Judging from their conduct in recent years, the branches of our
national government seem to be suffering a prolonged identity
crisis. It used to be expected, roughly speaking, that the Congress
would pass laws, the President would execute them, and the Supreme
Court would interpret them in individual cases. This was the
political framework established by the Constitution and adhered to
for the greater part of our political history. Increasingly,
however, it is not the way the federal government operates. And as
departures from the Constitution's plan grow more common, a
permanent derangement of the American political system becomes more
probable.
While the formal separation of powers promulgated in the
Constitution and explained in the Federalist remains, and in
some respects continues to function well, the actual distribution
of powers has changed dramatically. Like square dancers who miss a
call and end the dance with the wrong partners, the branches of the
federal government find themselves in strange company making
awkward excuses. Congress has become increasingly energetic and
administrative, the judiciary willful and legislative, and the
executive (in its institutional, not electoral, connection)
tentative and judicial. Under these conditions, it is the
Congress's and the Supreme Court's power that have grown at the net
expense of the President's. But more important than the balance of
power between the branches is the maldistribution of powers,
the mixing and confusing of governmental functions, which has
resulted.
THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
Increasingly, the bills that Congress passes are ill-digested,
little more than vague charges to the executive agencies to
accomplish some general and ill-defined purpose. But the statutes'
very vagueness is the license with which committee and, more
significantly, subcommittee chairmen are armed to threaten and
cajole the executive departments. In one sense, this is nothing
new. Congress has always looked over the executive's shoulder,
sometimes more, sometimes less gloweringly; and imprecise grants of
power to regulatory agencies have been common since the late
nineteenth century. What is new is the extent to which Congress's
role as legislator is being subordinated to its role as overseer of
the executive branch. With a vast array of federal programs to be
overseen and a multiplicity of subcommittees to do the overseeing,
congressional intervention in administrative affairs has increased
substantially. As a result, Congress today invests more energy and
exerts more influence in playing ombudsman, investigator, and
regulator than in discharging its duty as lawmaker.
This newfound emphasis on administering the executive branch,
combined with the Congress's old-fashioned delight at delivering
benefits and services to home districts and states, leaves
congressmen little time or appetite for public stands on highly
partisan issues. House members, in particular, find it advantageous
when running for reelection to emphasize not their partisan
affiliation, but their ability to deliver goods and services to
their districts. And their districts, in gratitude for their good
offices, have reelected House incumbents at astonishing rates.
Serious lawmaking, the kind involving divisive moral and
constitutional questions, is more and more left to the judiciary.
It is the Supreme Court that has in effect legislated on abortion,
obscenity, school prayer, the death penalty, and countless other
issues touching the welfare and morals of society; even as the
Court has arrogated to itself the right to have final say on the
most important constitutional questions determining how Americans
govern themselves--for example, the one-man, one-vote standard of
representation. But in truth, Congress has been eager to foist the
responsibility for making difficult political choices upon the
Court, if for no better reason than that it allows incumbents to
have their cake and eat it too.
With the contemporary executive the case is different. Beset by
both Congress and the Court, the President has found it difficult
to defend his institutional prerogatives. This is partly a
confession of the enormous political power now wielded by the other
branches, Congress in particular. On the whole, the executive
branch is torn between the search for a national electoral mandate
to legitimize and empower it against the Congress and Court, and
the knowledge that the means to capitalize on such a mandate are
ultimately elusive, given the executive agencies' dependence on
congressional subcommittees and their various clients.
This quick sketch of the politics of American national
government is not meant to be exhaustive, of course, but it does
convey the salient facts about the current situation in Washington.
Those facts point to the following conclusion: The chief
constitutional basis of our politics, the separation of powers, is
under severe pressure from the institutions and practices of the
administrative state. Paradoxically, the principal beneficiary of
the growth of the executive bureaucracy has been Congress, not the
President, who sees his responsibilities (as head of the executive
branch) continually enlarged but his power steady diminished. Even
so, not all congressmen equally have seen and approved of the
growth in the federal government's authority, or have cheered
Congress on in its own superintendence of the executive. For almost
a century a faction has existed within the national legislature in
favor of the administrative state as the emblem and vehicle of
national progress. This faction has included both Democrats and
Republicans but, since 1912, predominantly Democrats.
