See Mario Loyola, Sugar Shakedown: How Politicians Conspire with the Sugar Lobby to Defraud America’s Families, The Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 2929 (July 17, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2929.pdf.
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified, as amended, at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)), outlaws so-called naked agreements among rivals to fix prices or reduce output—viz., agreements whose sole purpose and effect is to create and maintain a cartel. See, e.g., American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 189–91 (2010); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 263–79 (Rev. ed. 1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 125–49 (2005). An agreement among private sugar producers to limit their output for the sole purpose of raising the price of sugar would be a clear violation of the Sherman Act. The government’s involvement in the process through sugar price supports disguises the operation of the cartel.
 Sometimes, there is a more malicious motive for rent-seeking laws. For example, a statute limiting the number of hours that certain employees can work per week prevents employees from earning additional income by working overtime. The New York state legislature passed such a law around the turn of the 20th century, and the Supreme Court of the United States held the restriction unconstitutional in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Commentators almost uniformly deride the Lochner decision on the ground that the Court’s ruling unjustifiably intrudes into the legislature’s ability to design economic and social policy. Yet David Bernstein has convincingly argued that the purpose of that law was to benefit large, commercial, unionized bakeries against competition from “small, old-fashioned bakeries, especially those that employed Italian, French, and Jewish immigrants.” See David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform 24–28 (2011). Critics of Lochner rarely examine the underlying rationale for that legislation or defend as a legitimate public policy the ethnic and religious discrimination that the legislation endorsed.
 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & Econ. 247 (1985). See generally W. Kip Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 381–92 (4th ed. 2005) (collecting authorities).
 See supra note 2.
 See Edward L. Hudgins, The Costly Truth About Auto Import Quotas, The Heritage Found., Executive Memorandum No. 74 (Feb. 1, 1985), available at ttp://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1985/pdf/em74.pdf.
 A licensing requirement that appears facially valid but is applied in a manner that is tantamount to a flat ban on entry into a certain occupation is a sham and should be treated in the same manner as a per se rule forbidding market entry. See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Textualism, 37 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 705, 709 (2014) (arguing that it is reasonable to construe legal rules in a manner that prevents their outright circumvention).
 See Clark M. Neily III, Terms of Engagement: How Our Courts Should Enforce the Constitution’s Promise of Limited Government 57–60 (2013) (criticizing the interior design and floral arrangement restrictions). Compare St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2012), and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding unconstitutional state laws limiting casket sale to licensed funeral home directors), with Powers v. Harris, 329 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of such a law).
 See Neily, supra note 9, at 49–63.
 See, e.g., Andrew S. Hogeland, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 75 Mass. L. Rev. 112, 114, 118 (1990) (offering examples of private environmental groups working with criminal prosecutors).
 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 Harv. J. Law & Pub. Pol’y 715, 738–39 (2013) (noting that legislators may use the criminal law as a regulatory tool because the public affords greater respect to law enforcement officers than to civil inspectors).
 See Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure 64, 81–82 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2011).
 An example where regulation would be preferable to prosecution can be seen in the case of interstate pollution. No one downwind state can address the problems stemming from upwind pollution, see EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014), and the number of potential upwind defendants makes regulation more efficient than prosecution of individual wrongdoers. Another alternative is a Pigouvian Tax on the company creating the externality (pollution) that third parties suffer, because the tax would force the company to internalize the pollution costs it otherwise would impose on others. See Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920).
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
 See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Sarbanes–Oxley Debacle: What We’ve Learned; How to Fix It 53 (2006).
 See The Environmental Law Handbook § 2.2, at 256 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 21st ed. 2011) (the Clean Air Act imposes more stringent pollution controls on “new” sources than on ones that predated the act).
 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
 See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (practicing optometrists who were members of the state optometry board could not participate in a disciplinary proceeding against rival optometrists because the former had a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case).
 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 476.034 (defining “barbers”); id. § 476.114(2)(c)(2) (requiring “a minimum of 1,200 hours of training” as established by the barber regulatory board, which consists of barbers, to be a licensed “barber”); id. § 476.134 (providing for examinations to be a licensed barber).
