At his June 10 confirmation hearing, Kurt Campbell said some
encouraging things about the administration's Asia policy.
President Obama's nominee for assistant secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific affairs emphasized America's enduring commitment
to the Pacific and the centrality of our treaty allies. And only in
this context did he address the U.S. relationship with China.
This is good.
But, over the long term, only fidelity to the underlying values
of a strong national defense, free enterprise and individual
liberty will effectively protect and promote American interests in
Asia.
A strong national defense has two inseparable elements:
alliances and long-term material commitment to U.S. predominance in
the Asia-Pacific region.
The administration seems to understand the first part of this
equation. Hillary Rodham Clinton made Japan and South Korea her
first destinations as secretary of state -- the first time in 48
years a U.S. secretary of state has given Asia such early priority.
She is scheduled to visit Thailand next month. Robert M. Gates just
wrapped up the first visit to the Philippines by a U.S. defense
secretary in nearly 10 years. Mr. Obama met at the White House with
the prime minister of our other steadfast Pacific ally, Australia,
very early in his term.
Building on the Bush administration's good work, Mr. Obama is
also pursuing stronger partnerships with India and Indonesia.
The administration, however, is falling short on the second half
of the national defense equation. It is feeding regional suspicions
of America's staying power by cutting Air Force procurements,
under-investing in naval forces and eliminating key missile-defense
programs.
What about free enterprise, the second leg of the Asia policy
stool? Commitment to free enterprise requires both support for free
trade and open, productive economic dialogue.
The administration's indecision on the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement (FTA), the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement and unfinished FTAs with Thailand and Malaysia is quite
worrisome. The long-term goal of creating a Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific also deserves vocal support.
Yes, these are all Bush-era initiatives, but Mr. Obama can --
and should -- make them his own. He could make his mark by adding
to the list. A U.S.-Taiwan FTA, for instance, would be an excellent
strategic decision on both trade and foreign policy fronts.
Economic dialogue is mostly about China. Here, too, there is
cause for worry.
China's embrace of capitalism lifted millions from poverty. But
free-market momentum there stopped about three years ago. When the
global economic crisis ends, that sad reality will remain, as will
the global imbalances it helps sustain.
Kick-starting specific free-market reforms in Beijing should be
the centerpiece in U.S.-China discussions. Instead, the
administration has opted to focus on climate change -- an area of
unproven value, questionable science and wholly unlikely
cooperation. And its slighting of human rights concerns, which
could have been dismissed early on as a slip of the tongue, seems
increasingly like a calculated part of a hard-core realist foreign
policy.
Respect for individual liberty is a value woven into the way
America conceives of its national interest. It is no coincidence
that our most comfortable alliances are with democracies and all of
our formal alliances in Asia are with democracies. Shared values
also gave rise to diplomatic forums like the trilateral dialogue
among the U.S., Japan and Australia.
The administration should continue and expand these values-based
partnerships, for example by creating a global freedom coalition.
Yet the administration is floating an antithetical idea: a
trilateral dialogue among the U.S., Japan and China.
Even from a realist perspective, positioning the U.S. as neutral
partner in the centuries-old rivalry between East Asia's two giants
would be a mistake. Worse, it would herald an era where hard
interests are pursued at the cost of drawing lines between
democratic allies; i.e., excluding South Korea from conversations
of vital importance to Seoul.
Such an approach must alarm Taiwan most of all. Our commitment
there is predicated almost entirely on concern for individual
liberty. On most every other interest the scales are tipping in
China's favor. But our love of liberty -- going back to support for
the Nationalists during the Chinese civil war -- and U.S. law wed
us to Taiwan.
As it opens up to engagement with the mainland, Taiwan needs our
support more than ever. Without it, China will swallow Taiwan
whole, snuffing out the freedom we struggled together to build. If,
in the process of supporting a free Taiwan, America sends a useful
signal to the region about our steadfastness, all the better.
Consensus on some basic contours of Asia policy - such as
putting our allies first - should be welcomed. It is the values
that underlie the policy, however, that will determine the depth
and breadth of our consensus. Unfortunately, for every sign that
the administration has its principles right, there are at least two
that they have them wrong.
is vice president of foreign- and
defense-policy studies at the Heritage Foundation. is director of Heritage's Asian Studies
Center.