THE FRAMERS' CASE FOR SEPARATED POWERS
Separation of powers was an idea accepted by all sides in the
American founding, though its precise meaning remained unclear--at
least until its famous exposition in the Federalist, the
defense of the Constitution written by "Publius," the pen name of
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. The confusion over
the meaning of separation of powers arose mainly from the status of
the executive power: If the executive were subordinate to the
legislature, as its name implies it should be, would not the
legislature quickly overpower the executive? And in that event, how
could the powers long remain separated? The initial context of this
problem was the English Civil War, when the idea of separated
powers first appeared in the pamphlets and essays of parliamentary
writers who distinguished between legislative and executive powers
in order to subordinate the executive to the legislative. The aim
of such republicans as John Milton and Philip Hunton was to
establish the rule of law by guaranteeing that those who made the
law could not execute it and that those who executed it could not
make it for the sake of their private advantage. In effect, of
course, the doctrine was anti-monarchical, inasmuch as it reduced
the King to the status of an "executive" (that is, someone who
carries out the will of another).[1]
Balancing Executive and Legislative
Power
Such a weak executive could hardly balance the power of the
legislature, however. John Locke, addressing this difficulty in his
Second Treatise(c. 1688), added a third power to the balance to
strengthen the executive. The "federative" power, as he called it,
concerned foreign relations (the ability to federate or ally with
other countries). While this federative power was theoretically
distinguishable from the executive, in practice it was inseparable
from the executive, because it, like the executive, presupposed the
united power of society. Circumstances would frequently demand that
these two powers be exercised for the common good, but in the
absence of a standing law and sometimes even against the law.
Locke's justification for this extra-legal but prudent action was
described as the "prerogative" power, which was necessarily
executive. In this fashion, Locke acknowledged what was reasonable
in the claims of each side in the English Civil War--the rule of
law for the Whigs and of prerogative for the Tories. But he
combined them in the idea of a liberal regime freed of both
excessive jealousy of the executive power and the pretensions of
divine right.[2]
His doctrines lived on in the thought of the so-called
Commonwealthmen, a circle of eighteenth-century republican radicals
who resisted the "corruption" of the House of Commons by the King
and his ministers. Through their patronage power, the ministers
could confer pensions and sinecures on complacent members of
Parliament, compromising the legislature's independence. The
practice was denounced on this side of the Atlantic as well, and
figured prominently in the Americans' criticisms of the British in
the 1770s and in their distrust of the colonial governors appointed
by the crown. This distrust was later embodied in the weak
executives formulated by the new state constitutions after the
Revolution. Thus the separation of powers as Americans thought of
it in the early 1780s harked back to the Commonwealthmen's fear of
corruption and the seventeenth-century republicans' preference for
a weak executive.
The Framers of the Constitution of 1787 solved the problem of
reconciling a strong, durable separation of powers with republican
government by means of a new doctrine of constitutionalism. The
most authoritative account of their achievement may be found in the
Federalist, which provides two justifications for the
separation of powers--liberty and good government.
Preserving Liberty
The argument from liberty holds that separation is needed in
order to prevent tyranny. According to Publius's famous definition,
"The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."[3] Tyranny is a danger
because man's passions and reason are not perfectly harmonious; his
reason may be distorted by desire. Although each man has by nature
the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, he
cannot secure these rights without joining together with other men
to form a civil society, a people. Despite the legal unity of this
people, it is composed of individuals whose impassioned opinions
and interests divide them into majorities and minorities. As a
precaution against injustice, therefore, the powers of government
must be so divided that no man or group of men may wield all of
them at once. This precaution would not be necessary if reason and
passion were utterly harmonious, and if the whole comprising such
reason and passion were a priori unitary rather than
synthetic. These conditions, however, are unique to God, who alone
justly unites the legislative, judicial, and executive powers in
the same hands. The Declaration of Independence affirms this by
appealing at once to "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God," "the
Supreme Judge of the world," and "the Protection of Divine
Providence."[4]
But men are prone to seek power, which has an "encroaching"
nature, and the Federalist insists that if the people's
liberty is to be secure, they must take precautions against the
oppressions of their governors. The republican form of government,
the elective principle itself, is the main defense. But Publius
also proposes "auxiliary precautions," chief among which is the
separation of powers. This separation will be enforced not by
"parchment barriers" but by reciprocal checks--the President's
veto, for example, and the Senate's confirmation power--requiring
that the powers be partially mixed in order to be kept independent.
