For example, The Heritage Foundation has played a leading role in the overcriminalization debate, establishing the Overcriminalization Project to educate lawmakers and citizens on the subject. See The Heritage Foundation, Legal Issues: Overcriminalization, http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization (last visited May 28, 2014). Heritage has also published a series of reports documenting the problems associated with overcriminalization and proposing common-sense reforms. See, e.g., One Nation Under Arrest: How Crazy Laws, Rogue Prosecutors, and Activist Judges Threaten Your Liberty (2d ed. 2013) (Paul Rosenzweig ed.); Brian Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010).
 Major newspapers and magazines, including The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, have carried news and opinion pieces in recent years on overcriminalization. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, Wall St. J. (Sept. 27, 2011); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared, Wall St. J. (July 23, 2011); Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join Forces to Take on U.S. in Criminal Justice Cases, N.Y. Times, at A1 (Nov. 24, 2009). See also, e.g., Ed Feulner, “The Trial,” American Style: Who Can Avoid Running Afoul of Overcriminalization? Wash. Times, at B3 (Aug. 13, 2013); Wendy Kaminer, When Everyone Is an Offender, The Atlantic (Sept. 28, 2011); Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, The Economist (July 22, 2010).
 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) includes overcriminalization reform as part of its Mass Incarceration project.
 The American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) have long been critical of overcriminalization at the federal level. In 1998, an ABA task force issued a report decrying the steady expansion of federal criminal laws. See American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law (1998). The ABA remains active in calling attention to the costs of overcriminalization. See American Bar Association, Task Force on Overcriminalization, American bar Association, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/overcriminalization.html (last visited May 27, 2014). The NACDL has consistently urged Congress to enact sweeping reforms to counteract the adverse effects of overcriminalization. See, e.g., Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong (2013) (testimony of Steven D. Benjamin, President, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
 The Heritage Foundation has created what might be called an “Overcriminalization Hall of Shame,” a list of documented cases nationwide in which federal prosecutors have convicted people who inadvertently ran afoul of obscure federal laws. See http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization. A sampling of these stories has been collected and published by members of an Overcriminalization Working Group, comprised of Heritage, the ACLU, and other respected opponents of overcriminalization, in USA v. YOU: The Flood of Criminal Laws Affecting Your Liberty.
 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511 (2001). This idea, previously known mainly to criminal law “insiders,” captured the attention of the public with the publication of Harvey A. Silverglate’s widely publicized exposé, Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent (2009). As his title indicates, Silverglate’s thesis is that American criminal laws are so broadly and poorly defined that ordinary, well-meaning citizens unwittingly commit multiple felonies on a daily basis and thus are exposed to indictment and conviction at the whim of federal agents and prosecutors.
 In 2013 alone, for example, the Congressional Task Force on Overcriminalization held three different hearings addressing concerns about the overly broad nature of federal criminal liability.
 See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 26, at 5 (June 16, 2008). The ABA’s Task Force on Federalization found that fully 40 percent of the thousands of federal criminal laws in force were enacted after 1970. See American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998).
 Baker, supra note 8, at 2.
 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 881 & n.2 (2005) (hereinafter Smith, Proportionality and Federalization) (noting that constitutional law does not limit, and indeed facilitates, the federalization of crime). The main culprit here, of course, is the Commerce Clause, which even after the so-called New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court allows Congress to regulate even the most local of crimes. As Professor Lino Graglia laments, with the “narrow exception” of “clearly noneconomic conduct that is not part of a larger regulatory scheme,” recent Commerce Clause cases “indicate a return to the Court’s practice since 1937 of reviewing purported exercises of the commerce power in name only.” Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 761, 784–85 (2008).
 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). As Dotterweich further explained, regulatory offenses employ criminal penalties as a form of regulation to promote the effectiveness of health, safety, and welfare rules otherwise enforced through noncriminal means. See id. at 280–81. Regulatory offenses differ from the types of crimes punishable at common law, which were deemed mala in se, or wrong in themselves, and typically involved infringements of personal or property rights of others.
 The fact that regulatory offenses are punished criminally increases the number of federal criminal offenses immeasurably. Although 4,000 to 5,000 federal statutory provisions carry criminal penalties, the total number of federal criminal offenses is well in excess of 10,000 when regulatory offenses are taken into account. As Professor Baker has explained, counting the many thousands of federal administrative rules and regulations that can be enforced criminally would add “an additional 10,000 or so crimes” to the total. Baker, supra note 8.
