Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
Through immigration and demographic changes, Europe's Muslim
population has grown exponentially in recent years. Because of
this, several experts and commentators have predicted doomsday
scenarios for Europe, forecasting majority Muslim populations in
major European cities within a decade. Mark Steyn, author of
America Alone: The End of the World As We Know It, envisages
the Islamization of Europe by the end of the 21st century.
The disaffection of significant segments of the Muslim
population in Europe has coincided with a growth in terrorist
activity. In a November 2006 speech, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller,
former Director General of the Security Service (MI5), announced
that British security services had identified over 1,600
individuals actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist
acts at home and abroad involving some 200 British-based terrorist
networks. The foiled attacks by Islamic
terrorist cells in Germany and Denmark stand as ominous
signs of the level of threat facing Europe.
However, this is not just a European problem. Knowing that
Europe is a logistical and fundraising base for both domestic and
international terrorist plots, including the September 11 attacks,
both the United States and Europe need to confront al-Qaeda and
other extremist groups head-on. The atrocities committed by Islamic
terrorists in Washington, New York, Madrid, and London were attacks
on the principles of freedom and liberty that define Western
civilization. Al-Qaeda and its allies have targeted innocent
civilians in Europe, America, Africa, the Middle East, the Far
East, and Central Asia and will continue to advance their
borderless war on Western values and attempt to break the West's
will to fight an asymmetric "long war.
A united transatlantic response and commitment to what is
currently an indeterminable timetable for victory is not only
necessary, but essential if Europe and America are to confront the
domestic and global network of extremists intent on
annihilating the West and its allies.
Islamic Extremism: A Global Threat
The threat of Islamic terrorism in Europe is nothing new.
The United Kingdom. In 1983, acting on behalf of the Abu
Nidal Organization, Tunisian Habib Muaamar bombed two Jewish-owned
department stores in London. Britain's first al-Qaeda-related terrorist
plot was uncovered in November 2000, and Moinul Abedin was
eventually found guilty of planning to detonate a terrorist bomb.
Since September 11, 2001, however, the number and scope of
Islamic terrorist threats in the United Kingdom have increased
significantly. In her November 2006 speech, the MI5 Director
General revealed that the police and MI5 were aware of 30
active plots. Since 9/11, there have been 15 attempted
terrorist plots on British soil. From September 11, 2001,
through the end of 2006, there were 1,166 terrorism-related arrests
in the United Kingdom, and more than 400 charges were brought.
The catalogue of extremist plots and the extent of the
radicalization of Muslim youth in Britain are enormous. For
- In August 2006, intelligence officers thwarted a plan to
explode up to 10 transatlantic flights headed for the U.S. with
liquid explosives and detonators disguised as drinks and electronic
- In September 2006, police raided a Jihadi training camp in the
South of England where young Muslim men were being indoctrinated
- In April 2007, five British men were convicted of an
al-Qaeda-related bomb plot targeting a shopping center, a
nightclub, and the House of Commons.
- In June 2007, seven men were convicted of more
al-Qaeda-inspired plots to "blow apart a London Underground tunnel
beneath the River Thames and to explode dirty bombs and cause mass
- In July 2007, four men were convicted of trying to detonate
explosive backpacks on public transportation targets in
London, just weeks after the successful al-Qaeda suicide bombings
on July 7, 2005, which killed 52 people and injured 700.
The recent failed car bomb attacks on London's entertainment
district and the burning car driven into the Glasgow airport are
potent reminders of the extent of Islamic radicalization in the
United Kingdom. However, Britain is not alone.
Continental Europe. Between June 2005 and September 2006,
French counterterrorist officers foiled three Islamist bomb plots
targeting the Paris Metro, Orly Airport, and the Directorate of
Territorial Security. In November 2005, Belgian
authorities arrested members of terrorist cells that were
moving suicide bombers into Iraq. In summer 2006, Cologne narrowly
avoided a Madrid-style attack when bombs on two regional passenger
trains failed to explode. On September 5, 2006, nine people were
arrested on charges of terrorism in Vollsmose after police foiled
Islamist bomb plots, which Danish Minister of Justice Lene Espersen
described as "the most severe ever in Denmark.
On March 11, 2004, an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell attacked
public transportation targets in Madrid, killing 191 commuters. In
November 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo van
Gogh in a frenzied attack after the airing of Submission,
his film about women in Islam that Bouyeri found insulting to
The United States.The United States has not been immune
to homegrown plots by Islamic extremists since 9/11 either. Four
al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists were arrested in June 2007 for
conspiring to attack fuel pipelines at John F. Kennedy
International Airport, and Shahawar Matin Siraj was sentenced to
30 years in prison for plotting to blow up a New York subway
station in 2004.
American intelligence services have adopted aggressive policies
to combat U.S.-based Islamic extremists. U.S. policy is one of
rapid intervention to arrest suspects at the earliest
opportunity. In the five years after 9/11, 510
individuals were arrested in cases initially announced as terrorism
cases. Of these 510 individuals, 158 were indicted for the federal
crime of terrorism. The other 352 were prosecuted on lesser charges
unrelated to terrorism such as fraud, racketeering, and criminal
Iraq. Al-Qaeda has largely conspired to levy war
against the U.S. abroad rather than at home since 9/11.
Iraq has proven a fertile ground for fighting al-Qaeda head-on and
has drawn significant numbers of prospective terrorists and suicide
bombers. Joseph Billy, FBI chief of counterterrorism, has
stated that suicide bombers are a threat to the United States
because of their numbers and "willingness to die for sheer
belief, and the Bush Administration has
recommitted itself to fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq and tackling the
The United States has captured or killed a number of senior
al-Qaeda leaders, including Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi, Muhammad 'Atif,
and Khalid Shaykh Mohammad. However, al-Qaeda's contribution to the
global jihad post 9/11 is still enormous, with a vast ability to
promote hateful ideology and inspire terrorist cells worldwide.
Transatlantic Plots. The groundswell of Muslim extremism
in Europe represents a particular threat to the United States. Many
of the high-profile foiled European plots were in fact
transatlantic in nature, including the August 2006 airliner bomb
plot. The threat from Islamic extremism is undoubtedly a
global one. As British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during
a recent press conference with President George W. Bush at Camp
We know we are in a common struggle, and we know we have to work
together, and we know we've got to use all means to deal with it
[terrorism]. So we are at one in fighting the battle against
terrorism, and that struggle is one that we will fight with
determination and with resilience, and right across the world.
