The February 25 inauguration of conservative Lee Myung-bak as
South Korea's president will do much to repair the damage wrought
by five years of the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration.
Under Roh, Seoul's relations with the U.S. and Japan deteriorated,
its outreach to North Korea was counterproductive, and domestic and
foreign investors were driven overseas by vacillating economic
policies and South Korea's declining competitiveness.
Lee is expected to improve strained relations with Washington,
implement a more pragmatic policy toward North Korea, and establish
a business-friendly environment. President Roh's departure also
sets the stage for greater integration with the U.S. on security
policy and more effective multilateral efforts to denuclearize
North Korea. The result should be a firm foundation for realizing
the full potential of the bilateral relationship.
President-elect Lee will enjoy a honeymoon period of positive
U.S. opinion, especially during an early summit meeting with
President George W. Bush. However, to maintain U.S. support, Lee
will have to avoid political landmines. He must describe his North
Korean policy more fully, continue a vigorous outreach to the
foreign business community, and deliver on his economic
An Ideological Mandate
Lee Myung-bak's landslide victory was a decisive mandate from the
voters, who gave him almost as many votes as all of the other
candidates combined. Lee defeated his closest competitor by the
largest margin since the reintroduction of direct elections in
South Korea in 1987. Because Lee positioned himself as a
centrist alternative to conservative Lee Hoi-chang and progressive
Chung Dong-young, his victory is perceived as a rejection of
both progressive and conservative ideology. Many U.S. and South
Korean pundits assume that Lee's policies, particularly toward
North Korea, will not differ significantly from those of
Lee's election represents a rebuff not only of Roh, but also of
the progressive movement. After 10 years of liberal policies, the
electorate rejected the message, not just the messenger. If, as
some claim, Lee's victory was due to the public's overwhelming
desire for a corporate executive-style president to improve the
economy, then progressive Moon Kook-hyun, the chief executive
officer of Yuhan-Kimberly, would have received more than 5.8
Lee has played to his public image by portraying himself as a
pragmatist rather than as a conservative, not only to
distinguish himself from candidate Lee Hoi-chang, but also to
distance himself from the unpopular authoritarian excesses of past
conservative administrations. "Pragmatism" has become the
moniker for the Lee administration, replacing the Roh
administration's "participatory government." In his inauguration
speech, Lee repeatedly used the term to differentiate his
administration, emphasizing that "we must move from the age of
ideology into the age of pragmatism."
Yet despite his assertions, his "pragmatic" economic,
education, and foreign policies are based on the conservative
principles of the Grand National Party (GNP) and directly opposed
to the progressive, redistributive policies of the Roh
administration. The one area in which Lee differed with
conservative candidate Lee Hoi-chang was on the degree of
reciprocity to demand from North Korea in the engagement
Polls show that the public has become more conservative
since 2003, though retaining a preference for progressive views on
some social issues. The result is that the political center in
South Korea is now occupied by a pragmatic conservatism.
Lee was able to maintain consistently high approval ratings
despite being plagued by countless scandal allegations. Eight
principal factors account for this.
First, the public was simply fed up with all
progressive candidates after 10 years of progressive
administrations and was eager for change. The much-vaunted
386-generation politicians were seen as having wasted
their opportunity to govern. The public punished the progressive
candidates for President Roh's determination to bring about
societal transformation rather than focusing on ensuring
the country's economic recovery.
Second, economic issues drove the election. The public
believed Lee was more likely to improve the economy, induce
domestic and foreign investment, create jobs, and improve South
Korean competitiveness against China and Japan. The younger
generation (those in college or recently graduated) are more
conservative and economically entrepreneurial than their
radical 386-generation predecessors, who strongly supported Roh.
Facing a higher unemployment rate than the rest of the population,
the "19-29 generation" (between the ages of 19 and 29) is more
interested in job creation than progressive ideology.
Third, the many scandal allegations against Lee failed
to inflict any lasting damage. The predicted "death by a thousand
cuts" did not materialize. The allegations either lacked merit or
were pushed off the front page by other events, such as the Afghan
Fourth, the progressives' failure to unite behind a
single candidate and party was a lost opportunity. If they had done
so, they would have provided a formidable challenge to Lee by
providing a rallying point for the 30 percent of the populace that
still identifies itself as progressive.