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition," in the words of
Federalist 51. This "policy of supplying, by opposite and
rival interests, the defect of better motives," is designed to
reinforce the people's distrust of their representatives, but,
simultaneously and ironically, to increase the people's confidence
in the Constitution.[5]
The last step is crucial, inasmuch as the people's jealousy for
their liberty must be directed more against the legislature, the
branch ostensibly closest to them, than against any other. In every
form of government, the Federalist cautions, the most
powerful branch is always the most dangerous to the people's
freedom. In a monarchy, it is the executive that ought to be
feared. But in a republic, it is the legislative. In the state
governments, for example, with their weak executives, it is the
legislative department that is "everywhere extending the sphere of
its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."
Therefore, Publius admonishes, "it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all
their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions." To protect their
rights and liberties the people must insist on limited national
government, but that means the people must limit Congress more
effectually than they had the state legislatures; and the
Federalist argues that the Constitution's improved
separation of powers (along with bicameralism) will do just that.[6]
Promoting Good Government
The people should feel, then, not that the Congress is
peculiarly theirs, as if the other branches belonged to someone
else or to another class; but that what is theirs is the
Constitution. In the course of the Federalist's argument,
this opinion that the Constitution is good because it is theirs is
gradually transformed into the opinion that it is theirs because it
is good. Publius's second, positive argument for the separation of
powers is responsible for this transformation. For in addition to
the negative function of preventing tyranny, the separation of
powers actively promotes good government. That is to say, it allows
the branches of the federal government to perform their respective
functions well or at least better than they otherwise could. In the
first argument, "power" is treated as a generic thing, abstracted
from any ends for which it might be used, regarded as a dangerous
end in itself (hence its "encroaching" nature). But in the second,
"power" is divided into "powers," acknowledging that each has a
"nature" that aims at the excellent performance of certain definite
functions.[7]
Contrary to Woodrow Wilson and more recent critics of the
separation of powers such as James MacGregor Burns and Robert Dahl,
the purpose of separation was not to produce governmental
"deadlock" but to produce good government, which is not the same
thing as simply popular or majoritarian government. These critics
reduce the separation of powers to its negative role, equating
separation with "checks and balances." While insisting that each
department must have a will of its own to preserve its
independence, the Federalist considers "the regular
distribution of power into distinct departments" to be something
quite different from "legislative balances and checks." In fact,
the term "balances and checks" is used only with reference to the
relation between the House and Senate.[8] The separation of powers,
though it does help to check governmental tyranny and to balance
the Constitution, is primarily designed to elicit sound and
deliberate legislation, a firm and energetic executive, and an
independent judiciary faithful to the Constitution.
These qualities are treated by the Federalist as the
consequences of certain carefully ordered quantities. The ability
of the national legislature to deliberate well is traced to the
relatively small size and two-year term of the House of
Representatives (allowing congressmen to learn their job and to
discover the common interests that make general legislation
possible) and to the smaller size and longer term of the Senate
(making it a force for stability, moderation, and wisdom). The
executive will be energetic because it is one rather than plural,
and will have a "moral certainty" or at least a "constant
probability" of being occupied by "characters preeminent for
ability and virtue" because of the President's mode of appointment
(the electoral college), his four-year term of office, and his
indefinite eligibility for reelection.[9] The independence and fidelity
of the judiciary (the critical third power of government first
hailed by Montesquieu) are guaranteed by the judiciary's indirect
mode of appointment and good behavior tenure.