 As the late Professor William Stuntz has explained: “Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher sentences (overlapping crimes are one way to make sentences harsher) and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly powerful the past two decades, as both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime.’” Stuntz, supra note 6, at 509. Although he credits tough-on-crime politics as an important factor in overcriminalization, his larger point is that deeper forces of institutional cooperation drive legislators repeatedly to expand criminal liability and penalties because those actions benefit prosecutors, who are legislators’ natural allies on issues of criminal justice. See id. at 509–11.
 In other words, Congress might take what Paul Larkin refers to as a “trust us” approach to criminal lawmaking. As he explains: “The ‘trust us’ argument is that the law should be willing to allow overbreadth in criminal statutes because the courts and the public can rely, as Justices Holmes and Frankfurter once noted, on the ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers.’” Paul Larkin, The Dangers of a “Trust Us” Approach to Statutory Interpretation, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 93, at 2 (June 12, 2013).
 Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 347.
 This notion inheres in the “principle of legality.” Although legality is sometimes described as merely a rejection of judicial crime creation vel non, the principle reflects the broader notion that only legislatures are “politically competent to define crime.” John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1985).
 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971).
 Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 196, 209 (Chicago, 1967)). The rule also has an important, albeit underappreciated, role in preventing courts from overriding legislative grading decisions. In a system with many overlapping criminal laws, broad interpretations of statutes can increase the penalties the legislature provided in laws specifically regulating a criminal act, potentially resulting in disproportionately severe punishment. See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 934–44.
 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), exemplifies the dismissive treatment lenity usually receives in federal court. Faced with a statutory term that even the majority admitted had literally dozens of different dictionary meanings and no evidence of the meaning that Congress intended, the majority simply chose the one it preferred and in doing so brought the defendant under a strict and otherwise inapplicable mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg correctly saw an easy case for the rule of lenity, the majority dismissed the rule as irrelevant. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote: “The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived…we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Id. at 138–39 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s schizophrenic case law on lenity, see Kahan, supra note 15, at 384–89.
 Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 926.
 See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 896–908 (discussing examples). One notorious example is mail and wire fraud. Courts have cut the concept of “fraud” loose from its moorings in common-law notions of “fraud” and allowed prosecutors to substitute in its place all sorts of imaginative “intangible rights.” Beginning with bribery and kickbacks involving corrupt public officials and corporate self-dealing, the intangible-rights doctrine was steadily extended over decades to allow federal prosecution of a stunning array of misbehavior. This misbehavior involved breaches of contract, conflicts of interest, ethical lapses, and violations of workplace rules that otherwise would not be federal crimes and in some cases may not have been crimes at all. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117 (1981). This area was wide open to federal prosecutors until the recent decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010), in which the Court invalidated the statute codifying the intangible-rights doctrine (18 U.S.C. § 1346) as void for vagueness as applied to wrongdoing other than bribery and kickbacks.
 An example is extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), the Court expanded the concept of “extortion” to include the passive acceptance of bribes and gratuities by public officials. The result was a dramatic increase in the maximum punishment available under other federal statutes regulating bribery and gratuities offenses. The maximum punishment for bribery and gratuities qua extortion is 20 years, far in excess of the then-applicable maximum for “honest services” mail fraud (five years, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1992)) and the applicable maximums under the federal program bribery statute (10 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 666) and the federal bribery statute (15 years for bribery and two years for gratuities, see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c)). See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 908–30 (discussing situations in which courts expanded overlapping crimes in ways that increased the penalty available under other statutes).
 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
 Id. at 251. Notice that, Morissette’s colorful reference to the “evil-doing hand” notwithstanding, the actus reus often is innocuous conduct. For example, the actus reus of mail fraud is simply using the mails, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the actus reus under the Travel Act includes interstate or international travel, see U.S.C. § 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). The blameworthiness of such crimes comes entirely from mens rea—in the examples just given, the illicit purpose for which the mails or channels of commerce are used. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (intent to defraud); id. § 1952(a) (intent to commit crimes).
 342 U.S. at 252.
 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 133–35 (2009) (hereinafter Smith, Proportional Mens Rea). As a consequence, the role of mens rea “is broader than exempting morally blameless conduct from punishment. It involves limiting guilt and punishment in accordance with the blameworthiness of the defendant’s act. The means of doing so differs. In some cases, mens rea serves to carve morally innocent conduct out of the reach of a criminal statute whereas, in others, it ensures that morally blameworthy conduct will not be punished out of proportion with its level of blameworthiness; in still others, it does both. The goal, however, is the same: to ensure that guilt and punishment track the moral blameworthiness of the conduct that gives rise to liability.” Id. at 136.
 To give but two examples, the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), construed in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), makes it a serious felony to possess unregistered grenades and other “firearms” but contains no express mens rea requirements. Similarly, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), makes it a crime to commit extortion, defined as obtaining money or property from another, with his consent, through the wrongful use of coercion, id. § 1951(b)(2). No mens rea requirements appear in the definition of the crime.
