There has been
growing interest in reforming Medicare to make it operate in a
similar way to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
(FEHBP), the health plan enjoyed by Members of Congress and over
nine million other federal workers and retirees and their families.
One of the arguments made for doing so is that the FEHBP performs
more effectively and efficiently.
A recent analysis
by Mark Merlis, published by the Kaiser Family Foundation, disputes
the claim that the FEHBP would be an improvement on Medicare. Merlis's paper comes to
the conclusion that although the FEHBP has many attractions, it
falls short of Medicare in a number of ways. Among the most
important:
-
FEHBP's per
capita spending, says Merlis, has risen faster than Medicare.
-
FEHBP's
administrative costs, he says, are much higher than those
experienced by Medicare, suggesting that FEHBP is less
efficient.
Merlis concludes
that "the FEHBP experience highlights the difficulties in
developing a competitive system that operates efficiently and
equitably for a nationwide program."
The Merlis study,
however, indicates the pitfalls associated with making comparisons
without painting the full data picture. Unfortunately, his approach
to the data presents a highly misleading comparison, and does not
support his conclusions.
Consider two
measures that form the heart of his comparison:
Spending
Growth in Medicare and FEHBP
Comparing the
experience of two programs depends a great deal on which time
periods are compared, and how long a period is used for the
comparison. Generally short periods, in which there may be a number
of temporary influences on one of the programs, can give a
misleading snapshot of the long-run picture. Moreover the selection
of one particular period may give a very different impression from
another period.
In his recent Kaiser
paper, for example, Merlis confines his cost comparison to the
years 1996-2002 - just seven years for programs that have been in
existence for several decades. During the period he selects, FEHBP
spending per enrollee increased at an average annual rate of 5.3
per cent; meanwhile spending per enrollee in Medicare rose at an
average annual rate of 4.2 per cent. While Merlis does discuss some
of the differences in the programs that would influence costs, such
as the absence of drug coverage in Medicare, he nevertheless
concludes that the record of Medicare is substantially better than
the FEHBP.
One problem with
this conclusion is that if one analyzes a different period one can
reach the opposite conclusion. Merlis himself did this in a 1999
study for Kaiser also comparing the two programs. In that study he looked
at the years 1988-1997. Over that period, FEHBP's cost per enrollee
rose 7.1 per cent, while Medicare's rose 8.1 per cent. Moreover,
Merlis drew attention to the fact that from 1992-1997, FEHBP cost
rose only an average of 3.4 per cent, compared with 8 per cent for
Medicare, leading him to note in that study that "per capita
spending did rise somewhat more rapidly under Medicare than under
the FEHBP between 1988 and 1997, and much more rapidly between 1992
and 1997."
Two Different Periods - Two Very
Different Conclusions
1999 Merlis study: Conclusion - FEHBP Showed Better Cost
Control
|
Year
|
FEHBP spending per participant
|
Medicare per capita spending
|
|
1988
|
12.6%
|
5.6%
|
|
1989
|
9.9%
|
8.2%
|
|
1990
|
8.4%
|
11.5%
|
|
1991
|
11.8%
|
4.3%
|
|
1992
|
11.8%
|
11.2%
|
|
1993
|
5.3%
|
8.1%
|
|
1994
|
5.3%
|
9.5%
|
|
1995
|
1.5%
|
9.1%
|
|
1996
|
1.5%
|
6.4%
|
|
1997
|
3.2%
|
7.0%
|
|
Average annual increase:
|
|
|
|
1988-1997
|
7.1%
|
8.1%
|
|
1992-1997
|
3.4%
|
8.0%
|
2003 Merlis study: Conclusion -
Medicare Better Cost Control
|
Year
|
FEHBP spending per participant
|
Medicare per capita spending
|
|
1996
|
-0.9%
|
7.2%
|
|
1997
|
3.3%
|
5.5%
|
|
1998
|
3.8%
|
-0.9%
|
|
1999
|
7.5%
|
-0.8%
|
|
2000
|
7.0%
|
3.1%
|
|
2001
|
6.4%
|
9.5%
|
|
2002
|
10.1%
|
6.5%
|
|
Average annual change,
1996-2002
|
5.3%
|
4.2%
|
Using the figures
for the entire period covered in Merlis' two studies, 1988-2002 (a
15 year period), the difference between the FEHBP and Medicare
turns out to be very small (and annual average of 6.9 per cent for
FEHBP and 6.5 per cent for Medicare).
But there are
reasons why even that difference may be exaggerated, or FEHBP's
cost growth might even turn out to be lower during that 15-year
period. For example:
Administrative Costs
Misleading
conclusions can also result from with overlooking important factors
when comparing administrative costs. Critics of Medicare reform
often argue that administrative costs of Medicare (defined as
administrative expenses compared with spending on enrollees)
averages roughly 2 per cent, and that this is well below the
administrative costs of the FEHBP or private plans - suggesting
that Medicare is more efficient. Merlis makes this argument, noting
that administrative costs compared with benefits averages 7-10 per
cent in preferred provider organizations (PPO's) and 15 per cent or
more in health maintenance organizations (HMO's). On the face of
it, therefore, Medicare management appears to be far more
efficient, with private plans spending between 3 and 7 times as
much on administrative costs for the same spending on
beneficiaries.