Popular Support for Extremism.Jihadi activity in Europe
and the Middle East has undoubtedly been fuelled by widespread
sympathy among significant minorities of Europe's Muslim
populations. Attitudes among British Muslims, as revealed in a 2006
survey, are particularly striking. Among Muslim youth in
Britain, 31 percent believe that the 7/7 bombings in London were
justified because of British support for the war on terrorism,
and 13 percent understood why young British Muslims might want to
carry out suicide operations. Among British Muslims, 42
percent of Muslims in the South of England would prefer to live
under Shari'a law rather than under British law, 28 percent would
like to see Britain as an Islamic state, and 45 percent believe
that 9/11 was a conspiracy by America and Israel.
In June 2006, when asked "What do you consider yourself
first? 81 percent of British Muslims, 69 percent of Spanish
Muslims, 66 percent of German Muslims, and 46 percent of
French Muslims considered themselves Muslim first rather than
citizens of their respective countries. Thirty-five
percent of French Muslims and 25 percent of Spanish Muslims
said violence against civilian targets to defend Islam can be
justified often, sometimes, or rarely. When asked "Did Arabs
carry out 9/11 attacks? 46 percent of French Muslims, 44 percent of
German Muslims, and 35 percent of Spanish Muslims answered "No.
Counterterrorism and the European
The 9/11 attacks spurred the European Union to introduce new
counterterrorism policies aimed at deepening cooperation and
integration among member states. The smooth flow of information and
exchange of intelligence was seen as critical to European
counterterrorist efforts, especially in light of the global jihad
proclaimed by al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates.
The EU has made great strides to become a bigger player in
this field. The centerpiece of its legislative agenda was the
EU-wide arrest warrant, which was accompanied by a number of other
measures to harmonize and standardize member states'
anti-terrorism policies. In traditional EU style, Brussels
created multiple new posts and beefed up existing agencies to
establish its formal standing as primary agent in anti-terrorist
affairs, including a counterterrorist coordinator, Europol,
and Eurojust. The European Council even went as far as declaring a
solidarity clause with one another in the event of a terrorist
attack, to be invoked under Article 42 of the original European
Coordinating counterterrorism efforts with the United States was
seen as an equally top priority for EU officials, and numerous
declarations and legislative initiatives followed. It
was also seen as a way for the EU to advance its integrationist
agenda and bring on board those member states that were
reluctant to pool sovereignty in these highly sensitive
fields. As the Congressional Research Service noted, "The EU views
establishing external relationships with the United Sates and other
countries in the police and judicial field as an essential part of
developing a common judicial identity.
However, the EU's counterterrorist efforts have slowly become
more focused on furthering its integrationist agenda in
security and defense and in justice and home affairs than on
genuinely cooperating in fighting the war on terrorism.
- EU Commissioner Franco Frattini and other officials in
Brussels continue to push national governments to give up veto
powers in a wide range of criminal justice areas.
- At a meeting of EU officials and European interior
ministers after the transatlantic airliner bomb plot was thwarted,
Finnish Interior Minister Karl Rajamaeki, whose country held
the rotating EU presidency, said, "We came to the conclusion that a
united Europe will win the battle with the terrorists.
- Former French Interior Minister and current French President
Nicolas Sarkozy said he hoped that Europe's response to the threat
of terrorism would be "harmonized.
- The European Council's 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism
called for "work to be rapidly pursued to develop the
contribution of ESDP [European Security and Defense Policy] to the
fight against terrorism.
These statements and intentions go beyond moral solidarity with
fellow EU members and beyond a desire to fight a comprehensive,
effective war against terrorists. They reflect a wider
The ESDP is a tool for projecting European power in the world
and promoting the EU as a global actor. Despite rhetorical
commitment to the fight against terrorism, the ESDP embodies the
worst elements of European animosity toward the United States and
fundamentally undermines the NATO Alliance and the Anglo-American
Special Relationship, both of which are vital in the long struggle
America and Europe should be facing together. As a consequence,
despite the initial 9/11 moment of solidarity, the European Union
has slowly become more inclined toward its traditional
confrontational approach with the United States, rather than
coordinating counterterrorism efforts as an effective partner.
Renditions. In January 2006, in a high-profile act of
hostility to U.S. foreign policy, the European Parliament set up a
46-member committee to investigate the CIA's alleged use of
European countries to transport and illegally detain prisoners.
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) pledged to leave "no
stone unturned to find out whether or not the CIA had carried out
abductions, extraordinary renditions, or detentions at secret
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went to extraordinary
lengths to clarify the Bush Administration's policy on
rendition, making a detailed speech on the matter in December
2005. Then-U.S. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales met with EU Commissioner Franco Frattini in Vienna in May
2006 to personally deny allegations that the U.S. either tortured
or was complicit in the torture of suspects. Poland and
Romania categorically denied the existence of secret detention
facilities in their countries. However, the sovereign
word of EU member states and the United States was not considered
sufficient, and the European Parliament voted a report condemning
national governments on little more than speculation and
In fact, the year-long investigation of America's rendition
policy, based on the flimsiest of evidence, served less as an
independent investigatory committee than as a Trojan horse
intended to rein in the American-led war on terrorism.As Heritage Foundation
analysts Nile Gardiner and James Jay Carafano noted:
Despite three major terrorist attacks on European soil in
the past three years (in London, Madrid, and Istanbul), many top
European officials still do not grasp the magnitude of the
terrorist threat. Instead, they are engaged in a campaign of
pandering and grandstanding to delegitimize U.S. counter-terrorism
efforts, especially the policy of rendition.
Data Sharing. Transportation security is an area in which
the EU and the United States need to cooperate effectively. A
number of transatlantic accords have been reached since 9/11.
The most important aviation security agreement is the May 2004
Passenger Name Records Agreement (PNR). The agreement allowed U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to access European airline
reservation databases to retrieve up to 34 pieces of intelligence
about each passenger, including personal data and travel
information. The U.S. ran this information against lists of known
and suspected terrorists and analyzed traveling trends of other
known terrorists in the interests of passenger safety and
As Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said, "It
simply gives us a way of analyzing their behavior in conjunction
with other things we know so we can pursue further inquiry when
they appear at our airports. The Department of Homeland
Security instituted strong privacy protections to "provide a very
strong guarantee against misuse of this information. The guarantees
of the Federal Privacy Act are extended to foreign nationals, and
the recently introduced Traveler Redress Inquiry Program allows
travelers of any nationality to seek redress if they feel their
rights have been violated.
