America's counterintelligence czar, Dr. Joel F. Brenner, painted
an alarming picture of economic espionage in 2006, albeit in the
objective tones and neutral parlance of the intelligence community.
He reported to Congress that "foreign collection efforts have hurt
the United States in several ways":
Foreign technology collection efforts have "eroded the US
military advantage by enabling foreign militaries to acquire
sophisticated capabilities that might otherwise have taken years to
"[M]assive" industrial espionage has "undercut the US economy by
making it possible for foreign firms to gain a competitive economic
edge over US companies."
Dr. Brenner's report goes on to say that foreign intelligence
efforts increasingly "rely on cybertools to collect sensitive US
technology and economic information." Foreign intelligence agencies
do this by "placing collectors in proximity to sensitive
technologies or else establishing foreign research" by "forming
ventures with US firms." The report specifically identifies China
and Russia as the leading culprits.
Dr. Brenner characterized China as "very aggressive" in
acquiring U.S. advanced technology. "The technology bleed to China,
among others, is a very serious problem," he said in March 2007,
noting that "you can now, from the comfort of your own home or
office, exfiltrate information electronically from somebody else's
computer around the world without the expense and risk of trying to
grow a spy."
On November 15, 2007, the bipartisan, congressionally chartered
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) put a
finer point on it: "Chinese espionage activities in the United
States are so extensive that they comprise the single greatest
risk to the security of American technologies." Cyberpenetration is
by far China's most effective espionage tool, and it is one that
China's spy agencies use against America's allies almost as much as
against U.S. targets.
Genesis of China's Cyberwarfare
In the 1990s, China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which
manages the country's police services, pioneered the art of state
control of cyberspace by partnering with foreign network systems
firms to monitor information flows via the Internet. By
1998, according to an insider's account of China's Internet
development, the MPS and its subordinate bureaus found that their
resources for monitoring the Internet had been overwhelmed by the
sheer volume of Internet traffic -- which by 1998 had not yet reached
1 million users in China. Several U.S. firms reportedly aided the
Chinese security services in constructing a new Internet
architecture and training a vast Army of cyberpolice to monitor
Internet sites in real time and identify both site owners and
visitors. In August 1998, the cyberpolice announced
their first arrest of a Chinese hacker via online monitoring.
China's MPS has been successful beyond its wildest dreams. Using
widely available sophisticated telecommunications equipment and
services and using its own software tailored to China's
requirements, China can effectively monitor all domestic Internet
and wireless traffic of its netizen population of 137 million.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) organized its first
cyberwarfare units (zixunhua budui) in early 2003. They have since
become a highly active element in China's ground force
organization, no doubt building on the expertise developed in the
late 1990s by China's police and state security services, which are
well trained and equipped in using the Internet and cell phone
networks to monitor, identify, locate, and censor cyberdissidents.
China's 2006 Defense white paper states the PLA's intention to
"basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized
armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by
the mid-21st century."
PLA cyberwarfare units are both active and highly sophisticated.
They are apparently the only PLA units that regularly target enemy
military assets in the course of their duties. New PLA doctrine
sees computer network operations as a force multiplier in any
confrontation with the United States and other
potential adversaries, including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea as
well as Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
No Ordinary Hackers
The first public indication that PLA cyberwarriors had achieved
initial operational capability came on November 1, 2004, Beijing
time. As Time magazine melodramatically set the scene, on
that day, PLA cyberwarfare troops "sat down at computers in
southern China and set off once again on their daily hunt for U.S.
secrets." Pentagon computer security investigators
had monitored their operations since 2003, when the unit began
their attacks on U.S. government networks as part of an information
operation that U.S. investigators have codenamed Titan Rain.
Using a simple but elegantly modified "scanner program," the
PLA's Titan Rain cyberwarriors identified network vulnerabilities
in scores of Pentagon systems, including the critically important
computers at the U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering Command
at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Defense Information Systems Agency in
Arlington, Virginia; Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego,
California; and Army Space and Strategic Defense Command in
Huntsville, Alabama. The attacks were traced to a network in
China's Guangdong Province, and the software and hacking
techniques, according to one expert, identified it as a
professional military operation. The hackers "were in and out with
no keystroke errors and left no fingerprints, and created a
backdoor in less than 30 minutes. How can this be done by anyone
other than a military organization?"
Are the Titan Rain attacks military operations run by the PLA or
purely espionage collection efforts by the Ministry of State
Security, China's civilian spy agency? One need only ask who
benefits from penetrating the vast range of U.S. military targets.
