Since its inception in 1965, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, now known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), has
directed billions of federal dollars toward low-income students.
Title I, Part A of NCLB is designed to equalize educational
opportunities and resources for disadvantaged children.
This analysis examines whether the current mechanisms for
providing federal education funding to disadvantaged children
are effective and whether the system works as originally intended.
The evidence yields the following major findings.
- Formulas have become increasingly complex and
The funding formulas used to determine each school district's
total Title I, Part A allocation are prohibitively complex,
with provisions that render the final results substantially
incongruent with the original legislative intention. Additionally,
as grants have been added to the program, the complexity of the
funding system has increased exponentially. Consequently, it
is likely that no more than a handful of experts in the country
clearly understand the process from beginning to end or could
project a particular district's allocation based on
information about its low-income students. The result is a funding
system that is opaque and unaccountable.
- Distribution of funds is characterized by seemingly
While it may be advantageous to give states flexibility in
distributing funds, there should be a defensible underlying logic
to their method. Currently, states operate according to guidelines
that are very complex and often based on disparate measures.
Complicated, disregarded guidelines result in wide variation in the
way that funds are distributed and often result in little or no
relationship between a district's demographics and the amount
of money received.
- Amounts reserved for administration greatly dilute what
reaches the classroom.
Funds reserved for administration or for specific programs, such
as parent involvement, drain a substantial portion of the
total amount appropriated for Title I, Part A at the school level.
In fiscal year (FY) 2004, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that
there were approximately 8,400,000 children eligible for Title I,
Part A. As the total allocation for that year was nearly $13
billion, the average amount per eligible child would have been
$1,500. However, in Florida, for example, the average amount of
Title I, Part A funds allocated to the school level was $554 per
- Title I's recent Education Finance Incentive Grant
encourages states to equalize spending across school districts,
despite the fact that this is an unproven education reform
The Concentration and Targeted Grants were designed to direct
funds to districts with higher percentages of low-income
students. However, the Education Finance Incentive Grant rewards
states that have equalized funding across their districts. This
goal of equalizing spending across districts-rather than a
student-centered approach that attempts to equate spending levels
with student need-has been questioned as an effective approach
to distributing education funding.
- Rather than delivering effectively on good intentions
for helping poor children, congressional action over eight
reauthorizations has led to a convoluted, bureaucratic system that
is less student-centered, less transparent, and therefore less
accountable to the public.
Title I should be reformed to achieve greater transparency and a
more student-centered approach.
A History of the ESEA and
As part of the "War on Poverty," the Elementary and Secondary
Education (ESEA) Act of 1965 was designed to direct federal
education dollars to the most disadvantaged children living in
poverty. Consequently, this landmark legislation was undertaken
specifically to authorize the federal government to equalize the
educational opportunities of all children. In addition to creating a
federal role in directing public education dollars to policy goals,
such as eliminating poverty, the ESEA was designed to transfer
funding through state governments, thereby resulting in
substantial increases in education bureaucracy at the state
Since 1965, the ESEA has been reauthorized eight times. Among
these reauthorizations have been the Improving America's
School Act (IASA) of 1994 and, most recently, the No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) Act of 2002. With each transition, the funding
mechanisms have become more complicated, and the bureaucracy needed
to implement the program has grown.
The U.S. Department of Education and numerous other researchers
have sought continually to assess the effectiveness of the
federal role in education in terms of its impact on the academic
achievement of the targeted populations, but much less
attention has been given to the effectiveness of the funding
approach. In other words, how well does the current system of
federal compensatory education achieve its original purpose?
Moreover, have the funding formula changes that have been made over
the past four decades helped or hindered the effectiveness of Title
Title I, Part A of NCLB specifically addresses federal
compensatory education for disadvantaged children by determining
which students are eligible and, in theory, how much they are
eligible to receive. This analysis examines the current format of
Title I of NCLB with a focus on its increasing complexity and the
implications of that complexity.
