would ensure that Japan would not again become a "menace to.the peace and security of the world.If1 accordance with the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, were Ifthe abolition of milita r ism and ultra-nationalism in all their forms; the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes in governmental, economic and social institutions; the encourage ment and support of liberal political tendencies in Japan; and the .disarmament and dem ilitarization of Japan, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make warVf (emphasis added This later point was institutionalized in the Post-War Constitution promulgated on November 3, 1946 and put into effect on May 3 19

47. Article IX of the Constitution states Among the measures set forth and enacted, in Cf. Daraf2raDh 3a of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380115 entitled Basic Objectives of Military Occupation of Japan, November 3, 1945.

Ibid 3 Aspiring sincerely to an inte rnational peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes ing land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potentia l , will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.3 While the primary emphasis of the Occupation policy continued In order to accomplish the aim of the preced to be, from 1945 to 1952, a prevention of Japanese revan ~ hism concern began to be expressed in Washington, especially during the late 1940s and early 1950s, about ''Russian expansive tenden cies,It5 the Communist takeover in China, the outbreak of the Korean War and their collective impact on Japan's external s ecur ity.

On September 8, 1951, concurrent with the signing of the Peace Treaty in San Francisco which restored Japan as an independent and sovereign nation, a security arrangment was initialed guaranteeing Japan's external security. This bilateral securit y pact between Japan and the United States provided for the continuation of U.S. military forces and installations in Japan, the use of such forces to help maintain peace and security in the Far East, and the deployment of American military personnel and e quipment to quell domestic revolts should Japan request such assistance. Although there was no explicit statement in the treaty which obligated the United States to defend Japan, the presence of American forces and bases most certainly served to deter an armed attack on Japan from without hardly surprising that the Japanese reaction to such an agreement was not one of unqualified acceptance and appreciation.

Japanese sense of nationalism was offended by the presence of foreign troops and bases. There was a lso dissatisfaction and controversy with those arrangements in the treaty providing for the use of Japanese-based American troops to suppress domestic rebellions, jurisdiction of American personnel involved in crimes against Japanese citizens and property , and the possible storing and use of nuclear weapons by American forces stationed in Japan.

These dissatisfactions eventually resulted in protracted negotia tions between the two countries looking forward to a more equitable revision of the 1951 treaty As this treaty contained some llunequallt aspects it is The U.S. Department of State, Publication 2836, Far Eastern Series 22, 1947 DD. 2-3 Tetsuya Kataoka, Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor Japan Debates Defense Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p 9 Cf. George F. KeMan (Mr X The Sources of Soviet Conduct Foreign Affairs, July 1947. 4 On January 19, 1960, a new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was agreed upon.

Some five months later, on June 23, the Treaty ente red into force. Unlike the'first which had no terminal date, this treaty was to run for ten years. However, after this initial ten-year period, either "Party may give notice to the other Party of his intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Tr e aty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given" (Article X While the United States expressly agreed to defend Japan, the Treaty did not commit Japan to the defense of the United States.6 Japan was to act only in those territories under its c ontrol and to the extent allowed by its Constitution contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States was granted continued use of military facilities in Japan Article VI depl o yment of American armed forces and equipment or the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat opera tions requires prior consultation with the government of Japan ly fragile environment in which anti-military sentiment ran especial ly high,' the ensuing decade was considerably more tranquil.

Such a dramatic l1atmospherici1 change was attributable, in large measure, to a significant policy shift on the part of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP ing the administration of Prime Mi nister Nobusuke Kishi (the negotiator of the 1960 treaty), the LDP platform had among its stated goals the twin pillars of constitutional revision and rearmament. Following Kishi's abrupt resignation, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and his followers in the L D P successfully rewrote the platform to include a politically low posture profile, the separation of politics and economics and a desire to double the For purposes of The Treaty stipulates that major changes in the Though the treaty negotiations were condu c ted in a political In prior years, up to and includ- national income.8 The decade of the 1960s has been aptly termed, by Professor Tetsuya Kataoka the llgolden age of pacifist. commercial democracy lr9 Describing that era, Professor Kataoka poignantly obs e rves With singleness of purpose and'energy seldom paralleled elsewhere in the world, the whole nation pursued the Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to it s own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes Article V emphasis added).

Because of the massive demonstrations against the Kishi government President Eisenhower was forced to cancel his goodwill trip to Japan.

Immediately following Diet approval of the 1960 Treaty, Prime Minister Kishi resigned.

