As the spring snowmelt signals the onset of Afghanistan's
traditional fighting season, the United States has begun to deploy
an additional 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan, raising the total U.S.
force level to about 32,000.1 These reinforcements will help to
blunt the expected spring offensive by the Taliban-led
insurgency, which has grown stronger in recent years.
Yet the United States and the young Afghan government need
more international support in their efforts to secure and stabilize
Afghanistan, which is a crucial front in the global war against
al-Qaeda and its radical allies. Washington and Kabul need greater
cooperation from Pakistan in controlling the border and from
NATO, which is leading the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).
Coalition efforts in Afghanistan have suffered from a disjointed
and poorly coordinated approach among the different NATO
contributors and an overall lack of resources to achieve mission
objectives. The United States should press its allies for more
troops, fewer political restrictions on their use, more economic
aid and capacity-building for the Afghan government, and greater
military, economic, and diplomatic coordination. It is
particularly important that the United States, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and all coalition forces carry out a unified and
integrated strategy and reject separate deals with the Taliban
leadership.
The results of the February 18 election in Pakistan, especially
the victory of a secular Pashtun party in the province bordering
Afghanistan, provide an opportunity to isolate Taliban and
al-Qaeda elements in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. The new Pakistani
civilian government needs to work hand-in-hand with the Pakistan
military to carry out a multifaceted campaign to uproot the
international terrorist threat and deny al-Qaeda and the Taliban
sanctuary in these critical border areas.[1]
The War in Afghanistan
In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001, the United States
and its Afghan and coalition allies inflicted a devastating
military defeat on the Taliban regime and its al-Qaeda allies, but
the Taliban has regrouped and made a significant comeback in recent
years and now threatens Afghanistan's hard-won progress. Fueled by
revenues from Afghanistan's booming opium trade and bolstered
by support networks that stretch across Afghanistan's porous
border into the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan, the Taliban
and allied insurgent groups have gained control of a steadily
increasing swath of Afghan territory.
The number and scope of insurgent attacks have steadily
increased, and 2007 was the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since
2001. Although attacks have occurred throughout the country, most
are concentrated in the Pashtun heartland in southern and
eastern Afghanistan.[2] Despite repeated coalition victories over
insurgent forces, the security situation has deteriorated in
some areas of the south, and Taliban forces have expanded their
operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around
Kabul.[3] In 2007, the Taliban expanded operations
into provinces where it had previously been weak, including Ghazni
and Lowgar provinces.[4]
Coalition forces have won every major battle with the Taliban
and the other insurgents, which lack the firepower to stand against
the superior military strength of U.S., NATO, and Afghan
forces. In the past year, coalition forces scored major
successes by killing three key Taliban leaders, including
Mullah Dadullah, a senior military commander. Targeting Taliban
leaders could have a cumulative debilitating impact because
charismatic leadership plays an important role in Afghan
war-fighting and politics.
Yet these tactical victories have not amounted to a strategic
knockout, in large part because the insurgents are free to
retreat and regroup in sanctuaries across the Afghan-Pakistani
border in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan. These sanctuaries
have significantly enhanced the resilience and long-term
staying power of the Taliban, which enjoys more popular
support from Pakistani Pashtuns than from Afghans who suffered
under its harsh rule from 1996 to 2001. Lacking popular support
outside of scattered strongholds, predominantly located in southern
Afghanistan, the Taliban has increasingly turned to terrorist
tactics that have become widespread in Iraq: suicide bombings,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle bombs.
Taming Pakistan's Tribal Areas
Because the Taliban movement straddles the border with
Pakistan--like the ethnic Pashtun population from which most
Taliban are drawn--the problems of Afghanistan cannot be addressed
effectively without undermining Taliban influence in Pakistan,
particularly in the border areas. The Taliban and al-Qaeda
elements in this region not only are destabilizing Afghanistan, but
also started a bombing campaign in Pakistan in 2007 to sow
confusion among the population and demoralize Pakistani
security forces. At least 865 Pakistani security personnel and
civilians were killed by suicide bombings and IEDs in 2007, and
more than 250 Pakistanis have perished in at least 18 suicide
attacks in just the first three months of 2008.[5]
This string of bombings began shortly after the July 2007
confrontation at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, where Taliban-linked
militants had holed up for six months, defying the government and
calling for an Islamic revolution. The Red Mosque showdown was a
watershed in Pakistan's battle against extremism, marking the first
time that Pakistani radicals had brazenly challenged state
authority. The suicide bombing campaign also follows Pakistani
assistance in the capture and killing of senior Taliban leader
Mullah Dadullah in Afghanistan in May 2007 and the death of
Pakistani Taliban commander Abdullah Mehsud during a raid by
Pakistani security forces on his hideout in Baluchistan last
July.