Chinese military doctrine discusses the importance of penetrating
an adversary's military logistics and personnel networks.
Furthermore, the multiple intrusions into what nuisance and
criminal hackers would regard as boring, mundane networks -- networks
that do not offer the treasure trove of credit card numbers, bank
accounts, and identity data that criminal hackers typically seek --
suggest a military purpose. The attacks yielded a
"substantial amount of reconnaissance" that would help the
attackers to "map out" U.S. military telecommunications networks
and "to understand who is talking to whom, and what means [we] are
using to communicate."
However, this does not mean that the PLA is the only Chinese
organization that is engaged in widespread cyberpenetrations of
U.S. and global networks. General James E. Cartwright, commander of
U.S. Strategic Command, testified before the USCC that "China is
actively engaging in cyber reconnaissance by probing the computer
networks of U.S. government agencies as well as private
When you do that type of activity, the opportunity to start to
understand where the intellectual capital of a nation is and what
it has put together to give you the chance to potentially skip
generations in your R&D efforts -- this is not just
military -- this goes across the commercial sectors, et cetera is
For us, we generally think about things in terms of -- and I'm
talking about military -- as a threshold is the law of armed
conflict. As long as you're willing to stay below that, you are
probing around, you are looking for opportunity, you may stumble
across opportunity, probably some of it [is] serendipity when
you're talking information operations. In fact, probably a large
part of it is, but the idea is to get an understanding of the
The better you understand it, the more likely you are to be able
to use that to your advantage should there be a conflict between
General Cartwright's words are a reminder that the tools of
cyberspace are both weapons of war and channels of intelligence
gathering and industrial espionage.
Software Skeleton Keys
People's Liberation Army cyberwarfare units now have the source
codes for America's ubiquitous office software, which Microsoft
provided to the Chinese government as a condition of doing business
in China. This means that they essentially have a skeleton key to
almost every networked government, military, business, and private
computer in America. But Chinese government hackers do not restrict
their operations to U.S. targets.
United Kingdom. Throughout December 2005, British
Parliament offices were surreptitiously penetrated, also from
computers using the Guangdong network. Britain's National
infrastructure Security Coordination Center investigators told
reporters, "These were not normal hackers.... The degree of
sophistication was extremely high. They were very clever
programmers." Some of the attacks targeted files in British
government offices that deal with human rights issues -- "a very odd
target," noted one U.K. security official, unless the
hackers had been tasked by the Chinese government.
The hackers used highly sophisticated software and had
authorization to develop Web sites in China. The hackers sent
Trojan horse e-mails directing the recipients to the
Web sites, which then corrupted the recipients' browsers. As one
British network security expert observed, "Whoever is doing this is
well-funded.... [I]t costs money to be able to mount an operation
of this complexity."
The Trojan e-mail attacks targeted specific victims. "One email
was targeted at one company in aviation. It was a Word document
that had a Math/ cad component. If you did not have math/cad on
your computer it would not open," said one expert. "The point was
to find documents that had been written in that particular program
and then send them back." PLA cyberpenetrations of Japanese
organizations used Microsoft "zero-day" vulnerabilities.
The PLA cyberwarfare units undoubtedly discovered many of these
vulnerabilities in key global operating systems and business
programs after they reportedly gained full access to Microsoft
source codes via the Chinese State Planning Commission.
The commission had alleged that Microsoft's Windows operating
systems were a "secret tool of the U.S. government" and obliged
Microsoft to instruct Chinese software engineers on inserting their
own software into Window's applications.
Taiwan. According to an official of Taiwan's
Ministry of National Defense, in 2006, Taiwan detected 13 PLA
zero-day attacks launched within Microsoft applications and
experienced a total of 178 days of vulnerability between notifying
Microsoft of the attacks and receiving the appropriate patches. One
PowerPoint-based attack was so sophisticated that it took Microsoft
engineers over two months to construct a patch. In spring 2006, a
certain foreign "coast guard agency" discovered a covert program
imbedded in its network that systematically searched for shipping
schedules and then forwarded them to an e-mail address in China.
United States. After the Titan Rain attacks, the
Pentagon shored up its cyberdefenses somewhat, but other U.S.
government agencies remained lackadaisical. In 2006, Chinese
intelligence agencies covertly attacked at least four separate U.S.
government computer networks.