In each case, "fit characters" are summoned to the office by
virtue of its formal characteristics--its job description, if you
will--and the task of the people or their representatives is to
select the best man for the job. If the negative function of the
separation of powers depends on connecting "the interest of the
man" with "the constitutional rights of the place," as Publius
argues in Federalist 51, then the positive function requires
that the virtue of the man be linked to the constitutional duties
of the place. As the Federalist discusses each of the
branches, it gradually brings the positive function of separated
powers to the fore, describing the special contribution that each
can make to good government. From this viewpoint, even the negative
or checking function of separation is reinterpreted as something
positive: for example, the President's veto is shown to be not
merely a defensive tool but a means of improving the deliberations
of the legislature by slowing, moderating, and correcting them.[10]
The Constitution as Supreme
Authority
Although "parchment barriers" are unreliable, the Constitution
can be relied on because the people's--and in a different way,
their representatives'--passions and interests will be tied to
their opinion of the Constitution's importance for good government.
As such, the Constitution underlies both the positive and negative
functions of the separation of powers. For without some idea of
what the branches' duties are, it is impossible to know when and
how to defend their rights and their independence.
This argument is not disproved by subsequent developments in
American politics, in particular the rise of political parties. It
is true that the Constitution of 1787 had to be amended to
accommodate the practice of presidential and vice presidential
candidates running for office on the same party ticket. The Twelfth
Amendment, ratified in 1804, changed the method of voting in the
Electoral College by requiring the electors to cast separate
ballots for President and Vice President. (Originally, the electors
voted for two candidates for President, with the runner-up becoming
Vice President.) But the point of the amendment was to make party
competition compatible with the separation of powers by securing
the President's independence from Congress. Without that change in
the Constitution, the power of electing the President effectively
would have devolved from the people (represented indirectly in the
Electoral College) to the House of Representatives, where ties
between presidential and vice presidential candidates would be
decided (as in 1800), and where all sorts of electoral mischief was
possible.
Present-day political and constitutional reformers, again
following the lead of Wilson and other Progressive political
scientists, argue that political parties evolved in America in
order to overcome the separation of powers, to bring the
executive and legislative together in a party program. Undoubtedly,
political parties did foster some cooperation between the branches
on questions of public policy. But the overriding consideration for
Jefferson and his contemporaries was to ensure that parties and
their public policies were shaped by and kept subordinate to the
general principles of the Constitution. This was the purpose of the
Twelfth Amendment. With that subordination firmly established, the
system of party government could operate safely and benignly. So
rather than the party system being designed to overcome the
"deadlock" resulting from separated powers, it quickly became an
additional safeguard of separation, with the parties' own vitality
and respectability depending on their integration within the
constitutional system.
The existence of parties did show, however, that the
constitutionality (not to mention the wisdom) of specific policies
was disputable. But the condition of their civil disputation was,
of course, that the comprehensive goodness of the Constitution was
considered indisputable. Here, too, the party system was dependent
on the constitutionalism most clearly articulated in the
Federalist. The doctrine of constitutionalism holds not only
that the people's rights are best secured in a written constitution
structured around the separation of powers, but that the people
have correlative duties to (and under) that constitution. In the
final analysis, indeed, those duties become the ground for the
people's rights--that the people are able to live up to their
rights, to vindicate them, reveals that the people are worthy of
being free.
The supreme achievement of the Framers' constitutionalism was to
elicit what Publius in Federalist 49 calls "veneration" or
"reverence" for the Constitution. By identifying the people's
sovereign will not with its latest but its oldest expression, the
Framers succeeded in identifying the people's authority with the
Constitution, not with the statutory law made by their
representatives. In this manner, republicanism in America came to
be constitutionalized, and the people whose choice had authorized
the Constitution in the first place came to regard it as the
lofty authority that should guide their own choices and those of
their posterity.[11]
It was the separation of powers that made possible this
identification of the Constitution with the awesome stature of the
moral law, for separation of powers helped to keep the Constitution
inviolate by elevating it above momentary popular whims. That is
why political disputes among the branches of government are never
decided by direct, extraconstitutional appeals to the people. In
effect, the people have no existence outside of the Constitution,
or more precisely, outside of the moral law embodied in the
Constitution.[12] It is only by elections and by political
competition among the branches, therefore, taking place
under the provisions of the Constitution, that the people's
rational will may be expressed.