Cf. Kataoka, Waiting for a."Pearl Harbor," p 20 Ibid p. 21 6 I 5 goal of expanding trade and manufacturing. The policy of growthmanship combined with Ilpolitical low posture may have been forced on the LDP government at its inception, but it was also a de l iberate policy pursued with skill and energy. The architects of Ikeda's policy justified small defense outlays as a booster of econymic growth, and the defense.budget was allowed to decline from 1.2 percent to 0.8 percent of the GNP during the 1960s. Succ e ssive LDP governments, in their dealings with Washington, began to point to the sensiti vity of the left on matters of defense in order to stave off U.S. pressures. The United States, for its part, learned not to rock the boat 10 During the 1960s, Japan p u rsued a somewhat paradoxical approach to defense issues: pacifism and protectionism. Symbolic of the LDP-leftist collaboration in pursuit of pacifism were the policies of the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmamentll and of pegging the defense expendlitur e s at 1 percent of the GNP ly, throughout the 1960s, Japan sought further assurance of American protection against threats to its security. On January 13, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson, in a joint communique with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, reaffirmed "Th e United States! deter mination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside.111z Sat0 in 1969, agreed to the reversion of Okinawa,13 anq the restricted use of bases there to the terms applicable to t he home i~1ands.l~ The joint communique is important for a number of other reasons. Both parties reaffirmed their desire to continue the Mutual Security Treaty for an indefinite period. But more importantly, Japan, for the first time, officially recognize d that their security was intimately tied to the peace and security of the Far East, and most particularly to Korea. The golden age of pacifist commercial democracy, dependent as it was on America's military might, was soon to be shaken at its core followi n g the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive (1968) prepared the Similar Subsequently President Richard Nixon, in a joint communique with Prime Minister The adverse psychological effects in the United States lo Ibid l1 Japan will not possess, manufacture or intro d uce nuclear weapons on her soil l2 Quoted in Fred Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations Washington D.C l3 Actual reversion took place in 1972 l4 Article VI of 'the 1960 Treaty granted the United States the use by its land, air and naval for c es of facilities and areas on the home islands of Japan. The use of these facilities and areas was governed by a separate agreement In extending Japanese jurisdiction to the Ryukyus, Japan was made responsible for the defense of the area and by implicatio n of the U.S. facilities on Okinawa The Brookings Institution, 1975), p 33. 6 way for the so-called Nixon Doctrine, first announced at Guam in July 19

69. While the Nixon Doctrine needs no elaboration here its major principles are nevertheless noteworthy: the United States could and should enter into an era of negotiations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China; negotiate with North Vietnam to bring about peace throughout Indochina lower America's military posture throughout the worl d , while at the same time maintaining our commitments, i.e., the mutual security treaties with our allies. Generally, the Nixon Doctrine was received by Western allies, including Japan, with doubt developing into shocks and suspicions, especially after the February 1972 U.S.-PRC meeting and its accompanying Shanghai communique. Tokyo, for one, was not informed by Washington in advance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking though a pledge had been given privately to the Japanese government a few years earlier that it would be notified in advance of any major change in American China policy.15 There were other tensions generated during the 1971-1972 period.

Nixon began to support legislation to impose quotas on imports of Japanese textiles an d rejected conciliatory measures proposed by In the spring of 1971 some members of the House of.Representatives.16 A more serious problem was the massive deficit in the Ameri can balance of payments with Japan, estimated to be between $3 to 4 billion per y ear. To help eliminate such, President Nixon announced on August 15, 1971, a program of wage and price controls suspension of the convertibility of the dollar, and a ten percent surcharge on import duties on the wisdom of-the alliance with the United Stat e s, were later followed by the Arab oil embargo shock had become fully aware of how dependent they were on their energy imports 85 percent of which came from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf could absorb the 4-5 times price increase and the galloping i nflation of 1973074 Thouqh the Japanese economy survived the These Nixon-Kissinger casting doubts as they did By late 1973, the Japanese Not even Japanese trade and payments balances oil crisis, the earlier economic policies were called into question.

Thes e successive llshocksll sounded the death knells of the pacifist commercial democracy era in Japan the fall of Saigon (1975) and the Lockheed Scandal (1976), that serious discussion relative to Japanese defense issues and needs materialized. In October 19 7 6, the I'National Defense Program It was not until that latter part of the 1970s, following l5 Harold C. Hinton, Three and A Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia Bloomington London: Indiana University Press, 1975 p. 134. l6 Ibid l7 Cf. Frank N. Trager and William L. Scully, "Asia and the Western Pacific A Time of Trial," in RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1975/76 (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1975), p..171. 7 Outline" was accepted at a Cabinet meeting of the government of Takeo Miki defense capab i lity in light of potential threats, but rather aimed at "even in peacetime, a balanced defense posture with effective organizations and functional positioning of units and equipment which are capable of coping effectively with aggression ranging from conv entional warfare with smaller scale than limited wars to aggression of more smaller scale with limited geographical expansion, objectives, means and duration."

One of the assumptions underlining the Outline was the notion that international geopolitical de velopments often involve factors of uncertainty and unpredictability e.g., the Nixon Doctrine Two years later, in November 1978, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee approved a counterpart to the Outline, namely the IIGuidelines for United State s -Japan Defense Cooperation cooperation between Japanese Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics.18 Since the 1950s, popular attitudes toward defense issues in Japan have on the whole been emotional and n egative. During the past several years, however, Japanese attitudes toward defense problems have undergone a gradual but significant evolution.

