Delivered October 10, 2007
Pursuing a strong and stable relationship with Pakistan
will continue to be one of America's most important foreign
policy objectives for several years to come. The range and
complexity of issues involved in our relations-eliminating global
terrorist networks, countering the rising tide of Islamic
radicalism in Pakistan, securing and safeguarding Pakistan's
nuclear assets, and facilitating the transition to civilian-led
democracy-require focused and sustained U.S. attention and deft
diplomacy.
Recent developments in Pakistan and the United States, however,
are threatening to create misunderstandings between our two
countries and to derail this critical partnership. Pakistan's
inability to control a burgeoning terrorist safe haven in tribal
areas bordering Afghanistan is causing frustration in
Washington, while recently passed U.S. legislation that conditions
military assistance to Pakistan is causing doubts about the U.S. as
a reliable long-term partner. Washington and Islamabad each have
high expectations of the relationship. In order to sustain the
U.S.-Pakistan partnership over the long term, we need to
manage these expectations and seek to align our strategic
perspectives of the region more closely. We should not repeat
the mistakes of the past by allowing our ties to Islamabad to
weaken.
A second breach in the relationship, such as that caused by the
Pressler Amendment that cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, would
seriously jeopardize U.S. interests in South Asia and have severe
implications for the global fight against
terrorism.
Political Transition
Pakistan is in the midst of an historic political transition
that will determine the core direction of the country at a time
when extremists are seeking to provoke an Islamic revolution. We
have seen dramatic developments in recent weeks, and the final
outcome of the political changes is still uncertain. Washington
should welcome the transition to civilian democratic rule
without backing any particular individuals or political
parties.
Given the perception that the U.S. has favored military over
civilian rule in Pakistan in order to pursue its own
counterterrorism objectives during the past six years, Washington
will have difficulty convincing Pakistanis that it supports genuine
democracy now. Unequivocal U.S. support for the democratic
transition, such as recent U.S. statements criticizing the
arrest of opposition politicians, as well as U.S. discouragement of
a declaration of emergency rule in Pakistan, is necessary to try to
defuse the increasingly shrill anti-Americanism that is gripping
Pakistani civil society.
If the Supreme Court this week rules in President Pervez
Musharraf's favor on cases challenging his eligibility for
re-election to another five-year term, he will officially become
president, and all eyes will begin to shift to the 2008 general
election.
To lay a foundation for a credible election process,
Musharraf will need to resign from the Chief of Army position. His
lawyer has already announced to the Supreme Court that he will shed
the military uniform before taking a new oath of office, and he has
little choice but to follow through on the commitment. A
second attempt to renege on his pledge, like he did in 2004, would
meet with a domestic backlash and strong international
condemnation. His recent announcement of a successor Chief of Army
signals that he is serious about resigning his military post.
Other preparations for a free and fair election are also
necessary. The Election Commission must work with the political
opposition and international observers to correct voter rolls,
which apparently fail to list millions of voters. Additionally, the
government must give all political parties a chance to
participate fully in the process. Any attempt to manipulate the
elections in favor of a particular political party would backfire
and undermine the credibility of the entire process, fueling
further political unrest.
Rising Extremist Violence
The increase in attacks in Pakistan during the past three
months, which have killed over 300 civilians and security
personnel, appears to be both retaliation for the July 10 military
operation at the Red Mosque and aimed at taking advantage of the
political unrest. Pakistan is now second only to Iraq in the number
of suicide attacks during the past few months.
The attacks on government forces have mainly taken place in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), where the Pakistan military has resumed
operations against militants. Last week a suicide bomber killed 15
people when he blew himself up near a police checkpoint in the town
of Bannu in the NWFP. Pakistan has reported killing 150 militants
in clashes over the weekend in North Waziristan.
Support within the Pakistan Army to continue fighting in the
tribal areas may be eroding. Circumstances surrounding the
capture of over 240 Pakistani soldiers by Taliban fighters on
August 30 are mysterious. Some observers speculate the soldiers may
have surrendered.