However, the European Parliament challenged the agreement, and
the European Court of Justice subsequently upheld their complaint,
ruling that the agreements lacked an appropriate legal
foundation. A new, more limited deal has since been
approved that restricts information sharing, reducing the pieces of
shareable information from 34 to 19, and airlines are now required
to "push or send data to CBP rather than allowing the U.S. to "pull
or access PNR data electronically. The amount of time that data can
be retained has also been limited.
Sharing personal information between the EU and the U.S. has
proven one of the most difficult challenges to overcome. The
European Union purports to be at the forefront of defending
its citizens' fundamental rights and considers America's data
protection standards to be a breach of EU standards. The political
reality is that the European Parliament is a bastion of
anti-American sentiment, determined to obstruct America's war on
terrorism rather than make a meaningful contribution to
transatlantic security. Regardless of the significant concessions
on America's part, MEPs still adopted a parliamentary resolution
calling the new PNR agreement "substantively flawed in terms
of legal certainty, data protection and legal redress for EU
To facilitate smoother transfer of information and to make a
statement in support of transatlantic cooperation, as a matter
of principle, EU leaders should agree to an umbrella agreement
accepting U.S. data privacy standards as adequate to permit the
transfer of information. The conclusion of two U.S.-Europol
information-sharing agreements and the new PNR agreement should in
fact establish U.S. data privacy standards as adequate for future
Visa Wars.Visa policy is a critical tool of American
public diplomacy, economic growth, and international
alliance-building. It is a strategic public policy that America
must get right.
The continued exclusion of many of America's closest Central and
Eastern European allies from the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) has
undoubtedly been a significant obstacle in America's attempts to
build enduring bilateral alliances with European nations. Under the
VWP, most visitors from 27 partner nations are allowed to enter the
United States for up to 90 days without a visa if they have valid
passports from their countries.
A 2006 U.S. Government Accountability Office report
substantiates the VWP's considerable value in encouraging
legitimate travel, commerce, and beneficial people-to-people
exchanges. A 2007 survey from the Pew Global
Attitudes Project shows that those who have visited the U.S. and
interacted with Americans consistently feel more positive about
America than those who have not: "familiarity breeds
favorability. At a time when America's image has
reached rock bottom among many Europeans, a strong coordinated
public diplomacy effort is clearly needed, starting with meaningful
reform of the VWP.
Undoubtedly, the VWP is a relic of the Cold War era rather than
the 9/11 era, and in Tallinn, Estonia, in November 2006, President
Bush announced plans to work with Congress to reform the Visa
Waiver Program. Congress recently passed homeland
security legislation that modernizes the VWP and includes a
modified version of the Secure Travel and Counterterrorism
Partnership Act (S. 342). President Bush signed it into law on
August 3, 2007.
Under the legislation, a handful of additional countries (e.g.,
the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, and Estonia) could be
included in the VWP based on the new set of criteria on visa
rejection rates and overstays. It also establishes a new electronic
travel authorization system for VWP countries whereby passengers
will be expected to register personal details and travel plans
on-line two days before departure.
The expansion of the VWP to European countries such as the
Czech Republic and other key U.S. allies like South Korea is
significant. It also creates a new path for other countries
eventually to gain admission. Regrettably, overly restrictive
amendment language was introduced at the last minute that
makes future VWP participation by countries such as Poland very
difficult. The requirement that countries achieve visa refusal
rates--determination of visa refusals is largely subjective--below
10 percent will have an unduly negative impact on some of
America's best friends in Europe.
Although details of the new road map to VWP participation have
yet to be settled, significant roadblocks will undoubtedly
remain. The 10 percent requirement will continue to exclude some of
America's strongest supporters in the war on terrorism (e.g.,
Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania) and hinder the Administration's
public diplomacy efforts.
The new electronic travel authorization system also could add a
layer of difficulty for travelers from existing VWP countries like
Britain. If implemented to its extreme--for example, without an
extended timeframe of eligible travel for previously registered
frequent travelers--passengers will see the system as cumbersome,
unnecessary, and especially restrictive to transatlantic
commerce. It is also likely to drive America's enduring allies
closer to the European Union, tempting them to use the EU's
retaliatory clout as a blunt negotiating instrument with the
The EU has responded quickly and issued its strongest statement
yet in favor of retaliatory measures at the EU level.
The EU's desire to supranationalize visa policy is nothing
new. In 2006, the European Commission threatened reprisals against
U.S. diplomats based in Schengen-area countries in retaliation for
not extending visa waivers to EU accession countries. The
commission has long demanded "political recognition of the enlarged
Europe by the United States and a commitment to treating all EU
member states in the same way.
However, the VWP should not be considered an EU issue. Extending
visa waivers to EU member states per se would allow Brussels
to decide to which countries America opens its doors and would set
a powerful precedent for automatically extending the VWP to future
EU accession countries like Turkey. Participation has never
been decided on an EU-wide basis. For example, Greece is not a visa
waiver participant, but Slovenia has been since the program's
inception in 1986. In fact, U.S. diplomats working in many
EU countries (e.g., France and Spain) already have to apply for
The EU's supranational drive is the latest in a protracted
power grab for competence over member states' borders. EU attempts
to make border security a purely political issue rather than a
security issue have been badly handled and deeply misguided. As an
editorial in the Financial Times opined, "Retaliation
is not the right basis for making security policy.
Yet passage of measures that the EU sees as discriminatory and
unfair has emboldened the EU's instinctively aggressive reflex, and
the United States should not be surprised to receive significant
pushback from Brussels, including a possible EU-wide
electronic travel authorization system of its own.
President Bush is already urging flexibility on VWP regulation
to ensure an inclusive and workable system. It is critical
that the system that is finally introduced minimizes travelers'
inconvenience and does not exclude last-minute legitimate
travelers who are vital to maintaining healthy transatlantic
relations. Frequent "trusted travelers such as business executives
must be recognized and not be required to reregister for every
visit. Allies such as Poland, which the U.S. is currently seeking
to engage in a special defense relationship, should also not be
neglected. Warsaw has invested considerable political capital
during the missile defense negotiations and has found itself
at the forefront of fighting for a European Union of independent
and sovereign nation-states. A VWP regulation that excludes Poland
but includes some of its neighbors could have significant
ramifications for the future of the Polish-American alliance.