Fifth, progress in the six-party talks at the time of
the election and the inter-Korean summit did not resonate strongly
with the public. A series of broken North Korean promises has
inoculated the populace against inter-Korean euphoria. There has
also been growing criticism over Roh's unconditional
engagement policy of providing massive benefits to Pyongyang
without securing political reform and moderation in North Korean
Sixth, public support for the U.S.-South Korea
relationship, which Roh and the progressives were seen as having
needlessly strained, has rebounded. The decline in
anti-Americanism, which was prevalent during the 2002
presidential campaign, coupled with declining support for
Roh's engagement policy, which failed to prevent the North Korean
missile and nuclear tests, resulted in more domestic support for
maintaining strong military ties with Washington.
Seventh, President Roh had short political
coattails. Even the ruling Uri Party and its successor ran
away from the unpopular Roh. The presidency did not influence the
election because no one wanted his endorsement.
Eight, regionalism remains a factor. Lee Myung-bak
gained votes from the conservative Gyeongsan provinces while Chung
Dong-young ran strongest in the traditional progressive stronghold
of the Cholla provinces. Lee's stint as mayor of Seoul gained him
stature in the capital city as well as in the surrounding Gyeonggi
province. (See Chart 2.)
Implementing a Principled Engagement
Lee Myung-bak's pragmatic demand for conditionality in
Seoul's engagement with North Korea will increase allied leverage
in the six-party talks and reduce Pyongyang's ability to play the
U.S. and South Korea against each other. A realistic policy that
requires reciprocity and transparency from North Korea will also be
more consistent with the six-party talks' goal of using coordinated
multilateral diplomatic efforts to leverage Pyongyang's
implementation of its nuclear commitments.
Under President Roh, South Korea pursued a unilateral,
uncoordinated policy that undermined the multilateral and
conditional approach of the six-party talks. By providing billions
of dollars in unconditional aid and promises of yet more
largesse, Seoul minimized its influence over Pyongyang
and marginalized its effectiveness in the talks. With a guaranteed
pipeline of benefits from South Korea, North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il had less need to comply with the "action for action"
requirements of the talks.
Lee will maintain South Korea's engagement policy but will
condition economic, humanitarian, and political benefits on the
pace of North Korean denuclearization. This is a significant
departure from Roh's approach of unconditional, asymmetric
provision of benefits without demanding any reciprocal
economic or diplomatic concessions from North Korea.
Although Lee has promised more conditionality when engaging
North Korea, his policy toward North Korea remains vague enough to
be a Rorschach test that allows for diverse and even
contradictory interpretations. After Lee's election, U.S.
analysts concluded that his demand for imposing conditionality when
engaging North Korea represented everything from mere campaign
rhetoric that masked a desire to maintain the status quo to a full
embrace of a neoconservative hard-line strategy.
As articulated during the presidential campaign, Lee's strategy
contains both progressive and conservative aspects, linking
offers of significant economic incentives for North Korean
development with concrete progress toward North Korean
denuclearization and implementation of political and economic
reforms. His proposal to raise the individual North Korean living
standard to $3,000 per year and allocate $40 billion to an
international cooperative fund would have been castigated by
conservatives as needlessly extravagant if President Roh Moo-hyun
had proposed it.
Lee Myung-bak's North
Seoul will help to provide economic
assistance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons
programs. Specifically, it will:
- Boost North Korean per capita income to $3,000
in 10 years.
- Establish five free trade areas.
- Establish 100 manufacturing companies
that can each export over $3 million annually.
- Educate and train 300,000 North Korean
- Create a $40 billion international fund to
develop the North Korean economy.
- Condition expansion of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex on North Korean denuclearization.
- Reassess all projects agreed to during the
October 2007 inter-Korean summit.