Tackling the Taliban/al-Qaeda threat in Pakistan's Tribal Areas
will require a multifaceted effort that includes close
U.S.-Pakistan coordination and cooperation, large-scale economic
assistance, precision military operations against terrorist
leaders, a comprehensive effort to undermine the extremist
ideologies that drive the various groups in the region, and a new
political arrangement that incorporates the region into
Pakistan proper. The new Pakistani civilian government has an
opportunity to make headway against the extremists, but only if it
develops a serious strategy that recognizes the gravity of the
threat and works hand-in-hand with the military leadership.
An Opportunity to Marginalize
Extremists
Major electoral gains by the secular Pashtun Awami National
Party (ANP) over the religious parties in the North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan's February 18 elections could
foster a political environment that helps to isolate Taliban and
al-Qaeda elements along the border. The vote in the NWFP clearly
repudiated extremists' efforts over the past year to push a strict
Islamic agenda by closing girls' schools, burning video stores, and
threatening barbers--the same tactics that the Taliban used to cow
the Afghans in the mid-1990s. Although the ANP does not enjoy
support throughout the entire region, especially in the most
troublesome southern tribal agencies, its recent election
victory provides a limited opportunity to roll back the
"talibanization" of the province and extend government control
in parts of the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). (See Map 1.)
The ANP's electoral victory will be helpful in the NWFP's Swat
Valley district, where the Pakistan Army is conducting operations
to roll back a Taliban-backed insurgency that swept the region
in 2007. The ANP won all of the provincial assembly seats and one
National Assembly seat in the Swat district, campaigning on a
platform of bringing peace to the troubled region. Large swaths of
the district had come under the control of Maulana Fazlullah,
leader of the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad, a Pakistani
militant group that supported the Taliban after the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan and that now seeks enforcement of
Shariah law in Pakistan.
In November, the Pakistan army launched a major operation with
10,000 troops to retake the territory. A Pakistani general said in
late February that the army had secured 90 percent of the region
and would continue operations until it had driven the militants
from the region.
Hazards of Tactical Negotiations
Recent statements from the new civilian leadership
emphasizing negotiations as a way to reduce the terrorist threat
emanating from the FATA are cause for concern. Asif Zardari,
co-chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, recently said that the
war against the insurgents in the FATA must be redefined as
"Pakistan's war" and that it should be dealt with through talks and
the use of more police force rather than the army. Pakistan Muslim
League/ Nawaz (PML/N) leader Nawaz Sharif likened the situation in
the Tribal Areas to the Northern Ireland problem, emphasizing the
need to negotiate.[6]
Comparing the situation in the Tribal Areas to that in Northern
Ireland, however, ignores the global threat from this region.
Most international terrorist plots against Western countries
that have been executed or thwarted during the past three years
have had links to the Tribal Areas. Additionally, the insurgents
that find refuge in Pakistan's border areas are battling nearly
60,000 U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. While Pakistani leaders
should indeed lead a public debate on the spread of terrorism and
extremism in Pakistan, they cannot ignore the international
nature of the threat from these areas.
Pakistani civilian leaders who are considering negotiations to
curb terrorism in Pakistan also need to take into account the
results of President Pervez Musharraf's efforts to establish peace
deals with militants in the FATA. While Pakistan's military has
conducted military operations in the FATA since late 2003, it has
also tried to make tactical peace deals since early 2005 to pacify
the region. Many of these peace deals have backfired and instead
have strengthened Taliban/al-Qaeda influence in the area.[7]
The Pakistan military achieved some success in spring 2007 when
it turned a group of South Waziristan militants led by Maulvi Nazir
against a group of Uzbek militants, leading to a major internecine
battle that killed nearly 200 Uzbek terrorists. Maulvi Nazir
was apparently supported by independent pro-Taliban groups of the
area, Punjabi members of banned sectarian and Kashmiri
militant groups, and his own tribe members.[8] The Pakistani army
provided medical support to Nazir's forces and helped him secure
the bases vacated by the Uzbeks. Although this deal relieved
pressure on Pakistan's military and temporarily stabilized part of
the border region, tactical military negotiations alone are
unlikely to uproot terrorism from the region or lead to long-term
stability.