Sometime in the spring of 2006, State Department computers were
shut down after software "backdoors" were discovered in the
department's unclassified networks. Chinese hackers were using the
backdoors to siphon off sensitive data dealing with China and North
Korea. It was later reported that hackers had
penetrated the State Department by exploiting a zero-day flaw in
Microsoft software. In connection with this discovery,
congressional pressure obliged the State Department to discontinue
purchasing computers from Lenovo, the Chinese firm that acquired
IBM's personal computer division in 2005.
In July 2006, overseas hackers operating from Chinese Internet
servers penetrated computers in the Department of Commerce's Bureau
of Industry and Security (BIS), which manages export licensing of
military-use products and information. "Through established
security procedures, BIS discovered a targeted effort to gain
access to BIS user accounts," according to a Commerce Department
spokesman, and Commerce officials admitted privately that Chinese
hackers had implanted covert "rootkit" programs to mask their
presence and enable them to gain privileged access to the computer
system. When the damage was assessed, said one unnamed official,
the agency's information security officers determined that the
workstations could not be salvaged and instead spent several
million dollars to build an entirely new system with "clean
hardware and clean software."
In mid-November, computer security officials determined that
Chinese military hackers had penetrated the unclassified computer
network at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. Retired Air Force
Major General Richard Goetze, a Naval War College professor, said
the Chinese "took down" the entire Naval War College computer
network -- an operation that prompted the U.S. Strategic Command to
raise the security alert level for the Pentagon's 12,000 computer
networks and 5 million computers.
At about the same time, in November-December 2006, computers at
the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C., were
also attacked. The NDU attack was unpublicized, although it was
common knowledge in academic circles that NDU e-mail accounts had
been shut down for weeks while the penetrated systems were
2007: A Banner Year for Chinese
In 2007, a new spate of media reports of very sophisticated
cyberattacks against U.S. and European government targets sparked
renewed interest in China's military cyberwarfare capacity. In
June, 150 computers in the $1.75 billion computer network at the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) -- guardian of the nation's
critical cyberinfrastructure -- were quietly penetrated with programs
that sent an unknown quantity of information to a Chinese-language
Web site. Unisys Corporation, the manager of theDHS computers,
allegedly covered up the penetration for three months.
In June 2007, Chinese military hackers circumvented the Defense
Department's Titan Rain patches, again hitting a Pentagon network
in the "most successful cyber attack against the US Defense
department," according to the Financial Times. The newspaper cited
a source who said that there was a "very high level of
confidence...trending towards total certainty" that the
Chinese Army was behind the attack.
In July, the State Department's unclassified computer system
suffered "large-scale network break-ins affecting operations
worldwide," which were also attributed to the Chinese
The Financial Times also noted that "the White House had
created a team of experts to consider whether the administration
needed to restrict the use of Blackberrys because of concerns about
cyber espionage." The vulnerability of networked PDAs is
not theoretical. In October 2007, Dr. Brenner commented to a group
of intelligence professionals, "This week I learned of another
smart guy who, after taking his PDA to a foreign country well
known for cyber intrusions, synched it up to his agency's
networks." Brenner calculated flatly that "the risk that he has
infected his agency's servers with a 'phone home' vulnerability
In May 2007, Canada's intelligence chief told the Canadian
Senate that "China is at the top of our list of
counter-intelligence targets and accounts for close to 50 percent
of our counter-intelligence program."
In August 2007, Der Spiegel reported that German security
agencies had discovered that computers in Chancellor Angela
Merkel's Bundeskanzleramt and three ministries had been
infected with Trojans, which had been inserted by hackers
associated with the Chinese espionage programs. Two days later, a
poker-faced Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promised to help track down
the perpetrators when Chancellor Merkel confronted him with the
A few days later, Chinese cyberattacks hit computers at
Britain's Parliament and Foreign Office. On September 8, 2007,
French Secretary-General for National Defense Francis Delon
confirmed that "our information systems were the object of attacks,
like in the other countries." Delon wryly noted, "We have proof
there is involvement with China" but declined to say who in China
was actually involved. Government offices in Australia and New
Zealand were also reportedly hit by Chinese hackers in September.