- Provide humanitarian assistance but
request that North Korea return POWs and
Progressives in South Korea and the U.S. have seized on these
economic incentives to deny the ideological nature of the
presidential election and discount the degree to which Lee will
alter the engagement policy. Conversely, his stated intention to
review all ongoing and proposed inter-Korean economic projects has
caused progressives to worry that he will suspend the engagement
policy, and they have expressed concern over Pyongyang's
Although Lee's North Korean policy remains uncertain, a number
of recent actions and statements suggest that Lee is making a
greater break from Roh's engagement strategy than is commonly
assumed. Specifically, Lee has:
- Proposed eliminating the Ministry of
Unification. Lee sought to downgrade the ministry to
a department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Although defeated by National Assembly opposition, the attempt
manifests Lee's intention to reverse Roh's prioritization of
inter-Korean relations above Seoul's partnership with
- Stated that inter-Korean projects will be subject
to political and economic conditions. On February 1, Lee
articulated that future inter-Korean cooperation would depend on
progress on North Korean denuclearization, economic feasibility,
availability of resources, and national consensus.
- Promised to raise sacrosanct issues. Lee and
his advisers have stated that Seoul will raise contentious
issues such as North Korean human rights during inter-Korean
meetings. The Roh and Kim Dae-jung administrations avoided
raising sensitive issues or supporting U.N. resolutions
condemning North Korean human rights abuses for fear of angering
Pyongyang and undermining Seoul's engagement efforts. Yoo Jong-ha,
a senior Lee adviser, stated that Seoul may condition economic
incentives on North Korea's return of 485 South Korean POWs.
In addition, Lee's national security ministers were critics of
Roh's engagement policy. The new ministers of foreign affairs,
defense, and unification and the national security adviser are
pro-U.S. advocates who are skeptical of North Korean
intentions. Nam Jooh-hong, Lee's original selection for
minister of unification, was derided as a neoconservative,
Cold War warrior, and proponent of North Korean collapse.
Lee Myung-bak's vision for conditioning South Korean aid on
North Korean behavior is a reversal of the Roh engagement policy,
which provided aid in hopes of eventually achieving reform. By the
October 2007 inter-Korean summit, Roh's policy had deteriorated to
promising a dramatic influx of benefits without any intention of
altering North Korea policy and even capitulating to Pyongyang's
demand to stop using the word "reform" in an inter-Korean
Although Lee will want to focus on domestic economic issues, he
will be forced to address North Korean recalcitrance early in his
administration. Kim Jong-il's refusal to abide by the data
declaration deadline of December 31, 2007, raises serious
concerns about Pyongyang's commitment to full
denuclearization. Pyongyang may also test the new South Korean
administration's resolve with escalatory behavior.
However, it is critical that Lee Myung-bak reject advice for
conciliatory measures to defuse a crisis and instead stand firm to
set the tone for the next five years of engagement. During the past
10 years, Kim Jong-il has been able to take South Korean
acquiescence for granted, to the detriment of the international
community's ability to achieve North Korean denuclearization.
Revitalizing Allied Relations
Lee Myung-bak has declared that repairing Seoul's relations with
Washington is his predominant foreign policy goal, citing the
bilateral military alliance as the bedrock of South Korean
security. Lee will give the South Korea-U.S. relationship
primacy, reversing Roh's subjugation of foreign affairs to further
inter-Korean ties. This is a dramatic change from the tone set by
Roh, who during the 2002 campaign asked: "What's wrong with being
anti-American?" Roh's administration was fraught with a series of
tensions brought on by differences over North Korean policy,
bilateral security issues, and remarks by the South Korean
president that generated suspicions over his views toward the
The new president would do well to seek common ground in
transforming the U.S.-South Korea military alliance to incorporate
enhanced South Korean military capabilities while maintaining
an integrated U.S. role. Washington and Seoul should conduct a
joint study of South Korean missile defense needs, including
potential integration into a multilateral ballistic missile defense
Yet Lee will risk alienating Washington if he presses too hard
on reversing the decision to transfer wartime operational
command to South Korea in 2012. Roh's quest to gain
operational command was depicted as regaining national sovereignty
and was consistent with his intent to distance South Korea from the
U.S. and to carve out an independent role for South Korea in
Conservative National Assembly members and former defense
ministers and generals were vehemently opposed to the idea,
which they thought would needlessly undermine South Korea's
national security. Moreover, they feared that disbanding the
integrated Combined Forces Command could serve as a precursor
to further U.S. troop cuts and eventual abandonment by
Washington. Reversing the decision has thus became a Holy
Grail for Roh's opponents, who see it as means to secure a
long-term U.S. commitment to defending South Korea.