A realistic evaluation of the situation in the Tribal Areas
points to the need to continue targeted military operations that
decapitate the terrorist leadership and disrupt terrorist plans and
operations. The new Pakistan government also needs to avoid
promoting a negotiating process that legitimizes the extremists and
boosts both their image with the local population and their ability
to consolidate authority over Pakistani territory. Assistant U.S.
Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher
has stated on several occasions that peace deals must be backed by
force and achieve the desired outcome.
The key to uprooting terrorism from the Tribal Areas is to
develop a joint U.S.-Pakistan strategy. Washington and other
influential capitals need to convey to Islamabad that the
international community will not tolerate the existence of a
refuge for Taliban/al-Qaeda elements, which are fighting
coalition forces in Afghanistan and training and
inspiring international terrorists. At the same time,
Washington should reassure Pakistan that it is sensitive to
concerns about destabilization of Pakistani society and is
committed to the country's long-term stability and prosperity.
Trilateral Efforts to Control
Border
Efforts to improve trilateral cooperation among coalition,
Pakistani, and Afghan forces along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier
should also help to bring coherence to the fight against extremists
straddling the border. At the end of March, a border
coordinating center manned by Afghan, Pakistani, and
coalition forces opened at Torkham Gate, a critical crossing
point through the Khyber Pass. A second border coordination center
is scheduled to open in June across from the Pakistani city of
Miram Shah, followed by six additional centers.[9]
In the past, Pakistani and Afghan officials have blamed each
other for the Taliban's ability to cross back and forth between
their two countries. Senior U.S. diplomats and military officials
have also criticized Pakistan's inability to prevent Taliban
militants from crossing into Afghanistan. According to former
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neuman, U.S. military
commanders have observed firsthand the incoherent approach of
Pakistan military officers toward the Taliban in the Tribal
Areas. Neuman attributed the Pakistani Army's ineffectiveness
to either "fear of the individual [Taliban] commanders" or
sheer "absence of policy."[10]
ISAF's Rocky Road
Initially, NATO participated in Operation Enduring Freedom to
only a limited degree, but in 2003 it assumed leadership of the
ISAF, which was created under a U.N. mandate in 2002 to
undertake postwar stabilization and reconstruction
missions in Afghanistan.
Many NATO members that signed up to participate focused
more on reconstruction than on security and stabilization. A
common sentiment was that economic development would make the
Taliban irrelevant, but economic development cannot be sustained
without security and respect for the rule of law, human rights, and
property rights.
Lacking resources and trained professionals, the Afghan
government has found it extremely difficult to extend its authority
in a civil society that had been traumatized by 30 years of
constant warfare. Moreover, the Taliban has persistently played the
spoiler by exploiting Afghan xenophobia, religious beliefs,
lack of rule of law, the mushrooming black market
narco-economy, and tribal rivalries.
NATO, like the United States, was initially caught off guard by
the Taliban's revived strength, which gained momentum in 2005.[11]
The United States opted for a "light footprint" policy in
Afghanistan to minimize the stoking of the Afghans' easily aroused
xenophobia and to free military forces for Iraq.
Although Afghanistan is larger than Iraq in size and population,
it is protected by far fewer government and foreign troops.
Before the dispatch of 3,200 U.S. Marines, which began arriving on
March 18, OEF forces numbered only about 13,000 troops, which
focused on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and training
missions with the Afghan National Army. As of April 1, ISAF
consists of about 47,000 troops from 40 NATO and non-NATO
countries, including about 19,000 from the United States. (See
Table 1.)
There is a great need for more ISAF troops to secure and
stabilize the countryside, but this may be politically difficult
given growing opposition in several European countries to
increased involvement. Many of the NATO and non-NATO countries that
joined ISAF did so presuming that they would conduct
peacekeeping and reconstruction operations, not fight an
insurgency.
Washington's efforts to induce its allies to strengthen their
contributions to ISAF have yielded mixed results. At the 2006 Riga
summit, Britain, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, and Spain
agreed to commit more personnel to the force, but others stayed on
the sidelines. In 2007, the United States, Britain, Denmark, and
Poland dispatched greater numbers of troops, but other countries
appear to be wavering in their commitments to provide troops.
France announced at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest that it will
send 800 additional troops to eastern Afghanistan, but this falls
well short of the level of troop commitments necessary to stabilize
Afghanistan. Senior U.S. military officials have recently indicated
that as many as 10,000- 15,000 additional troops are needed.