Despite the rising violence, Pakistanis are generally
ambivalent about taking on the extremist threat directly. A recent
poll taken by Terror Free Tomorrow, a U.S. non-governmental
organization, shows that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis do
not view the fight against terrorism as benefiting Pakistan,
nor do they see defeating al-Qaeda as a priority for their leaders.
Instead they appear to blame the recent violence on Pakistani
counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. Increasingly, they
question the benefits of continuing to support U.S.-led
anti-terrorism efforts in the region that, in their opinion,
rely too heavily on military force.
Harmonizing U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism
Efforts
The U.S. and Pakistan differ on how to achieve counterterrorism
objectives. Our two countries share the overall goals of bringing
stability to Afghanistan and preventing the rise of extremism in
Pakistan. Moreover, we are in agreement that the Taliban's
resurgence in Afghanistan would have a blowback effect in
Pakistan.
However, for a variety of reasons, including fears of creating
greater instability in the country, Pakistani doubts about the
U.S. long-term commitment to the region, and Islamabad's distrust
of the Karzai government in Kabul, Islamabad is reluctant to crack
down fully on the Taliban and other extremists operating from
its territory.
Also contributing to broader U.S.-Pakistan misunderstanding
on counterterrorism issues are the complex political and
societal dynamics in Pakistan that prevent Islamabad from taking
credit for some of its counterterrorism successes. Given the
Pakistani public's opposition to the war in Afghanistan and
pockets of sympathy for the Taliban, Islamabad has refrained from
highlighting its recent contributions in targeting senior Taliban
leaders. With the assistance of Pakistan, senior Taliban military
commander Mullah Akhtar Osmani was killed last December in an air
strike in Afghanistan, and Mullah Dadullah was killed in May in
Helmand province in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis also arrested
Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah earlier in the year
and eliminated key Pakistani Taliban leader Abdullah Masood in
Pakistan's Baluchistan province in July. [1]
To garner the full counterterrorism cooperation the U.S.
requires from Islamabad, Washington must develop a realistic and
hard-nosed policy that takes on Pakistan's ambivalence toward going
head-to-head with the extremists. Despite Pakistan having been one
of the largest recipients of U.S. aid over the past six
years-receiving well over $10 billion-the terrorist threat
emanating from Pakistan is as dangerous as ever.
Many of those involved in recently foiled terrorist plots
across the globe received training and inspiration at
terrorist training camps in Pakistan, and a recent United Nations
report says that 80 percent of suicide bombers that have conducted
attacks in Afghanistan from 2001-2007 were recruited, received
training, or stayed in safe houses located in the North and South
Waziristan agencies of Pakistan's tribal areas.[2]
Pakistan believes the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan relies too
heavily on military operations that result in collateral damage
that further alienates the local population. Furthermore, Islamabad
believes it is possible to negotiate with the Taliban to bring them
into the political process. In his remarks at the closing
ceremony of the August peace jirga in Kabul, President Musharraf
said the Taliban is part of Afghan society and can be brought into
the political mainstream.
While promoting an inclusive political system that provides
adequate representation of Pashtuns is important to stabilizing the
country, there should be no doubt about the international
commitment to preventing the Taliban from again gaining influence
in Afghanistan. Advocating a Taliban role affirms extremism as an
acceptable ideology and undermines the establishment of
pluralistic democracy in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a recent U.N.
report asserts that overall support for the Taliban in Afghanistan
remains "astonishingly low."[3]
Some observers believe Pakistan prefers to allow the Taliban to
undermine the current dispensation in Afghanistan since the success
of Hamid Karzai- perceived as a close ally of India-would be
detrimental to Pakistani security interests.[4] At the same time,
however, the recent wave of terrorist attacks in retaliation for
the Pakistan military's action against extremists at the Red Mosque
in Islamabad on July 10 have led to the death of over 300 Pakistani
civilians and security officials, demonstrating that the
Taliban can be as threatening to the Pakistani state as it is to
the Karzai government.