Chinese cyberspies apparently leave very few countries
Beware Chinese Bearing Gifts
No one should be comforted by the fact that some Chinese
cyberattacks have been identified. While PLA cyberwarfare units
devoutly wish to avoid detection, they also seek to give a false
sense of security that all network penetrations can be
One expert told a conference of federal information managers
last year that "the Chinese are in half of your agencies'
systems." U.S. Defense Department sources say
privately that the level of Chinese cyberattacks obliges them to
avoid Chinese-origin hardware and software in all classified
systems and as many unclassified systems as fiscally possible. The
high threat of Chinese cyberpenetrations into U.S. Defense networks
will be magnified as the Pentagon increasingly loses domestic
sources of "trusted and classified" microchips.
In a February 2005 report, the Defense Science Board warned that
"a significant migration of critical microelectronics manufacturing
from the United States to other foreign countries has [occurred]
and will continue to occur." The strategic significance of this
phenomenon cannot be overstated, because this technology is the
foundation of America's ability to maintain its technological
advantages in the military, government, commercial, and industrial
sectors. Indeed, microelectronics supplies for Defense, national
infrastructure, and intelligence applications are now in peril.
This is a critical national security issue because America's
defense-critical electronics demand "trusted and classified"
microchips. The "confidence that classified or mission critical
information contained in chip designs is not compromised,
reliability is not degraded, or untended design elements inserted
in chips as a result of design or fabrication in conditions open to
adversary agents" simply does not exist in commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) microchips from overseas foundries. Furthermore, as the
February 2005 report explained, "Trust cannot be added to
integrated circuits after fabrication; electrical testing and
reverse engineering cannot be relied upon to detect undesired
alterations in military integrated circuits."
Increasingly, China is the source of COTS microchips, and
Chinese foundries and design shops have had direct network access
to foundries in other countries, particularly Taiwan -- a fact that
has become a source of alarm to Taiwan's intelligence agencies.
Chinese microchip output increased an average of 37 percent
annually between 2000 and 2007, giving China a 6 percent share of
the world semiconductor market, and China's semiconductor
production capacity grew about 45 percent annually for 2006 and
2007, which suggests that China will surpass
the United States in output in five years.
Intel Corporation is reportedly building a $2.5 billion
semiconductor wafer fabrication plant in Dalian, China. At
the same time, however:
Manufacturing costs in China are [only] 10 percent lower than in
the United States while manufacturing cost in Taiwan are 7 percent
Almost all of the manufacturing cost difference...is accounted
for by labor costs....
The composite cost data...does not support the hypothesis
that...the current migration to China is due to lower construction
and operating costs. Other factors, primarily the [Chinese]
government policies...are driving this.
The United States simply "no longer [has] a diverse base of U.S.
integrated circuit fabricators capable of meeting trusted and
classified chip needs." The Defense Department's Trusted Foundry
Program is a good start toward addressing near-term needs, but it
does not address the long-term threat posed by a diminishing
domestic capacity to supply critical systems for classified
The 3Com-Huawei-H3C Nexus
Huawei Shenzhen technology Company -- China's top networking
services, equipment, and supply corporation -- is a prototypical PLA
protégé firm. It was founded in 1988 by Ren Zhengfei,
a former director of the PLA General Staff Department's Information
Engineering Academy, which is responsible for telecommunications
research in the Chinese military. According to a RAND Corporation
study, "Huawei maintains deep ties with the Chinese military, which
serves as a multi-faceted role as an important customer, as well as
Huawei's political patron and research and development partner."
Huawei's Dubious Reputation. The extremely close links
between Huawei and the PLA mean that the People's Liberation Army
has direct access to Huawei's training and technology
infrastructure. The cyberwar units trained in this environment are
now among the world's experts in the military applications of
network communications and coding.
In 2003, Huawei was charged with stealing corporate secrets from
U.S. counterpart Cisco Systems and wholesale pirating of Cisco's
software -- "even the software 'bugs,' or glitches, and misspellings
matched." With such a dubious reputation, one might
think that Huawei would be persona non grata among American
telecommunications firms, yet a few months later, 3Com established
a joint venture with Huawei to manufacture and distribute routers
The Problem. If a PLA protégé firm acquired
an American firm that provided computer network equipment,
software, and services to the U.S. government, the possibilities
for cyber-espionage would be virtually unlimited. On September 28,
2007, Huawei technology announced its intention to participate in a
Bain Capital Partners' corporate buyout of 3Com, one of Huawei's
top U.S. counterparts.
This is a problem. 3Com is an important vendor of computer
security software, routers, and servers to the U.S. government,
and several U.S. Senators say that the company is apparently a
vendor to the U.S. Department of Defense. How 3Com got into this
predicament is complicated.