Growing public awareness of defense issues and acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces and the Mutual Security Tre aty do not mean that attitudes about the role and missions of these forces have changed is still subject to post-war constitutional restraints and remains today a very serious political problem The Outline did not simply estimate quantities of These Guide l ines endeavor to achieve a posture for Japanese willingness to assume increased responsibility JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES Article IX of Japan's Constitution is truly a monumental landmark in the annals of international law. No other nation in history, l e t alone a major power such as Japan has gone so far as to renounce war as a sovereign right, while denying itself the maintenance of armed forces or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes. As straightforward as Article IX appear s to be, there have been a multiplicity of interpretations which have beseiged the Article since its implementation. However no objection is raised by the Constitution to the right of Japan as an independent nation to defend itself from any foreign invasio n in December 1959, stated that pacifism as defined under the Constitution does not stipulate non-defense or non-resistance on the part of Japan. Indeed, the preamble of the Constitution The Japanese Supreme Court, in a ruling on the Sunagawa Case l8 In ad d ition to the above, the Guidelines specify actions to be taken in response.to an armed attack against Japan. 8 specifically states that "the people of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want From this perspective it is "not just i fiable to consider the Constitution as prohibiting the maintenance by Japan of the minimum required level of prepared ness against situations in which the 'people's life, liberty and pursuit of happiness' as guaranteed by the Constitution are seriously en dangered.I1lg held the view that Japan's national defense capabilities must be exclusively for self-defense, and that any action exceeding this limit is strictly prohibited, constituting as it would the creation of a "war potential.

It was not until the ou tbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that a basic structure for Japan's Self-Defense Forces began to be devised. Upon instructions from General Douglas MacArthur, a 75,000-man National Police Reserve Force was established to "deal with international disorders Following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1951, lively debate ensued within the Japanese Diet over the establishment of defense guidelines and a gradual buildup of defense capability as proposed by the Liberal Party (Jiyuto in the fall of 1951 In April 1952, a Maritime Safety Force later renamed the Coastal Safety Force, was established to deal with maritime security. In August of the same year, a Safety Agency was formed to administer the nascen t military forces Police and Coastal Finally, on October 15, 1952, the Security Agency (Hoancho) was established with jurisdiction ovel; ground and maritime forces and capabilities sufficient to "maintain internal order.l1 The size of the armed forces was then increased to 110,000 men.20 The Japanese government has consistently With the passage of defense bills in both houses of the Japanese Diet (May and June 1954), a new security agency, the Defense Agency (Boeicho), was formally established on July 1 19

54. Similarly, the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces were also inaugurated In 1956 the National Defense Council, an advisory body, was created with responsibility for formulating defense policy and recommending the size, shape and composition o f the Self-Defense Forces In May of 1957, the IIBasic Policies for Defense previously noted were drawn up within the terms of the Consti tution and provided the foundation upon which all subsequent defense programs have been built of those Forces were ach i eved by means of a series of four programs the first of which was introduced in 1958 The expansion and modernization l9 2o Defense Agency.of Japan, Defense of Japan, 1978 (Tokyo, 1978), p. 57 Cf. Rodger Swearingen, The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan Chall e nge and Response (Stanford 203 Escalating Hoover Institution Press 1978 p 9 The First Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1958-60) was designed to Ilconstruct a fundamental ground defense capability- in order to cope with the rapid reductions in U.S. ground forces s t ationed in Japan.1121 The plan also aimed at establishing maritime and air defense capabilities. During this period, Japan anticipated leasing some ships, aircraft and substantial equipment from the United States. The plan also called for recruitment of 1 8 0,000 ground force personnel, construction of about 124,000 tons of shipping and acquisiti0.n of about 1,300 aircraft thening that defense potential Vo the point of capability in meeting conventional aggression on a scale no greater than local ized 'confl i ct.1t22 Especially important here was the call for qualitative improvements in the basic defense capability in light of the development of scientific technology. goals of this Plan were the programmed replacement of obsolete equipment, the introduction of ground-to-air missiles, and the institution of an ongoing R&D program The Second Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1962-66 aimed at streng Among the major The Third Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1967-71) was aimed at consolidating the defense potential of each of the v arious services.

However, special emphasis was placed on strengthening maritime defense capability within Japanese coastal waters and ai,r defense capability in key areas.

The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1972-76) was essentially a follow-up program of the previous plan was placed on the modernization and replacement of outmoded equipment, improvements in maritime and air defense capability and specific increases in the various armed forces levels. Some of the goals of the Fourth Plan were unattainable , particul'arly arms acquisition, due in large measure to the economic situation resulting from the oil crisis. In the period that followed the defense budget was not substantially increased and was limited to, what Professor Kataoka calls, Mikits canonize d Ill percent of GIGi1 uncrossable barrier Once again emphasis Given the fact that a Fifth Buildup Plan was economically untenable and politically unfeasible due to the mounting pacifist opposition to enlarging the SDF, the Miki government espoused a new p rogram which, in their minds, could provide for external defense and satisfy pacifist opposition.