THE PROGRESSIVES' ASSAULT ON THE
CONSTITUTION
Nothing could be further removed from the reverence for the
Constitution recommended by the Framers and encouraged by the
separation of powers than the tone adopted by the chief architect
of the administrative state, Woodrow Wilson. In his first book,
Congressional Government, published in 1885, he acknowledged
that "opposition to the Constitution as a constitution, and even
hostile criticisms of its provisions, ceased almost immediately
upon its adoption; and not only ceased, but gave place to an
undiscriminating and almost blind worship of its principles...."
Reverence for the Constitution would be "blind worship" only if
reason's say in political life had been gravely underestimated by
the Framers, and the Constitution's rationality greatly
overestimated. This was exactly Wilson's position. He attributed
"the charm of our constitutional ideal" to a kind of "political
witchcraft," and advised his countrymen to undertake an
unsentimental and "fearless criticism" of the Constitution. "The
more open-eyed we become, as a nation, to its defects, and the
prompter we grow in applying with the unhesitating courage of
conviction all thoroughly tested or well-considered expedients
necessary to make self-government among us a straightforward thing
of simple method, single, unstinted power, and clear
responsibility," he counseled, "the better."[13]
Rejecting the Separation of Powers
Wilson's political thought, like that of many of the leading
American political scientists and reformers in the Progressive era,
rejected the separation of powers in favor of the allegedly more
fundamental and modern separation between politics and
administration. Separation of powers, in his view, was the product
of an outmoded theory of politics. At the time of the founding, men
thought of politics on the model of Newtonian physics, imagining
that the departments of government could be held in place by the
countervailing forces of interest and ambition, even as the stars
and planets were kept in their orbits by the force of gravity. The
"theory of checks and balances" was at bottom "a sort of
unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe."[14]
A century or so later; however, the limitations of this
eighteenth-century world view were apparent. Government is "not a
machine, but a living thing," wrote Wilson, in lines that he would
incorporate into his presidential campaign speeches in 1912. "It is
accountable to Darwin, not to Newton." Consequently, government
must constantly adjust to changes in its environment; its purposes
and structure are not ordained by "the laws of Nature and of
Nature's God" (as the Declaration of Independence states) or
limited by a written constitution.[15] In particular, government
has no use for separated powers. "No living thing can have its
organs offset against each other as checks, and live," he declared.
"There can be no successful government without leadership or
without the intimate, almost instinctive, coordination of the
organs of life and action."[16]
Wilson's efforts to overcome the separation of powers occupied
his entire life, from his student days at Princeton through his
career as a professor to his years in politics. Concerning the
specific reforms that would be necessary to achieve this
"coordination of the organs of life and action," his own thought
underwent an evolution. As a young man, he favored a series of
constitutional amendments designed to make Congressmen, Senators,
and the President serve roughly concurrent terms, so as to increase
the probability that one political party would gain control of the
whole elective part of the government. In addition, he proposed
that the President be required to choose his cabinet from the
leaders of the majority party in Congress, who would be authorized
to introduce legislation on the Hill, thus obviating the committee
system. These are essentially the same proposals as those advanced
recently by Lloyd Cutler and the Committee on the Constitutional
System, though their view of the costs and consequences of
superimposing them on American government is not so clear as
Wilson's.
In any event, later in his career Wilson decided that there was
an easier way. Strong presidential leadership combined with a
highly developed and centralized administrative apparatus would
succeed in liberating the national government from the straitjacket
of separated powers. Today's constitutional reformers have had a
similar change of mind but in reverse order, starting out with an
enthusiastic embrace of strong presidential leadership (Roosevelt,
Truman, Kennedy, Johnson), but eventually deciding that progress
will not come to America without far-reaching constitutional
change. Whatever the strategy, the goal of these political reforms
is the same: to deliver up American government to the salutary
currents of progress, rather than allowing a superannuated
Constitution to keep the country drydocked.