 The false statement statute, for example, requires that the false statement have been made “knowingly and willfully” but provides no mens rea requirement for the part of the crime requiring that the false statement have been made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Similarly, the federal child-pornography law requires that the defendant “knowingly” transported or received a visual depiction but prescribes no mens rea either for the sexually explicit nature of the visual depiction or for the fact that it involved minors. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a).
 According to the Brown Commission, known more formally as the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, federal criminal statutes contain a “staggering array” of mens rea terms, and “there is no discernible pattern or consistent rationale which explains why one crime is defined or understood to require one mental state and another crime another mental state or indeed no mental state at all.” 1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 119–20 (1970). For example, “willfulness” has a chameleon-like quality in federal criminal law: “The word ‘willfully’ is sometimes said to be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears. Most obviously it differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in the criminal law…a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (citations omitted).
 A good example is Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). In that case, the defendant was convicted for possession of an unregistered machine gun despite his claimed ignorance of his rifle’s ability to fire automatically. To the prosecution, all that mattered was that he knew his rifle was a gun. The Court disagreed. In our gun-friendly culture in which handguns and long guns are lawful possessions in millions of households, mere knowledge that one is in possession of a firearm fails to give notice of a potential criminal violation. In order for the requisite culpable mental state to exist, the Court ruled, the government must prove the defendant knew the specific characteristic of his gun (in Staples, its automatic-firing capability) that placed it in the category of “quasi-suspect” weapons as to which citizens can reasonably expect legal regulation.
 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). As unfortunate as Morissette’s dictum was in this respect, the Court had previously held that the category of regulatory offenses that Morissette later referred to as “public welfare offenses” “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added).
 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (noting that common-law crimes belong to a “different category” than the “expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare” as to which relaxed mens rea requirements apply).
 544 U.S. 696 (2000).
 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
 Arthur Andersen held that ordering the destruction of documents to keep them out of the hands of federal investigators cannot be considered “knowing corruption” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) unless the person who gave the order knew he was acting illegally. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 706. Staples, as previously explained, ruled that a person does not knowingly possess an unregistered “firearm” unless he knew the precise characteristics of the weapon that classified it as a “firearm” subject to federal registration requirements. See supra note 30. Ratzlaf held that to be guilty of “willfully” violating a prohibition of evading currency transaction reporting requirements by breaking down a cash transaction in excess of $10,000 into smaller transactions, the prosecution must prove the accused knew that such “structuring” activity is illegal. See Ratlzaf, 510 U.S. at 149.
 Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 127 (footnotes omitted); see generally John S. Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021 (1999).
 The government’s interpretation would have made it a crime either to withhold documents from federal investigators or to destroy documents pursuant to the sort of document-retention policies that are commonplace in the business world, even if the person responsible for nondisclosure or destruction honestly believed he was acting lawfully and even if the person was reasonably unaware that the documents pertained to a federal investigation. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705–08.
 For a more detailed discussion of these and other potential judicial reform measures, see Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 537, 578–89 (2012).
 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
 See David Jackson, Obama Commutes 8 Crack Cocaine Sentences, USA Today (Dec. 19, 2013). The grant of executive clemency, unusual for the Obama Administration, came a year after stunning press reports and calls for investigations concerning misconduct in the Office of the Pardon Attorney resulting in critical evidence supporting clemency being withheld from the White House. See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, Pardon Attorney Torpedoes Plea for Presidential Mercy, ProPublica (May 30, 2012). (In the interest of full disclosure, the author signed a joint letter of criminal law and procedure professors calling for an investigation into the Office of the Pardon Attorney.)
 See Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 593 (2012). For a similar argument in the context of capital offenses, see Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 Va. L. Rev. 283, 319–27 (2008).
 See Kahan, supra note 15, at 425; Jeffries, supra note 16, at 189.
 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (allowing the federal racketeering statute to be used against corrupt “enterprises” without any effort by racketeers to infiltrate legitimate businesses); see generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 909–11 (discussing implications of Turkette for federal efforts to eradicate organized crime).
 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a case in point. There the defendant sought to trade a machine gun for drugs. He was convicted of multiple drug offenses and presumably could have been convicted of any number of serious firearms offenses as well. Suffice it to say that there was no danger that he or others who purchase drugs with guns (much less machine guns) would slip through the federal cracks. The prosecutor, however, argued that exchanging guns for drugs constitutes “use…of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). One would think that such barter is not a terribly significant problem: Even if trading guns for drugs is common (which is far from self-evident), it would surely be the rare drug dealer whose access to firearms depends on bartering customers. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the ordinary meaning of “using a gun” (which connotes employment as a weapon) and endorsed the “universal view of the courts of appeals” that the statute encompasses barter with as well as more lethal “uses” of guns. 508 U.S. at 233. That the Court stretched the statute to convict is all the more remarkable given the draconian penal consequences of its interpretation: Having bartered with a machine gun, Smith faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years, to run consecutively with his underlying drug convictions. See id. at 227.