It is important to understand how funds appropriated by Congress
under NCLB actually flow to the targeted students, since
significant discretion at both the state and local levels results
in variations in amounts per student between the Local Education
Associations (LEAs) and schools that have similar demographics. In
addition, the effectiveness of Title I, Part A in reaching its
targeted population is a critical point to be considered. With a
cost of nearly $13 billion in federal funds, is this program
achieving its intended purpose, or might there be a better way to
direct resources to those students who are the intended
Compensatory Education Funding: Increasingly Complex and
In general, public education funding in the U.S. over the past
century has evolved from a fairly straightforward system of local
residents contributing a portion of their income (usually based on
the amount of property that they own) to the education of the
community's children into a complex system of state and federal
funding formulas. In 1920, over 80 percent of the revenue for
public elementary and secondary schools was generated at the local
level. By the 2001-2002 school year, that number
had dropped to less than 43 percent.
More important, the funding mechanisms have become so complex at
the state level that only a handful of people in each state
can claim to understand them. As a result, it is nearly impossible
to determine how a school's total funding changes as children enter
or leave their public school systems.
Similarly, the federal government's funding for compensatory
education programs has grown from a single grant program that
assigned a roughly similar supplementary amount to every eligible
child to a set of four major grant programs and a growing list of
categorical programs. Each additional formula grant, moreover,
has been more complex than the previous one.
Thus, although a child living below poverty in the United States
is clearly eligible under Title I to receive some amount of federal
compensatory funding for his or her education, determining the
particular amount that child actually receives is nearly
impossible. While funding increases lead to more money in the
system, they flow into a confusing distribution maze, and it
is difficult to tell what additional benefit, if any, they provide
to individual students. This calls into question the efficacy of
further funding increases.
How Title I Works: Four Major
As noted, Part A of Title I currently contains four separate
grants for disadvantaged students. The main program, begun at the
inception of ESEA in 1965, is the Basic Grant. In FY 2005, the
total Basic Grant appropriation was $6.9 billion, or 57 percent of
the total Title I, Part A appropriation. Shifting priorities since
that time have resulted in the Basic Grant appropriation's
remaining steady at approximately $7 billion, while the other three
grants-Concentration, Targeted, and Education Finance
Incentive Grants-now comprise 46 percent of the over $12.7 billion
appropriated to Title I, Part A in FY 2006.
The Basic Grant is the least complex of the four types. The
total amount of a Basic Grant allocated to a state, referred to in the
legislation as a State Education Agency, or SEA, is determined by
multiplying the total number of eligible children in each of the
state's Local Education Associations by a dollar amount that is 40
percent of the state per-pupil expenditure (SPPE), provided that
this amount falls between 32 percent and 48 percent of the national
The SPPE was included in the formula to capture differences in
the cost of education between states. However, it has come under
considerable criticism both for being a uniform number for an
entire state, regardless of urban, rural, or other potential cost
of living differences, and for representing a state's willingness
to fund education rather than simply a cost difference.
Eligible children are defined as those between the ages of five
and 17 living below the federal poverty threshold in each LEA,
regardless of whether they attend public schools. The count also
includes children in foster homes, children living above poverty
but receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and
children in institutions for neglected and delinquent
children. Until recently, the U.S. Census Bureau released the
eligible children count every 10 years, but it is now based on an
annually updated number, the Small Area Income and Poverty
Estimates (SAIPE). This number, however, is usually several
years out of date.
To participate in the Basic Grant program, an LEA must have at
least 10 eligible children who represent more than 2 percent of the
school-age population in the LEA. For the 2003-2004 school year,
approximately 150 of the over 14,000 LEAs in the U.S. (only 0.01
percent) did not meet these criteria. It does not follow from this
statistic, however, that over 99 percent of LEAs received Title I
funding, as will be explained in greater detail later.
The result of the formula (SPPE times the number of eligible
children) should determine an LEA's Basic Grant allotment; in
reality, all it initially represents is the relative proportion of
that LEA's needs compared to the total funds allotted for all LEAs.
The authorized levels are higher than appropriations to date. As a
result, each LEA's allotment is ratably reduced by multiplying
its proportion of the total allotment by Congress's total
appropriation. Once this initial allocation has been
determined, however, further calculations must be made to determine
state and local grants.
Some of the most frequently criticized provisions of the federal
grant program are its hold-harmless provisions. For example,
districts with particular percentages of poverty rates are
guaranteed certain funding the next year, despite any decrease in
poverty that they might experience. Districts with up to a 15
percent poverty rate are guaranteed to receive at least 85
percent of their prior year's funding; districts with 15 percent to
30 percent poverty are guaranteed at least 90 percent; and
districts with more than 35 percent are guaranteed at least 95
percent of the prior year's grant.