While hard-core Taliban elements with links to al-Qaeda will
have to be defeated militarily in both Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Washington, Kabul, and Islamabad should devise together a strategy
to siphon off "guns-for-hire" who would be willing to become part
of civilian society. According to the British House of Commons
Defense Committee Report on "United Kingdom Operations in
Afghanistan," British commanders in Helmand province reported
that there were two levels of Taliban fighters: "tier one"
fighters who are religious fundamentalists who would never
accept a compromise with government, and "tier two" fighters whose
allegiance was not based on ideology, but who were in effect
hired guns and therefore more amenable to reconciliation.[5]
Pakistani Tribal Areas. Perhaps the greatest
challenge in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is to develop an
effective strategy to root out the terrorists from the Tribal
Areas. Senior U.S. intelligence officials revealed over the summer
that the Pakistani peace deals in the FATA have not achieved the
desired objectives and, in fact, have allowed the region to develop
into an al-Qaeda stronghold. Pakistani extremists also took
advantage of the decreased military pressure by attempting to
institute strict Islamic edicts in the region-the same tactics
employed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The
extremists have sought to close down girls' schools, barbershops,
and video stores, and are increasingly challenging the writ of the
government, even in some of the settled areas of the Northwest
Frontier Province.
While focusing greater attention to combating this problem, it
is important to acknowledge the tremendous losses the Pakistan
Army has suffered in these areas over the last five years. The
peace deals were implemented because of these losses, as well as
the growing disillusionment among military cadre about fighting
their own citizens. Part of the government's plan in
initiating the peace deals was to restore the traditional form of
governance in the region and to co-opt the tribal elders and
political representatives through an infusion of economic
assistance for new roads, hospitals, and schools.
U.S. revelations about al-Qaeda's safe haven in the border areas
coincided with the Pakistan military's July 10 storming of the
Red Mosque in Islamabad, which left at least 100 dead. Reports
indicate that there were links between the leadership of the Red
Mosque and al-Qaeda elements in the Tribal Areas. The combination
of events led Pakistan to send fresh military reinforcements to the
region, reactivate military checkpoints, and resume limited
military operations.
While Pakistan's willingness to go back on the military
offensive in the tribal areas is welcome, Islamabad's efforts
alone are unlikely to address the serious threat from the region.
U.S. and Afghan forces repeatedly have pursued insurgents to
the border, but are banned from crossing into Pakistan in hot
pursuit. Senior Pakistani military officials do not support the
extremists in the tribal areas, yet they do not view the situation
with the same urgency as the U.S. They also are reluctant to engage
in a full-out confrontation with the extremists in these areas
because of the risk that it would destabilize Pakistan.[6]
Washington must convince Islamabad to work more closely in joint
operations that bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear
on the situation and employ a combination of targeted military
operations and economic assistance that drives a wedge between the
Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists. A
large-scale U.S. troop invasion of Pakistan's Tribal Areas would
have disastrous consequences for the Pakistani state and would not
provide a lasting solution to the problem. A more effective
strategy involves working cooperatively with Pakistan's military to
assert state authority over the areas. Once they are secure,
substantial assistance could be provided to build up the economy
and social infrastructure. The Bush Administration already is
moving in this direction with a pledge of $750 million over five
years to develop the Tribal Areas.
Over the long term, U.S. assistance should encourage political
reform that incorporates the institutions of the tribal lands fully
into the Pakistani system. Some have argued that the Pakistan
military is loath to implement political reform in these areas, and
that only the democratic parties would move in this direction.
In late July, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir
Bhutto filed a petition with the Supreme Court, seeking enforcement
of the Political Parties Act in the FATA that would extend Pakistan
election laws to the region and encourage political activity.
