President George Bush's proposed
legislation (H.R. 5005) creating a Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) had included a number of important federal agencies as well
as flexibility provisions to allow federal assets to be used for
multiple purposes. This multi-use strategy for organizing and
funding the new department would promote greater effectiveness and
efficiencies within the department and limit bureaucratic
redundancy.
But these important aspects of the President's proposal are in
danger of being left out of the final legislation being drafted by
the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. A number of House
committees have removed the multi-use functions from H.R. 5005.
During markup of the bill last week, for example, the House
Judiciary and Transportation and Infrastructure Committees removed
provisions that would transfer the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) to the
Department of Homeland Security. FEMA and the Coast Guard, it was
argued, already have too many diverse missions that would suffer
from being included in a new department. The Appropriations
Committee, meanwhile, removed a provision that would permit the
Secretary of Homeland Security to transfer up to 5 percent of the
department's annual budget among its programs.
The committees failed to provide convincing justification for
their actions. In each case, the real issue appears to be not
concern for affected agencies and programs but parochial interests
and personal prerogative.
Why the Select Committee Should Commit to a Multi-Use
Approach.
It is vital that the bill submitted for a vote next week include
the President's multi-use organizational and operational structure.
Including FEMA in the DHS would facilitate its efficient
interactions with state and local first-response organizations and
help eliminate potential turf battles. The Coast Guard would be
better placed to receive the modern assets it needs to conduct its
maritime operations. Finally, the Secretary of Homeland Security
should have budget flexibility to shift funds as needed to respond
to the threats, particularly during the initial transition period.
Without such provisions, the final structure of the department
could well undermine its success.
Why Make DHS Multi-Mission?
Building Blocks for the DHS.
A number of homeland security and non-homeland security challenges
can be met with similar resources and methods. Each division of the
new Department of Homeland Security will have multiple and, at
times, potentially conflicting duties.
FEMA and the Coast Guard offer clear examples of the culture
that should emerge in the new department to address this obstacle.
FEMA's approach to the challenge of dealing with many different
kinds of disasters has enabled it to develop strong relationships
with the first-response community that have been central to its
success. The Coast Guard's focus on maritime operations has allowed
it to develop tactics that are applicable to any situation that
arises on America's waterways. This kind of multi-use flexibility
is essential if DHS is to succeed in meeting its diverse
missions.
Including FEMA and the Coast Guard in the DHS also would enable
linear progression in threat planning. Conversely, excluding either
agency would create overlapping jurisdictions and heighten
coordination concerns. Moreover, to develop its own
multi-mission-based culture, the new DHS should be able to point to
centers of excellence in multi-use tasking within its own
structure, such as FEMA and the Coast Guard. These two agencies can
serve as models of multi-use planning for underperforming
components of the proposed DHS, such as immigration
enforcement.
A multiple-use approach to homeland security assets is the best
strategy to enable the department to meet its important mission
efficiently and effectively. Organizationally, such an approach
also would be cost-effective. Thus, this is an issue not only of
good governance, but also of practical necessity if the federal
government is to interact efficiently with local agencies involved
in its various missions.
FEMA and All Hazard Cooperation
FEMA is the main federal agency responsible for working with
state and local authorities to prepare for, prevent, and respond to
disasters, including acts of terrorism. It has established close
operational relationships with state and local first-response
organizations (such as the police, fire departments, emergency
medical services, and public health sectors) that are responsible
for the initial and ongoing responses to a disaster.
First responders must be trained and equipped to handle all
disasters equally, regardless of whether they are due to acts of
nature, human error, or terrorism. As a result, their equipment,
tactics, training, and doctrine must be multi-use in nature--a
strategic approach called "All Hazards" that FEMA has utilized for
years as the basis of the Federal Response Plan. The Office of
Homeland Security has also made this all-hazards approach the basis
of the emergency response provisions of its national strategy. 1
Any effort to separate disaster response into two
categories--terrorist-related, on the one hand, and natural
disasters, on the other--would be artificial and harmful to the
nation's preparedness for both missions for a number of reasons.
Specifically:
-
Two agencies working on preparedness would breed
confusion. Should FEMA and DHS remain independent, they would
likely develop competing standards of preparedness. This would be
problematic for communities on limited budgets that cannot afford
two sets of equipment and redundant training programs. Likewise,
FEMA and the DHS would likely adopt different strategies on how to
prepare for and respond to incidents, which would lead to
conflicting doctrines. Such confusion would become even more
evident in the agency grant programs, which should be consolidated
under the DHS's Office for State and Local Coordination.
- A separate FEMA would complicate response time. Under
the House committee proposals, the federal government would need to
determine the nature of the disaster before either FEMA or DHS
could respond. Turf fights between the two could delay the federal
response, costing lives. And if an initial assessment proved wrong,
one agency would likely have to pack up while the other moved in,
further complicating matters on the ground.
