Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's imposition of emergency
rule on November 3 appears aimed at avoiding the potential for an
unfavorable Pakistani Supreme Court ruling that could invalidate
the legitimacy of the October 6 presidential election. Aware that
such a Supreme Court ruling-scheduled for this week-would have
further eroded his credibility and intensified calls for him to
step down from power altogether, Musharraf resorted to
extra-constitutional measures to maintain his grip on power. The
move will raise public anger against Musharraf, deepen
civil-military tensions, and hinder the Army's ability to fight an
already faltering war on extremists.
Political Divisions Hamper Response to Surging
Terrorism
Pakistan's divisive politics are creating a situation in which a
variety of Pakistani extremist groups that subscribe to
al-Qaeda/Taliban goals are softening the state through an
intensified campaign of violence. Since the July 10 Pakistan
military operation at the Red Mosque, extremists have launched a
series of revenge attacks that have killed hundreds of Pakistani
security officials and civilians. Two suicide attacks-one on a bus
carrying air force officials and another at a police checkpoint
near Musharraf's office in Rawalpindi-together killed more than 15
people last week. The Pakistan military also recently sent troops
to the Swat Valley in Northwest Pakistan to confront the forces of
a militant cleric who has been inciting the population through
radio broadcasts referencing the Red Mosque operation and calling
on the people to rise up against the Musharraf regime.
The October 18 bombing on Pakistan People's Party leader and
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto that resulted in more than 150
deaths deepened political fissures in the country. Bhutto accused
several senior officials surrounding Musharraf of maintaining close
ties to militants and implied they were complicit in the bombing.
Railways Minister Sheikh Rashid essentially blamed the bombing on
Bhutto's tough stance against extremism and her recent statements
in support of U.S. action in Pakistan to address the growing
terrorist threat. These highly provocative public statements fuel
political divisions and contribute to the overall weakening of the
state in the face of the rising challenges to maintaining law and
order.
Imposition of emergency rule will further divide the country and
will be unlikely to help the military guarantee the security of its
citizens. Neither the Supreme Court nor the judiciary had sought to
prevent the military from conducting operations in the Tribal Areas
and the Swat Valley. In fact, the Supreme Court sought justice
against the perpetrators of the October 18 bombings last Thursday
when it asked the federal and provincial governments to submit a
detailed report of the blasts within a week. Establishing emergency
rule, which involves curbs on the media and dismissal of the
judiciary, will heighten public anger against Musharraf and
decrease overall support for the military. Also, the security
services will be consumed with subduing an agitated civil society
that will detract from efforts to prevent further terrorism.
Tough U.S. Reaction Should Worry Musharraf
The United States has stated its opposition to Musharraf's
decision to impose emergency rule and expressed solidarity with the
Pakistani people in pursuing a democratic process as the best way
to counter violent extremism. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
had publicly warned President Musharraf against taking the drastic
measure on November 2, and so he will be seen as openly defying the
U.S. position. It is important for the United States to maintain
its strong stance against the draconian measures and in favor of an
early general election so that Washington is not viewed as backing
Musharraf against the public's will. The Pakistani public in recent
years has grown increasingly resentful of U.S. policy toward
Pakistan, which it perceives as placing U.S. counterterrorism
interests ahead of Pakistani popular objectives like return to
civilian democratic rule. Anger at the United States has eroded
popular support for countering extremists, damaging U.S. objectives
in the war on terrorism.
Conclusion
The best-case scenario for Pakistan at this critical point in
its history would be for a caretaker government to take power and
allow the major politicians to lead their parties in a general
election at the earliest date possible. The election rules and
guidelines would have to be established by a neutral caretaker
government in touch with all of the major parties. In the past,
Pakistan has established caretaker governments during periods of
transition from military to civilian rule. For example, in 1993 a
caretaker government was established to usher in elections that
ended up bringing Benazir Bhutto to power for the second time.
A credible election would be a major blow to the extremists and
their agenda for Pakistan-which includes imposing harsh Islamic
rule-and provide conditions for a smoother working relationship
between civilian and military leaders to confront the rising tide
of Islamic extremism and violence in the country. In any new
political dispensation, the military would maintain a strong
decision-making role, especially regarding security matters, and
would continue to be responsible for keeping the country's nuclear
assets safe and secure and out of the hands of terrorists.
Musharraf has been an important ally for the United States in
the war on terrorism, but his steps toward increasing
authoritarianism have put him at odds with the moderate political
forces of the country and thereby strengthened the extremists.
Washington must consider carefully how to leverage its influence
with Pakistani leaders to encourage this pivotal country of 165
million to transition to civilian-led government, while maintaining
a military capable of focusing on confronting anti-state forces.
Developing a united front between the Pakistani military leadership
and moderate civilian politicians against the extremists remains
the most promising path out of Pakistan's current crisis.
Lisa Curtis is
Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.