The key to ensuring national security is targeting terrorists,
not placing punitive and restrictive measures on genuine
travelers. The legislation itself notes that extending visa-free
travel privileges to nationals of foreign countries that are
partners in the war on terrorism will strengthen bilateral
relationships. In a cost-benefit analysis, the
legislation could easily exclude and inconvenience legitimate
travelers more than it deters terrorists. Not only does it place
America's bilateral alliances at considerable risk and
inadvertently push toward further European integration, but no
substantial evidence suggests that it will make air travel
Foreign Terrorist Organizations.Following the September
11 attacks, the EU sensibly agreed on a Common Definition of
Terrorism, making it harder for terrorists to abuse the EU's open
borders and seek sanctuary in countries not specifically
recognizing terrorism as a crime. It also defined a common
list of terrorist individuals and organizations, whereby
designated individuals and groups would have their assets frozen
and member states would provide mutual judicial and legal
cooperation and assistance.
It is important that the United States, Great Britain, and
the European Union coordinate these lists as closely as possible in
designating foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). As a symbolic
gesture alone, it sends a powerful message that the West is united
in defeating the enemies of freedom and liberty, but it also acts
as a powerful financial sanction against the free flow of terrorist
Both sides have had some notable successes. The EU added the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), and Hamas to its FTO list after lobbying from
Turkey, Columbia, and Israel. The U.S. also added
several "European terrorist groups to its FTO list, including
Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) and the Real IRA.
Regrettably, some extraordinary gaps in the EU list persist,
including not listing Ansar al-Islam and Hezbollah.
According to Europol's "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
Six Member States reported investigations into Islamist
terrorist recruitment in the EU between October 2005 and December
2006. In total, 24 individuals were arrested on suspicion of
terrorist recruitment. The individuals reported as having been
arrested for recruitment were linked to the Iraqi Sunni
organization Ansar al-Islam. This may suggest that they were
involved in recruiting volunteers in the EU for the support of the
armed struggle against coalition troops in Iraq.
The omission of Ansar al-Islam as a proscribed terrorist group
on the EU's FTO list is incredible considering the significant
contribution of many EU member states to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Another notable exception is the Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat (GSPC), now linked with al-Qaeda, which plotted to blow
up multiple French targets and was described by the French
Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit in 2006 as "one of the most
serious threats currently facing France.
Yet the EU's refusal to proscribe Hezbollah as an FTO is what
has drawn real ire from the United States. In the five years after
9/11, 510 individuals were arrested in the U.S. in cases initially
announced as terrorism cases in the United States. In 228 of those
cases, the U.S. government alleged an affiliation with an
FTO--overwhelmingly al-Qaeda, Hamas, or Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is a violent international terrorist organization that
has repeatedly targeted Europe in the past, including a campaign of
bombings in France in 1985-1986 that killed 13 people and injured
hundreds more. Refusal to place Hezbollah on the EU's FTO list
has allowed Hezbollah to raise funds and transfer money freely,
using European banks. Hezbollah has also had a profoundly
radicalizing affect on Europe's significant Muslim population.
Heritage Foundation research has outlined multiple reasons for
adding Hezbollah to the EU's FTO list, from protecting Europe's
citizens to acting consistently and in concert with domestic
and international allies to helping to stabilize the volatile
Middle East and containing Iran's rising power.
Congress should continue its steady pressure on the European
Union, and President Bush should use the recent détente in
French-American relations to press for Hezbollah's inclusion on the
EU's FTO list.
Counterterrorism and Bilateral
As Secretary Chertoff has observed, "Information sharing and
intelligence gathering are some of our most important tools in the
global war on terrorism. Because intelligence is
often sensitive and classified, how to share and disseminate it
among allies has always been a major issue. The biggest challenge
of developing exclusive ties with the European Union has been the
risk to the solid and enduring alliances established with
individual member states. The United States will find its
strongest partners, both in fighting the war on terrorism and
in combating Islamic extremism, among its individual bilateral
British and American intelligence services share one of the most
successful relationships in counterterrorism. The July 2007
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report on rendition notes
that Britain's most important intelligence-sharing
relationship is with the U.S. and explains:
Our intelligence-sharing relationships, particularly with
the United States, are critical to providing the breadth and
depth of intelligence coverage required to counter the threat to
the UK posed by global terrorism. These relationships have
saved lives and must continue.
The Special Relationship has meant that high-level trust and
enduring friendships are the norm and that disagreements are
largely played out in private. The directors of the Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communication
Headquarters both gave evidence to the ISC emphasizing
Britain's national interest in maintaining the close working
relationship between Britain and America. The European
Union's desire to take a primary role in counterterrorism puts
that in jeopardy.
America should continue to build bilateral alliances with
its strongest European partners to maintain the trust and
cooperation necessary for high-level intelligence sharing,
especially considering the international nature of terrorist plots.
The Administration should reassess its investment in EU
alliance-building and recommit to strong bilateral alliances
for police, judicial, and border control cooperation.
This should not exclude sensible dialogue and cooperation with
the EU as necessary, but it should also acknowledge that the EU is
often a complicating factor in many areas and that the
multilateral forum for intelligence sharing is suboptimal. As the
Congressional Research Service noted in 2005:
Some U.S. officials doubt the utility of collaborating with
EU-wide bodies given good, existing bilateral relations between
U.S. law enforcements agencies--such as the FBI and CIA--and
national police and intelligence services in individual EU
member states.… [M]ember states' national police and
intelligence services are often reluctant to share information
with each other, let alone with U.S. authorities.
The Successful Special Relationship.The issue of
rendition perfectly illustrates the contrast between the U.K.'s
cooperative and workable approach and the EU's combative attitude
toward the United States. The ISC report on rendition outlines
the different legal guidelines and ethical approaches under which
the U.K. and U.S. operate with regard to rendition but concludes,
"It is to the credit of our Agencies that they have now managed to
adapt their procedures to work round these problems and
maintain the exchange of intelligence that is so critical to UK
While the European Parliament has worked dogmatically to
obstruct U.S. policy, the U.K. approach has been to work together
toward a mutually beneficial arrangement that does not infringe on
either's national security. As the SIS Chief made clear, the
British intelligence services assess the merits and seek
ministerial approval when sharing "actionable intelligence where
rendition may occur, but "this does not and cannot be allowed
to inhibit the exchange of what we call 'building-block
intelligence,' by which I mean material which over time contributes
to a picture of a terrorist or a terrorist group, or much other
vital operational collaboration. Although rendition has
been a contentious issue of public debate in the U.K. and Europe,
British security services have strived for a workable resolution.