U.S. defense officials are adamantly against reopening the
issue. Lee's transition team appears to have heard this message
during its visit to Washington in January and has since
downplayed the issue. In any case, it is better to defer the
contentious issue for several years when an assessment of the
status of the North Korean threat and South Korean military
capabilities may lead to closer agreement.
In the near term, Lee Myung-bak should request that Washington
assuage South Korean security concerns by reaffirming U.S. troop
deployment commitments, including the continued presence of
combat, attack helicopter, and air-defense units. Lee should also
underscore that Washington should treat its alliance with South
Korea on an equal basis with the U.S. military relationship with
Japan, including Seoul's inclusion in the U.S.-led "alliance
of values" with Japan, Australia, and India.
Improving Relations with Japan
Lee has already signaled that he hopes to improve relations with
Japan, an overture welcomed by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda.
Lee announced that he will not seek a formal apology from Japan for
its occupation of the Korean Peninsula during the early 20th
century. He commented to a visiting Japanese delegation that "Korea
and Japan must not be tied down by the past in order to set up a
new relationship for the sake of the future of Asia and the two
Lee signaled his intent to improve relations by holding his
first summit meeting with Fukuda. Both leaders agreed to resume the
biannual summit schedule that foundered under Roh. Trilateral
minister-level security policy meetings with the U.S. and
Japan should also be implemented.
Lee's outreach is an attempt to overcome historical
animosities, which were exacerbated by then-Prime Minister
Koizumi's controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and President
Roh's appeals to nationalist themes to reverse his flagging public
Stimulating Economic Growth Through Free-Market
Lee will implement a wide-ranging economic reform strategy to
reinvigorate South Korea's economy, spur growth, and reverse
the country's flagging competitiveness against regional rivals. He
will accomplish this through business-friendly policies favoring
deregulation, transparency, tax reform, and greater openness to
investment in marked contrast to Roh's redistributionist economic
policies, punitive real estate taxes, and protectionist
policies against foreign investors. The linchpin of his
campaign pledge is Plan 747 to achieve 7 percent annual growth
and $40,000 per capita income and to make South Korea the world's
seventh-largest economy by 2013.
Lee Myung-bak's Economic
- Plan 747: Achieve 7 percent annual growth and
$40,000 per capita income and make South Korea the world's 7th
largest economy in 10 years.
- Create 3 million new jobs.
- Assist 50,000 innovative small and medium-size
- Implement tax reform and reduce corporate
regulations to induce business investment.
- Reduce discriminatory practices to
stimulate increased foreign direct investment.
- Ease property development restrictions and
reduce new apartment prices by 10 percent.
- Strengthen government measures to combat
illegal labor strikes.
South Korea's top 10 companies have sat on $160 billion in cash
reserves rather than investing it domestically as a result of
uncertainty over Roh's economic policies and excessive
regulation. The Federation of Korean Industries
estimated that $23 billion in domestic spending was being delayed
because of excessive regulations on investment in the Seoul
However, President Lee will need to ensure that his
business-friendly policy is not construed as overly conciliatory to
the chaebol (South Korea's large family-owned
conglomerates). The chaebol fueled South Korea's
spectacular economic miracle, but their overleveraged debt
magnified the domestic impact of the 1997 Asian financial
Lee has stressed that enhancing the competitiveness of
small and medium-size enterprises will be the pillar of his
government's industrial policies and growth strategy because they
account for 90 percent of South Korea's employment. In a
post-election meeting with representatives of small businesses and
high-tech venture firms, he pledged tax cuts, credit guarantees, $1
billion for the Korean Small Business Innovation Research Program,
and a state fund worth an estimated $54 billion gained from
privatization sales of state-owned enterprises.
Economic disparity worsened during the Roh administration
despite its pledge to impose greater equality through
redistributionist policies aimed at societal transformation.
Although the South Korean populace welcomes Lee's economic growth
plans, it will grow increasingly critical if the
administration makes no progress in reducing economic
Lee has sought to dampen both excessive expectations and
early criticism by downplaying the potential for achieving 7
percent national economic growth during his administration's first
year. He emphasized that dismal global economic conditions,
soaring oil prices, and the government's already determined annual
budget would make reaching the growth target difficult. He
commented, "what I want to stress is not the seven percent target,
but that we will change the economic fundamentals to eventually
achieve that rate."