Another problem has been the restrictions, or "national
caveats," put on the use of troops contributed to ISAF. Many
NATO members have barred their military forces from operating in
high-threat areas, engaging in dangerous missions, or moving
outside of narrowly defined geographic areas. For example, Germany
has restricted its relatively large ISAF contingent to operations
in the calm northern part of Afghanistan, where its troops patrol
only in armored vehicles and do not leave their bases at night.[12]
Many countries, including Italy, Spain, and Turkey, have refused
requests to deploy their troops in southern Afghanistan, where the
most intense fighting has occurred.
This has put more of a burden on U.S., Australian, British,
Canadian, and Dutch forces, which have undertaken most of the
combat operations in southern Afghanistan. Danish, Estonian,
Polish, and Romanian forces have been actively engaged in the
fighting in other areas. The de facto segregation of coalition
forces into frontline and "stand aside" units has undermined NATO's
effectiveness, flexibility, and unity of purpose. This is no
way to fight or win a war.
Canada, which has admirably taken the lead and made a vital
contribution to bolstering the security of southern Afghanistan,
has become increasingly frustrated with the lack of support from
other NATO allies. The Canadian government has threatened to
pull out its 2,500 troops when their parliamentary mandate
expires in 2009 unless it receives reinforcements from other
allies.
The French pledge to send an additional 800 troops to eastern
Afghanistan will free some U.S. forces to move south to help the
Canadians in Kandahar province. However, other NATO nations
still need to fulfill their commitments and provide additional
military forces and economic development funds to wage a more
effective counterinsurgency campaign in the Taliban's
heartland.
Streamlining the International
Reconstruction Effort
The reconstruction effort in Afghanistan lacks strong leadership
in coordinating the various assistance programs, which involve
more than 40 contributing nations, the U.N., the World Bank,
the European Union, and several nongovernmental organizations. As a
senior U.N. official recently said, "the international community
has been committed and generous, but all too often insufficiently
united" in providing aid to Afghanistan.
Over the past six years, international assistance has raised
many Afghans' living standards by providing health facilities
and education opportunities. However, the aid has been less
effective in strengthening the institutions of the state and
bolstering the central government's authority throughout the
country. A recent report from the Agency Coordinating Body for
Afghan Relief reveals that major donors have fallen behind in their
pledges and that two-thirds of international assistance to
Afghanistan bypasses the Afghan government.
To address these problems, on March 20, the U.N. Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1806,[13] which sharpens
the mandate of new United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) Representative Kai Edie. The resolution empowers the UNAMA
representative to coordinate all international civilian assistance
and to act as a point-person for civilian-military coordination in
Afghanistan.
The resolution further calls for "more coherent support by the
international community to the Afghan government" and calls on the
UNAMA representative to facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian assistance to build the capacity of the Afghan
government. While individual countries will likely resist taking
direction from the U.N. representative on how to spend their
assistance funds, the strengthened mandate for the UNAMA
representative should bring a higher level of
accountability and coherence to the overall international
reconstruction process.
More International Help Needed
All NATO allies share the goal of preventing the return of a
terrorist regime to Afghanistan, but they differ over how best to
attain this goal, the policy priorities, and how many military and
economic resources should be devoted to this goal. The United
States, due to the searing experience of the 9/11 attacks, puts a
much higher priority on destroying al-Qaeda and bringing top
Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders to justice. Britain has been
generally supportive due to its own experiences with
terrorism that has been linked to groups based in Pakistan's
border areas.
However, Germany, Italy, Spain, and many other European
countries are where the U.S. was in 1993 after the first World
Trade Center bombing. They do not see themselves as being at war
with Islamist terrorist networks, but seek to handle the
terrorist threat primarily as a law enforcement matter. This leaves
them much less willing to sacrifice to wage war and build peace in
Afghanistan.
This school of thought will eventually be discredited by
further terrorist atrocities, as it was in the United States on
9/11. Until then, NATO leaders need to do their best to educate
their publics about the urgent need to prevent the reestablishment
of a terrorist state in Afghanistan, which would greatly amplify
the terrorist threat in Europe and around the world.
In addition, they should stress the important stake that all
NATO members have in reducing the flow of opium and heroin from
Afghanistan. Afghanistan now provides 93 percent of the world's
illicit opium supplies. Moreover, the cultivation of opium poppies
is significantly correlated with the areas controlled by the
Taliban-led insurgency, such as Helmand province.