In October of 1976, the Japanese government abandoned the various Buildup Plans, opting instead for a "National Defense Program Outline.Il objectives for defe nse buildup within a fixed time frame, the Unlike the previous plans which had set specific 21 Defense of Japan, 1978, p. 63. 22 TLIA LUAU. 23 Eka, Waiting' for a "Pearl Harbor p. 47. 10 National Defense Program Outline" was designed to set fundamental gu i delines for Japan's defense posture in the future.24 Outline no longer simply estimated defense capability in light of any potential threat, but aimed at providing, even in peacetime, a balanced defense posture capable of coping effectively with situation s up to the point of limited and small scale aggression rather than maintaining a defensive force capable of surviving a full-scale conventional war as had been previously emphasized in earlier government plans. Whereas previous defense plans have been spe c ifically detailed (see accompanying chart the new Outline spoke more in generalities and referred to the overall mission of the Self-Defense Forces rather than stipulating the exact nature and composition of each branch The The Defence Buildup 1958 to 197 6 lat Plan 2ndhn 3rd Plan 4th Plan 1958 1960 I962 1966 1967 1971 1972 1976 Scu-Dcraa O~CM 170,000 men 171.500 men 179.000 men 180.000 men Unib deployed 6 Divisions 12 Mvidonr rrgio~lly in pucetime 3 Combined Brigades Ground 1 Meckzcd Com- 1 Medunizcd Divi d efmca bind Brigade don Bdc Mobile Operation Units 1 Tank Group 1 Tank Gioup Units 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Traininp, Brigade 12 Divisions 12 Divisions 1 Combmed Brigade 1 Mechanized Divi 1 Tank Group I ArtiUery Brigtde 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Trninii Brigade 1 Heliconter Brimdc ion 1 Mechanized Din 1 Tank Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade don Low Altitude Ground-to-Air 2 ht+crsft Mi0 u nits Ar(lllerv Battalions 4 Anti-Airerait Artillery Groups another group being planned 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups Anti4ubmarine Surface Ship 3 Escort Flotilks 3 Escort Flotillas 4 Escort Flotillas 4 Escort Flotillas bkitime Units (for mob& operation defence Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship 5 Divisions 5 Divirimns IO Divisions 10 Divisions Bulc Units (Rqiolul District Units) Units Submarine Units 2 Divisions 4 Divisions 6 Divisions Minesweeping Units 1 Flotilla 2 Flotillas 2 Flotillas 2 Flotillas Land-Base d Anti-Submarine 9 Squadrons 15 Sqvrdronr 14 Squadrons 17 Squadrons Ahaft Units Anti-Submarine Surface Ships 57 Ships 59 ships 59 Ships 61 Ships Major Submarins 2 Submarina 7 Submarhz 12 Submarines 14 Submarines equipment Opcntiorul Aircraft Apx. 220 Airdt Apx. 230 Airaaft APL 240 Airdt) Apx. 210 Aucxaft Apx. 310 Aircraft Aircraft Control and Warning 24 Groups 24 Groups 24 Groups 28 Groups Units 10 Squadrons 'Air Interceptor Units 12 Squadrons I5 Squadrons 10 squadronr defence Support Fighter Units 4 Squadr o ns 4 Squadrons 3 Squadrons Buic Ai Reconnaissana Units 1 Squadmn 1 Squadron 1 Squadron Unitr Air Transport Units 2 Squadrons 3 Sq,udrons 3 Squadrons Euly Warning Units High-Altitude Gmumi-to-Air 2 GIOUPS 4 Groups Missile Units POUP wing 3 Squadrons 5 Grou p s [Another PliUUlCd aor operntlolur Aircraft upx. i.i30 Aucnlt) upx. 1,100 Aircraft) (Apx. 940 Auadt 4:g,:t& equipment Note: pUmthe&d numbers of operational aircraft denote total numbers of-aircraft including trainers The numbers of units from the 1st to 3 rd Buildup Plans are as of the end of each plan period 24 Defense of Japan, 1978, p. 68 11 The Outline further states that if greater than a "limited and small-scale aggressionll is encountered, the standard defense force should be capable Itof continuing effective resistance until such time as cooperation with the United States can be introduced thus rebuffing such aggression.

In essence, the Outline aimed at a qualitative, rather than quantitative improvement in Japan's defense posture, emphasizing impro vements in logistical infrastructure, maritime surveillance and air defense. The Defense Agency, having lowered their sights to attainable goals, was now able to lay down for the first time rather specific,levels of arms maintenance, replacement schedules and accompanying budgets It remains to to be seen, however whether such qualitative changes have significantly improved the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, and whether these changes are sufficient to meet the changing military balance in the Far East THE CHANGING MILITARY BALANCE IN THE PACIFIC Contemporary Japanese defense planning remains rooted in the Standard Defense Force Concept enunciated in 19

76. Essential to an understanding of this program, particularly its emphasis on repelling only lim.ited, small-scale aggression, is its..evaluation of the domestic and international situation at the time. This perspective assumed that no major changes wer e anticipated in the domestic and international situation in the foreseeable. future,26 and that any aggression requiring advance preparation would allow time for the arrival, deployment and use of adequate U.S. forces.