Political parties currently are prohibited from functioning in
the FATA, although there are 12 seats reserved for FATA members in
the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament) and
eight in the Senate. The petition claims that since the political
parties are not allowed to field candidates for elections, the
mosques and madrassahs (religious schools) have been able to assert
undue political influence in the region.[7]
Washington should also prioritize development of Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones (ROZs) that would build up industrial zones in
the Northwest Frontier Province and other areas that would
produce textile goods receiving preferential access in the
U.S. The ROZ initiative is an integral component to our
overall strategy to develop the FATA and uproot terrorism from the
border areas. The Bush Administration first announced this
initiative over 18 months ago. The U.S. Administration and
Congress should work together expeditiously to get this
critical project off the ground.
Pakistani Regional Relationships
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations. Our ability to
defeat al-Qaeda's capabilities and ideology rests on a strategy
that integrates our diplomatic and security efforts toward
Afghanistan and Pakistan and that focuses more intently on
improving these two key countries' relations with each other. The
Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 that is
now before the U.S. Senate acknowledges this linkage and authorizes
the President to appoint a special envoy to promote closer
Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation. This is an important
initiative and should be taken up as quickly as possible.
This senior envoy would need to take a pro-active role in
mediating disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, prodding
both countries to develop a fresh strategic perception of the
region based on economic integration, political
reconciliation, and respect for territorial boundaries.
To achieve stability in the region, Pakistan will have to root
out Taliban ideology from its own society and close down
madrassahs and training camps that perpetuate the Taliban
insurgency. For its part, Afghanistan will have to acknowledge the
sanctity of the border dividing Pashtun populations between the two
countries and ensure adequate representation of Pashtuns in
the Afghan government.
Pashtuns in Afghanistan number about 12 million, making up
42 percent of the Afghanistan population, while the Pashtun
population in Pakistan stands at about 25 million, constituting
around 15 percent of the total Pakistani population. British
colonialists purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes in 1893
with the Durand Line, which now constitutes the 1,600-mile porous
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[8] Afghanistan at one time
claimed Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan and has never officially
recognized the Durand Line. In the past, Pakistan has countered
Pashtun nationalism within its own borders by promoting pan-Islamic
extremism in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga that was held in early
August in Kabul was a first step in bringing local leaders together
from both sides of the border in face-to-face talks. While no one
expected immediate breakthroughs, the gathering represented an
important step in beginning to build confidence between the hostile
neighbors. Pakistani and Afghan delegates, numbering around 700,
focused on terrorism as a joint threat to the two nations and urged
their governments to make the War on Terrorism an integral part of
their national policies and security strategies.
One highlight of the jirga was President Musharraf's
admission during the closing ceremonies that Afghan militants
received support from within Pakistan. His statements
represented a welcome departure from past rhetorical barbs
blaming Afghanistan's woes entirely on President Karzai.
Musharraf's remarks demonstrate that the two sides have made some
limited progress in improving relations since the historic
tri-partite meeting hosted by President George W. Bush in September
2006.
Pakistan-India Relations. India and Pakistan
have achieved tangible progress in the peace talks that started in
January 2004. They have held dozens of official meetings, increased
people-to-people exchanges, increased annual bilateral trade to
over $1 billion, launched several cross-border buses and train
services, and liberalized visa regimes to encourage travel
between the two countries. During a meeting in September
2006-just two months after the Mumbai commuter train blasts that
killed nearly 200-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President
Musharraf established a joint terrorism mechanism and agreed
to expedite resolution of disputes over the Siachen Glacier and Sir
Creek, a narrow strip of marshland separating the province of Sindh
in Pakistan and the state of Gujarat in India.
Perhaps the most significant
progress has been the narrowing of differences about how to address
the seemingly intractable issue of Kashmir. President
Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh are beginning to craft
their statements on Kashmir in ways that narrow the gap between
their countries' long-held official positions on the disputed
territory.