Once the hold-harmless amounts are compared to current-year
allocations, funds are ratably shifted from districts that are
not affected by hold-harmless to districts that are affected. As a
result, by retaining rates of guaranteed funding, districts with
declining poverty can siphon funds from districts with growing
poverty. Of course, this process may need to be performed
multiple times if the ratable reduction causes an initially
unaffected district to become affected.
Finally, the total Basic Grant allocation for any state cannot
be less than either 0.25 percent of the total U.S. allocation
or the number of eligible children times 150 percent of the
national average per-pupil payment. This means that small states,
such as Vermont, New Hampshire, Wyoming, or Alaska, receive a much
larger amount per child than larger states, regardless of
socioeconomic status. After the small-state allocation of funds,
the ratable reductions must be repeated.
Utah: An Example of How a Basic Grant
Is Awarded. Using the state of Utah as an example, the
grant process can be demonstrated up to the point of hold harmless,
as seen in Table 1. To determine the 2003-2004 Basic Grant
allocation, Utah's state per pupil expenditure of $5,008 is used.
Forty percent of Utah's SPPE is $2,003, and because this amount is
less than 32 percent of the U.S. SPPE average ($2,620), the federal
government would use the minimum U.S. SPPE to determine the initial
Basic Grant funding.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are 49,493 eligible
children in Utah. Multiplying the number of eligible children
by the minimum SPPE yields an initial amount for Utah of $129.7
million. However, because the federal government allotted only
$6.8 billion for the 2003-2004 school year, the initial amounts
appropriated to each of Utah's 40 LEAs are compared to the other
14,250 districts in the nation in order to ratably reduce the
state's allocation to $33.7 million. At this point, the
hold-harmless comparisons would be made. Beyond that, Utah appears
to have 0.5 percent of the total spent on Title I throughout the
nation, making it unnecessary to apply the small-state provision.
However, the amount calculated for each of Utah's 40 districts
could be reduced once the small-state provision is applied to
Similar processes would then be carried out for the other three
Title I, Part A grants-Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants,
and Education Finance Incentive Grants. The total Title I, Part A
funds granted to Utah in 2003-2004 was $50.8 million. Because Utah
has only 40 LEAs, computations are not as extensive as they are for
other states. For example, California has nearly 1,000 school
districts, which require much more calculation. Regardless of the
complexity of other states' districting, Table 1 demonstrates
that all LEAs in a given state use the same SPPE amount, whether
they are urban, suburban, rural, high-poverty, or low-poverty.
To supplement the Basic Grant, the Concentration Grant was added
in 1978 as part of an effort to focus funds on districts with
higher numbers of low-income students. It is calculated in same
manner as the Basic Grant, with two exceptions.
First, to be eligible to receive this grant, an LEA
must have at least 6,500 eligible students, or else 15 percent of
the total number of students must be eligible.
Second, the hold-harmless provision for the
Concentration Grant guarantees prior-year funding for four years
instead of one, even if the LEA is no longer deemed eligible for
Targeted and Education Finance Incentive
In 1994, when the ESEA became the Improving America's School Act
(IASA), two more grant categories were added: the Targeted Grant
and the Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG). The purpose of
these two grants was, like the purpose of the Concentration Grant,
to direct funds to those districts with the greatest percentage of
children living in poverty. LEAs are eligible for both the Targeted
Grant and the EFIG if they have more than 10 eligible students and
this number is greater than 5 percent of the total number of
children in the LEA. These thresholds are slightly different from
those for either Basic or Concentration Grants.
For the Targeted Grant, eligible children are weighted by
factors ranging from 1.0 to 4.0, based on any of the four
thresholds: the percent or number of qualifying children in each
LEA or county. There are five weighting categories for each of
the four types of thresholds, and there are different weights for
the percent calculations versus the number-of-children
calculations. The lowest weightings are for LEAs with less than
15.58 percent poverty, or 691 children, and for counties with less
than 15 percent poverty, or 2,311 children. The highest categories
are for LEAs with more than 38.24 percent poverty, or 35,514
children, and for counties with more than 29.2 percent poverty, or
93,811 children. After the different categories are summed for each
qualifying LEA or county, the higher number is used.
The rationale behind the particular thresholds is not entirely
clear in the legislation. However, it would seem to suggest a level
of precision in the Census data that may not be practical.