To maximize the prospects for successfully stabilizing
Afghanistan, the United States should:
- Press NATO allies to provide more troops. ISAF forces
are stretched thin across Afghanistan's rugged terrain. A
larger ground presence is necessary to wage a more effective
counterinsurgency campaign and reduce its dependence on air
strikes, which can often produce civilian casualties.
The United States has led by example, committing an
additional 3,200 U.S. Marines for a seven-month deployment in
southern Afghanistan. The lead elements of this force began
arriving in Kandahar on March 18. French President Nicolas
Sarkozy's announcement of an additional 800 troops is welcome but
insufficient. Other countries should also contribute to share
the burden more evenly. Washington should especially press
Turkey for additional troops in return for stepped-up American
cooperation with Turkish counterterrorist operations in northern
Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers' Party forces.
- Seek to remove as many national caveats as possible. The
United States and the other frontline NATO members should
press reluctant NATO allies to remove national caveats that hinder
joint operations against insurgents and threaten the long-term
success of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. These restrictions
hamper the flexibility and effectiveness of NATO forces and make
the situation more difficult for other ISAF contingents by
forcing them to shoulder a disproportionate share of the
war-fighting. All ISAF elements should be able to participate in
joint operations and fight under common rules of engagement
wherever possible. ISAF and OEF forces also need to improve
coordination of their operations.
- Seek greater NATO involvement in building up, training, and
financing the expansion of the Afghan army and police. The
Afghans will ultimately determine the outcome of the struggle and
are more capable of sustaining the effort than the many NATO
members that do not perceive themselves as being at war. The Afghan
National Army (ANA) was created only six years ago and has made
great strides in improving its effectiveness, but it is still
a work in progress. It is severely underfunded, underequipped, and
undersized. It is rapidly approaching its goal of 70,000 fully
trained and equipped troops by 2009 but is handicapped by
inadequate pay, which has contributed to problems in retaining
trained soldiers.
NATO should undertake a commitment to expand the ANA far
beyond its planned end strength of 80,000, boost the number of
foreign trainers and embedded advisers to improve its
effectiveness, and establish a fund to finance its expansion and
subsidize its operations and salaries.
- Call for a common strategy for inducing greater Pakistani
cooperation in combating the Taliban and constraining Islamic
radicalism. The U.S. should work with NATO countries on a
joint approach to Pakistan that addresses the problems in the
Tribal Areas. NATO should consider appointing a high-level
envoy to coordinate policies between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
especially efforts to control the border and to promote
Afghan-Pakistani military cooperation.
- Call on the NATO commander to increase coordination on
civilian reconstruction and military operations with the new UNAMA
representative. This will help to integrate civilian
activities with military operations, expediting the delivery of
reconstruction aid to areas that have been cleared of the
Taliban.
- Rule out a peace agreement with top Taliban leaders.
President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly hinted at negotiations with
Taliban and other insurgent leaders. On September 29, he offered to
include Taliban militants in his government if they agreed to a
peace deal. While diplomatic efforts to split the loosely knit
insurgents could pay dividends if managed correctly, any
insurgents included in the negotiations must agree to renounce
the Taliban's harsh ideology, denounce their ties to al-Qaeda, and
publicly break with the Taliban. No deals should be offered to
Mullah Omar, other top leaders, or anyone who has committed
terrorist atrocities. NATO members also need to reject cease-fires
that undermine government legitimacy and help the Taliban.
- Substantially increase aid to the North-West Frontier
Province and the Tribal Areas in tandem with the Pakistani
military and the local provincial administration. The focal
point of international involvement in the region should be to
provide large-scale assistance that gives hope to the people and
builds confidence in the ability of Pakistani state authorities to
meet their basic needs. U.S. economic assistance has already begun
flowing into the tribal border areas with the U.S. Agency for
International Development allocating $90 million in fiscal year
2008 for projects in education, health, road-building, and economic
growth.[14] The Pakistan government's openness in
allowing U.S. aid programs into the sensitive areas is a
positive sign.
To isolate the extremists, Washington should seek to ensure that
the aid also bolsters the local ANP-led government and builds the
population's confidence in the government. The U.S. should
also move forward with legislation that establishes reconstruction
opportunity zones to provide duty-free access to the U.S. for goods
produced in NWFP industrial zones. These zones can play an integral
part in the overall development of the region, providing jobs and
economic linkages between the underdeveloped tribal areas and the
rest of the country.