Ironically, the ISC report also notes that there is "no real
evidence to support the spurious allegations of the European
Parliament's report on rendition.
The success of Operation Rhyme is an example of the high-level
counterterrorism cooperation that both Prime Minister Brown and
President Bush should seek to maintain at all costs. Operation
Rhyme was responsible for investigating and subsequently
convicting seven British men of plotting terrorist attacks in
Britain and the U.S. from 2004 until their arrest in August 2006.
The joint U.S.-U.K. investigation foiled a series of coordinated
attacks, including plans to set off a dirty bomb in the U.K.
Following the arrest of British cell leader Dhiren Barot, terrorist
"reconnaissance documents of multiple American targets
including the New York Stock Exchange and the International
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C., were found on two of his
Upon the conviction of the seven men in June 2007, British Home
Secretary John Reid specifically noted the international nature of
the threat posed by Islamic extremists "to murder innocent people
both here and in the United States causing death and injury on a
horrific scale. FBI Director Robert Mueller cited
Operation Rhyme to demonstrate "unclassified examples of successes
in the war against terrorismthat would not have been possible
without extensive cooperation and coordination with both our
domestic as well as our foreign partners.
In October 2005, President Bush outlined 10 serious al-Qaeda
plots targeting the United States and its international partners
that American intelligence services had helped to prevent.
Operation Crevice was mentioned as a major success of
British-American intelligence sharing. It thwarted a plot to
detonate a fertilizer bomb in the U.K. that was intended to cause
mass civilian casualties. The ensuing convictions of cell
leader Omar Khyam and four other cell members after the
longest criminal trial in British legal history was a major
victory in the war on terrorism. "Through joint investigation by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in these countries [U.S.,
U.K., Pakistan, and Canada], Mueller said, "components for
explosive devices were recovered and numerous individuals overseas
British and American intelligence officers were also in close
contact for months tracking the transatlantic airliner bomb
plot in the summer of 2006. After the arrest of 21
men, Prime Minister Tony Blair commented: "There has been an
enormous amount of cooperation with the U.S. authorities
which has been of great value and underlines the threat we face and
our determination to counter it. This approach also
corresponds closely with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that
the U.S. should continue to develop strategies for
intelligence sharing with trusted allies.
Transnational and supranational counterterrorism policies
have roles to play in combating Islamic extremism. However, it is
imperative that such measures are innovative and helpful and
that they actually add value to the existing work of national
law enforcement agencies. Europol and Eurojust are EU agencies
looking for roles to justify their budget lines rather than
significantly contributing to counterterrorism. The United
Kingdom is the second largest contributor to Europol's _63.5
million budget, but it remains unclear whether the costs justify
the benefits or its contributions would be better invested in
domestic counterterrorism efforts.
In the same vein, EU attempts to formulate a common judicial
identity and further harmonize member states' judicial and legal
spheres under the EU Reform Treaty will usurp existing bilateral
cooperation with Washington under a supranational banner. The
proposal to move police and judicial cooperation from third-pillar
(intergovernmental) decision making to "the community method
(co-decision of the Parliament and Council) will equally negate
Britain's ability to operate bilaterally.
Neither is Brussels' attempt to take control of Britain's
borders commensurate with its national interest. Although Britain
wisely exempted itself from the Schengen Agreement, Tony Blair
chose to opt into far too many EU immigration and asylum measures,
including the first phase of the Common European Asylum System.
Frontex, the new EU body coordinating the management of external
borders, has not added significant value for member states,
although Britain's minor 2007 contribution (_400,000) reflects
a certain contempt for failing EU policies. For the U.K., the
best public policy would be to sign on only to policies that are
clearly in the British interest and that demonstrably add
Bilateral Relationships: A Recipe for Success.The first
law of terrorism is that it plays on weakness.
The current U.S. negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic on
missile defense send a clear message that they will pursue a
muscular response to emerging threats. One of the foremost lessons
of the Cold War is that threats should be addressed from a position
of strength. Stationing 10 long-range, ground-based missile defense
interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar in the Czech
Republic will strengthen transatlantic security and especially
counter the evolving Middle Eastern ballistic missile
These "third site installations allow the United States to
extend its security umbrella and protect its European allies. For
Warsaw and Prague, this would mark a milestone in their integration
into the transatlantic security community. They would be
providing a significant contribution to NATO and making a
powerful statement in support of the alliance's principle of mutual
defense. While the European Parliament may find it "undesirable for
member states to assert their sovereign right to conduct national
security and defense policy, Warsaw and Prague are asserting their
primary rights as self-determining and independent nation-states to
take the actions that they deem necessary to ensure their own
Joint EU counterterrorist activities are better taken through a
mutual recognition approach rather than by undoing national
sovereignty and historic traditions. The serious divergence
between the U.S. and the EU on policy questions such as
missile defense, rendition, the International Criminal Court,
and capital punishment should make Washington wary of further
attempts by Brussels to consolidate power. Although the United
States might save time in the short term by negotiating with one
power, full EU integration and supranationalization is not in
America's long-term interests.
A Multi-Layered Strategy: Development,
Diplomacy, and Defense
A muscular response to terrorism is clearly needed. However,
winning hearts and minds should also be a policy priority. As MI5's
Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller pointed out, al-Qaeda has a
sophisticated propaganda machine and wages 50 percent of its war
through the media. Europol's 2007 terrorism report
highlights a "coordinated global media offensive from Islamist
terrorists. As a major element of President Bush's
National Security Strategy, economic development has a vital role
to play alongside diplomacy and defense. The British
government's July 2006 report "Countering International Terrorism
calls for British policy to become engaged in the "battle of
America and Britain need to demonstrate visibly that their
global leadership is not restricted to military campaigns in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. and Britain are the world's largest
and third largest net aid donors, respectively, and U.S. and
British humanitarian and development assistance totals more than
$38 billon per year, representing enormous global reach.
Combining this effort with better public information
campaigns, a commitment to freedom, and people-to-people exchanges,
America can work in conjunction with its European allies to win
deeper understanding and support for its policies through
multiple instruments of foreign policy.
A recent report from Terror Free Tomorrow, a research
organization, found that foreign aid not only changes short-term
perceptions of the United States, but also "makes a significant and
long-term difference in building goodwill toward the United States
and eroding popular support for global terrorists.