While the amount of information required for Targeted Grants is
substantially more than is required for either Basic or
Concentration Grants, it pales in comparison to the data required
for Education Finance Incentive Grants. First, it should be
noted, the SPPE used for the EFIG is restricted to between 34
percent and 46 percent of the national average rather than the 32
percent to 48 percent range of the other three grants. Again, these
limitations simply affect the proportional amount ascribed to each
LEA prior to ratable-reduction, hold-harmless, and small-state
provisions. Nonetheless, using different amounts for different
grants adds to the program's complexity and red tape.
Similar to the Targeted Grant, the EFIG requires a weighted
student count. However, for the EFIG, the count is multiplied by an
"effort factor," which represents the ratio of the three-year
average SPPE for a given state multiplied by the three-year average
per capita income in the United States to the three-year average
per capita income in each state multiplied by the three-year
average SPPE for the U.S. In other words, each state's "effort" is
how much of its per-capita income it devotes to public education as
compared to the national average.
In addition, an "equity factor" is calculated for each state,
based on a weighted coefficient of variation. This number
represents a measure of variation in per-pupil expenditures across
a state. The EFIG implicitly assumes that equal total per-pupil
spending across districts and states is the ideal, though the
effectiveness of funding equalization has been debated.
States are then divided into those with an equity factor of less
than 0.10, those between 0.10 and 0.20, and those with an equity
factor of greater than 0.20. Each of these groups then has unique
student weighting rules similar to those of the Targeted Grant-five
categories of weights for percentages and number of children for
both LEAs and counties. In other words, there are 60 weighting
categories for the EFIG rather than the merely 20 used for the
Clearly, determining the amount of federal aid generated by a
particular student living below poverty is extremely complex.
Nonetheless, once the four grant categories have been calculated,
adjusted, and recalculated for each LEA or county, they are summed
for each of the 50 states. This amount is that state's Title I,
Part A allocation. As a result of this complicated process, the
underlying calculations are not well understood, either by those
administering the program or by the public in general.
After the federal government appropriates the funds to states,
the focus then shifts to distributing the total state allocations,
both to the eligible LEAs and then to the schools within each LEA,
ideally resulting in some measurable classroom impact on the
students living below poverty. There are two important factors in
this process, however: first, the complexity of the guidelines for
the SEA and the LEAs in distributing funds and, second, the
monetary amounts that can be retained at each level, either for
administration or for particular programs.
Compensatory Funds: Dilution and Discretion
Each state's total Title I, Part A allocations are calculated by
adding together the four grant categories for every LEA in the
state. Although the U.S. Department of Education informs the LEAs
that they are to receive funds, it is the state that distributes
the funds based on a separate set of guidelines.
Before distributing funds, the state reserves a portion of the
total for various tasks. In terms of set-asides, states may reserve
up to 1 percent or $400,000 for administrative duties. In addition,
states must reserve 4 percent of the amount received for school
improvement. Of this amount, at least 95 percent must be directed
at schools identified as in need of improvement. The funds may be
used for school support and for the state to recognize academic
achievement gains made by LEAs.
Technically, a district's Title I, Part A allocation should be
approximately 95 percent of the amount calculated by the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for the four formula grant
programs. However, this is often not the case, as states have to
redistribute funds to account for new districts or charter schools
that are not contained in the NCES database. States can also use
alternative poverty data, such as the number of children that
qualify for free or reduced-price lunch, to distribute funds.
District size affects Title I distribution even further. Any
districts with fewer than 20,000 total residents are
considered "small LEAs" and are not subject to the NCES grant
calculations. States can redistribute the total amount
calculated for small LEAs based on "population data that the
State educational agency determines best reflects the current
distribution of children in poor families."
This small LEA designation applies to nearly 80 percent of
public school districts. For this reason, tying the data on total
Title I, Part A allocations as distributed by the U.S. Department
of Education to data reported by states or districts is usually
Finally, before distributing the remaining Title I funds to
schools, districts must also set aside funds for specific programs.
- LEAs are required to use up to 20 percent of their Title I
funds to offer public school choice to students in schools
that fail to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) after two years
and supplemental educational services through after-school tutoring
after three years of missing AYP;
- An LEA must use between 5 percent and 10 percent of its funding
for professional development activities;
- Schools that have failed to meet AYP for two or more years are
required to use at least 10 percent of their Title I, Part A
allocation for professional development; and
- An LEA must set aside 1 percent for parental involvement.