Redefining the Role of the
Executive
In rejecting separation of powers in favor of the separation of
politics and administration, Wilson reformulated the terms of
political debate. "Democracy" now meant the last and most perfect
stage in the evolution of the state, in which the people's will was
directly responsible for setting public policy. But the immediate
expression of their will could be whimsical, and so was not to be
taken as authentic, as conveying their permanent instinct for
progress--the Darwinian impulse. Therefore, the people's will had
to be mediated by leadership, a word that assumed a new prominence
and respectability in the vocabulary of American politics. As
compared to the masses, leaders were more closely attuned to the
spirit of the age; they were able to distinguish the faint but
swelling notes of progress from the background noise of history.
Their task was to prepare the people for the future, to act as
interpreters and spokesmen for the spirit of the age; and, of
course, actually to lead the way. But they went only where the
"common thought" and "common impulse" were destined eventually to
take the people. The leaders' function was to mediate between the
people and the future, not to educate or elevate the people's will
to a rational or trans-historical, much less a constitutional,
standard.[17]
What did this mean for American politics? Whereas "energy" in
the executive had come mainly from the President's position in the
constitutional order, leadership in the executive would depend
entirely on the President's personal traits--his charisma, as we
say today. Around his personal appeal to the voters and his
"vision" of the future, he would build a political movement,
perhaps even a "Reagan Revolution." But the important point for our
purposes is that his principal role in office would be the same as
in campaigning for office: he would be first and foremost a
political or party leader, not the country's chief executive. The
constitutional function of chief executive officer, which in
Wilson's scheme falls under the rubric of administration, would be
largely transferred to the Congress.
The reason for this, in Wilson's blunt words, is that the
President "cannot execute laws." In practice, it now takes a dozen
or so departments and millions of executive branch employees to
execute the laws. "It is therefore becoming more and more true, as
the business of the government becomes more and more complex and
extended," Wilson wrote, "that the President is becoming more and
more a political and less and less an executive officer." His
executive powers drain away into the bureaucracy while "his
political powers more and more centre and accumulate upon him and
are in their very nature personal and inalienable."[18] In
the new dispensation, it is not our rights but our charisma that is
inalienable. Even as, in Wilson's considered view, it is inevitable
for society to become more complex and in need of governmental
regulation, so it is inevitable that the President must take more
and more of the responsibility for leading the country into the
future, and less and less for executing the laws.
Presidential leadership has therefore a certain hollow ring to
it, of which Wilson was well aware. The President is the only truly
national leader, chosen by the whole people; and if he rightly
interprets the people's inchoate desire for progress, "he is
irresistible," for the people's "instinct is for unified action,
and it craves a single leader." Therefore, in Wilson's famous
phrase, the President's office "is anything he has the sagacity and
force to make it."[19]
But this means that in ordinary times, with ordinary men in the
Oval Office, the presidency will not be the center of affairs and
the dictator of events. Largely bereft of constitutional rights and
duties, the office will be as small as the men who occupy it. And
even on those occasions when the President is a man of great
"personal force," his leadership will depend absolutely on his
connection to the people, on his ability to read their thoughts and
stir them to action. Far from being the energetic and independent
executive the Framers sought, the President in the routine
operations of his office will be a hostage to popular opinion.[20]
The Rise of Administrative
Lawmaking
However, perhaps the deeper reason why, for the Progressives,
the President cannot execute the laws is that few laws in the old
sense--general rules and measures directing action toward the
common good-- would be necessary. The assumption of the
Progressives is that history ultimately will direct human action
toward the common good. To put it differently, the Darwinian
imperative does not require human legislation to see to it that the
fittest will survive. That outcome is guaranteed; those who survive
are by definition the fittest. The task of law, in Wilson's view,
is only to see to it that the inevitable growth of society be as
evenly distributed as possible among classes and sections of the
nation. Thus, law regulates and redistributes the inevitable; it is
not based on a choice between competing opinions of the common good
or clashing views of justice. In this sense, law is not political
but administrative; the main purpose of law in modern times is not
to defend the country, punish wrongdoing, and inculcate principles
of justice. It is to administer progress--in short, to create the
administrative state.
"Legislation is but the oil of government," as Wilson put it.
