Testimony of Peter T.R.
Brookes
Before
The Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
June
15, 2004
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,
it is an honor and privilege to appear before you today to discuss
the decision of the United States to draw down forces from the
Korean peninsula.
I want to commend you for holding this
very timely hearing as there are many questions being asked on both
sides of the Pacific that should be addressed in an open
forum.
I am testifying here today as an individual and my views do not
necessarily reflect the views of The Heritage
Foundation.
The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) defense relationship took
a major step into the 21st century this month with the announcement
that Washington
would withdraw one-third of its 37,000 troops from the Republic of
Korea by the end of 2005.
The news, not completely unexpected in light of the United States'
decision in May of this year to send 3,600 combat troops from South
Korea to Iraq, still has observers nervous on both sides of the
Pacific.
It is my view that they need not be.
Even though this is the largest drawdown of American forces from
Korea since the end of the Korean War-and the most significant
since 1992, when 7,000 troops left-the reduction in 12,500 U.S.
soldiers from the Korean peninsula is, in my estimation, a win-win
situation for the United States and the Republic of
Korea.
First, in a general sense, the number of troops does not completely
determine the military capability of any force. And the 37,000
American troops currently stationed in the Republic of Korea is
only a small portion of the U.S. troops that would actually be
needed in the event of a Korean peninsula contingency.
In fact, despite the upcoming decrease in American soldiers in the
Republic of Korea, according to the Pentagon, U.S. firepower will
actually increase due to expected improvements in American force
structure over the next several years.
Although technology cannot replace soldiers in some missions,
today's hi-tech equipment can provide significant firepower
advantages over the common foot soldier.
Therefore, the United States can withdraw some of its Korean-based
troops for other solider-intensive missions, such as Iraq,
Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, while actually improving the
lethality and deterrence of its forces in the ROK.
Improving the defense capability of U.S.
Forces Korea (USFK) can be accomplished by bringing to bear such
systems as Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for air defense,
the Army's new Stryker brigade, the Navy's High-Speed Vessel, and
the forward-deployment of additional air and naval assets to Hawaii
and Guam.
Washington is also planning an $11
billion investment in some additional 150 military capabilities
over the next four years that will enhance defense against any
North Korean attack, according to the Department of
Defense.
Secondly, it is useful for both Seoul and Washington to reduce the
visibility and "footprint" (that is, the size and number of bases)
of U.S. forces because of trends in South Korean public opinion,
which has been mixed-at best-- about USFK's presence.
Moving the American army out of Seoul, drawing down troop levels
and consolidating bases will reduce pressures from some sectors of
Korean society for all U.S. troops to leave.
Returning valuable land to the city of Seoul is an important
gesture and it makes no sense to have U.S. military forces
operating in the midst of a metropolitan area, which is home to 12
million people.
Shifting U.S. troops away from the DMZ and south of the Han River
will improve the maneuverability and flexibility of our forces,
increasing their deterrent effect and war fighting
capability.
Next, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun stated his belief early
on in his tenure that the Republic of Korea should do more for its
own defense. As the world's 11th largest economy, the ROK can spend
more on its own defense-and should.
It is already doing so with the procurement of the power projection
systems such as the F-15K fighters, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems,
P-3 anti-submarine aircraft and KDX-II/III destroyers with Aegis.
In addition, it has requested an 13 percent increase in its defense
spending for next year from the National Assembly.
Despite these positive developments, the ROK can still do
more.
Moreover, the reduction in U.S. forces will provide the Roh
government an opportunity to do more for the Republic of Korea's
national security as promised.
This supports both Washington's need for more flexibility in
deploying its forces to global hotspots and Seoul's desire for a
bigger role in its national defense.
Lastly, though unlikely, there is a sliver of a chance-perhaps
less- that the reduction of U.S. forces could help reduce
North-South Korean tensions. The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) long has demanded that U.S. troops leave the
peninsula.
This reduction could be seen as a gesture of goodwill to the DPRK
that just might lead to some additional political openings between
Seoul and Pyongyang in addressing issues of national reconciliation
or even North Korea's nuclear program.
But because no one is naïve regarding North Korean intentions
or petulance, the U.S. force reduction will be matched by an
increase in USFK's military capabilities.
The bottom line is that despite these changes, America's commitment
to the ROK's defense is as strong as ever. The United States'
obligation to the security of the South against the North is a
moral one in the defense of a fellow democracy, not to mention
codified in the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.
Moreover, the real "tripwire" is the Mutual Defense Treaty, not the
number of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea. The tripwire
analogy is a false concept and anachronistic. The troop reduction
should not be viewed as a weakening of America's
resolve.
A military confrontation between North and South Korea would
invariably result in the demise of the regime in Pyongyang.
Fortunately, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il understands
this.
The U.S.-ROK alliance is a partnership forged in blood and valor.
It is strengthened by the shared values of freedom, democracy, open
markets and the millions of Koreans who have come to America's
shores as immigrants.
The alliance has successfully deterred North Korean aggression,
provided for peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and fostered
the growth of freedom and prosperity in the ROK for over 50 years.
It should do so for as long as needed because it continues to be in
America's interest to do so.
Adjusting the U.S.-ROK partnership for the 21st century makes
ultimate sense.
The
future of the alliance will be better for this, making the
relationship ready for challenges on the Korean peninsula-- and
beyond.