The report found that American aid cut across societal boundaries
in the world's three most populous Muslim societies (Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Pakistan) and shifted previously held
sympathies for terrorist organizations:
The bottom line is that American aid is the single most
important action the people of the three largest Muslim countries
want from the United States. And here's the key to winning hearts
and minds: deeper American assistance directly to the people,
following their expressed priority.
The broader effects of direct American assistance in priority
areas such as education, health, and economic growth should
not be underestimated.
As a matter of principle, U.S. foreign aid should seek to garner
goodwill for the United States. The longer-term positive effects
harvested by the enormous U.S. humanitarian relief efforts
following the tsunami in 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake in 2005
support the argument that America's generosity reaps the most
goodwill when it is most visible to ordinary people. In a 2006
poll, Terror Free Tomorrow found that, more than a year after
the tsunami and for the first time in almost four years, more
Indonesians are favorable to the United States than unfavorable.
This followed a 2005 poll that showed--for the first time ever in a
major Muslim nation--that more people in Indonesia were
favorable to America's efforts to fight terrorism than were in
An international survey conducted in 2007 by the Pew Research
Center found similar trends. Support for suicide bombings
among Pakistanis fell from 41 percent in 2004 to just 9 percent in
2007. Among Indonesians, it dropped from 26 percent in 2002 to just
10 percent in 2007. A combination of economic growth following the
demonstrable benefits of U.S. assistance and a strong belief
that the next generation will be better off than the current one
has encouraged greater support for America in many parts of the
In a separate poll, Terror Free Tomorrow found that the
five-month Western Pacific humanitarian deployment of
USNSMercy, which treated 60,000 people, was hugely welcomed
by Bangladeshis and Indonesians and led to a positive view of
America in a broader sense.
These polls contrast sharply with the traditional model of
government-to-government financial assistance.
Government-to-government aid has not made America friends in the
world. Heritage Foundation analysts have noted that, overall, U.S.
foreign and military assistance has not led recipients to support
America in the United Nations. In fact, most countries that
receive U.S. assistance vote against the U.S. more often than they
vote with the U.S. The analysts have suggested that
economic freedom is the key to unlocking nation-states' support in
the U.N. This applies equally to public support in general and
vindicates the Administration's slow attempts to restructure the
development agenda toward supporting economic growth and
Using foreign aid as a strategic tool of foreign policy to
project American values will require analyzing the results
from the Terror Free Tomorrow and Pew Research Center surveys very
carefully. While America is unlikely to find popular support for
the war on terrorism in these countries, the goodwill harnessed by
emergency and direct foreign aid frees the public space
necessary for America to communicate its message and explain
its policies more effectively.
A New Policy Agenda
Europe has an appalling catalogue of failed public
policies, such as multiculturalism and crippling human rights
legislation, that must be addressed. A new legislative agenda could
face down both domestic and international threats and help Europe
to work in close partnership with the United States to combat
Islamic extremism effectively.
Multiculturalism: Toward Separation.Multiculturalism
has been a comprehensive failure. Instead of integrating different
ethnic and cultural groups into society and garnering value from
waves of immigration, Europe has moved far further toward
separation than toward integration, with millions of disaffected
and radicalized Muslims living in ethnic ghettos.
Multiculturalist policies appear to give special treatment to
groups identified by religious affiliation, which stirs
resentment among the majority population. This has given
birth to an emergent culture of isolated ethnic groups,
particularly Muslim, who are geographically clumped together
and are increasingly unlikely to challenge extremist
ideologies. Ed Hussain, a reformed former Islamic
fundamentalist terrorist plotter, has said that "in the name of
multiculturalism we have these monocultural ghettos, this
underworld where none of this [extremism] is ever questioned.
In social, economic, political, and security terms,
multiculturalism has failed, and European governments have
failed to address this on a public policy level. As Melanie
Phillips argues in Londonistan:
Having allowed the country to turn into a global hub of the
Islamic jihad without apparently giving it a second thought, the
British establishment is still failing even now--despite the
wake-up calls of both 9/11 and the London bomb attacks of 2005--to
acknowledge what it is actually facing and take the appropriate
action. Instead it is deep into a policy of appeasement of the
phenomenon that threatens it.
London's courting of radical imams such as Sheikh Yusuf
al-Qaradawi is a perfect example of this policy of appeasement. In
July 2006, the British government paid for Dr. al-Qaradawi and his
wife to attend a taxpayer-funded conference on "Muslims of Europe,
including accommodations at a five-star hotel. The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office describes al-Qaradawi as "a highly respected
Islamic scholar and particularly influential to British foreign
However, al-Qaradawi has defended suicide bombings and called
for the execution of homosexuals. He has also advised
European Muslims to create "Muslim ghettos where they can avoid
cultural assimilation and introduce Shari'alaw. Because of his
views on violence, he has been banned from entering the U.S. since
The London Metropolitan Police also sponsored Tariq Ramadan to
attend the "Middle Path conference in London on July 24, 2005,
under the guise that "the Government and police need the
co-operation of the Muslim community. In 1999, a Spanish
judge found that Professor Ramadan had "routine contacts with an
Algerian member of al-Qaeda, and he has denied Osama bin Laden's
involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which he refers to as
"interventions. He has also been banned from the U.S.
for endorsing terrorist activity.
These Islamists are actively working to separate Muslims from
society, and the policies of multiculturalism have encouraged
them. Public money is being used to elevate not the principle of
fairness or the right to equal treatment, but the right to
difference as an end in itself, even to the extreme of being
governed by different laws.
The British government is funding advocates who want to see an
Islamic state under Shari'a law in Britain and who want
Muslims to withdraw from democratic participation. The British
government should reassess its £8.5 million Engaging with the
Islamic World Group (EIWG) program, which has been pivotal in
promoting engagement with radical clerics such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi
and Delwar Hossain Sayeedi. The British government
has laudably doubled its annual spending on counterterrorism
since 9/11, but that does not excuse boondoggles
and ill-advised adventures like the EIWG, which recently
funded The Muslim Scholars Roadshow, which British
journalist Martin Bright described as "an elaborate sham.
The British government has placed at the heart of its
counterterrorist agenda the need to counter domestic radicalization
and win hearts and minds, but by embracing
preachers of hate and radical imams, it is setting itself up for
failure. Moreover, Jon Benjamin, chief executive of the Board
of Deputies of British Jews, argues that the government's
embrace of radical imams like Yusuf al-Qaradawi means that
"moderates within the Muslim community are not really given a
voice. Muslims certainly have at least as much
to lose as non-Muslims in this war, and the British government
should not crowd out genuine moderates by picking and choosing the
wrong allies in the war of ideas.