However, this simple
statistic is quite misleading. For one thing, as Merlis notes in
the study, a program serving predominantly retirees will
necessarily spend more on benefits per enrollee than is typical in
a plan serving primarily working-age people (such as FEHBP). Hence,
there will be a larger denominator in the ratio of administrative
costs to benefits for Medicare than for FEHBP just because of the
age of the enrollees. Merlis does draw attention to this, and notes
in his text that if one were to examine the cost of administrative
cost per enrollee, rather than comparing it with the expenditures
for each enrollee, it would be a better indicator of comparative
administrative costs. He estimates that by doing this the
difference between private plans and Medicare would be more like 2
to 1, rather than as much as 7 to 1.
But even this does
not provide a real comparison of efficiency. There has been concern
for many years that Medicare may actually suffer from dangerously
insufficient spending on management and administration. Members of
the National Academy of Social Insurances panel on Medicare
Governance and Management, for example, cited an inadequate
investment in Medicare administration as partly responsible for
poor control of costs, including excessive waste and fraud by
providers. An overhaul of management and increased funding for
administration featured prominently in the panel's
recommendations.
In addition, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report in
2001criticizing the poor performance of Medicare's management in
providing information to consumers and other services related to
effective management.
The GAO's survey found Medicare's line managers to be more critical
of their management structure and capacity than virtually any other
agency. Thus, it appears that Medicare management is inadequately
funded to carry out the tasks needed to provide quality service and
careful control of expenditures.
Paradoxically,
inadequate financing of management falsely gives the impression of
greater efficiency. This is because wasteful unnecessary
expenditures actually serve to reduce the arithmetic ratio of
administration to spending. In a similar vein, a private
manufacturing company that spent nothing on inventory control,
quality measures, or checking accounts receivable could boast it
was clearly efficient because its ratio of overhead costs to sales
was very low. But of course it would be highly inefficient.
Medicare is probably also below the threshold of administrative
spending needed to run an efficient program.
Thus, the comparison
of administrative cost to spending between FEHBP and Medicare may
well indicate that Medicare performs far less well than the
FEHBP.
Conclusion
The Merlis study thus
does not make a convincing case that the FEHBP "highlights the
difficulties in developing a competitive system." Not only that, but the
study fails to draw attention to the enormous weaknesses in the
Medicare program. Among the problems:
-
There is a growing
concern that price controls, payment formulas and congressional
restrictions on Medicare's management spending are leading to
reductions in the quality and availability of services in the
program, particularly since the passage of the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997. Worries about doctors leaving the program, and hospitals
unable to maintain adequate services have led to calls in Congress
for "givebacks." The more Congress responds to these concerns, the
greater the additional future spending in Medicare and the greater
the erosion of the apparent cost advantage of the program.
-
Medicare lacks the
most basic benefits available in FEHBP and private-sector plans,
such as a drug benefit and catastrophic protection. In the FEHBP,
these and other benefits have been gradually added to the program
over many years without congressional legislation because private
plans competing in the FEHBP market must over time respond to
consumer demands for modernized services or lose business.
Medicare, on the other hand, sets benefits using the legislative
process, and this is notoriously subject to the weaknesses of a
political system in making rational changes in benefits. The lack
of the basic benefits, in other words, is a direct and inherent
characteristic of the design of the Medicare program and consequent
politicization of Medicare benefits.
-
The chronic
under-funding of management noted earlier is also a direct result
of the design and political control of the program. Spending money
on "overhead" is never popular with politicians when the
alternative is to spend it directly on benefits - even if these
cannot be adequately managed. The history of Medicare is one of
congressional demands and micromanagement of the program, yet
inadequate financing of the management obligations of the agency
running the program.
Comparing Medicare
and FEHBP from this wider prospective, therefore, highlights the
difficulties of operating a tightly government-run system like
Medicare. This is why there is growing interest in learning the
true lessons of the FEHBP and using them to reform the operation of
Medicare.
Stuart
Butler is Vice President for Domestic and
Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Joseph R.
Antos, Ph.D., with Alfredo Goyburu Comparing Medicare and Private Health
Insurance Spending (Washington, DC: The Heritage
Foundation, WebMemo # 250, April 8th,
2003), available at:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm250.cfm
] Sheila Burke, et.
al., Improving Medicare's Governance and Management
(Washington, DC: National Academy of Social Insurance, July
2002),
U.S. General Accounting
Office, Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views on Key
Management Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies, GAO-01-592, May
2001
Merlis, The Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program, p.16