Inspecting every container that is shipped to the U.S. makes no
sense. Doing so would cost billions of dollars and drown
authorities in useless information. The "nuke-in-a-box" scenarios
deployed to justify such drastic measures are highly implausible.
Though scanning and sealing every container would not make
Americans much safer, it would increase the cost of just about
everything that American consumers buy. Already, the United States
evaluates every container coming into the country and inspects the
suspicious ones. It is not a perfect system--it can be
improved--but it is a reasonable precaution and deterrent.
Congress
Deserves Praise for Dropping Collective Bargaining with Security
Screeners
James Sherk and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D
July 12, 2007
Though Congress merits praise for dropping a collective bargaining
provision in national security legislation, more improvements are
needed. A measure proposing mandatory inspection of all shipping
containers sent to the United States must also be dropped.
Securing
the Home Front
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
July 10, 2007
While our nation's homeland security initiatives are producing
promising results, we should not implement nonsensical strategies.
Though such "feel good" security measures as compulsory cargo
screening sound compelling, upon closer scrutiny they make no
sense.
Contain
Yourself
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Robert Quartel
July 5, 2006
Though some politicians think that mandatory container inspections
makes sense, in reality, 100 percent screening would be a waste of
time and money.
Time to
Rethink Airport Security
Robert W. Poole, Jr., and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
July 26, 2006
Although well intentioned, much of the effort to enhance aviation
security since September 11, 2001, has done little to make the
skies significantly safer. The DHS should turn its attention to
developing a 21st century international passenger and cargo
security system that does not waste resources by treating every
person and package as an equal risk that requires close
scrutiny. A new model system would allocate security resources
in proportion to the risk, relying on "focused security" that puts
the most resources against the greatest risks.
One
Hundred Percent Cargo Scanning and Cargo Seals: Wasteful and
Unproductive Proposals
Alane Kochems and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
May 5, 2006
Inspecting every container that is shipped to the U.S. makes no
sense. Doing so would cost billions of dollars and drown
authorities in useless information. Instead, the United States
needs to expand Coast Guard capabilities, improve the sharing and
use of commercial information, and enhance international
cooperation in order to safeguard the flow of global maritime
commerce.
Trade
Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding
America's Economic Lifeline
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Martin Edwin Anderson
April 27, 2006
The debates over U.S. maritime security policies and programs are
inappropriately focused on ports and shipping containers. An
effective approach to making the seas safer must provide
comprehensive solutions. The most significant and effective
contributions that can be made to enhancing maritime security
involve modernizing the Coast Guard, improving public-private
information sharing, and enhancing international cooperation.
Complete Cargo
Inspection and Port Security Grants Do Not Promote Homeland
Security
Alane Kochems and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
April 3, 2006
Closing the real gaps in U.S. maritime security means focusing the
government on stopping terrorists and criminals and focusing the
private sector on sensible, reasonable, transparent, and uniform
action that will enhance the security of the global supply chain.
Much can be done to improve maritime security without placing such
undue burdens on maritime commerce as mandatory shipping container
screening.