This means that in some cases, only 64 percent of an LEA's
remaining Title I allocation is available to be distributed to
schools for general use. If these set-asides were not mandated,
states and LEAs would have the ability to use their Title I funds
in ways they believe to be most effective.
Once the funds have been distributed to the LEAs, they must then
be directed to the eligible schools. Federal guidelines require
that LEAs first serve those schools with more than 75 percent of
their students living in poverty. Most schools rely on free and
reduced-priced lunch data to determine eligibility.
Then, after all schools meeting this threshold have been served,
districts rank order their schools according to the percentage of
low-income students. This can be done with the Census data, the
free and reduced-price lunch data, TANF data, Medicaid data, or a
composite of all of these. Districts serve the schools in order of
decreasing rates, down to those that have at least 35 percent
eligible students. To help LEAs determine how to allocate funds,
the U.S. Department of Education has published a Non-Regulatory
Guidance. The guidelines are very specific and
Table 2, taken from the Non-Regulatory Guidance, demonstrates
how LEAs can follow department guidance by serving schools down to
the level of 35 percent poverty; it also demonstrates the
complexity of distribution. This table is one of several examples
that LEAs can use for guidance. Ultimately, however, the school
board and superintendent are responsible for determining the
strategy for the allocation of funds. It is also their
responsibility to ensure compliance with the associated
Florida: An Example of Title I
Distributions. According to the U.S. Department of
Education, 67 Florida districts were to receive a total of $639.2
million during the 2005-2006 school year. Of this amount, the
Florida Department of Education distributed $573.1 million to its
LEAs, with over $67 million, or 10.5 percent, retained by the
state. Over one-third of the $573.1 million was then set aside for
the categorical programs designated in the legislation. As Table 2
demonstrates, Florida's state-level discretion allowed
approximately $367 million, or 57 percent of the total federal
allocation, to be distributed to the schools.
Once the LEAs are granted authority to distribute funds, it
appears that Florida districts use variable criteria to determine
school-level allocations. Some districts, such as Hillsborough,
distribute a flat amount of $500 for each child who is eligible to
receive free and reduced-price lunch, regardless of total school
poverty or grade level. Other districts, such as Palm Beach, appear
to distribute $259 per student for schools with 50 percent to 60
percent eligibility, $324 for schools that are between 61
percent and 75 percent eligible, $389 for schools that are between
75 percent and 90 percent eligible, and $486 for schools with more
than 90 percent of their students eligible for free and
In fact, there does not appear to be any discernible pattern in
the amounts of school-level distributions in Florida. The
smallest amount distributed per student was $142 in Putnam County,
and the largest amount was $1,044 in St. John's County.
Title I, Part A Funds: Results vs.
Having shown how Title I, Part A funds are calculated for each
state and how they are to be distributed to districts and
schools, it is necessary to examine whether the current Title I
system is the most appropriate way to provide compensatory
education funding to assist disadvantaged students. The system's
complexity and variability make it difficult for the public to
determine how well the federal government is directing resources to
the intended beneficiaries.
At a minimum, a state's Title I allocation should have some
relationship to the number of students living below poverty in the
state. To account for the differences in cost of living between
states, the federal government uses the state per-pupil
expenditure. To prevent great variability, the government then
limits the SPPE differences between 32 percent and 48 percent of
the U.S. average.
However, Chart 1 suggests that there is much disparity between
the states without regard for need. Students in some of the less
populated states, such as Vermont or Wyoming, receive, on average,
over $3,000 per child. Quite a few of the more populated states, on
the other hand, receive less than $1,200 per child. As a result of
these inconsistencies, some states receive 250 percent of the
amount per pupil that other states receive.
The greatest causes of this variability are the hold-harmless
and small-state provisions. Consequently, some states with a higher
number of disadvantaged students, such as Kentucky, Mississippi, or
Missouri, actually receive substantially less per child than others
receive. In addition, when poverty shifts from one
state to another, the funds take several years to follow.
For example, the Title I program apparently is intended to focus
funds where the greatest concentrations of poverty levels are
located. Thus, there should be higher funding per student in states
with higher percentages of children living in poverty.