While such assumptions may have been valid in 1976, developments over the past five years call into question the continuing legiti macy of such premises.

The most significant change in the past five years has been the continued and unrelenting buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear mili tary power and the increasing interference, through surrogates such as the Cubans, in the internal affairs of other nations (e.g., Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Afghanistan The dimension of the Soviet military buildup is particularly revealing when one e x amines overall Soviet defense spending: For each of the past twenty years, Soviet defense spending has in creased steadily and significantly by an average of 4-5 percent a year. According to CIA estimates, the Soviets allocate 12-14 percent of their GNP t o defense, whereas the United States spends only about 5 percent. The discrepancy is all the more remarkable 25. 26 9 Ibid P' 202.

Ibid p. 69.

Theiganization of Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1982 Supplement, p. 1 27 12 when one considers that the Soviet GNP only ranges between 50 and 75 percent that of the United States.. According to former Secre tary of Defense Harold Brown, the Soviets spent about 50 percent more than the United States on defense in.1980 (using estimated d ollar costs).28 In terms of investment efforts (research and development, procurement and military construction), the statistics are similarly revealing. Only a decade ago (1970), Soviet invest ments began exceeding those of the United States; today, Sovi e t investments are 80 percent greater than those of the U.S over the past decade U.S. investments'have fallen some 20 percent Soviet investments have risen 50 percent. From 1968 to 1979 Soviet investments are estimated to have been $270 billion more than t h ose of the United States While Throughout the past decade the Soviets with their commitment of massive resources have continued to strengthen and modernize their armed forces in all categories. As to their strategic offensive forces, the Soviets have now completed deployment of their fourth generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles including the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-

19. There has been a twenty percent growth in th size of the Soviet SSBN force in the last five years alone, accompanied by a 356 perc ent growth in the DELTA SSBN force (from 9 to 32 units today nuc,lear forces have been considerably augmented by the BACKFIRE bomber and me MIRVed SS-20 misslle. Similarly, conventional forces have been upgraded, thereby enhancing their ability to conduct distant operations Their theater Especially noteworthy is the recent assessment offered by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their Military Posture Statement for FY 19

82. The posture statement notes that Ithe military balance between the U nited States and the Soviet Union continues to shift toward the latter Nowhere is this shift more evident than in the Far East and approximately 1.83 million men, 43 divisions are deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier, two are on Sakhalin Island, and on e on Kamchatka. In the area east of Lake Baikal, over three quarters of the total land force 34 divisions, comprising some 350,000 men are deployed. Most of these ground forces consist of motor rifle divisions, with modern equipment, armored mobility heavy fire power and good air defense ~apabilities Few of these divisions, however, are fully combat ready by U.S. standards Of the total Soviet ground forces, consisting of 173 divisions The Soviet Pacific Fleet, more than any other branch of the armed forces, has been visibly upgraded. In 1979 alone, the 28 29 Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget January 19, 1981, p. 15.

Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980 (Tokyo 1980 p. 30 I 13 Fleet received as many as eight new ships, totaling-81,450 tons raising its total strength to 785 vessels, or 1,520,000 tons.30 Among these additions were: the Minsk, the second of the Kiev class aircraft carriers (32,000 tons); the Petropavlovsk, the fifth Kara-class missile-c a rrying cruiser (8,200 tons); the Ivan Rogov, the first of the new amphibious assault transport/dock ships (11,000 tons); a Ropucha-class landing vessel (3,450 tons a Dubna-class supply ship (12,000 tons); the Tashkent, a Kara-class missile cruiser (8,200 t ons); and two missile destroyers of the Krivak I and II-class (each 3,300 tons).31 The Fleet itself has a total of 507 combat ships, comprising 110 submarines32 (including 30 carrying strategic missiles); one ASW aircraft carrier 78 cruisers, destroyers, . and frigates; and 318 amphibious ships and boats, patrol boats and mine warfare ships. Of the Fleet's 169 attack submarines, ASW aircraft carrier cruisers, destroyers and frigates, approximately one-fourth are equipped with missiles carrying nuclear or co n ventional warheads capable of attacking surface ships and submarines. The Fleet flag is at Vladivostok, with most of the surface combatant ships as well as half of the submarine fleet, attached to the southern segment of the Fleet stationed in the Sea of J apan.33 segment of the Fleet, primarily stationed at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, is heavily weighted with submarines See map of major Soviet naval facilities in area surrounding Japan The Northern Soviet air strength in the area is approxima tely 2,060 Capabilities'for attacking ground aircraft. These include about 450 bombers, 1,450 fighters, and about 160'patrol planes targets and ships have been enhanced, as has their stand-off attack capability.

In terms of theater nuclear forces, the Sovi ets have now deployed the TU-22M BACKFIRE bomber, a small number of which are stationed around Irkutsk, and the SS-20, deployed east of Lake Baikal. The SS-20 is a mobile, solid-fuel-propelled IRBM with three 150-KT nuclear MIRVed missiles with a range ca pability of some 5,000 km. These missiles and bombers are capable of reaching almost any part of.Asia, including Taiwan, Korea, China and Japan.