- Expedite counterinsurgency training of Pakistan's
Frontier Corps. The U.S. has moved slowly with plans to train
Pakistani Pashtun paramilitary troops, partly because of
disagreement over the potential benefits of such training
programs. The Frontier Corps is drawn from Pashtun tribes and
includes officers from the Pakistan Army.
Given the Frontier Corps' lack of success in confronting
terrorists in the FATA and Swat Valley and their ethnic links to
the region, many argue that investing in training programs for
these troops will be a waste of U.S. resources. Others argue that
the Frontier Corps' Pashtun composition is an asset because
the nature of counterinsurgency operations requires troops who
are welcomed by the local population, not seen as a foreign
occupying force. While training the Frontier Corps may not
seem like the optimal solution, it probably offers the best
chance for bolstering Pakistani forces against the extremists and
provides an opportunity for the U.S. to build ties to troops that
have close links to the region.
For its part, Pakistan should:
- Pursue deradicalization programs and delegitimize
suicide bombings. As Pakistan works to combat extremism, it
should consider adopting policies to deprogram or deradicalize
militants that pose less of a direct security threat. Nearly a
dozen countries, including the U.S. in Iraq, have recently started
programs to educate radicals about the gap between their religious
ideals and the groups that they follow--often with the help of
clerics and ex-terrorists.
In 2003, Singapore launched the Religious Rehabilitation Group, in
which volunteer clerics lead weekly one-on-one counseling sessions
with detainees to expose them to the distortions in the radical
Jemaah Islamiyah doctrine.[15]
Indonesia has been experimenting with similar deradicalization
programs for the past three years using reformed, high-profile
prisoners to convince radicals of the error of their ways through
the force of argument.[16]
Pakistan greatly needs a public relations campaign that emphasizes
the horrors of suicide bombings and portrays such acts as cultish
behavior with no religious or political legitimacy.
- Reform intelligence and police services. Before her
assassination, Benazir Bhutto told an interviewer that dismantling
the terrorist networks that threatened the unity of the
Pakistani state would be difficult unless the Pakistani security
apparatus is reformed. According to a recent Strategic Forecasting
analysis, extremists have aggressively used their connections to
the state's security and intelligence apparatus to conduct their
operations.[17] Completely severing these links will take
time and strong leadership in the intelligence and security
services. Disenchantment with the recent wave of suicide bombings
may provide an opportunity to draw clearer lines between the
violent extremists and nationalistic Pakistanis.
Conclusion
Afghanistan has made tremendous progress since the 2001
overthrow of the Taliban dictatorship, but this progress is
threatened by a growing insurgency, mounting regional instability,
and a disjointed and underresourced international response.
The mission in Afghanistan requires a steadfast commitment to
providing security for Afghan civilians, rooting out the
Taliban and other Islamic extremists, boosting the Afghan economy,
and helping the Afghans to build a responsive government that
will be an effective ally in the war on terrorism. The conflict
will be a protracted one, and the U.S.-led coalition needs to adopt
a coherent long-term strategy that integrates military, political,
and economic instruments.
The U.S. should welcome the results of Pakistan's recent
elections, which brought to power a coalition of mainstream
centrist parties, and seek to build an effective joint strategy
with Islamabad to uproot terrorism from the tribal
borderlands. Washington should convey to the Pakistani leadership
the importance of its partnership in overcoming the terrorist
scourge that threatens both Pakistan and the global community.
Integrating NATO policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan is
necessary to stabilize the region and prevent the Taliban from
regaining influence in Afghanistan.
James Phillips is
Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, and Lisa Curtis
is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies
Center at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]This
figure includes 19,000 U.S. troops under ISAF (see Table 1) and
approximately 13,000 troops in Operation Enduring Freedom.
[3]J.
Michael McConnell, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of
National Intelligence," testimony before the Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, February 5, 2008, p. 17.
[4]Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-War
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, updated January 28, 2008, p.
25, at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf (April
4, 2008).
[5]John
D. Negroponte "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National
Intelligence," unclassified statement before the Select Committee
on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, February 5, 2008, at www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080205_testimony.pdf (April
4, 2008).
[12]Paul Gallis, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of
the Transatlantic Alliance," Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress, updated January 7, 2008, at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf (April
4, 2008).
[16]
International Crisis Group, "'Deradicalisation' and Indonesian
Prisons," Asia Report No. 142, November 19, 2007.
[17]"Pakistan: Democracy and the Jihadist
Threat," Strategic Forecasting, Inc., March 12, 2008.