3Com, like many other U.S. high-tech firms, suffered losses
during the U.S. stock market technology slump that began in 2001,
and it looked for export opportunities in China. In 2003, in an
attempt to penetrate the China market, 3Com sought out a top
Chinese information technology firm with close ties to the
government to help it break through government restrictions on
telecoms and IT investments. Fatefully, 3Com partnered with Huawei
technology, a company that was being sued by Cisco Systems, one of
3Com's major competitors in the United States.
In May 2003, faced with a ban on doing business in the United
States because of vast intellectual property theft from Cisco,
Huawei voluntarily withdrew from the U.S. market. 3Com would have
been well aware of highly publicized charges against its new
Chinese partner because Huawei was being sued at the time for
stealing corporate secrets. However, 3Com formed H3C,
a Chinese joint venture with Huawei, paying $160 million to Huawei
to capitalize the joint venture in return for a 49 percent share.
3Com later paid Huawei $28 million for 2 percent of H3C's shares,
giving 3Com controlling interest in H3C. "Controlling," however, is
an imprecise term. Aside from two non-Chinese executives in H3C,
the joint venture remained a Chinese entity staffed entirely by
On November 29, 2006, 3Com reportedly bought out Huawei's 49
percent interest in H3C for $882 million, making H3C a wholly owned
3Com subsidiary. Altogether, 3Com paid Huawei $1.26
billion for H3C.
Yet details of the Huawei-3Com joint venture posted on China
Computer World, a Chinese computer news Web site, indicate that
every one of H3C's Chinese employees remains on Huawei's personnel
rolls, even though Huawei no longer owns any H3C shares. "They
retain Huawei personnel employment numbers, Huawei stock ownership,
and their internal corporate contacts, job descriptions
(zhiwei) and ranks." Therefore, Huawei likely
continues to maintain all security dossiers and to control "work
certificates" (gongzuo zheng) for all of H3C's Chinese
The 3Com-Huawei joint venture naturally raised suspicions
because the Chinese military regularly penetrates U.S. national
security agencies' computer systems. Huawei is now moving to buy a
significant share of 3Com, initially paying $363 million for a 16.5
percent share via a major U.S. mergers and acquisitions firm. It is
reasonable to speculate that Huawei intends eventually to take full
control of 3Com, primarily as a vehicle for introducing Huawei's
products into the U.S. market and incidentally giving China's
telecoms access to American communications networks.
The irony is that 3Com paid Huawei $1.26 billion over the past
four years for the privilege of having Huawei as partner in China.
Now Huawei hopes to buy a slice of 3Com for $363 million.
India and Huawei. Unlike the United States, other
countries are more leery of cooperation with China in the area of
telecommunications. India has kept Huawei at arm's length despite
Chinese President Hu Jintao's personal intercession with Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to permit the Chinese telecoms firm
to expand its marketing in India.
intelligence agency concerns about Chinese cyber-espionage
prompted India to shelve a planned $60 million Huawei investment in
its telecom in 2005. Although using Chinese equipment would be
substantially less expensive than using domestic systems, India's
Defense Ministry has warned that inadequate safeguards would also
make strategic networks vulnerable to Chinese infiltration and
manipulation. The choice was "between cheap Chinese equipment and
national security." India's intelligence services also noted
that Huawei "has been responsible for sweeping and debugging
operations in the Chinese embassy. In view of China's focus on
cyber warfare there is a risk of exposing our strategic telecom
network to the Chinese."
Lessons Not Yet Learned
While the U.S. government is very reticent about the
vulnerabilities of its databases to Chinese penetration, the known
penetrations in 2007 alone show how widespread Chinese cyberattacks
have become. Chinese PLA cyberwarfare units have already penetrated
the Pentagon's unclassified NIPRNet (Unclassified but Sensitive
Internet Protocol Router Network) and have designed software to
disable it in time of conflict or confrontation. Indeed, Major
General William Lord, Director of Information, Services and
Integration in the Air Force's Office of Warfighting Integration
admitted that "China has downloaded 10 to 20 terabytes of data from
the NIPRNet already" and added, "There is a nation-state threat by
Richard Lawless, then Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Asia-Pacific affairs, told a congressional committee on June 13,
2007, that the Chinese are "leveraging information technology
expertise available in China's booming economy to make significant
strides in cyber-warfare." Lawless noted that the Chinese
military's "determination to familiarize themselves with and
dominate to some degree the Internet capabilities -- not only of
China and that region of the world -- provide them with a growing and
very impressive capability that we are very mindful of and are
spending a lot of time watching."