 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 476.178 (prohibiting the unlicensed operation of a “private school of barbering”); id. § 476.184 (prohibiting the operation of an unlicensed “barbershop”); id. § 476.188 (prohibiting anyone from providing barber services in any place that is not a licensed barbershop); id. § 476.194 (making it a misdemeanor to practice barbering or operate a barbershop without a license) (West 2014); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 316.030(1) (prohibiting anyone from being an unlicensed funeral director); id. § 316.990 (the penalty for being a funeral director without a license is a fine of $50–$500, imprisonment up to six months, or both); id. § 317A.020(2) (West 2014) (prohibiting the unlicensed practice of cosmetology); id. § 317A.990 (the penalty for the unlicensed practice of cosmetology is a fine of $50–$500, imprisonment of 10 days to six months, or both); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 326B.46 (West 2014) (requiring a license to be “a master plumber, restricted master plumber, journeyman plumber, and restricted journeyman plumber”); id. § 326B.47 (unlicensed individuals except apprentice plumbers must be registered with the state); Ohio Rev. Stat. § 4709.02 (West 2014) (prohibiting anyone from practicing barbering or operating a barbershop without a license); id. § 4709.07 (requiring as a condition of receiving a barber’s license that one has “eighteen hundred hours of training from a board-approved barber school or has graduated with at least one thousand hours of training from a board-approved barber school in this state and has a current cosmetology or hair designer license”); id. § 4709.99 (a violation of the regulations on barbering is punishable by a fine of $100–$500); id. § 4719.02 (prohibiting anyone from engaging in telephone solicitation without a license); id. § 4719.99 (unlicensed telephone solicitation is a class four felony); Okla. Stat. Ann. § 396.3a.1.c (West 2014) (prohibiting anyone who is not a licensed funeral director from selling any “funeral service merchandise,” including caskets); Penn. Stat. Ann. § 63:479.3 (prohibiting anyone from being a “funeral director” unless licensed); id. § 63:479.17 (the penalty for being an unlicensed funeral director is a fine of $100–$1,000, up to one year’s imprisonment, or both); id. § 63:551 (West 2014) (prohibiting the unlicensed practice of barbering); id. § 63:565 (the penalty for a first offense of barbering without a license is a fine of up to $600 or up to 90 days’ incarceration); Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-4-108 (West 2014) (prohibiting anyone from practicing, teaching, or attempting to practice or teach “cosmetology, manicuring or aesthetics”); id. § 62-4-129 (making it a misdemeanor to violate the state law governing cosmetology, manicuring, or aesthetics); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 440.62 (1) (West 2014) (prohibiting anyone from operating a “school” of “barbering,” “cosmetology,” or “manicuring” without a license); id. § 440.63 (prohibiting anyone not holding an instructor certificate from being an instructor in those schools).
 Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 188 (codified, as amended, at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (2012)). For an excellent history of the birth, growth, and politics of the Lacey Act, see C. Jarrett Dieterle, Note, The Lacey Act: A Case Study in the Mechanics of Overcriminalization, 102 Geo. L.J. 1279 (2014); Francis G. Tanzcos, Note, A New Crime—Possession of Wood: Remedying the Due Care Double Standard of the Revised Lacey Act, 42 Rutgers L.J. 549 (2011).
 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 1–2 (1969); H.R. Rep. 97-276, at 5, 30 (1981); Oversight Hearing on the Lacey Act: Why Should U.S. Citizens Have to Comply with Foreign Law?, House Comm. on Natural Resources, Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Kristina Alexander, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional Research Serv.).
 The 2008 Lacey Act amendments were part of a far larger bill that was addressed to the entirely different subject of farm policy. See the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–234, 122 Stat. 923 (2008); Tanzcos, supra note 22, at 549 n.2. It is quite possible that members who voted on the farm bill were unaware of the Lacey Act amendments that the farm bill contained.
 Bruce Yandle, an economist at the Federal Trade Commission, coined the phrase. He wrote that bootleggers wanted liquor stores and bars closed on Sundays so that they could sell liquor without competition, while Baptists wanted to prevent the lawful sale of liquor on Sundays so that church members could pursue a different pastime. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 Regulation 12 (1983). The phrase “bootleggers and Baptists” has come to refer to the combination of two very different parties with entirely different agendas joining forces to achieve a common goal.
 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Why U.S. Citizens Should Not Be Branded as Criminals for Violating Foreign Law, The Heritage Foundation, Legal Memo. No. 107 (Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/lm92.pdf.
 See United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant sentenced to eight years in prison for importing undersized, egg-bearing lobsters from Honduras in violation of Honduran law). The McNab case is discussed in detail in Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 725, 777–82 (2012).
 See Brendan Sasso, House to vote on easing environmental regulations after Gibson Guitar raid, The Hill (May 25, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/229545-house-to-vote-on-easing-environmental-regulations-after-gibson-guitar-raid.
 See Geof Koss, Lacey Act Overhaul Stalls Amid Push-Back by Virginia Companies, Cong. Q. Today On-Line News (July 23, 2012), available at Westlaw, 2012 WLNR 15869677.