However, Chart 1 disputes this contention as well. New Hampshire
has one of the lowest rates of poverty at 5.2 percent and one of
the highest amounts of Title I funds per student: $2,294. Arkansas
is just the opposite: Nearly 22 percent of its children are living
in poverty, while the per-student amount is only $1,185. One can
argue the merits of the concentration of poverty approach, but
the law does not appear to be having the effect that the law
intended, at least at the state level.
In addition to the great disparity at the federal and state
levels, districts are given discretion over the distribution of
their federal funds. The intention here is to allow districts the
flexibility to use funds in the most effective way for their given
set of circumstances. It would seem that more funds would be
directed at schools with higher percentages of low-income students,
or at least at schools with the lowest performance.
However, Chart 2 suggests no clear pattern in Florida. From a
concentration of poverty perspective, the highest per-pupil school
allocation is for schools with between 70 percent and 80 percent of
students qualifying for free or reduced-price lunch, not the
highest levels of poverty. More interesting is that the pattern of
per-pupil amounts by school performance is counterintuitive.
Florida administers a yearly standardized test, the FCAT, and
grades schools based on the results. Schools with the lowest grade,
"F," had the lowest average per-pupil amount of federal funds,
while the "B" schools had the highest.
What Congress Should
Because American taxpayers spend approximately $13 billion on
the Title I program-and hundreds of billions of dollars on K-12
public education all told-it is important that education funding be
spent in an appropriate manner and that policies are designed
to minimize waste, fraud, and abuse. Excessive complexity only
opens the door to error and makes mismanagement more easily
Yet Congress, over many decades, has continued to add layer upon
layer to Title I so that it is implemented in a manner that is
different from the original legislative intention. Moreover, the
program's complexity increases the challenge of fiscal
accountability and allows only a few people to understand the
For example, the current system of formula grants has become
increasingly difficult to understand and implement, and this
in turn has augmented the bureaucratic and administrative costs of
implementation. The result has been that less funding reaches the
program's intended beneficiaries: disadvantaged students and the
schools they attend. Moreover, this complexity has led to great
variance in the amount of funding that is provided to local
communities across the country relative to their population of
disadvantaged students, and the system's increasing bureaucratic
complexity has clouded transparency and public understanding,
thereby undermining accountability for the largest federal K-12
Title I should therefore be reformed to achieve greater
transparency and a more student-centered approach. Specifically,
- Simplify the Title I delivery system and return to the
basic rationale of student-centered compensatory
education. The current system of Title I delivery should
be streamlined and refocused on the original goal of compensatory
education: providing additional funding to meet the needs of
disadvantaged and low-income students. This can be done by
transforming the four current Title I program grants into a single,
simple formula that provides funds based on the number of
low-income students in each state.
- Use a clear, student-centered calculation to set a
per-pupil allocation amount. This would avoid the
complexities of ratable reductions. The dollar amount per student
could be a straightforward reflection of the total appropriation
divided by the number of eligible students. This
amount-approximately $1,000 per student, or 10 percent of the
national average per-pupil expenditure-could then be weighted by
cost of living differences across states or regions. Moreover, this
streamlined approach would greatly improve policymakers' and the
public's understanding of the program and allow for better future
projections of funds.
- Allow states the flexibility to fund the student, not
the system. Congress should allow states the flexibility
to transform their current Title I delivery systems in a manner
that would more directly fund the individual student, including
allowing portability of the student's per-pupil allocation to the
school of choice.
In the course of eight reauthorizations, Title I has accumulated
great bureaucratic complexity. The program's funding formulas have
become increasingly complex and obscure.
Today, the distribution of funds through the Title I program is
characterized by unintended variability. There is little or no
relationship between a district's demographics and the amount of
money received for compensatory education aid assistance.
Moreover, because the current funding formula reserves too much
funding for administrative costs, less money is available for
Congress should (1) reform the Title I program to return to the
original student-centered goal of compensatory education; (2)
streamline the funding formula to use a simple per-pupil allocation
to improve transparency; and (3) allow states to implement
simplified student-centered funding that provides aid more directly
to students, thereby allowing greater portability and school
Susan L. Aud, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow with the Milton and
Rose D. Friedman Foundation and teaches doctoral-level quantitative
methods courses as a professorial lecturer at the Paul H. Nitze
School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University. Her research has been focused predominately on K-12
public education fiscal policy, as well as the competitive and
efficiency effects of school choice on the public school system.
Dr. Aud received her Ph.D. from George Mason University and
her MBA in finance from George Washington University.