Domestic Factors in Policy Formulation
After Lee Myung-bak's landslide victory in South Korea's December
presidential election, the GNP seemed guaranteed to sweep the April
legislative election, but a series of missteps by the Lee
administration and bitter infighting among conservatives
lowered initial estimates from winning 180 seats in the 299-member
National Assembly to struggling to gain a 150-seat majority.
Lee was forced to withdraw several cabinet minister
nominations following allegations of corruption. This had the
unfortunate consequence of reminding voters of Lee's own
series of alleged scandals-an image that the progressives sought to
Lee failed to heal the rift within the conservative movement
after he narrowly defeated Park Geun-hye for the GNP presidential
nomination. His supporters were perceived as being rude, if
not vindictive, toward the former GNP chairwoman. Animosities
over perceived slights were exacerbated by a contentious battle
over the selection of candidates for the legislative election.
The rift caused many pro-Park legislators to leave the party,
vowing to run as independent candidates against the GNP.
In addition, Koreans have long believed in a concept of
yeoso yadae (smaller ruling party, bigger opposition
party) to balance power between the executive and legislative
branches. The progressives appeal to this concept by declaring
dramatically that "if the GNP seizes enough seats to have power to
change the constitution, it could pose a threat to democracy as we
would have a multiple-party system in name only." In a February 2
poll by the liberal Hankroyeh and Research Plus, 49
percent of respondents wanted GNP candidates, while 43 percent
wanted "more opposition candidates to keep the president and the
ruling party in check."
The progressive parties will benefit from the GNP's missteps but
remain hampered by its factionalism and uncertain policy
message. The progressive opposition remains weak and in
disarray after its decimating losses in the presidential election
and four previous legislative by-elections. The progressives
have not been able to decide on a common message and are still
debating whether to combat Lee in the political center or remain on
the far left.
However, the February merger of the United New Democratic Party
and Democratic Party has provided a rallying point for the
country's progressive voters. The new party-actually a
reconstitution of the Millennium Democratic Party, which
splintered in 2003-may secure 100 legislative seats, far more than
would have been the case if the parties had remained
In the wake of the legislative election, it is unclear whether
the conservative factions would vote together or be more eager to
exact retribution over personal slights and gain political leverage
than to implement Lee Myung-bak's agenda.
What the U.S. Should Do
U.S. policymakers should take advantage of the significant
opportunity that Lee Myung-bak's election provides to repair
and broaden Washington's bilateral relations with South Korea.
"Principled Engagement" with North Korea.
Washington should call on the Lee administration to:
- More closely integrate South Korean and U.S. policies
toward North Korea by identifying the conditions that Seoul
will impose on its ongoing and future economic incentives with
concrete steps that Pyongyang must take toward nuclear compliance.
South Korea should distinguish between the October 2007
inter-Korean summit proposals that provide direct economic benefit
to Seoul and those that are politically motivated, which should be
linked to defined benchmarks in North Korean economic and/or
political reform. No new projects should be initiated without
- Maintain the Kaesong industrial zone and Kumgangsan
tourism projects at existing levels, but condition the planned
expansion of Kaesong to successful completion of Phase II of the
six-party talks, including a viable data declaration.
- Emphasize that the Northern Limit Line is the inter-Korean
maritime boundary and that South Korea's sovereignty will not
be abrogated by vague and one-sided "peace zones."
- Require North Korea to implement extensive verification
measures, including provisions for short-notice challenge
inspections of non-declared facilities to resolve current and
- Join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to
monitor North Korean airborne and maritime shipments and interdict
- Integrate South Korea's unilateral aid to North Korea into
the conditionality of the six-party talks process and
implement World Food Program monitoring standards to ensure that
Pyongyang does not divert humanitarian assistance.
- Integrate North Korean human rights issues into Seoul's
engagement policy by acceding to U.N. resolutions condemning
North Korean human rights abuses, insisting on discussions of North
Korea's retention of 500 Korean War POWs and 400 South Korean
post-war abductees, and demanding an expansion and acceleration of
the reunion of separated families.
- Review available financial sanctions to implement U.N.
Resolution 1718 if the six-party talks break down.