"It is that which lubricates its channels and speeds its wheels;
that which lessens the friction and so eases the movement." What
becomes important about law for the Progressives is not so much its
purpose or claim to justice but its execution or implementation,
its effect on the process of government. "It is even more important
to know how the house is being built than to know how the plans of
the architect were conceived and how his specifications were
calculated. It is better to have skillful work...than a drawing on
paper which is the admiration of all the practical artists in the
country. "[21] Yet how is it possible to know whether a
house is being well built without comparing it, implicitly or
explicitly, to the idea of a well-built house? Although Wilson
implicitly rejected Aristotle's claim that politics is the
architectonic art, he could not abolish the need for a "literary
theory" or a model to act as a guide for skillful craftsmen. He
simply replaced prudence or practical wisdom as that guide with the
notion of a leader's "vision," the revelation that history
vouchsafes to him.
Replacing Traditional Notions of Good
Government
To regulate or administer progress, not to secure men's
inalienable rights, is therefore the basic function of the modem
state. Such regulation is necessary because progress brings with it
problems, or more precisely, progress exposes as "problems" what
had once been regarded as unhappy aspects of the human condition.
Selfishness, poverty, war, as well as many lesser evils--these
became social problems in the modem sense when the assumption was
made that they could be solved, that man did not have to content
himself with alleviating or enduring them. What made their
designation as social problems plausible, in turn, was the
assumption that the future would be very different from and much
better than the past. From that tenet it was easy to conclude that
the distinction between "progressive" and "reactionary" ought to
replace the distinction between good and evil, because the former
distinction was not only the functional equivalent of the latter
but was historically demonstrable, hence unassailable.
The dichotomy between politics and administration, which Wilson
did as much as anyone to popularize, meant ostensibly that the ends
of government ought to change easily with the changing sentiment of
the majority, and that the means to those ends ought to be
efficiently, scientifically determined by a specially trained class
of nonpartisan civil servants. But underlying and bridging the
dichotomy was his faith that history was progressive. Both politics
and administration served the cause of progress--the one through
leadership, sounding the trumpet of advance; the other through
pacifying and reorganizing the newly won territory. For that
reason, administration was not as "value-free" or "value-neutral"
as Wilson and the reformers let on. In truth, the administrative
class was intrinsically hostile to anyone who did not accept the
rationale of its own existence, namely, the progressive theory of
history.
Publius had stated in Federalist 68 that,
Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet
who says: "For forms of government let fools contest--That which is
best administered is best,"--yet we may safely pronounce that the
true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to
produce a good administration.[22]
The difference between Publius's and Wilson's positions could
not be more significant. For Publius, the poet utters a heresy
because there is a connection between a properly constituted
republic and good administration: republican government under the
Constitution will have a greater "aptitude and tendency" to produce
good administration than would any other form of government. But
what is good administration? Certainly it comprises energy in the
executive and all those other means to the public good of which
Publius speaks. The crucial point, however, is that the
Constitution is part of the public good, according to Publius.
Whereas Wilson treats public policies abstractly, as ends in
themselves to be determined by a progressive people, Publius
emphasizes that public policies and laws are themselves only means
to the ends set out in the Constitution. Therefore the people can
err, and the powers of government ought to be separated both to
protect against governmental--or popular, that is,
legislative--tyranny, and to provide the time and institutions
necessary to decoct "the cool and deliberate sense of the
community" from its "transient impulse[s]" and "temporary
delusion[s]."[23]
For Wilson, however, the people always (not "commonly") express
the historical forces working for good, and the leader's task is
only sifting the timely from the untimely impulses at work in them.
In practice this means that all popular impulses are regarded as
ultimately rational, that neither popular nor governmental tyranny
is seen as a fundamental danger anymore, that separation of powers
may safely be dispensed with, and in particular that the Congress
may be--must be--entrusted with "complete and convenient" authority
over the executive agencies.[24] "Complete" is not the same
as "exclusive," of course, and Wilson did not envision the
executive surrendering all executive authority. But with the advent
of the administrative state, whatever power the executive retained
over the agencies was bound to atrophy. To this development Wilson
could not imagine an ethical or political objection, for the
principle governing the distribution of powers within the
administrative state, like the Darwinian ethic as a whole, admitted
no appeal from the order of things determined by the triumphant
forces of history.