It is important that in the British drive to transmit the
values of liberal democracy, hate speech does not get confused with
free speech. Islamist groups that advocate overthrowing liberal
democracy in favor of Shari'a law should not be considered
non-extremist simply because they do not necessarily call for
terrorist acts. As Hudson Institute scholar Zeyno Baran argues:
[S]trategies based on such a framework will certainly lead to
defeat in the "war of ideas, since they mistake the nature and
ultimate goals of the enemy. The deciding factor in choosing allies
in this war cannot be based on tactics--that is, on whether or not
a group has chosen to pursue violent methods. Rather, it must be
based on ideology, on whether a group is Islamist or not.
Forced vs. Productive Integration and
Assimilation.France has taken a much stronger line in
favor of assimilation over multiculturalism, but it has still
failed to address the problem of radicalization. The social
fragmentation caused by failed integration policies across
Europe is profound and will take decades to turn around. Many young
members of ethnic minorities now believe themselves to be
persecuted minorities and are being systematically
radicalized by extremists who exploit this sense of alienation.
According to Europol, terrorist organizations recruit in schools,
mosques, and prisons to find Muslims to take part in the
global jihad. No element of society is excluded, and
a mixture of social, economic, and security responses is clearly
Europe currently lacks confidence in its own values and
founding principles and is even more unwilling to act in defense of
them. The EU's reluctance to cite its Christian heritage in
its draft Constitutional Treaty demonstrates the profound loss
of confidence, verging on revisionism, that is consuming
Conversely, radical Muslim groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Hitz ut-Tahir provide British Muslims with the cultural
identity that they lack. If European countries were to replace the
banner of cultural diversity with a new sense of national
identity and reassert the non-negotiable values of democracy, rule
of law, tolerance, and integration for all, Europe would be on
track to combating the radical ideology promoted by Islamic
The American integration model is something Europe should
consider. Muslim Americans reject Islamic extremism by larger
margins than Muslims in Western Europe reject it. Muslim Americans
report far lower levels of support for extremism. Overall, they
have a positive view of American society and believe that
America is a land of opportunity for those who wish to work hard.
The American integration model stands in stark contrast to the
failure of multiculturalism in Europe. America's widespread and
highly integrated Muslim population contrasts with British, German,
and French ethnic populations of poorly integrated concentrated
communities. The strength of a democratic society is
not its multiculturalism and diverse set of values and principles,
but its unified adherence to basic societal principles.
A New Legislative Agenda for
Integration is undoubtedly a long-term project that may not show
results for decades, but a number of other public policy
measures should also be undertaken.
In August 2005, the British government introduced a list of
"unacceptable behaviors that could lead to deportation for non-U.K.
citizens. These behaviors included the glorification of terrorism
in public speaking engagements and fostering hatred to cause
intercommunity violence. Since then, 36 foreign nationals have been
excluded from the U.K.
The removal of hate preachers such as Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed
has been an enormous force for good and a visible sign of
deterrence to those who facilitate and encourage terrorism. Omar
Bakri Mohammed tried unsuccessfully to reenter the U.K. in July
2006. He is famous for saying, "I want Britain to become an Islamic
state. I want to see the flag of Islam raised in 10 Downing
Britain must not allow people who promote, incite, and glorify
terrorism and who represent threats to public order to abuse its
liberal tradition of free speech. Prime Minister Brown recently
listed a growing number of exclusions and deportations from the
U.K. for individuals who glorify terrorism. This sends a
powerful message that extremism will no longer be tolerated,
and the British government needs to continue to enforce this policy
as a matter of practice rather than haphazardly or on an ad hoc
Prosecution as well as deportation can be employed as a valuable
public policy to disrupt Islamists. In February 2006, the
successful prosecution of Abu Hamza al-Masri, an imam at the
Finsbury Park mosque, signaled that London was finally getting
tough with those who abuse the freedoms afforded by liberal
democracies to further Islamist aims. Washington has described
Hamza as a "terrorist facilitator with a global reach and has requested his extradition to
the U.S. to face terrorism charges after he completes his
Britain's legislative stand against these hate preachers and
Islamists needs to be firm, including recovery of £1 million
in legal aid costs spent on Hamza's defense. Britain can
also signal its intent to face down the extremists by working
closely with Washington to coordinate Hamza's potential
extradition to the U.S. However, the U.K. may face
interference from the EU, which has long been hostile to the
United States' use of the death penalty.
It is essential that European countries, including Britain,
create a hostile environment for terrorists and terrorist
collaborators and that in their pursuit of tolerance, robust
legislation strengthens, not weakens the government. The strangling
effect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
exemplifies how supranational legislation is constraining Britain's
counterterrorist measures. Even after Parliament introduced control
orders under the Terrorism Act 2000, judges have been reluctant to
use the full powers afforded by these control orders on the grounds
that 18-hour curfews breach Article V of the ECHR on detention
without trial. This has been roundly condemned by
Britain's anti-terrorism watchdog Lord Carlile and previous Home Secretary John Reid,
who indicated that he wanted to suspend certain parts of the ECHR
under a state of emergency.
Prime Minister Brown has indicated that he will present a
comprehensive counterterrorism bill to Parliament later this year.
He should propose to withdraw from the entire convention and
formulate alternative arrangements that are specifically
commensurate with British interests.
What the U.S. and Europe Should Do
The United States and its European allies should take a number
of steps to confront Islamic extremism. Specifically:
- The U.S. Congress and the Administration should carefully
implement the changes in the VWP with flexibility and bilateral
alliance-building in mind. The system that is finally
introduced should minimize travelers' inconvenience and
recognize frequent trusted travelers.
- Congress should support Poland's entry into the Visa Waiver
- The EU needs to be more receptive to transatlantic
information sharing and agree to an umbrella agreement
accepting U.S. data privacy standards as adequate to permit the
transfer of information.
- The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union should
coordinate their lists of designated foreign terrorist
organizations as closely as possible. Congress should
continue its steady pressure on the European Union, and
President Bush should use the recent détente in
French-American relations to press for Hezbollah's inclusion on the
EU's official list of foreign terrorist organizations.