Strengthening Allied Relations. The Lee
- Defer until 2011-not reopen-the issue of transferring
wartime operational command, pending a reassessment of the
North Korean threat and South Korean military capabilities.
- Consult closely with U.S. counterparts to evolve the
U.S.-South Korea military alliance by incorporating
enhanced South Korean military capabilities while maintaining
an integrated U.S. role.
- Call on Washington to reaffirm U.S. troop deployment
commitments to South Korea, including the continued presence
of combat and air defense units.
- Conduct a joint study on South Korean missile defense
needs, including possible South Korean integration into a
multilateral ballistic missile defense system.
- Expand South Korean diplomatic and peace-keeping
operations to assume a greater international security role.
South Korea should join the U.S.-led values-based initiative with
Japan, Australia, and India.
- Institutionalize trilateral coordination by
resurrecting the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight
- Implement annual "2 + 2 meetings" of the
secretaries of defense and state and their South Korean
counterparts, such as the U.S. conducts with Japan.
- Consider trilateral minister-level security policy meetings
with the U.S. and Japan.
- Improve bilateral relations with Japan by
resuming regular summits with Tokyo.
Implementing Free-Market Principles.
Implementingthe South Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) would improve South Korea's trade freedom, help the economy
to lock in further economic reforms, send a powerful signal to
foreign and domestic investors, and provide a new growth engine to
improve competitiveness. To facilitate this, Seoul should:
- Remove the beef obstacle.The political reality is that
South Korea must resume unimpeded imports of U.S. beef before
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) and the U.S. agricultural industry will
support the FTA. This issue has become an impediment to far greater
geostrategic interests for both countries. South Korea should open
its markets in accordance with international standards, and the
U.S. should accept any reasonable additional health safety
standards that Seoul requests.
- Ratify KORUS prior to a summit meeting.Although South
Korean implementation would not force reciprocal congressional
action, it would remove an excuse for U.S. inaction.
- Affirm its commitment to free-market principles.Lee
Myung-bak should announce unilateral measures that remove potential
discriminatory barriers and ensure regulatory transparency. This
will counter U.S. critics who claim that South Korea will continue
to use non-tariff barriers to impede foreign businesses, especially
in the auto sector.
- Engage Congress on KORUS.During his U.S. visit, Lee
should highlight to U.S. Members of Congress KORUS's importance to
the strategic interests of both countries. The U.S. auto
companies and associated labor unions will never support
the FTA, not because they have problems with the details of the
text, but because it threatens their interests. They are a
lost cause for ratification. The real goal is to convince
enough Democratic Members of Congress from non-auto districts to
vote for the FTA to benefit their own constituents.
The U.S.-South Korean relationship should improve under Lee
Myung-bak because he shares common values and policies with the
United States to a greater degree than Roh Moo-hyun did. Lee's
pro-market economic principles, understanding of regional threats,
and willingness to impose conditionality in South Korea's
engagement policy are more in line with principles shared by U.S.
Republican and Democratic leaders. If he effectively implements
these values, South Korea will have a strong bond with Washington,
regardless of which party occupies the White House after the 2008
is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies
Center at The Heritage Foundation.
 Lee Myung-bak, "Together We Shall Open a
Road to Advancement," inauguration address, February 25, 2008, at
(March 24, 2008).
 They are called this because they were in
their 30s in the 1990s, attended college in the 1980s, and were
born in the 1960s. In addition, the 386 computer chip was the
predominant microprocessor at the time.
South Korea handed over both peacetime and
wartime command to the U.S.-led United Nations Command in 1950 at
the beginning of the Korean War. Seoul resumed peacetime
operational control in 1994.
 "Lee Stresses Lean, Efficient
Government," The Korea Herald, January 14, 2008.
 "Small-Firms Sector to Get Massive
Support," The Korea Herald, January 3, 2008, and
"President-Elect Lee Pushes Privatization," The Korea
Herald, January 4, 2008.
 "Lee Stresses Lean, Efficient
 Kim Ji-Hyun, "Parties Gear Up for April
Elections," The Korea Herald,February 21, 2008.
 For a fuller discussion of South
Korea's economic challenges and extensive policy recommendations to
redress them, see Bruce Klingner and Anthony B. Kim, "Economic
Lethargy: South Korea Needs a Second Wave of Reforms," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 2090, December 7, 2007, at