Lawless further testified that:
[The Chinese] have developed a very sophisticated, broadly-based
capability to degrade and -- attack and degrade our computer systems
and our Internet systems. I mean, the fact that computer access,
warfare and the...disruptive things that that allows you to do to
an opponent are well appreciated by the Chinese and they spend a
lot of time figuring out how to disrupt our networks -- how to both
penetrate networks, in terms of gleaning or gaining information
that is protected, as well as computer network attack programs
which would allow them to shut down critical systems at times of
contingency. So first of all, the capability is there. They're
growing it; they see it as a major component of their asymmetric
PLA cyberwarfare units' access to source codes for America's
ubiquitous office software means that the PLA essentially has a
skeleton key to every government, military, business, and private
computer in America that is accessible through the Internet.
General Cartwright has warned, "I think that we should start to
consider that 'regret factors' associated with a cyber attack
could, in fact, be in the magnitude of a weapon of mass
A well-planned and well-executed Chinese cyberattack could do
significant damage to the U.S. economy, telecommunications,
electric power transmission, financial data, and other vital
infrastructure -- damage equal to or exceeding the effects of the
9/11 terrorist attacks, conceivably even causing significant loss
of life. After such a cyberattack, even if no one was killed,
"regret" would be an understatement.
What the Administration and Congress
Recent cyberattacks on the United States and its allies combined
with warnings from the Defense Science Board and the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission emphasize the seriousness
of this growing threat to U.S. national security. To address this
threat, the Administration and Congress should:
- Identify China as an intelligence risk. The
Administration has been too timid in highlighting the espionage
challenge from China. This failure to say that "China is our
biggest intelligence problem" leads U.S. businesses and academies
to assume incorrectly that they face no greater risk from Chinese
penetrations than they face from any other country. The Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the Department of
Justice, and the FBI should follow the USCC's lead and identify
China as the top spy threat. Congress should hold public
hearings on the problem primarily to educate the public, but also
to gather important data for legislation.
- Address the legal impediments to criminal prosecution of
cyberspies. Current U.S. criminal laws are vague about
assisting unknown foreign actors to penetrate secure networks for
information-gathering purposes. They are insufficient to prosecute
other penetrations in which the purposes behind embedded Trojan
horse programs are unclear.
- Closely examine Chinese commercial investments in cyber
companies. The Treasury Department's Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States should closely examine any attempt
by Chinese military or intelligence agencies to gain access to U.S.
cybertechnology operations via commercial investments.
- Require software companies to patch vulnerabilities
quickly. Software companies frequently seem to consider
cyberpenetrations that involve no disruption of service as
tolerable nuisances, not as immediate crises. Software firms should
be required to give first priority to the most critical
vulnerabilities and should coordinate with U.S. government
cybersecurity offices in identifying, assessing the risks from, and
patching and/ or mitigating vulnerabilities.
- Require "trustworthiness" in critical IT systems.
Components for defense-critical IT systems -- from chips to storage
devices -- must come only from trusted and certified firms. Congress
must address the disappearance of an industrial capacity to
manufacture trusted IT equipment for Defense needs over the long
term, both by mandating "trustworthiness" for U.S. information
systems -- i.e., that defense-critical microcircuits be 100 percent
designed, fabricated, packaged, and tested in the United States
under secure conditions -- and by providing adequate funding,
personnel, and resources for compliance and oversight.
- Strengthen America's engineering and scientific
competitiveness. In February 2005, the Defense Science Board made a
number of recommendations to address this crisis, including the
expansion of America's electrical engineering and scientific talent
pool. At a minimum, Congress should offer "national service"
incentives, including scholarships and internships, to students in
the information science and technology fields and should require an
ROTC-type commitment to national service in the IT industry as a
condition of the academic grants.
Congress should also urge the Defense and intelligence agencies
to leverage competition among the U.S. national laboratories as an
ideal way to sustain peak innovation in IT research and development
on highly classified systems. Just as the national laboratories
competed with each other on scientific and engineering
breakthroughs in developing nuclear weapons and tested each other's
weapon designs, their competitive culture should be equally
successful in designing and fabricating secure and trustworthy
America's vulnerability to cyberattacks is a critical threat to
national security. If the Administration and Congress do not
address these problems and implement the 2005 recommendations of
the Defense Science Board, the fix will become prohibitively
expensive and/or America's national security will be irreversibly
John J. Tkacik, Jr., is
Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the
Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.