- Prime Minister Brown should carefully assess which EU
policies are in the British interest and sign on only to those
that demonstrably add value. Britain should withdraw from the
European Convention on Human Rights and formulate
alternate arrangements that are specifically commensurate with
British interests. Britain should also oppose proposals in the
forthcoming EU Reform Treaty that would supranationalize key areas
of police and judicial policy.
- Joint EU counterterrorist activities should be pursued
through a mutual recognition approach rather than a supranational
- Britain should vigorously enforce exclusion and
deportation from the U.K. for individuals who engage in
unacceptable behaviors and should continue to prosecute
high-profile Islamists who threaten public order.
- Poland and the Czech Republic should continue to
pursue negotiations with the United States on missile
Peter Wehner, former director of the White House Office of
Strategic Initiatives, recently commented that it has fallen
to the West, particularly the United States, to deal with Islamic
extremism. European directives, regulations, and
communiqués will not win the war on terrorism. The EU
has a specific role in coordinating intergovernmental action and
even cooperating on a multilateral basis with third parties, but it
should not be seen as a replacement for the valuable relationships
and bilateral alliances that the United States has carefully
crafted over decades.
When Irish republican terrorists attempted to assassinate
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with a bomb at the
Conservative Party Conference in 1984, she famously held her ground
and declared that terrorism would never destroy democracy. On 9/11, Islamic terrorists killed
nearly 3,000 people, including 67 British citizens, and America and
Britain were called upon to react with equal resolve and vigor.
Just as Prime Minister Thatcher stood firm in 1984, and just as she
and President Ronald Reagan faced down the Soviet Union and won the
Cold War, American and British leadership will once again be
required to stand up to a hostile and motivated enemy and
defeat the enemies of freedom and liberty.
Sally McNamara is Senior
Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation. The author is grateful to James Dean, Deputy Director
of Government Relations, Foreign and Defense Policy, at the
Heritage Foundation for his advice on reform of the Visa Waiver
Program. Erin Magee, an intern in the Davis Institute, and Maria
Verbanac, Administrative Assistant in the Thatcher Center,
assisted in preparing this paper.
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It (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006).
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UK, speech at Queen's College, London, November 9, 2006, at www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page374.html (September
Manningham-Buller, "The International Terrorist
Threat to the UK.
Pat Milton, "FBI Counterterrorism Chief Says
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For instance, the U.S.-EU Declaration on
Combating Terrorism was signed at the U.S.-EU Summit in Shannon,
Ireland, on June 26, 2004.
European Council, "Declaration on Combating
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Sajjad Karim, "Extraordinary Rendition
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18, 2007), and Sarah Ludford, quoted in "European Parliament CIA
Committee--First Meeting, January 26, 2006, at www.sarahludfordmep.org.uk/news/000611.html (September
Veronika Oleksyn, "Gonzales Denies Torture by
U.S., Deseret News (Salt Lake City), May 4, 2006, p.
These include the U.S.-EU high-level policy
dialogue on border and transport security in April 2004 and customs
cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters in April 22,
Official Journal of the European
Union, May 20, 2004, p. L183/83, at /static/reportimages/FB8DCE49FA4A1E0B854601851D9F29CF.pdf (September
18, 2007), and July 6, 2004, p. L235/11, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_235/l
_23520040706en00110022.pdf (September 18, 2007).
The first U.S.-Europol agreement was reached
in December 2001. A second agreement in December 2002 permitted
European and American investigators to share personal
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs
and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Border Security:
Stronger Action Needed to Access and Mitigate Risks in the Visa
Waiver Program, testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, September 7, 2006, at www.gao.gov/new.items/d061090t.pdf (February
Favorable opinions of the U.S. were 39
percent in France, 37 percent in Germany, 23 percent in Spain, and
56 percent in the United Kingdom. See Pew Global Attitudes Project,
"America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran,
Hamas, June 13, 2006, at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252 (September
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53.
EU candidate countries are Turkey, Croatia,
and the Republic of Macedonia.
Public Law 110-53, § 711(a)(1)(B).
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom were the only EU member states that recognized
terrorism as a specific crime as opposed to a common offense.
Archick, "Europe and Counterterrorism, p.
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Kristin Archick, "US-EU Cooperation Against
Terrorism, Congressional Research Service Report for
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U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee,
Rendition, p. 49.
Justin Davenport, "The Biggest Terror Plot
Since 9/11, The Evening Standard (London), August 17,
Anna Farley, "Terror Cell Members Jailed for
'Wicked' Plot, Press Association Newsfile, May 15, 2007.
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on Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives,
September 14, 2005, at www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller091405.htm
(September 18, 2007).
Mueller, "Transforming the Federal Bureau of
Melanie Phillips, Londonistan (New
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Manningham-Buller, "The International
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Europol, "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend
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The largest component of U.S. foreign aid
finances bilateral economic assistance programs. Within that
pillar, the largest level of funding has been for economic growth,
agriculture, and trade--$4.4 billion from a total budget of $8.2
billion for fiscal year 2004. See Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels,
"Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,
updated April 15, 2004, p. 10, at /static/reportimages/A2B91B80CF1574B4EB7949F1B50A3772.pdf (September
Jytte Klausen notes this phenomenon, saying
that the Church of England has complained that the British
government is showing "favoritism to Muslims and that tax money is
being used to promote Islam. See United States Institute of Peace,
"British Counter-Terrorism After the July 2005 Attacks: Adapting
Community-Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism,
February 2007, at www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0205_terrorism.html
(September 18, 2007).
Phillips, Londonistan, p. 182.
Julia Hartley-Brewer, "'Danger Man' Will Be
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Ben Leapman, "He Supports the Suicide
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Hartley-Brewer, "'Danger Man' Will Be
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Dipesh Gadher,"Radical Past of Top
Whitehall Islamic Aide, Sunday Times (London),
July 30, 2006.
By 2008, annual spending on
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Stationery Office, "Countering International Terrorism.
See Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
"Countering International Terrorism.
Padraic Flanagan, "Taxpayers Fund Hate
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Baran, "Countering Ideological Support for
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Anushaka Asthana, Dana Gornitzki, Lorna
Martin, Tariq Pnaja, David Smith, and Ned Temko, "Bombers, Racists,
the Law: They're Out to Get Muslims, The Observer, July 24,
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(September 18, 2007).
Europol, "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend
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Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
"Countering International Terrorism, p. 12.
Brown, in Parliamentary Debates.
Ford et al., "We May Declare an
Emergency to Quit Rights Act, Says Reid.