The Demise of Constitutional
Government
The administrative state was born to replace an outmoded
constitution with a new one, organized around a powerful
centralized government retaining, at most, only the independent
judiciary as a holdover from a principled separation of powers. The
new government would feature a closely integrated executive and
legislative, dominated in partisan matters by a President who could
influence Congress through his leadership of public opinion, and
dominated on the administrative side by a Congress whose committees
could control the executive agencies. On many levels, this is a
description of American national government today. From the
Framers' point of view, this picture represents a critical
breakdown in the separation of powers. From the viewpoint of
Woodrow Wilson and the advocates of the administrative state, it
represents a stupendous breakthrough for enlightened political
theory and practice.
The Constitution defended in the Federalist presumed that
in order to be respectable, republican government had to be good
government. It had, that is, to secure private rights and the
public good, rather than simply obey the majority's will.
Furthermore, it presumed that man, as a creature of passions as
well as reason, would often act rashly and unjustly if he were not
taught or habituated to respect the moral law superior to his own
will, the law embodied in the Constitution.
But the Progressive architects of the new order assumed that
history itself would guarantee the victory of reason in politics.
Granted, this victory would not be direct but dialectical,
employing men's passions as the vehicle by which reason would
progress. Actually, however, the doctrine encouraged the belief
that in political life there is no compelling need for
self-restraint, for the moderation of political passions, for the
accommodation of prejudices to reason. Practically speaking, no
respect is owed to anything except the future--that became the new
meaning of idealism, in whose name leaders and experts of all sorts
were (in effect) to claim the right to rule ordinary citizens.
The success of the politics of progress was, on its own terms,
the token of reason's ascendancy over passion. Man seemed, so to
speak, to be reducing the distance between himself and God, as his
reason worked itself out in the life of the administrative state.
This is a strange, impious justification for bureaucratic rule, but
perhaps, in the final analysis, it is the only compelling one.
Charles R. Kesler, Ph.D., is a senior fellow of The
Claremont Institute and editor of the Claremont Review of
Books. A version of this essay appeared as a chapter in
The Imperial Congress, ed. Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini
(New York: Pharos Books, 1988).
[1]
See, in general, W. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of
Powers (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1965), and M. J.
C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
[2]See
the excellent discussion in Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the
Prince (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
[3]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay
[Publius], The Federalist Papers (New York: New American
Library, 1961), 47, p. 301.
[4]See
Harry V. Jaffa, How to Think About the American Revolution
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1978), pp. 131-132; George
Anastaplo, "The Declaration of Independence," St. Louis
University Law Journal, Vol. 9 (1965), p. 390.
[5]Federalist 48, p. 308; 51, p. 322.
[6]Federalist 48, pp. 308-310.
[7]Federalist 48, p. 308; cf. 37, p. 227;
39, p. 241; and see Aristotle, Politics IV. 14-16.
[8]Federalist 9, p. 72. For examples of the
"deadlock" thesis, see Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government
in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press,
1908); James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy:
Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
[9]Federalist 68, p. 414.
[10]Federalist 10, p. 82; 73, pp.
442-446.
[11]Federalist 49, pp. 314-315.
[12]Federalist 49, p. 317.
[13]
Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American
Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981; orig.
ed., 1885), pp. 27, 215.
[14]Constitutional Government, pp.
54-56.
[15]Constitutional Government, pp.
56-57.
[17]
See Woodrow Wilson, "Leaders of Men," in The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link, 43 vols. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966-83), Vol. 6, pp. 644-671.
[18]Constitutional Government, pp.
66-67.
[19]Constitutional Government, pp.
68-69.
[20]
Consider in this connection Constitutional Government, pp.
80-81.
[21]Congressional Government, p. 203.
[22]Federalist 68, p. 414.
[23]Federalist 63, p. 384; 71, p. 432. See
Paul Eidelberg, A Discourse on Statesmanship (Urbana, Ill.:
University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 296-304. On the people's
goodness, cf. Federalist 71, p. 432: "It is a just
observation that the people commonly intend the PUBLIC
GOOD," he writes in Federalist 71. "This often applies to
their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator
who should pretend that they always reason right about the
means of promoting it."
[24]Congressional Government, p. 203.