 In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), the Court watered down the mens rea required to convict under the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, to “permit the statute to reach cases…where an ex-convict robs a bank [without any intent to abscond with the loot] because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison.” Id. at 271. The reader will be forgiven for regarding this as a solution in desperate search of a problem.
 For example, Professor Dan Kahan asserts that “federal criminal statutes should not uniformly be read either narrowly or broadly, but rather appropriately so as to carry out their purposes and to realize the full range of benefits associated with delegated lawmaking.” Kahan, supra note 15, at 426; see generally Jeffries, supra note 16, at 220–21 (identifying situations in which criminal laws should be interpreted narrowly).
 See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 896–930 (demonstrating that federal courts often expand the reach of criminal laws in spite of strong grounds for interpreting them narrowly).
 See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 534–35 (describing legislatures and prosecutors as “natural allies”).
 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2194 (2002). One might wonder what the point of enforcing lenity would be if Congress can be counted upon to repeal decisions narrowing the reach of criminal statutes. The fact, however, is that Congress does not reflexively ride to the rescue of federal prosecutors handed interpretive defeats in court. According to a leading study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions, Congress lets stand the vast majority (80 percent) of narrow interpretations of federal criminal statutes. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 351 tbl. 19 (1991). This is cause for optimism about the potential for lenity to make serious inroads on overcriminalization.
 Even though moral culpability is an essential prerequisite to punishment, judges (many of whom are themselves former prosecutors) may tend to defer excessively to the judgment of prosecutors that an offender is blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment. Such misplaced deference undoubtedly explains why the many sympathetic defendants whose stories have been cataloged by The Heritage Foundation and the Criminal Law Reform Group were found guilty in spite of their blamelessness. See supra notes 1–2 & 5.
 This hypothetical inquiry is exactly how the Supreme Court decides federal mens rea issues. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (1999) (explaining that courts deciding such issues start by asking “as a hypothetical matter whether morally blameless people could violate [the statute]”).
 Pleas for proportionality of punishment inevitably encounter the objection that it is impossible to determine when, objectively speaking, punishments are proportional. Although familiar, the objection is misplaced. Proportionality serves as a judicially manageable legal standard in a variety of other contexts, such as determining the excessiveness of terms of imprisonment and of punitive-damages awards, and proportionality is used by legislatures and judges alike in grading offenses and sentencing offenders. See Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 891–92 (citing cases). Taking proportionality considerations into account is no more perilous in interpreting federal crimes than in these other contexts, especially if the proportionality inquiry is grounded in a comparison with the penalties other laws provide for a particular crime and is used only as an interpretive principle (as opposed to a standard of constitutionality).
 In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), for example, the Court declared that mens rea doctrine “requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’” Id. at 269.
 For an extensive argument along this line, see Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26.
 See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000); see generally Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 131 (“The Supreme Court has insisted that federal crimes be defined in terms that guarantee a path to acquittal for morally blameless conduct and has increasingly looked to the mental element of crimes to provide this protection against punishment for ‘innocent’ conduct.”).
 “Where the nature of the prohibited act, as defined by Congress, is sufficient to guarantee that anyone convicted of the crime will be morally blameworthy, courts treat the legislative definition of the crime as conclusive and do not impose heightened mens rea requirements. If, however, the prohibited act is not ‘inevitably nefarious’ and thus could potentially reach innocent conduct, courts adopt more stringent mens rea requirements designed to exclude all innocent conduct from the crime’s reach.” Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 130. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2000); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
 For a collection of cases in which this has occurred, see, e.g., The Heritage Foundation, Legal Issues: Overcriminalization, http://www.overcriminalized.com/CaseStudy.aspx (last visited May 28, 2014). The website does not mince words, describing the case studies as “documented stories of good people whose lives were impacted by overcriminalization: criminal laws that are overbroad or flat-out ridiculous, prosecutors and prosecutions that are over-zealous, and sentences that are harsh, unreasonable, and unjust. The lives of some were shattered when they were arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned for doing things no one would think are crimes. Others did an act that could be considered wrongful, but did so unintentionally—without ‘criminal intent’ (what lawyers call mens rea)—and should not have been charged, convicted, or punished.” Id.
 See Darryl Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 657, 677–82 (2011).