President Musharraf declared last December in an Indian
television interview that Pakistan would give up its claim to
Kashmir if India agreed to a four-part solution that involves
keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Line of
Control (LOC) that divides Kashmir irrelevant, demilitarizing
both sides of the LOC, developing a plan for self-governance of
Kashmir, and instituting a mechanism for India and Pakistan to
jointly supervise the region. In 2003, Musharraf dropped
Islamabad's long-held insistence on a United Nations plebiscite to
determine the status of Kashmir.
It is critical that the two sides maintain momentum in the
peace process, since the state of Pakistan-India ties will be
a major determinant of overall regional stability. The peace
process has understandably slowed due to the recent political
instability in Pakistan. In a welcome development, Indian and
Pakistani officials agreed to meet in New Delhi to discuss nuclear
confidence building and expand on their counterterrorism joint
mechanism. If, as expected, Pakistan holds general elections
early next year, the peace process could become
vulnerable if new leaders fail to express commitment to the
peace talks early on in their administration.
One reason for continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the
Taliban stems from the concern that India is trying to encircle it
by gaining influence in Afghanistan. In this context, the Taliban
offers the best chance for countering India's regional
influence. Pakistan believes ethnic Tajiks in the Afghan
government receive support from New Delhi. India, in cooperation
with Russia and Iran, supported the Afghan Northern Alliance
against the Taliban in the late 1990s and almost certainly retains
links to Northern Alliance elements now in the Afghan
government. Pakistan also complains that the Indian consulates
in the border cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar are involved in
fomenting insurgency in its Baluchistan province.
Because of the regional rivalry between Pakistan and India,
Islamabad has been reluctant to allow Indian trans-shipment of
goods across its territory into Afghanistan. The U.S. should
encourage India and Pakistan to work toward greater economic
cooperation in Afghanistan as a way to defuse their tensions.
Participants in unofficial talks on improving Indo-Pakistani
ties have suggested that the two countries add Afghanistan as an
agenda item in their formal dialogue.[9]
Pakistan-China Relations. Pakistan and China
have had long-standing strategic ties. China is Pakistan's
largest defense supplier, and the Chinese view Pakistan as a useful
counterweight to Indian power in the region. In the run-up to
Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Pakistan last November,
media reports speculated that Beijing would sign a major nuclear
energy cooperation agreement with Pakistan.[10]
In the end, however, the Chinese leader provided a general pledge
of support to Pakistan's nuclear energy program but refrained from
announcing plans to supply new nuclear reactors. China has helped
Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the
Punjab Province and has provided Pakistan with nuclear
technology as far back as the 1970s. China also is helping Pakistan
develop a deep-sea port at Gwadar in the Pakistani province of
Baluchistan, near the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabad that
has surfaced in the past has been about the issue of rising Islamic
extremism in Pakistan and the ability of Chinese Uighur separatists
to receive sanctuary and training among other radical Islamist
groups on Pakistani territory. To mollify China's concerns,
Pakistan in recent years has begun to clamp down on Uighur
settlements and on religious schools used as training grounds for
militant Islamists.[11] Their tensions over Islamic extremism
flared earlier this year when Islamic vigilantes from the Red
Mosque kidnapped several Chinese citizens they accused of running a
brothel in Islamabad. Many believe Islamabad's decision to use
military force against the extremists at the Red Mosque stemmed
largely from the incident with the Chinese citizens, which greatly
embarrassed the Musharraf regime.
Pakistan-Iran Relations. Pakistan's relations
with Iran have been far from smooth during the last three decades.
Relations soured following the 1979 Iranian Revolution due to
Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq's previous support of the
Shah's regime and his encouragement of Sunni militant organizations
that pushed a strict Sunni interpretation of Islam and
targeted the minority Shia population in Pakistan. Iran, in
turn, began to export to Pakistan Shiia militants to counter the
Sunni extremists. Sectarian violence has ebbed and flowed during
the last fifteen years in Pakistan and continues to have a chilling
impact on Iranian-Pakistani relations.