Of particular significance to Japan has been the increased Soviet presence on the Northern Islands (see map insertion) about 30 Ibid p. 31 31. Ibid p. 36 32 Some estimates give 130 submarines.

Space Technology, March 9, 1981 and Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily May 2, 1980.

According to Soviet Analyst, Vol 8, No. 3 (8 February 1979), two new submarine bases are being constructed near Vladivostok for the use of Delta I1 and Delta I11 types See, for example, Aviation Week and 33 14 MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL FACILITIES IN AREA SURROUNDING JAPAN 74 Kamchatka reriuiauLa p n I N i kolayey sk Kurile Islands Sovetskaya Gavan E torofu Is Kunashiri Is.

Shikotan Is The Habomeis Islands PACIFIC OCEAN 7 b Ofl Okinawa Islands b 0 0 4 Naval Facility 0 SHIKOTAN Ma tsugahama Bay HOKKAIDO THE HABOMEIS ISLANDS d' Fu'rukamappu Harbor/ 1 Anchorage Tomari Bay Airfield THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES 15 10 kilometers off Hokkaido. Immediately after the end of World War 11, the Soviets invaded the northern islands and stationed a corp of troops and RIG-17 fighters on the island of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Such a military presence was to remain until the summer of 1960 when Khrushchev announced a decision to cut Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men.

However, the Soviets began reintroducing ground troops and creating military installations on the two islands from around May 19

78. Since the summer of 1979, they have extended their operations to the island of Shikotan (which never had been occu pied approaches the size of a division circa 6000 men. Divisional headquarters is on the island of Etorofu with tanks, surface-to-air mi s siles, and other weapons of a motor rifle division, as well as with large-caliber 130 mm guns. Armed helicopters with anti-tank missiles have recently been sighted 12 MIG-24s The Air Defense Force comprises approximately 24 In contrast to the slow but ste a dy upgrading of Soviet The combined total of Soviet forces on these islands The troops are equipped MIG-~~s forces in the Far East is the somewhat static position of U.S forces. U.S. troop'strength in the Pacific has shrunk from a level of 250,000 in 1964 , the baseline year before the Vietnam buildup, to some 130,000 today. U..S. force levels currently are at their lowest in three decades. The only readily available major maneuverable.force west of Hawaii are the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea and the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa.

Correspondingly, only seven amphibious ships are assigned to the Pacific Fleet four of which were assigned to the Arabian Sea during part of the Iranian Crisis. In mid-1964, the U.S. had 15 Air Force fighter squadrons; today, th eir number has been reduced to five. While the Pacific Fleet, composed of the 7th and 3rd Fleets, had 11 carriers in 1964 (both CVA and ASW), today there are only six (CVA/N Though four were formerly deployed with the Seventh Fleet, only two are still per m anently attached.35 Though a rough state of equilibrium exists today between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Far East, the future forecast is far less certain. In his farewell address as Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific (October 31, 1979, Hawaii), Admiral Maurice F.

Weisner poignantly observed "that Soviet momentum in conventional military force improvements will put us in second place especi ally here in the Pacific where we are no longer in a position of military superiority and where military par ity is threatened 34 AsianSecurity- pp. 42-45 35 Cf. John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabili ties 1960-1980, p. 348. 16 Further complicating the overall Pacific environment is the threat posed by North Korea. In 1979, the U.S. intelligence community admitted that its estimates of the North Korean armed forces were too low. North Korean ground forces were reappraised upwards by 25 percent to 600,000 men; the number of divisions by 40 percent to 37; and tanks by over 33 percent t o 2,6

00. North Korea today possesses the world's fifth largest army and the sixth largest submarine force.

In contrast, the South Korean armed forces are seriously outnumbered. Though their ground forces are roughly equivalent the North Koreans hold a de cided 3:l edge in aircraft, a 2.5:l edge in tanks, and a 4:l superiority in ships. This unstable military position is particularly significant given Japan's recognition that her security is intimately tied to that of Korea.

CURRENT ANALYSIS OF THE SELF-DE FENSE FORCES Given the ever-increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union and North Korea to the overall military balance in the Far East it is important to ask whether current Japanese Self-Defense Force levels are adequate to meet potential aggressors.

Th e Japanese Self-Defense Force is currently divided into three separate branches: Ground, Maritime and Air. The Force's primary responsibility is to stand ready to repel any armed incursion against the home islands.of Japan therefore, defensive in nature a n d has been structured according ly. Current force levels in all branches, however, are inadequate and seriously jeopardize Japan's ability to defend itself against external aggression. Before reviewing the current mission status and operational capability of each branch of the Self Defense Force, including.new equipment allocations for the coming year, a few words need to be said about the current defense budget and the overall budgetary process Its mission-is Current Budget The budgetary process in Japan, particularly the role of the bureaucracy in formulating fiscal policy, differs dramatically from that found in the United States and hence deserves review.