- Two agencies for emergency response would unduly expand
government. Under the House plans, FEMA and the DHS would have
redundant structures and personnel for supplying grants,
coordinating and communicating with state and local officials,
conducting exercises, and responding to an incident. Such
duplication would be a dramatic waste of taxpayer dollars and
unduly increase the size of the federal payroll.
The U.S. Coast Guard and Maritime Domain Awareness
The U.S. Coast Guard has primary responsibility for ensuring the
security and safety of America's waterways, a task that encompasses
many missions. However, the Coast Guard does not detail unique
assets for each of its missions. Instead, nearly every USGS asset
is employed for every mission, every day.
Regardless of the situation that arises, the Coast Guard's
tactical approach involves a multi-use policy called "Maritime
Domain Awareness." This approach relies on (1) quick recognition of
what is occurring on America's waterways and (2) rapid response,
usually within two hours. The process of surveillance, detection,
classification, and interception is generally the same for each
mission, although the specific nature of each situation may vary.
This approach also allows the Coast Guard to fulfill many missions
with the same assets. It is the approach that the Department of
Homeland Security should take.
The greatest threat to the Coast Guard's operational success is
not the breadth of its duties, however, but a lack of adequate
modern resources. Currently, despite its multitude of missions and
large geographical area of responsibility, the Coast Guard is
forced to make do with small budgets and antiquated technology. In
fact, its two oldest active-duty ships were commissioned in 1936,
and a number of others saw service in World War II. Further,
according to a July 2002 report of the Congressional Research
Service, a lack of budget resources required the Coast Guard to
reduce the operations of some of its ships and aircraft by 10
percent during fiscal year 2001. 2 Simply put, the Department of
Transportation, which currently has authority for the Coast Guard,
puts a higher priority on facilitating transportation by building
infrastructure than it does on equipping the Coast Guard to perform
its missions.
Moving the Coast Guard into the new DHS makes sense. The DHS
will share its institutional culture, which should lead to better
resource allocation over the long term. Funding modern, efficient,
and reliable equipment for the Coast Guard will improve its ability
to respond to all maritime challenges.
Why Give DHS Budget Flexibility?
The Department of Homeland Security needs a flexible budget to
shorten its transition period and adapt quickly to changing
threats. It will have many missions, each of which will need to be
fully funded. The strategic approach needed to meet the domestic
threat of terrorism is very different from that needed to meet
challenges to American national security abroad. Global threats
develop slowly (for example, military equipment must be procured)
and are observed and can be prepared for in advance. Adaptation to
meet these challenges can be met through the annual budget
process.
Terrorists, however, do not rely on long-term procurement
strategies or a stable home front. As a result, they can change
their tactics quickly. What the DHS views as its top priorities
during the budget authorization and appropriations process can
change even before the budget takes effect. If the Secretary must
ask for Congress's blessing to shift resources each time the
terrorists shift tactics, the United States will constantly be a
step behind.
Nevertheless, the House Appropriations Committee struck down the
proposed budget flexibility entirely, with some Members vaguely
suggesting that the provision might be unconstitutional. In
reality, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that prevents
Congress from granting this type of minimal spending flexibility to
a department secretary as long as the authority is expressly
granted. The General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, agrees.
3
Nor is there anything to the contrary in Clinton v. City of New
York, 4 a decision that invalidated a novel Line Item Veto Act that
would have allowed the President to cancel or impound an otherwise
lawful appropriation, not merely to shift spending between approved
accounts. By contrast, provisions similar to the one in H.R. 5005
have been inserted into many other appropriation bills. Further,
Congress will retain its legitimate authority over any transfer, as
the Secretary must report any reallocation 15 days in advance.
The Appropriations Committee's refusal to grant flexibility to
the Secretary of Homeland Security to reprogram a mere 5 percent of
the DHS budget to respond to dramatic new threats or national
catastrophes shows precisely the kind of narrow congressional
mindset that must be discarded in this time of war.
Conclusion
As the House Select Committee on Homeland Security drafts the
final version of H.R. 5005 for a vote next week, it should ensure
that the bill is rooted in provisions that promote a multi-use
organizational and operational structure in the DHS. FEMA should be
placed in the new Department of Homeland Security to ensure
efficient interaction with state and local first-response
organizations and linear planning that is free from bureaucratic
turf battles. The Coast Guard also should be included and given the
modern assets it needs to boost all of its maritime domain
operations.
Both FEMA and the USCG must be included in the new department
now when their successful cultures could best influence the entire
department. Further, the Secretary of Homeland Security must have
budget flexibility. Such provisions are constitutional and
necessary to respond to the threat of terrorism. Failure to include
any of them will threaten the multi-use objective of the DHS that
is essential to its success.
Michael
Scardaville is Policy Analyst for Homeland Defense in the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
at The Heritage Foundation.
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1. The Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security, July 2002, p. 41.
2. Ronald O'Rourke, "Homeland Security: Coast Guard
Operations--Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional
Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. RS21115, updated July
11, 2002, p. 2.
3. U.S. General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law, Vol. 1, 2d ed. (1991), pp. 2-20 to 2-28.
4. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).