Pakistan's support of the Sunni Taliban in the mid-1990s
significantly raised tensions between Tehran and Islamabad. These
tensions climaxed in August 1998 when the Taliban killed several
Iranian diplomats in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif.
Iran responded by amassing its military along the border with
Afghanistan. If fighting had broken out between Iranian forces and
the Taliban, Pakistan would have likely been drawn into the
conflict in support of the Taliban.
It is difficult to imagine Pakistan would have officially
sanctioned nuclear cooperation with such an unsteady neighbor,
although some analysts believe the bulk of the nuclear cooperation
occurred in the early 1990s before the Taliban had emerged and
shortly after the U.S. had cut off assistance to Pakistan.
Pakistan's halt to official support for the Taliban
following 9/11 has helped to improve Pakistani-Iranian ties,
and both countries are actively engaged in talks on developing an
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
Nuclear Issues
Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from
falling into the hands of terrorists is a top priority for the U.S.
President Musharraf recently made a series of promotions to
key Army posts aimed at ensuring continuity in Army policies
during the political transition. The round of promotions
is critical to maintaining the professionalism and institutional
integrity of the Army and reassuring the international
community that the military remains committed to the fight against
terrorism and to the protection of the country's nuclear
assets.
While there is no immediate threat to the security of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons during the current political transition,
Washington will need to be diligent in pursuing policies that
promote the safety and security of Islamabad's nuclear assets. The
results of investigations into Pakistani nuclear scientist
Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear black market and proliferation network
demonstrate the devastating consequences of nuclear proliferation
by individuals with access to state-controlled nuclear
programs.
Although A.Q. Khan avoided engaging al-Qaeda on nuclear issues,
earlier revelations about a group of former Pakistani military
officials and nuclear scientists who met with Osama bin Laden
around the time of 9/11 remind us of the continuing threat of the
intersection of terrorism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan.
On October 23, 2001, acting on an American request, Pakistani
authorities detained Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, two
retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) officials.
Since their retirement from the PAEC in 1999 they had been involved
in relief work in Afghanistan through a non-governmental
organization they established called Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN). In
November 2001, the coalition forces found documents in
Afghanistan relating to UTN's interest in biological weapons. This
prompted Pakistani security forces to arrest seven members of
UTN's board, most of whom were retired Pakistani Army officials and
nuclear scientists.[12]
Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet speculates
in his memoirs that UTN's contacts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda
may have been supported by some elements within the Pakistani
military and intelligence establishment. Tenet says Pakistani
interrogations of the seven board members were initially
insufficient. He further notes that despite CIA warnings to
Pakistani officials about UTN's activities before 9/11, it was only
when President George W. Bush dispatched him to Pakistan in
November 2001, following revelations of a meeting between bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and UTN leaders, that Musharraf took
serious action.[13]
What Should Be Done
Washington is
unlikely to succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan and preventing the
Taliban from regaining influence in the country unless it
addresses Pakistani stakes in Afghanistan and integrates U.S.
security and diplomatic policies toward these two key countries. In
this regard, the U.S. should follow through with suggestions to
establish a senior envoy to focus solely on working with both
Pakistani and Afghan officials to address their political and
historical tensions and encourage greater security and economic
cooperation.
As part of this effort, the U.S. will need to spur Pakistan to
adjust its security perceptions of the region and demonstrate U.S.
sensitivity to Pakistan's core security interests and willingness
to use influence with both Kabul and New Delhi to address these
concerns. Washington should continue and expand the
Pakistan-Afghanistan jirga process as a way to bring together local
leaders from both sides of the border.
Washington should encourage New Delhi and Islamabad to engage
directly with one another on the issue of Afghanistan and help
identify regional economic or political initiatives on which
the two can cooperate. Pakistan should not expect the U.S. to
discourage India from having a role in Afghanistan, since
Washington views New Delhi's example of a pluralistic
democracy as a positive influence in helping Afghanistan develop
itself into a stable democracy.