The Finance Ministry (Okurasho) is the primary bureaucratic organ charged with determining the budg et for all ministries and agencies in the Japanese government. Performing more than an advisory function, the Finance Ministry often comes into conflict with the Diet as well as the leadership of the LDP. Unlike U.S departments, which take a limited .role in determining government fiscal policy, the Finance Ministry operates like an autonomous Om; any major decision must clear the Ministry'before its imple mentation. 17 In particular, the defense budget has always generated controversy between the Finance M inistry, the Defense Agency and the LDP-controlled Diet. The Ministry prefers to fund domestic programs and has generally taken a dim view of military and defense-related projects and expenditures. With the decline in the growth of the Japanese economy, t h e reluctance of the Ministry to expend funds for the Self-Defense Forces has risen proportion ately period (announced on April 29, 1981) will further fuel the Finance Ministry's arguments for fewer defense-related allocations The decision to hold back aut o imports over a three-year The Japanese political custom of decision by consensus requires consultation with the Finance Ministry before implement ing any fiscal policies. This decision-making process, coupled with the Finance Ministry's monopoly on econo m ic information necessary in formulating the budget, assures the continued import ance of the Ministry in the budgetary process In May of last year, Prime Minister Ohira agreed in principle to an increase in Japanese defense spending as a percentage of GNP . Following Ohira's untimely death, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki reaffirmed Japan's commitment to improving national defense through an increase in the defense budget cant increases in the defense budget would be impossible, the full Cabinet on July 29 appr o ved a scheme exempting the defense budget from the overall ceiling placed on other ministerial budget requests. The defense ceiling was set at a 9.7 percent increase rather than the 7.9 percent for other agencies. Accord ingly, the Defense Agency requeste d a budget of Y2,474 billion representing 0.92 percent.of Japan's GNP.

During subsequent negotiations, the Finance Ministry cut defense appropriations to 6.6 percent. Suzuki, however, was able to achieve a compromise of a 7.6 percent increase, bringing the approved budget to Y2,400 billion or approximately $11.8 billion.

This budgetary increase, after adjusting for inflation, amounts to about a 4 percent increase in real terms only a 0.6 percent rise over last year's increase I Despite warnings by Finance Ministry officials that signifi Capabilities and Deficiencies of the Self-Defense Forces A) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF The primary mission of the GSDF is to prevent foreign nations Given the. geographic configura- from successfully invading Japan tio n of Japan, ground forces should be highly mobile, able to be quickly deployed in a variety of terrains and locations.

Accordingly the GSDF emphasizes armor as the primary, mobile striking force. Currently, the GSDF has about 830 tanks on line most of which are the older Type061 model.

Japan's aging tank capability, the new budget calls for 72 Type-74 In order to upgrade 18 tanks to supplement current strength levels. In addition, the new allocation calls for an additional nine Type-73 armored personnel ca rriers and 36 203mm and 155mm self-propelled howitzers in order to "beef up present levels of mobile, support artillery.

The present personnel quota of the GSDF is 180,000 troops.

However, current manpower is maintained at only 86 percent of the authorized quota with a ready reserve force of 39,000 buildup plan announced by Prime Minister Suzuki on April 28, 1981 calls for the addition of 25,000 troops to the active ground force, t hereby bringing its strength to the authorized level.

The anti-tank capability of the GSDF lags far behind current technology found in other ground forces. Japan has yet to deploy an effective anti-tank missile system and still relies on the 84mm recoiless rifle which has a relatively short kill range and limited destructive capability. The Type-79 anti-tank and anti ship missile launchers are scheduled for deployment this year but production will leave the GSDF anti-tank capability below desired levels Th e B) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF The MSDF has a two-fold mission: to protect the nation against seaborne invasion and to secure the sea lanes around Japan in the event of war The MSDF emphasizes anti-submarine warfare. Consequently its ability to def end against missile and airborne attack at sea is considered inadequate.

Japan's naval capability, the new budget includes authorizations for one 4,500 ton destroyer; two 2,900 ton destroyers; one 2,300 ton submarine-killer submarine; two 440 ton minesweep ers; and six HSS-2B anti-submarine warfare helicopters. In addition, the MSDF is.currently deploying the P3C and has plans to purchase 'one more squadron for deployment in late 1982 In an attempt to upgrade and strengthen In the event of war in the Pacifi c , Japan would be incapable of mining the strategically important straits which surround Japan and would be unable to I1choke-offt1 the Soviet Navy at Vladivostok. The MSDF currently deploys only one minelayer and has not announced intentions to purchase a nother, though methods of improving Japan's minelaying capabilities are currently under consideration.

In an attempt to upgrade transport capabilities, construction has begun on two 500 ton transport vessels to support the six ships currently providing mar itime, logistic support to the GSDF C) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF The ASDF is organized, equipped and deployed to engage in defensive operations only strikes against a potential enemy, the ASDF must be able to react Denied the right to initiate air quic kly to intercept and destroy airborne invaders with little prior warning In order to bolster ground radar capability, the ASDF has decided to purchase two E-2C early warning aircraft in FY 1982 and two more in FY 19

83. In addition, Japan's ground radar equipment is being modernized and the current Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system in use since 1967 is being upgraded, with studies currently underway to determine a suitable replacement.

Japan's main interceptor-fighter, the F-4EJ, has become somewhat obsolete in view of the more sophisticated aircraft being introduced in and around the area of Japan by other nations.

Consequently, in 1978, the F-15 was selected to replace it with the first squadron scheduled for deployment in the latter half of 19

82. Additionally, Japan lacks an adequate electronic warfare capability, precision-guided bombs and a sophisticated air defense missile system. The NIKE, operational since 1962, remains Japan's primary surface-to-air missile defense though plans f or its replacement. are currently under consideration In order to upgrade the ASDF, the current budget calls for the purchase of two F-1 supersonic ground support fighters; two U.S.-made C-130H Hercules transport planes; four E-2C Hawkeye airborne early w a rning planes; and'two units of short-range SAM system called Tan-SAM D) Other Capabilities and Deficiencies The system for combined and joint operations and the command and control structure are considered deficient., Effective combined and joint operatio ns are nearly impossible under present circum stances since there is as yet no established mechanism for crisis management, for a wartime leadership structure, for joint opera tions of three services, and for combined Japan4.S. operations.

Similarly, readi ness is at an extremely low level. A mobili zation system has not yet been established of personnel and equipment are considered insufficient, a tendency particularly noted above in the GSDF Peacetime reserves Finally, there is the problem of sustainabili t y in a wartime situation. Present stockpiles of munitions, fuel, food and other equipment are considered low sioned by the growing power of both the Soviet Union and North Korea, and the present state of Japanese defense efforts, one can easily conclude t hat the Japanese Self-Defense Forces leave much to be desired in both quality and quantity.

National Security Study Group, appointed by Prime Minister Ohira Given the growing military imbalance in the Far East occa A' similar conclusion was arrived at by the Comprehensive 20 during the summer of 19

80. In their Report on Comprehensive National Security, the Group ridiculed the current capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, noting that a half of the defense equipment was virtually useless, arms stockpiles were insufficient and security effortswere, in general, deplorable.

CONCLUSION In the future, the international environment in the Pacific i) the growing military power of the. Soviet Pacific Fleet, and the introduction of the BACKFIRE bomber and the SS- 20 missile the ever-increasing instability on the Korean Peninsula will be more forbidding, particularly in light of 2 3) the sagging position of the US. in the area particularly the Seventh Fleet's over-commitment recent requirements of Fleet activity in the Indian Ocean and continuing responsiblity north of Formosa): and 4 the existing deficiencies within the Self-Defense Forces I With these factors in mind, what should be the appropriate response I I the potential military challenges which lie ahead and maritime force improvements be given to the following of'the Japanese government to adequately and successfully meet i In the short term, greater emphasis must be placed-on air Particular consideration should procuring additional P-3C anti-submarine warfa re aircraft capable of mining waters SH-3B ASW helicopters and ASW frigates for the maritime forces. procuring new destroyers, CG-

47. Aegis cruisers and dest'oyer escorts armed with surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, and additional RH-53E minesweeping helicopters. strengthening surveillance capabilities on the coast and the Straits upgrading early warning capabilities with a greater number of E-2C early warning aircraft. increasing the number of F-15 fighters and procurement of long-range, land-based F-14 fighters armed with Phoenix air-to-air missiles. I 21 improving the BADGE system. converting NIKE units to SAM-X units.

In addition, consideration should be given to stockpiling petroleum, ammunition and other supplies; increasing interservice exercises and joint maneuvers with the United States assuming more of the burden of stationing American forces on the home islands cr e ating a Central Command HQ In the long-term, Japanese defense planners should consider first extending the range of defensive operations, through the I acquisition of new guided missile and helicopter-carrying destroy ers, modern anti-ship missiles for us e against surface combatants and more destroyers with improved air defense equipment range submarines (possibly nuclear) might also be introduced.

Consideration should also be given to the acquisition of a V/STOL aircraft carrier, similar perhaps to the Soviet Kiev-class carrier All P-3J aircraft should be replaced with P-3Cs and all F-4Js with either F-15 or even the F-

16. Finally, consideration should be given to the establishment of an amphibious/airborne, force I Long During both the short- and long-t erm, Japan must seriously re-evaluate much of the philosophy underlying its current defense posture It is hoped such a re-examination will lead to the discarding of such meaningless taboos as the 1 percent ceiling canonized during the Miki administration. Similarly, one would hope that the prohibitions against possession of offensive weapons and the sending of Self-Defense Forces abroad in any contingency would be eliminated. Consideration should also be given to the abandonment of the three non-nuclear pr inciples and export controls on defense equipment.

Japan should be encouraged to define and develop its own concept of security and act accordingly In such a re-examination and re-evaluation William L. Scully Policy Analyst Guy M. Hicks Policy Analyst


Guy M.

William Hicks

Bradley Fellow in Education Policy