Washington should consider fostering regional trade cooperation
initiatives among Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan that would
encourage Pakistan to allow India to trans-ship goods destined for
Afghanistan reconstruction programs through its territory as
stipulated in H.R. 2446. The U.S. could support a high-profile
regional trade initiative with Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan
representatives somewhere in the region that also involves
participation by U.S. companies currently involved in the Afghan
reconstruction effort.
The U.S. will need to build up Pakistan's capacity to take on
the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas and focus substantial
attention on developing these areas economically. Washington must
convince Islamabad to work more closely in joint efforts that
bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear on the situation
in North and South Waziristan and employ a combination of targeted
military operations and economic assistance programs that drives a
wedge between the Pashtun tribal communities and the
international terrorists.
A large-scale U.S. troop invasion of Pakistan's Tribal Areas
could have disastrous consequences for the Pakistani state and
would not provide a lasting solution to the problem. A more
effective strategy involves working cooperatively with Pakistan's
military to assert state authority over the areas. Once they
are secure, substantial assistance should be provided to build
up the economy and social infrastructure. Washington's pledge
of $750 million to develop the Tribal Areas over the next five
years is welcome, but the aid should not be delivered until it is
clear the Pakistani authorities have the upper hand in the region
and can ensure the aid does not fall into the wrong hands. This
will require U.S. access to the region and a clear commitment from
the Pakistan government to counter Taliban ideology.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has
implemented assistance programs in the FATA for several years,
including road building and school construction, and through opium
cultivation eradication programs that were successful in the 1980s.
Although the U.S. will have to provide aid initially through
Pakistani government channels, USAID should seek out potential
non-governmental organizations that could work in these areas
so that eventually it can work through them rather than
relying solely on the local administration.
The U.S. should conduct counterinsurgency training programs for
the Pakistan military, especially the Frontier Corps, whose
troops know the terrain of the FATA, but have little
counterinsurgency training. This training will both build
trust and stronger ties between the U.S. military and its Pakistani
counterparts, as well as better prepare the Pakistan Army to
fight al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas.
To address rising Islamic extremism, Washington should
encourage the Pakistan government to enforce the rule of law
against militants who use the threat of violence to enforce
Taliban-style edicts and close down madrassahs that are teaching
hatred against the West that leads to terrorism. Washington, in
coordination with the United Kingdom and European allies,
should make clear to Pakistan that the Taliban does not have a
place in any future government in Afghanistan, and that only those
who firmly renounce violence and participate in the current
political process will have a say in running the country.
The U.S. should refrain from conditioning assistance to
Pakistan because it sends a wrong signal at a time when we need to
demonstrate that the fight against terrorism is a joint endeavor
that benefits Pakistan as much as it does the U.S. and global
community. Given the abrupt cutoff of U.S. aid to
Pakistan in 1990 because of nuclear concerns, the U.S. lost
valuable leverage with Pakistani leaders and created a feeling of
mistrust between our two countries that still plagues the
relationship.
Because of the 1990 aid cutoff, Pakistan views the U.S. as a
fickle partner that could exit the region at any time. This lack of
faith in U.S. commitment to the region hurts our ability to garner
the kind of counterterrorism cooperation we require from the
Pakistani government. Pakistani soldiers are dying in the battle
against terrorism, and average Pakistanis are beginning to
question whether these sacrifices are being made solely at the
behest of the U.S. rather than to protect their own country.
Conditioning assistance only fuels the idea that Pakistan is
taking action to fight terrorism under coercion, rather than to
protect its own citizens.
The U.S. should encourage the current transition to civilian-led
democratic rule, yet not try to micromanage it from
Washington. The Pakistani people, by and large, do not support
extremist policies and would likely vote into power one of the
secular democratic parties-so long as they have a range of
political choices and perceive the elections as transparent
and free.
Lisa Curtis is
Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center
at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered before the
House Armed Services Committee.
[4] 7/
page7.shtml (subscription required).
[12]
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant
Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp.
154-155.
[13]
George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), p. 286.